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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the transformation of "Native Authorities" 
into local government bodies in a British Protectorate. The setting 
is "the Pearl of Africa", popularly known as Uganda. The study is 
concerned with British "Indirect Local Rule" and Administration from 
1900-1962. Its prime interest is to detail Britain’s colonial record 
and its legacy. It sets out the legal framework within which the 
indigenous political institutions were recognised and employed by 
the Protecting Power as "mouth organs" and agencies through which 
British Officers carried out their administrative, judicial and 
legislative powers; examines the transformation of some of the 
indigenous procedures and ideas about justice, taxation and local 
administration generally, and highlights the success or otherwise', 
as the case may be, of these reform efforts. To this end, attention 
is focussed on the evolution of local government units - the District 
Councils, the. Chiefly system of justice, the local revenue system, and 
the central-local relations. The idea is, firstly, to present a lucid 
portrait of each of these institutions, and secondly, to appraise the 
Protectorate's Devolution policy and its ramifications vis-a-vis the 
development of "an efficient and democratic system of local government" 
before and after Independence.
I
It is found that the move towards democratic decentralisation was always, 
Government policy not withstanding, viewed with suspicion and occasionally 
impeded and blocked by officers whose main concern was the "a massing of 
revenue" and administrative efficiency. It is, indeed, arguable that the 
post-war emphasis on the Devolution of Power was, to some extent, incompatible 
with the general tenets of Imperialism and Colonial overrule.
It is interesting to note, however, that, since 1962, the Nationalists-led 
Administrations have, without exception, tended to view local autonomy 
in much the same way, and virtually, through similar spectacles as their 
British counterparts before them. They, too, have adopted a paternalistic 
attitude towards autonomous local institutions,and, as a corollary they 
have, so far, underdeveloped them. Yet, the absence of a viable system 
of local government has been, in the eyes of some discerning observers, 
the main stumbling block to many statecraft oriented programmes. It is 
argued that local government is the strongest link between the centre and 
the periphery and, that the failure to involve it in the processes of 
economic and political development is a flagrant waste of the nation's 
scarce resources. The be]far that this is the case is rapidly gaining 
ground and, there are many positive signs, in the attitude of some 
government circles, that the era of the negative approach to local 
government is at an end. It is believed that the key to future policy 
is to be found in the development of "free and independent" local 
government institutions.
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1CHAPTER ONE
1.1.1. THE BRITISH COLONIAL LEGACY
In the late 1950s, towards the beginning of the end of British
colonial rule in'Africa, the pro-empire lobby was concerned that
"Britain’s colonial record was too little known and too little
understood", both at home and abroad. ^ It was felt that the
anti-colonial lobby’s propaganda was well publicised, but, that
the Colonial Governments’ good work was not, and were, therefore,
most anxious "to clear away the clouds of misunderstanding and
prejudice that [had] gathered round the very idea of colonial 
.. 2
government , and many were not unwilling to re-write the
colonial record. To that end, the "Corona Library book series",
the aim of which was"to present a contemporary portrait, at once
3
reliable and attractive, of each territory" was conceived and
e
the first tome published in 1960, with a Forward by
Sir Winston S.Churchill, the relevant part of which forms the
basis of this introduction and reads as follows:
"There has been no lack of critics, at home and abroad, 
to belittle Britain's colonial achievement and to impugn 
her motives. But the record confounds them.
Look where you will, you will find that the British have 
ended wars, put a stop to savage customs, opened churches, 
schools and hospitals, built railways, roads and harbours 
and developed the natural resources of the Countries so 
as to mitigate the almost universal, desperate poverty. 
They have given freely in money and materials and in the 
services of a devoted band of civil servants; yet no tax 
is imposed upon any of the Colonial peoples that is not 
spent by their own governments on projects for their own 
good.
I write "their own government" advisedly, for however 
much diverse conditions may necessitate different 
approaches, the British have for long had one goal in 
view for their overseas territories; their ultimate 
development into nations freely associated with the 
Commonwealth framework. The present state of the 
Commonwealth is the proof of the sincerity of this 
policy." 4
1. Churchill, Sir Winston, Spencer, Forward, 
Ingrams, H., Uganda, London H.M.S.O. 1960.
2. Ibid., p.l.
3. Ibid., p.l.
4. Ibid., p.l.
It is ironic that these platitudes were written by "the leader 
of the diehards of the 1930s11 - the geralissimo of the most
illiberal colonial policies of the interwar years - and one 
reputed to have said that he did not become "His Majesty's 
first minister to preside over the dismemberment of the 
British Empire". ^ Churchill's reactionary colonial policies 
and his unflinching loyalty to the minority white community in 
Eastern Africa are well documented and well known. And so, 
too is his influence over British Colonial policy, over a long 
period of time.^ By 1960 however, Churchill's time and tone 
were rather different, and only his bitterest critics, with long 
memories would have doubted his sincerity. "For a more constructive
g
phase in Colonial development" was well under way: and a new
5. Emerey, Julian, interview on. "Channel Four". End of Empire, 
3.6.85. Indeed on his return to Downing Street, in 1951, 
Churchill was incensed by Labour's Colonial policy that he 
sought, unsuccessfully, to block the Gold Coast's progress 
towards independence. He believed that the Colony's 
achievement of Independence would set a bad example, in 
West Africa and the rest of Africa. Despite this setback, 
however, Churchill' remained uryielding. He thus, obstinately 
refused to accept that the British Empire was on its last 
legs, so much so that he secured the services of an 
architect to plan a more grand Colonial office and "took 
particular interest in the design, stressing the need for 
an imposing audience chamber in which the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies could receive the prime ministers 
and chiefs, princes and emirs of The Empire, together 
with their usually considerable retinues". Vide Brian 
Lapping, End of Empire, Granada Publishing, London,1985,
p.16. This too, however, failed. The anti-imperialist 
forces were irresistible; the imperial brakes could no 
longer hold.
6. See for example, Bennett,G., Settlers and Politics in
Kenya, in History of East Africa, Harlow,V., and Chilver,E.M., 
(Eds.) O.U.P. 1976, Vol II p.295; Wrigly,C.C., Kenya: The 
Patterns of Economic Life, 1902-45, in Harlow, Supra.
7. Winston Churchill's Parliamentary career spanned 65 years.
He was a minister for over 25 years, holding most of the 
principal offices of state, including Admiralty, Air,
Colonies and the Treasury. He served in the Cabinet
of every leading statesman of his time and was Prime 
Minister for eight years and eight months - three months 
less than Asquith, the longest-serving Prime Minister in 
war and peace in this century. Vide, Sir Harold Wilson,
A Prime Minister on Prime Ministers. Book Club Associates, 
London, 1977, pp 239-276. Thus Churchill's influence over 
matters colonial, can hardly be overemphasised.
8. Creech-Jones, A., The Labour Party and Colonial Policy,
1945 - 51, in New Fabian Colonial Essays, Creech-Jones,A.,
(ed.) The Hogarth Press, London, 1959, p.19.
3African millennium was in sight. This - I960 - was, aftea: all, 
the year of Africa. The preceding decades had seen a 
bewildering succession of momentous events, including the rise 
of the Osagyefo - the Redeemer, (the African Napoleon), and 
the demise of the British Raj; some sixteen states became 
independent, sovereign states in 1960, and. many more were soon 
to follow. The future of the Colonial peoples looked bilight. 
Indeed, leaving aside Churchill’s rhetoric- flourishes, Britain's 
colonial record, particularly the decolonization programme was, 
at the time, more than remarkable.
The anti-colonial lobby had successfully challenged
"the older notions of colonial possessions,had exposed, 
what abuses and exploitation it found in many territories, 
had analysed and spotlighted the squalid waste and human 
Wretchedness . in many colonies and had unsettled the public 
mind. The war cry of the Allies had been 1 freedom' and 
'democracy' authoritarianism and political domination had 
been denounced. The propaganda had been infectious and 
had spurred on the Colonial peoples to forego many of 
their Immediate wants." 9
Moreover, "a Labour Government had been widely acclaimed as 
offering to the Colonies the prospect of a hopeful period of 
political advance, economic improvement and social welfare."^* 
The wind of change was utterly irresistable; the evolution of 
the new Commonwealth was slowly, but surely, unfolding: some
9. Creech-Jones, op.cit. p. 19
10. That the Labour Party was critical of Britain's colonial
record, is well-known; that it was less expansionist is 
equally well-known, yet, some of its leaders were not
always so disposed. Thus Malcolm MacDonald, the Labour
Colonial Secretary in the British National Government of 
1938, reassured the House of Commons in the following pro­
empire terms :-
Tt may take generations, or even centuries for the peoples 
in some parts of the Colonial Empire to achieve self- 
government. But it is a major part of our policy, even 
among the most backward peoples in Africa to teach them 
always to be able to stand a little more on their feet," 
Hansard, 7 December,1938, quoted by Michael Crowder,(Ed.) 
The Cambridge History of Africa,C.U.P. 1984,Vol.8.p.4. 
Worse, a decade later, Herbert Morrison, Labour's Deputy 
Leader, was of the view that to give African Colonies 
independence would be "like giving a child of ten a latch­
key, a bank account and shotgun".' Quoted by Brian Lapping 
in his, End of Empire, op.cit. p.15. Thus the rhetoric of 
some Labour Leaders has to be read with caution.
4colonies, most notably, India, Ceylon and Ghana, strove for,
and, as already mentioned, achieved 'Uhuru' in 1947 and 1957
respectively. "A few isreconcilables remained,” ^  however.
The old guard were still rehearsing and extolling the virtues
of the British Empire and asserting, somewhat emphatically,
that Britain was handing over power to ”men of straw of whom
12
in a few years, no trace will remain."
Such arguments were, however, no longer tenable. It was the 
turn of the critics of the Empire to call the tune. They
were^to vary the metaphor, on d  winning wicket . The British 
Empire was slowly but inexorably coming to a glorious end, and 
its demise- seemd to herald a new age.
Today, barely a generation on, and incidentally, one hundred 
years on since the Conference of Berlin in 1885, the promised 
millennium ushered in by the epoch making decolonization processes of 
the 1960s has not*materialised* The cheering and the celebrations 
which greeted the nascent nationalist "redeemers" have long since 
ceased. ' The former have been replaced by sulkiness, sullenness 
and tears; the latter have, almost everywhere, been deposed 
and succeeded by the men in Khaki uniforms; and once again, 
the omens for the most of Africa are full of foreboding. And 
Churchill's critics can, mutatis mutandis,and with tongue in 
cheek, quote his celebrated, but ill-fated words, noted earlier, 
with approval.
"Look where you will, you will find [the terrible trinity: 
disease,, hunger and ignorance prevalent everywhere ; you 
will find that most Independence Constitutions have been 
abrogated and replaced by home spun military decrees; 
that the hastily assembled political institutions have 
been jetisoned and the pre-independence fragile democracies 
dismantled; that the ballot box has been replaced by the 
barrel of the gun and, that the corridors of power are 
now thronged by .the gens de guerre;the sergeants, majors, 
colonels and generals]. The present state of the [new] 
Commonwealth is the proof of the lack of that policy 
alluded to in Churchill's statement mentioned above? 12a
11. McIntyre, W.D., Colonies into Commonwealth,
Blandford Press, London 1968, p.206.
12. Ibid. 206.
12a This is a rearrangement of Churchill's Forward quoted earlier.
5The new regimes, like their colonial predecessors are largely 
undemocratic, extremely autocratic, repressive, paternalistic 
and are mostly based on brute force. So, what has gone wrong? 
Or rather more pertinently, why did sucessive British 
Governments, in Churchill's ardentia verba, "grant power to 
men of straw of whom in a few years no trace [wouldl remain."? 
Some of the answers are easy and suggest themselves, but others 
are not. The latter are hard to grasp, they are controversial 
and need unravelling, and that is the main task of this short 
introduction.
1.1.2. THE CONCEPT OF READINESS FOR INDEPENDENCE
That there is a direct correlation between British tutelage, or
rather the lack of it, and the post colonial state of affairs
in Africa is generally acknowledged. That, that state of affairs
is a corollary aadanecessary concomitant, however, is not always,
rather astonishingly, appreciated, nor, indeed, generally
accepted. The problem, in a nutshell, is purely semantic:
it revolves around the colonial peoples "lack of preparedness"
13
or readiness for independence. The latest restatement of this 
problem runs as follows
13. See Dudley, B.J., Decolonization and the Problems of 
Independence* in The Cambridge History of East Africa 
Vol.8, Crowder,M., (ed). C.U.P. Cambridge, 1984, p.93. 
Shaffer, B.B., The concept of preparation - some 
questions about the transfer of Systems of Government, 
World Politics, 1965, p.18.
Mazrui,A., Edmund Burke and reflections on the revolution 
in the Congo, in Mazrui, On heroes and Uhuru-worship : 
Essays on independent Africa. London,1967,p .3-18.
Cooper, H., Political Preparedness for Self-Government, 
The Annals of the American Academy, July, 1956,
Vol. CCCVI p. 71 - 77.
Cutting, E.B.B., Fitness to Govern - Letters to the 
Editor, The Economist, December 24. 1960 p.1306.
6‘‘The global changes which followed the end of the 
Second World War made independence for the various 
African States inevitable. It might be argued, 
however, that though independence was inevitable, 
these States were little prepared to cope with the 
numerous problems which went with the granting of a 
Sovereign status. But such argument could be mis­
leading, because of the ambiguity inherent in the 
notion of "preparedness". On the other [SIC] hand, 
the argument about lack of preparedness could be 
taken to mean that the colonial authorities, by 
their various policies, failed to create the conditions 
necessary for the assumption of Sovereign ty. On the 
other hand, the argument about lack of preparedness 
could be taken to mean that the African people were 
themselves unprepared for independence, implying that 
they were, in some sense, incapable of self- 
government ." 14
Of course, "the notion of lack of preparedness could", in 
accordance with the humpty-dumpty principle, "be taken to mean" 
all that and, even worse. That is beside the point, however.
The important question is whether the concept of preparedness 
can withstand such a construction and retain its original and 
true meaning? In other words: Does the concept of preparedness
have a fixed meaning, or does its meaning vary according to the 
height, or, for that matter, the weight of individuals who, at 
any given time, are in the business of interpreting and applying 
it? That is the question.
Most of the argument shorn of its inference, is, of course, 
unquestionable. There is ample evidence to sustain it. That 
the "African peoples were not prepared for independence" in the 
light of the available evidence, few would deny: it is worth
remembering that the indigenous "agitators" were excluded from 
Colonial Governments; many were kept in prisons or banished 
into exile; and few had ministerial experience on the eve of 
independence* That to date, their post colonial record has had 
no redeeming features is equally undeniable. That, pari passu, 
that means that they are "incapable of governing" is, however, 
untenable, partly because such an inference is a non-sequitur, 
and partly because it equates "lack of preparedness" with lack 
of ability to govern, and such reasoning would, if extended 
elsewhere lead to some absurdities. Thus, for example, Britain's 
failure to create the necessary conditions for the assumption of
14. Dudley, op. cit., p. 93.
7Sovereignty, according to this thinking, would be attributable 
to Britain's incapacity so to do. Yet, nothing could be farther 
from the truth.
Worse, the inference at issue, can be criticised on other grounds.
It is too personal and idiosyncratic. Furthermore, it begs the 
question as to why the Colonial peoples were "unprepared" for 
independence; and it is reminiscent of the 19th Century 
European table talk about the "Dark Continent" and all that; 
it dwells on the symptoms rather than the causes, and indeed, 
the whole argument is tautologous and circular. It also 
erroneously assumes that the existence of some sort of "preparation" 
policy, and that, the rhetoric to the contrary not withstanding, 
is far from clear.^
Did the Colonial office have a policy on the preparation of its 
charges for independence?- Such a policy, if it existed was, 
until the eve of independence, a well guarded secret; one would 
need a micro-electronic microscope to find such a policy in the 
interwar years for example. True the idea of trusteeship 
envisaged, at some unspecific future date, some kind of self- 
government - dominion status - within the British Empire, of 
course, but that is a different matter altogether. Even here, 
however, the colonial policy makers were, until the early 1940s, 
rather reticent, indeed, even at this late hour, they needed
16
some prompting from the "Allies", particularly the Americans.
Be that as it may, some indication that the British Government
intended to honour its trusteeship obligations was given by
the Secretary of State for the Colonies In the House of Commons
in July 1942. "We are pledged", he said, "to guide Colonial
people along the road to self-government within the framework
1 [J
of the British Empire." 1 Some years later, the Colonial 
Office uncharacteristically, went public and made the same point 
in the following terms:-
15. Yet another ground for criticising Dudley's inference is 
that it is arbitrary, and as such may be said to be based
on personal feelings, or even on whims, caprice er prejudice.
16. Louis', Riy imperialism at Bay,'- Oxford " Press.. 1977.
17. Cmd. 7167 (1947)-The Colonial Empire, 1938-1947. HMSO London,p .15.
8"The central purpose of British policy is simple. It is 
to guide the Colonial territories to responsible self- 
government within the Commonwealth in conditions that 
ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of 
living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.
But though the policy is clear enough, the problems to ^g 
be overcome in carrying it out are numerous and complex.
That, at any rate, was the theory; the practice as this study 
clearly demonstrates, was another matter, indeed, that much is 
to be gathered from the "policy statement" itself. And, assuming 
that that was the "agreed" policy - the man on the spot, not 
infrequently, had the last word on these matters - its execution 
would, for the reasons noted below, have required the skills of 
a tight-rope walker.
Furthermore, it would appear that these policy pronouncements 
were actually aimed at Asia, Ceylon and India, in particular, 
rather than British Tropical Africa. Thus Malcolm MacDonald, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, informed the House of 
Commons- on December 7, 1938, that:
"It may take generations, or even, centuries, for the 
peoples in. some parts of the colonial empire to achieve 
self-government* But it is a major part of our policy, 
even among the most backward peoples of Africa, to teach 
them always to be able to stand a little more on their 
own feet." 19.
So far, so worse, what is worst, is that this statement was 
actually made to placate the minister's critics, and not as a 
statement of policy for immediate implementation. It sets out 
the Government's long term policy objectives. Indeed, it 
envisages, in the case of Africa, an almost illimitable period 
of continued trusteeship. Self-government was reckoned in terms 
of centuries; independence, not at all. This sheltered calm, 
however, did not emerge from the 1939-1945 European barbarous 
war unscathed. The war's impact on the political and constitutional 
developments in the colonies can hardly be over emphasised.
18. Cmd. 7433 (1948) The Colonial Empire 1948 HMSO London p.l.
19. See, Hansard, December 7, 1938.
9It "awakened new hopes, released new influences of "freedom"
and "adventure", "new adjustments in tempo,, relations, and
purpose", ushered in "a more constructive trusteeship", and
thus brought "new conceptions of the responsibilities and
functions of government" in the forefront of British Colonial
policy. As a Colonial Office chronicler put it, "the warr
had a profound effect on political growth in the colonies", the
Colonial Office and the empire generally. It brought in a
,20
"flood of adverse criticism- which, in turn, begot a plethora 
of counter arguments and so was born the so-called "preparation" 
theory of which the following excerpt will serve as an example.
"Reference has already been made to advances in local 
government in certain of the African Territories. The 
encouragement of local political interest and the 
building up of a system of efficient and democratic 
local government is a cardinal feature of British policy 
in Africa. It is now recognised that the political 
progress of these territories is dependent on the 
development of responsibility in local government, 
that without sound local government a democratic 
political system at the Centre is not possible, and 
that, if social services are to be built - and 
expanded, there must be efficient organs of local 
government directly representative of the people to 
operate and control them. Everywhere, local 
government bodies are assuming larger financial 
responsibility and playing an increasing part in the 
control of local services such as primary schools, road 
construction and maintenance, sanitation etc. Local 
civil services are being organised and trained, and 
in these and on the native administrations themselves 
younger and better educated men are increasingly making 
their presence felt. Indirect rule has become more 
elastic, with the people exercising greater responsibility 
and the System adjusted to carry new duties and strains.
In all the African Territories this evolution is 
proceeding under the guidance of the district staffs .... 
The basis of sound local government is being laid and 
the African people are slowly manning the positions of 
trust in local services and in Government itself." 21.
In fact, much of this was no more that a regogitation of Creech- 
JonesT despatch on local government much of which had yet to be 
implemented in almost all of the African Territories. Besides, 
it is one thing to formulate a policy, it is another to carry 
it out.
20. Cmd. 7167 (1948) London. H.M.S.O. p.15.
21. and. 7167 (1948) tUid., p. 37.
10
It Is also important to remember that the "Colonies [were]
22
not governed from Whitehall". The Colonial Secretary,
in spite of his enormous constitutional powers, could not 
impose his wishes on "tbs*unwilling nabobs of Co!lon±al 
governments in Africa. Creech—Jones, the Colonial Secretary 
in the 1945-1951 Labour Government justified his failure to 
implement the Labour Party’s Colonial policies in the 
following terms:
"Before we discuss the work of. the Labour Government 
we should be clear as to what is meant by ’Colonial 
Policy* and whether, in the light of British Colonial 
practice, Socialism can be applied in the Colonies 
by London. In theory, the Secretary of State ... can 
exercise full authority over a dependency .... In 
practice, though little used, powers of delay, reservation 
and disallowance are preserved in the Governor. .. The 
Governor is the Servant of the Secretary of State, 
however, much he may serve his Executive and legislature: 
normally he exercises great influence in the territory.
But the British Government is reluctant to impose its 
will or policy on the local inhabitants and therefore 
the Secretary of State generally proceeds in a territory 
by persuasion and consent.
Thus in practice, a Socialist Secretary of State is limited 
in his exercise of authority. His powers to^export 
"socialism" to a colony are very limited." 23
Additionally, it should not be overlooked that British colonies
were of "Infinite variety and that ministers in London [could]
24
not readily ignore their characteristic features", nor
indeed, the advice of colonial governments. Thus, the working
out and application of policy [depended] indisputably on "the 
25
man on the spot". It follows, therefore, that whereas London 
could propose, the Governor, and for that matter the district 
officer, some three hundred miles away from the Colony’s capital, 
could dispose. And, invariably did. This of course, does not 
discount the existence of some sort of "preparation" theory, it 
merely goes to show that that policy, if such existed, was not 
easy to execute; and partly explains why such broad policy 
statements were rare in the interwar years.
22. Cmd. 7433.ibid. p. 3.
23. Creech-Jones, A., The Labour Party and Colonial Policy, 
1945-51, in New Fabian Colonial Essays. A.Creech-Jones (ed). 
The Hogarth Press, London, 1959 20-21.
24. Ibid. p. 21
25. Ibid. p.24.
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Moving from the general to the particular, the devolution of
power in Uganda, the first clear intimation appeared in 1954,
barely six years before the arrival of self-government, does
not tally with the existence, of the "preparation” theory. Uganda1s
count-down to independence is instructive. The plan for the
Protectorate’s move towards self-government was announced on
the 23rd February, 1954. The Colonial Secretary told the
House of Commons that "the long-term aim of H.M.Government [was]
to build the Protectorate into a self-governing State”, and
rather ominously added that "when the time for self-government
eventually comes, H.M.Government will wish to be satisfied that
the rights of minority communities .... are properly safe-
2 6
guarded in the Constitution."
Shortly afterwards, in accordance with this clear statement of
policy, the Governor announced that he was "anxious that members
of the public should-be more associated than they are at
27
present in the formulation and execution of policy", and
proceeded to make some changes regarding the Executive and 
Legislative.Councils of the Central Protectorate Government 
"as an immediate step forward to implement H.M.Government1 s 
policy of constitutional development" for the Protectorate
* i 28as a whole.
Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, the Governor 
proposed the introduction of a ministerial system of government.
The Executive Council was to consist of 14 members: nine 
officials, six or seven of them with Ministerial status: seven 
members of the public of whom five would be Africans, were to 
be invited to join the Government and to- sit on the Government 
side of the Legislative Council: of these five Ministers,two -
one African, and one other - would have full executive 
responsibility under the Governor for groups of departments.
26. Cmd. 9320 (1954) Uganda Protectorate:-..Bugaiida. p. 17. ■«
27. Ibid., p. 17.
28. Ibid., p. 3.
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Additionally, there were to be two African Parliamentary-
Secretaries. The Legislative Council was to be slightly enlarged,
to permit increased African representation for Buganda, Busoga and
29
one other district yet un-named. These changes, the Governor
hoped would lead to "a responsible Government answerable to an
30
elected Legislature of the whole Protectorate..," he also 
expected them to remain un-changed for the next eight years. He 
thus wrote:
"In order that a period of stability may be secured 
for the country, I would propose that no major changes 
in the above Constitutional arrangements should be made 
for six years from the date of the introduction of these 
arrangements, if approved by H.M.Government, and that; 
assuming these arrangements are introduced in 1955, the 
position should be reviewed early in 1961, with a view 
to introducing any changes that are then agreed at the 
beginning of the life of the new Legislative Council 
which will come into being early in 1962." 31
The Governor’s "preparation" plan thus envisaged a long period of 
political education, a period long enough to enable the new 
peoples' leaders to learn the rudiments of "Self-goverment" within 
the British Empire. This, as it happened, however, was not to be; 
fate ordained otherwise. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending 
on your point of view, the Governor’s proposed training programme 
was sabotaged, and mortally wounded by ^external forces and his 
disengagement plan telescoped and squeezed into a few years rather 
than centuries as originally conceived. The controlling power, in 
the face of internal and external pressures and criticism, cut and 
ran, leaving the uninitiated raw probationers to complete their 
political education without their colonial masters,. The "guidance" 
began and ended with the first lesson: 1957 saw the first general 
elections, 1961 ushered, in "self-government", 1962 brought political 
independence and thus brought both British tutelage and British 
Colonial rule to an abrupt end.. That these changes at the Centre 
do not entirely support the "preparation" theorists, is self-evident 
that they were too little and too late is equally trite, and can 
hardly be over emphasised. Such, however, was the preparation for
29. Cmd. 9320 (1954) Appendix B: Statement by the Governor.
30. Ibid., p.17.
31. Ibid., p.19.
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independence. The action taken in the realm of "local government", the
development of which was "a cardinal feature of British policy in 
32
Africa", ~and which provides much of the substance of this thesis, 
is equally revealing.
The record tells of attempts to transform "Native Authorities" 
into "Local Governments",, on the Westminster model, of course, the 
development of "Native Councils" and the maintenance of law and 
order, the financing of British local and central administrations 
and clearly shows, despite the official rhetoric to the contrary, 
that there was no co-ordinated "preparation" policy, that that 
policy, if one existed, was unstructured and unenthusiastically 
implemented; if anything it was sacrificed at the altar of "efficiency" 
which though understandable, was, in many ways, diametrically opposed 
to the policy under consideration. It effectively denied the people 
to have "a hands on" experience of "self-government"; public 
participation in local government was, as in the case of central 
government, introduced in the last few years of colonial rule; and 
even then, district councillors had no policy making powers, they 
were simply central government policy executioners. In sum, Native 
Administration, or Indirect Rule as it was sometimes called had 
nothing to do with the colonial peoples' advancement towards 
political independence, let alone "self-government"; at any rate, 
not in the 19th Century.
"Ask different officials", wrote one shrewd observer,
"what is [Native] Administration? And you will get 
different answers .... The general idea will be that 
it is to hear cases and to get revenue for the 
Government". 33
The colonial authorities thus did not "prepare" their charges for 
independence. The most revealing testimony of this, however, lies 
barely hidden in the non-existence of an education policy in the 
interwar years; unless,of course, that ipso facto, was the policy 
itselfI
32. Cmd. 7167 (1948) p.37.
33. Stiand,C.H., Administration in Tropical Africa Up to 1914,
London, 19i4, p.60. quoted by Shaffer,op.cit. at pp.59-60.
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1.1.3. . SOME COLONIAL DILEMMAS
The importance of "Native education" vis-a-vis the "preparation"
theory is undisputed, indeed, it was a pre requisite and, by all
accounts, should have been its core and its essential ingredient,
but, alas! it was neither - it did not form part of it. In fact,
"Native education" was, for the most part of colonial rule, the
34
exclusive preserve of the Mission Societies - the Colonial
authorities were otherwise engaged. The reasons for this are not
far to seek; a cursory glance at the origins of British Colonial
rule in Africa is illuminating; the motives were selfish rather
than altruistic in nature.. It is of vital importance that this
background is properly understood, by all the parties engaged in
this debate, for herein lies the criterion against which the policy
under consideration should be tested; the basic assumptions behind
some of the main arguments for and against the policy are based and
derived from this background. The vexed question is: Why did the
British venture into tropical Africa? The simple answer, to this
singularly enormous question and, one which is usually de-emphasised,
is that the British went to Africa in search, of raw.materials and,
markets for their wares and manufacturers and nothing else. In turn,
this led to slave trading and the "Scramble for Africa" and the
Conference of Berlin, in 1885, a little over a century ago, and so
began the British Tropical African Empire. Again, it is pertinent
35to enquire what caused the Scramble for Africa? Again, interestingly 
enough, the reasons for "scrambling" had nothing to do with Africa's 
interests - the scramblers were solely actuated by national Interests,
34. Cmd. 2374 (1928) Education Policy in British Africa: Memorandum 
submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the 
Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical 
African Dependencies,, p.3. In part, the Memo random states:
"As a result on the one hand of the economic development of
the African dependencies, which has placed larger revenues 
at the disposal of the Administrations, and on the other hand 
of the fuller recognition of the principle that the controlling 
power is responsible as trustee for the moral advancement of the 
native population, the Governments of these territories are 
taking an increasing interest and participation in native 
education, which up to recent years, has been largely left to 
the Mission Societies".
35. See, for example, McIntyre op.cit, passim.
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viz, prestige, commercial and strategic considerations. Yet
the advancement of commerce, Christianity and civilization was
given as the raison detre for scrambling. And such has been the
propaganda that to suggest otherwise is, in certain quarters,
tantamount to sacrilege. A close examination of the relevant
literature however, suggests, that the motive for "Scrambling
was European and not African centred - Africa was merely a stage
on which European rivalry and power games were played out. The
dramatis personae, to continue the metaphor, of scene one were
commercial companies in the pursuit of "a quick buck" for their
shareholders: Carl Peter's Society for German Colonization, 1884;
Sir George Goldie's Royal Niger Company, 1886; Sir William Mackinnon's
Imperial East Africa Company, 1888; and 1 Cecil Rhodes' British
South Africa Company, 1889, are examples of such pioneering companies;
and all had one feature in common, the paramount importance of the
36
company promoters' interests. .The "private' ' commercialism" of 
the Congo International Association and the exploitation of the "Congo 
Free State", now the Republic of Zaire, vividly illustrate the 
companies' modus operandi.
It is often alleged, however, that one of Britain's motives in 
granting charters to private entrepreneurs was the advancement of 
civilization including Christianity; and that her subsequent
37entanglement, in tropical Africa is the proof of that policy objective.
It would appear, however, that, that too, is a post facto rationalization,
for the old empire building heroes were, at times., at a loss to find 
their way in the African jungle.
Thus in 1890, Lord Salisbury, "who was responsible for adding more 
colouring to the map of African than any one", told the House of 
Lords that:-
"We have had a fierce conflict over the possession 
of a lake whose name I am afraid I cannot pronounce
correctly There are indeed great doubts as to
whether it is a lake at all or only a bed of rushes?
36. Hobson, J., Imperialism, London 1902, quoted by McIntyre op.cit.p.253
37. McIntyre, op.cit p. 146
38. Quoted by McIntyre, op.cit. p. 252.
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Here, the main interest was to raise the Union Jack on one of 
the ’’rushes", or the nearest molehill, declare the area British 
territory and, at once and for all, exclude the other European 
rivals. In this scheme of things, the interests of the indigenous 
people were, more often than not, of secondary importance, and it 
is against this background that British tutelage, and per force,
Britain’s colonial education policy or rather the lack of it, must 
be discussed. Clearly, if the spread of civilization was the prime 
mover of British imperialism in Africa, a liberal "native" 
educational programme would have been, most naturally, its hand­
maiden; if not,, its pith. Yet, as noted above, and as the 
following material shows, the colonial governments in "British 
Tropical Africa, did not, for a long time, have "an interest in
native education" which up to the 1930s was in the hands of
39
missionary bodies. Indeed, the Colonial Governments had no 
policy on "native education". The first tentative steps towards 
a common colonial educational policy were made in November 1923 
when, the Duke of Devonshire, the Colonial- Secretary, established 
and detailed an Advisory Committee:
"To advise the Secretary of State on any matters 
of Native Education in the* British Colonies and 
Protectorates in Tropical Africa and to assist 
him in advancing the progress of education in those 
Colonies and Protectorates." 40
The Advisory Committee spent the next 18 months, "engaged upon the
examination of educational activities in all the Colonies",
particularly Ghana,. Nigeria and Uganda and submitted its findings
to the Secretary of State, in March 1925; and, having come to
the. conclusion that the time was long overdue for "some public
statement of principles and policy" for the guidance, inter alia,
of the "missionary bodies who are playing such a large part in
41
educational activities", the Committee recommended the establishment,
in each Dependency, of "Advisory Boards of Education, Educational
Committees, a System of grants-in-aid, a thorough System of inspection
and supervision; Elementary, Secondary 1 Technical and Vocational
Schools and Institutions" of higher learning, and advised the
42
Colonial Secretary accordingly and urged him to publicize 
these suggestions" forthwith as a Parliamentary Paper ... as there
39. Gmd. 2374 (1925) op.cit., p.3.
40. Ibid., p.2..(Terms of Reference)
41. Ibid., p.12.
42. Ibid., p.3-7.
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is growing interest in the problems with which it deals in
Parliament and in educational circles in this Country as well 
43
as in Africa." So, "Native education", which under normal
circumstances would have been the key to the "moral advancement
44
of the native population", and arguably a pre requisite of
the so-called "preparation" theory, was still in an embryonic 
state in almost all of the British Colonies in Africa in 1925. 
The position in Uganda, described below, was not un typical.
"Education in this country is carried out by 
the various missionary societies who receive 
a small Government grant for this purpose.
There is little or no co-ordination between 
the various Societies and the standard of 
education is low. There is no doubt that the 
time has come when there must be formulated for 
Uganda, a definite educational policy. There 
is nothing of the sort at present, and except in 
regard to technical training at the Government 
College of Makerere, we have cast the whole 
burden of responsibility on the shoulders of 
the missionary bodies in consideration of some 
moderate financial grants. It is an economical 
method, of course, but I am not sure whether it 
is justified. The missionary bodies, without 
any co-ordination between the various denominations 
are turning out vast numbers of children all over 
the Country with only the most rudimentary 
knowledgewhich can be of no practical advantage 
to them after life." [sic.J. 45
The excerpt speaks for itself; it needs no explanation, save to 
say that it enlisted a favourable response from the Government of 
which the following extract deserves mention:
"While splendid work has been done in the past, and 
is now being done by the missionary societies ... 
the arrangement as it stands, is by no manner 
of means adequate to the educational requirements 
of the Country. Too long, indeed, has government, 
owing to financial limitations shelved its 
responsibilities in the matter of native education.
It is the opinion, unanimously held that Government 
must enter the educational field and set up without 
further delay an educational department. Fortunately, 
the present finances of the Country permit of such 
action: the money can be found from the £50,000
which was hypothecated as an annual charge from
43. Ctad..-2374 op.cit. p.3.
44. Ibid., p .2.
45. C.O. 536/134/27292 Report on Native Education.7.6.1924
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which to meet war liabilities - an.obligation 
from which we are now temporarily released.” 46
Indeed, the provision of education by the missionary societies, 
left much to be desired and can be criticised on several grounds. 
Not unnaturally, it was too catechetic, too liberal, and for 
reasons beyond their control - too under financed - and was, 
therefore too pre-o'ccupied with literal skills'so thatr the 
catechumen could imbibe the lessons of the Bible and the Songs 
of Praise; incidentally, the bulk of indigenous Roman Catholics 
were not allowed to read the Bible; in those days, the Bible 
was one of the books on the index liborum prohibituml Some 
of these converts went on to become colonial government clerks 
interpreters and territorial chiefs and with that, the Colonial 
Governments were well satisfied - that was all they needed.
"No large demand for technical skills was envisaged, 
owing to the conception of the colonies as purveyors 
of raw materials and food stuffs produced by uneducated 
peasants. Adapted to the purposes of forming clerks, 
ministers of religion and latter officials, the 
educational institutions in Colonial Africa laid stress 
on literacy studies, and neglected industrial and 
commercial training, not to speak of the agricultural, 
shunned by everybody and stigmatised by the notion 
that anything to do with the cultivation of the soil 
is fit only for a poor and illiterate rustic." 47
These strictures were confounded by the official attitude towards 
"an educated-African", a euphemism for a "westernised" non- 
European. Such a "native" was not infrequently looked upon with 
some suspicion and was invariably regarded as a "nuisance" 
and a potential trouble-maker* Thus, for example, Dr. Akiiki 
Nyabongo’s academic reference, from his tutor at Queens College, 
Oxford contains the following passage:
46. C.O. 536/134/27292. op.cit. Governor to Secretary of State.
47. Andreski, S., The African Predicament, Michael Joseph, 
London, 1968, p.204.
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"There is no doubt that he is an intelligent
and pleasant person. Some idea of what goes
on in his brain beneath his black woolly hair 
can be had from his books. The one which I 
have read : "Africa Answers Back" is a curious 
defence of polygamy. He is probably clever 
enough to be useful as a friend and a nuisance 
as an enemy, and I hope that, your advisers 
will consider his request for employment 
carefully." 48
In similar vein, is the following extract from The Report on the
Committee on Police Terms of Service, 1942, quoted by Mugo Gatheru,
in his "Child of Two Worlds" ; it readsi-
"The evidence submitted to us indicates that, 
in general, the illiterate African makes a better 
policeman than a literate African* The latter is 
less amenable to discipline and is reluctant to 
undertake the menial tasks which sometimes fall 
to the lot of the ordinary constables. That 
being so^ . it seems to us that the policy of 
recruiting literates should be pursued with 
great caution, and that no special inducements 
by way of salary are necessary. In fact, we 
venture to go so far as to recommend the abolition 
of literacy allowance for new entrants." 49
The legacy of this policy, to the post-colonial law and order 
agencies, particularly the police and the armed forces, is too 
well-known to be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say that it is 
yet another nail in the coffin of the so-called "preparation" 
theory. The effect of all this, of course, was that the 
Colonial Governments could not, even if they wanted to, "prepare 
the illiterate natives" to operate the semi-English political and 
economic institutions without an English operators' manual in hand 
an English .education, which, as noted above, was at a premium.
Even those who could afford to send their sons abroad in search 
of that illusive commodity, were not always successful, however. 
Their aspirations and good intentions were, through sheer 
prejudice and bigotry, not always understood and were occasionally 
deliberately misconstrued.
48, C.O. 536 / 214 / 40005/38. Rev.John Wilson to Secretary of State
49. Mugo Gatheru, Child of Two Worlds, Heinemann Educational 
Books, London 1973, p.94.
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"There can be no doubt that, in their present 
state of development, it is very undesirable 
for natives to come to this or other countries 
for education^ On the other hand, as the 
Governor points out, it is difficult, in view 
of the absence of educational facilities in 
Uganda, to refuse permission - altogether." 50
Why, it may be asked, was it "undesirable for natives to come
to this or other countries for educatiorir? There were,in fact,
many reasons for this; firstly, many officials felt that "the
granting of such an honour to young men [was] likely to render
them less amenable to advice and instruction on their return",
secondly, others were "anxious to limit to this Country the
52
exodus of these youths"; thirdly, it was thought by some, 
that "in many cases", the desire for foreign travel was 
actually, actuated by some base non-academic considerations. Thus 
Gowers told the Secretary of State for the Colonies that:-
"A second point, which must be clearly understood 
at the outset, is that the motive which stimulates 
young men from this Protectorate of the age of 18 - 
30 years to visit countries outside Eastern Africa 
is, in many cases, not the desire for a high education 
and improvement of the mind and character by study, 
which is usually alleged.
Hr. Cannon Weatherhead judged George, the son of 
Mukama of Toro and Omulagira Suna who stayed with 
him for one year in a report to the Governement 
thus :
"In my own mind there is no shadow of doubt that 
those two young men’s thoughts in coming to England 
were set first of all on new sexual experiences 
with English girls." 53
Accordingly, the Secretary of State was, owing, to the absence of 
local institutions of higher education and in view of the fact that 
it was- difficult to refuse to issue passports to these youths, . 
advised that:-
50.C.0. 536/119/3310. Conf. of 30.5.1922. Natives Proceeding 
Abroad for Education: Bartterbee1s-Minute 13.7.22.
51.C.0. 536/139/3287. Education of Native Youths Outside E.A. 
Gowers to Secretary of State. Conf. of 8.3.1926.
52.C.0. 536/119/3310. loc. cit. Bottomley’s minute of 9.8.1922.
53.C.0. 536/139/3278. op.cit.
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"After the fullest consideration I would support 
the view held by Sr Geoffrey Archer that educational 
institutions of Ceylon afford the least objectionable 
solution to the difficulty." 54
Fourthly, it was feared, contrary to conventional wisdom, that 
foreign travel would "do the native youth more- harm than good," 
presumably, because, as Croyndon put it: "It will generally 
be the case that the position of the individual on his return 
will be very difficult, that he will find it impossible to 
maintain in his tribal environment the level of thought and style 
of living he has acquired, and that all his education will not, 
in practice, help him to lead his backward fellow tribesmen along 
sound and wholesome lines of development." ^
In fact, all this, including the preceding reasons, was official 
gobbledygook for "political" expediency, which was the real reason 
for the proposed embargo on foreign travel and was spelt out by 
Croyndon himself in his dispatch to the Colonial Secretary, the 
relevant part of which was as follows
"The arguments for and against the advanced education of 
individuals among the native tribes have been so 
frequently rehearsed that I should not dwell on them 
here. I need only say that. I regard anything in the 
nature of a university course for isolated individuals 
drawn from the tribes of this Protectorate with grave 
misgivings. I regard with special anxiety a desire 
which has become more marked of late, on the part of 
certain chiefs ... to send their sons to America and 
notably to the great institution at Tuskegee, for 
education. Although it may perhaps be considered 
that such bodies as the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association, and the African Countries League are 
scarcely at present formidable political organisations,
I consider it advisable to avoid as far as possible 
anything that may facilitate communication between 
the leaders of such movements and young natives of 
this Protectorate. There is no doubt that leaders 
of Negro Political aspirations in the Southern 
States would eagerly seize an opportunity for 
influencing and helping to educate sons of chiefs of 
this Protectorate." 56
54. C.O. 536/139/3287. op.cit. Gowers to Secretary of State.
55. C.O. 536/119/3310. op.cit. Croyndon to Secretary of State.
56. C.O. 536/119/33310.
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Thus, "the absence of educational facilities" the details of
which are examined above, was not, as is usually alleged, due
to lack of financial resources - of course, it "would [have]
been an expensive matter"; but, it could, as Reed reminded his
58
colleagues at the Colonial Office, "be done," nor indeed,
was it, as the preceding official reasoning vividly shows, due
to lack of policy on "Native education". On the contrary, it
was Government policy, to leave "the burden of [native education]
; on the shoulders of the missionary bodies in consideration of
59
t some moderate financial grants."
j
I
[ This, of course, is a simple overview of a very complex situation;
| it is offered here as an example, the moral of which is that the
; simultaneous building and dismantling of an empire was a herculean
task; and not, as a definite explanation of the un-preparedness 
! of the two sides - the Colonial, authorities and the Colonial peoples -
| to grant and to take independence respectively.
57. C.O. 536/119/33310 op.cit.
! 58. Ibid., vide, Reed’s minute of 20.7.22.
59. C.O.536/134/27292 Hussey’s Report on Native Education, 1924.
The sums given to the missionary bodies to provide education 
facilities were not only meagre but erratic; a random sample 
in the early years of the Protectorate reads as follows
In 1909, the Church Missionary Society received £300; the White 
Fathers, £300, and the Mill Hill Mission, £100 
(C.O. 536/30/33163). In 1912 the sums were £100; £750 and 
£100. (C.O. 536/53/33217 and in 1916 the figures were £850,
£300 and £100 respectively.
In 1936 the amount of money spent by the Government on native 
education per head of school children was, a mere 6 shillings. 
Vide, Hinden, Rita, Plan for Africa, George Allen & Unwin, 
London 1941, p. 107.
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The "native education" issue is one of those dilemmas conjured 
up by the Colonial authorities - "to which ambiguities, as well
as conflicts of purpose and the limits of manoeuvre, condemned
/ 60 
the makers of Colonial policy during the interwar years."
Sometimes the right hand did not know what the left hand was
doing. As Professor McIntyre poignantly points out:
"Boththe British Empire and the Commonwealth got lost 
in Africa. The great continent turned out to be a maze 
into which adventurers and idealists, private enterprize 
and government, white supremacists and Pan-Negrists 
entered, mingled and lost their direction." 61
"Thus", he adds, "in Africa the empire and the commonwealth met
62
their greatest crises and produced their most puzzling paradoxes."
The question of-"native edudation". alluded to above Wes'; one of
those catch 22 situations; the others - the economic, social and
political have been x. most ably dealt with elsewhere and need
63
not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to note that all told,
they makej'.grim reading. The portrait that emerges, though un­
attractive, shows that the processes of empire building and 
decolonization were inherently incompatible, relegates the 
preparation theory to the lumber room and, confounds, its advocates, 
puts Britain*s Colonial record in its proper perspective, and shows 
that there were no heroics. Nearly all the colonial dilemmas, 
despite the rhetoric to the contrary, were invariably resolved in 
favour of the colonial power and always at the colonial peoples' 
expense. Thus, though some "statesmen were unusually frank in 
their admissions that they were lost in Africa, the empire-builders
themselves usually resorted to official cliches about advancing
64
"Commercial, Christianity and Civilization." In fact,"the 
policy appears to have been to amass revenue at any cost, and to 
cut down expenses to breaking point."
60. Robinson,K., The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, OUP. 1965 p.75.
61. McIntyre,W.D., Colonies into Commonwealth, Blandford Press, 
London, 1968, p. 251.
62. McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, lot.cit., p.251
63. Vide, Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, loc.cit.
64. McIntyre, loc.cit., p. 253.
65. C.O. 536/4/11, Private and Confidential, Sir Frederick Jackson 
to the Secretary of State, 19.7.1911.
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Such was the policy and, to be sure, it had a long pedigree.
In fact, in the case of Uganda, such a policy way first advocated 
as early as 1893, by Sir Gerald Portal. It was subsequently 
reaffirmed by the Colonial Office, in July 1899, and from the 
British point of view, was the centre-piece of the Anglo- 
Buganda Agreement of 1900. And, though it, at a stroke, solved 
the basic issue of financing the Protectorate, it had, it is 
argued, a deleteriou-seffect on the future, of local government 
finance. It meant that the central Colonial authorities were 
the sole beneficiaries of all the tax revenues gathered within 
the Protectorate and that the"Native Authorities", the precursors 
of local government, were for their sustenance dependent on 
Central Government hand outs.
Briefly stated, the question was, how was the Empire to be 
financed, and who was to pick up the bill - the British, or 
the "Native" taxpayer? Given the three intentions, set out 
above, there could only be one answer, of course I The 
Colonial authorities had other ideas, however; they decided 
that the "natives" should carry the "Whitemans* burden" and 
proceeded to impose murderous tax rates, with, as we shall 
see, some unfortunate results, and it is against this ,
background that the establishment of British rule and the 
concomitant apparatus is to be considered.
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1.2.1. THE FOUNDATION OF THE UGANDA PROTECTORATE
Although British interest in Uganda, particularly the Kingdom
66
of Buganda, has been traced back to 1863, it was not until
1900 that the first steps for the introduction of a civil
administration, as opposed to military occupation, may be
said to have commenced. For it was in that year that
67
Sir Harry H.Johnston* on behalf of the British Government,
concluded a treaty, the "Uganda Agreement", 1900, with the
people of Buganda, that inaugurated sixty two years of British
68
over rule and administration.
Under the Agreement, the traditional chiefs were recognised
as the de jure "Local Authorities" through whom the Protectorate
Agents were to exercise their jurisdiction. Thus the Kabaka was
to exercise ’direct rule’ over his people "through the Lukiko„
or native council, and through others of his officers in the
69
manner approved by Her Majesty’s Government". The Commissioner, 
and subsequently the Governor, was vested with "a benign authority" 
to advise the chiefs in the administration of their districts and 
to impose taxation for the maintenance of his staff and its 
attendant machinery. ^  Johnston's settlement thus envisaged 
a two-tier system of Government, the Protectorate Administration 
and the Kabaka's Government.' The latter, which was subordinate 
to the former, was based on Buganda’s autochthonous institutions, 
the essential features of which have been summarised as follows:-
In the old days the Kabaka of Buganda was the Supreme 
Ruler of his people, assisted by his various chiefs 
from the Katikiro (or Prime Minister) , down to the 
lowest "Mutongole" chief. The Kabaka alone had the 
inherent right to sit on the throne of the Kingdom 
of Buganda and to appoint his chiefs from the biggest 
to the lowest, over whom, along with the rest of his 
subjects, he had the power of life and death. The 
administration of the Country, although not based 
on civilised principles, was carried out by these
66. Thomas,H.B., and Scott, R., Uganda.OUP 1935 p.3.
67. F.O. 2/200, Salisbury to Johnston. 1.7.1899.
68. Uganda Agreement, 1900, (was signed on 10.3.1900)
69. Ibid., Article 6.
70. Uganda National Archives, SMP 119/09, Minute dated 8.7.07.
71. Ibid., Vide, Deputy Commissioner’s minute.
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chiefs in a most efficient manner. Each chief 
had to obey his immediate superior from the 
lowest of the rank up to the Katikiro. The 
Kabaka's wishes which were always considered 
as commands, were communicated to his subjects 
through these properly organised channels of 
his chiefs and in this way a recognised form 
of Government was carried out by these chiefs.
It is not surprising therefore that in drawing 
up the Uganda Agreement, after the first five 
formal clauses, Sir Harry Johnston should give 
prominence to the Constitution of the Native 
Government of Buganda Kingdom. 1 Z
Thus, Buganda's political system was, according to the Kabaka,
"highly developed',' and though the Kabaka may have overstated
his case, there is little doubt that the British were mesmerised
by Buganda's traditional institutions. More importantly, however,
they found Buganda's institutions tailor-made for their immediate
needs and wasted no time in exploiting them.. In particular, the
Foreign Office was anxious to relieve the British taxpayer of the
Uganda expense and their strategy was, in the first instance, to
rely on local staff and to raise revenue through native- taxation.
Johnston was thus enjoined to pay special regard to questions of
"Native taxation and the establishment of a self supporting
73
administration".
Indeed, the very idea to establish a Protectorate over the Country
74
was solely dictated by monetary and fiscal consideration. And 
it was this pre-occupation with these issues that gave rise to 
many of the questions with which this study is concerned.
Johnson's Agreement with Buganda was followed three months' later 
by one with Toro and a year later, by one with Ankole. With minor 
modifications, the provisions of the latter Agreements>which were 
in similar terms ; were based on the Buganda model, and were 
afterwards applied to the non-treaty districts, and till the 
1955 Cohen Reforms, provided the general framework within which 
the Colonial power exercised its influence in these areas.
72. C.O. 536/211/4008/1 Daudichwa's Memo on the Constitution 
of Buganda.
73. F.O. 2/200, Hill to Johnston. 1.7.1900
74. C.7303 Africa No.2. (1894) Portal to Rosebery 1.11.1893.
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In this introductory note, an attempt is made, albeit in outline, 
to sketch out the arena and for this purpose, the year 1890 will 
serve as our point of departure. That year saw the signing of 
two important treaties: the Anglo-German Agreement and the
Uganda Agreement between the Imperial British East Africa 
Company and the illustrious Mwanga, the Kabaka of Buganda.
The former placed Buganda within the British sphere of influence, 
whilst the latter, despite its onarous terms, was the foundation 
of Buganda's autonomy, including its much coveted special 
relationship with the British Government.
1.2.2. LUGARD1S PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS
The events and circumstances which impelled the IBEA Company
to appoint Captain. Lugard* a relatively young army officer, to
head an ill-equipped expedition to Buganda, are sufficiently
clear and need not be rehearsed here.. Qf immediate interest
are the consequences of Lugard*s intervention, and in particular,
his treaties with the chiefs. The terms of which are detailed
below. Lugard arrived in Buganda in (o^-December 1890. He was
accompanied by Messrs. Fenwick de Win ton and William Grant, a
handful of troops and an old maxim, gun. His instructions were
according, to a contemporary observer, of the simplest kind, "to
guarantee peace" in Buganda. Before Lugard could do so,
however, he had to secure a peace treaty with Buganda's leaders,
76
aiid that, as he soon discovered, was no mean task. As Lugard 
put it, Mwanga, "still feared that sooner or later, he would 
have to pay for the murder of Bishop Hannington"; and not un­
naturally, he was suspicious "and most unwilling to sign any
77
treaty" or have any direct dealing with the "Wazungu".
Mwanga thus held out till he was literally "forced to sign" on 
the dotted line. Even then, he, apparently, refused to "agree
75. Jackson, Sir Frederick, Early Days in East Africa, 1930 p.262.
76. "It is the most difficult task that.I have undertaken in my
life, and no one can say yet whether it will end in peace
or war. I have some 300 natives all told, and two white men,
and very little ammunition." Lugard to Lt.Edward Lugard -
Lugard's Papers, Rhodes House, MSS. Brit.Emp. S.40.
77. Jackson, op.cit., p. 262.
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in writing that it' was absolute." Indeed Mwanga did not formally
adopt the treaty until he was satisfied that Lugard was genuine
and as he represented himself, H.M.Representative; and though,
the latter was a fraudulent misrepresentation, it had the desired
effect. Lugard1s credentials were accordingly accepted and his
79
treaty duly confirmed on 31st March 1891.
Lugard1 s treaty which was said to be for two years did not ,
uncharacteristically, involve any transfer of land or executive
powers to the Company or their chief representative. It merely
defined the rights and duties of the parties. Thus, for example,
Mwanga was required to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Company
80
in return for their protection. To this end, the Company
undertook to promote Buganda’s civilisation and commerce; to
81
introduce a civil system of government and adminsitration, and
82to secpre to it the blessings of peace and prosperity.
With the Company’s status thus confirmed and its position
regularised, Lugard turned his attention to the second, and,
undoubtedly, the most important part of his mission, namely, the*
establishment of "industrial missions" and the "prosecution of 
83
lucrative trade". His searching inquiries, however, soon
disclosed that Buganda’s potential as a commercial centre had
been greatly overstated. It was, for the first time, discovered
for example, that Buganda’s natural resources were-very limited
indeed. To his surprise, Lugard found that there were hardly any
suitable articles for export, and that, ’’with transport at £200
a ton to the coast,there was no incentive to grow and gather
articles for e x p o r t . A n d  as Lugard put it, "without exports
85
there would be no import trade." Still, Lugard believed that
Buganda was invaluable to the Company, and had no hesitation in
recommending its retention. He thus told the. Company’s directors 
that:
78. Lugard, F., Rhodes House, Oxford; Lugard to Brayne, n.d.
79. C.6555 (1892) Lugard’s Report, p.110.
80 Clause 1
81. Clause 2
82. Ibid
83. Lugard’s Diaries, op.cit. p.170.
84. Lugard’s Report, p.101
85. Ibid., pp. 101-102.
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"As regards the value of [Buganda] to the Company 
I hold the opinion, which seems to me to be shared 
alike by the English and French missionaries, the 
Germans and Messrs. Jackson and Gedge, that [Buganda] 
per se, has been much overrated. At present there 
appears to be few or no products suitable for 
exportation except ivory, and that almost entirely 
comes from the tributary states. Nor can the Country 
I understand, supply much labour for the construction 
of public works. The recent wars have decimated the 
population, and at presets:, and for a long time hence, 
the labour must remain a monopoly of the King and 
Chiefs.
Uganda however, as a road to the territories lying 
towards Albert Nyanza, must always remain an important 
acquisition, and if the Country can repay part of the 
money expended on it, the outlay will not be wasted-." 86
In the meantime, emphasis was to be laid on retail trading and income
taxation, in furtherance of which the Company was urged to dispatch
"one or two Indian traders, notably a Pursee; and a considerable
87amount of specie", including rupees, anna and pice," thus ; ■? 
facilitating the early Introduction of a civilised system of shop- . 
keeping, trading!coinage and personal taxation.. This, Xugard. 
hoped would turn Kampala into a m£j>or industrial centre. From 
here, the Company"s Agent would direct his commercial activities 
in the surrounding territories such as Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga,
Toro and the Southern Sudan. Having thus outlined the company’s 
future prospects in Buganda, Lugard proceeded to prepare for his 
treck to the west, the object of which was to bring the Katwe 
Salt Works under the company’s control and management, and needless-' 
to say, exploitation for their own benefit.
86. Lugard's Report, op.cit., p. 101 
87 Ibid., p. 101.
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1.2.3. LUGARD'S TREK TO THE FOOT OF MT. RWENZORI
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that Lugard's match to the
Western frontier was enterprising and venturesome . Of course
Lugard was fully aware of the enormity of the task before him,
save that he does not appear to have appreciated the consequences
of his proposed action. He was preoccupied with the acquisition
of the Katwe Salt Lake, "the gold field of this part of Africa",
the possession of which was, in Lugard's own words, "of the very
88
greatest importance to the Company". Indeed, that was the
star prize. Of immediate importance, however, was to enlist
"Major" Selim Bey and his troops, thus securing some most valuable
recruits to the Company's service in Buganda and the adjoining
territories that Lugard hoped to bring under the protection of 
89
the Company. Here Lugard would establish trade centres, forts,
garrisons and stockades, the primary object being "to divert the
trade of those countries from passing into the German Protectorate";
to prevent the importation "of firearms and powder from the south
into Buganda, and the "opening up of a connection between the two
90
lakes Victoria and Albert*" Moreover, the annexation of this
whole region would form and provide "a valuable base of operations
91
against Unyoro and that hostile country." Having formed this
plan, Lugard's intention was now "to proceed to Ankole in the
endeavour to meet and make a Treaty with Ntali, the independent
King of that Country, and bring those territories under the
92
Company's protection." As it happened, however, King Ntare
was averse to Lusgard's advances and his "amiable farce of treaty- 
93
making". Hence, on arrival in Ankole, Lugard's efforts to
94
contact Ntare were "met with delay and excuses."
t
It is difficult to know what lay behind Ntare's reluctance to
receive Lugard at his Court, since it is reported that he "sent
presents and the strongest professions of friendship", that he
"preferred the British to any other Europeans", and that "he was
95
delighted to have come under their rule and not the Germans."
88. Lugard's Report op.cit.p.120 
89 Ibid., p. 120
90. Ibid.,rp.114 *
91. Ibid., p.114
92. Ibid., p.114
93. Thruston, A.B., Africa Incidents, London 1910, p.170.
94. loc-.cit. -p. 119.
95. Ibid., p.119.
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Yet, he declined to meet their accredited representative!
Lugard thought that Ntare was either "in mortal fear of seeing
a white man" or that "he feared the strength of the expedition",^
and that Ntare was "too fat to walk" - his Capital lay some 40
97miles away from Lugard1s temporary camp at Nyabushozi.
Whether in fact, this was the case has yet to be proved.
Lugard's rationalisation lacks colloborative evidence and is to
be read subject to Portal's critical remarks vis-a-vis the
former's reports to the Company's directors set out below.
Indeed, it would appear that Ntare's stance was not dictated by
98
his "mortal fear of a white man". On the contrary, his conduct,
cunning protestations of friendship and contemptuous presents of
sheep rather than the traditional hamitic cows suggest otherwise.
Ntare seems to have been an independent minded traditional ruler
in the real sense of the word. He acknowledged no higher power,
his position, unlike that of his counterparts, such as Mwanga,
for example, was fairly secure, and arguably, was in no hurry to
enter into an alliance with any foreign power, including the
mighty IBEA Company. Ntare had no good reason to leave his
Capital for Nyabushozi to meet some, unknown self-styled "protector",
and so it was that he detailed a small delegation, headed by "a
99
small boy of the most prepossessing appearance" to meet the 
hapless traveller, render him assistance and, if need be, escort 
him to the borderland. On arrival, Ntare's emissaries were
well received by the unsuspecting Lugard "and much pleased them 
by going through the full native ceremony of blood-brotherhood."
96. LugarU's Reports op.cit. p.119
97. Ibid., p.119
98. Ibid. p.119. _
99. Lugard's Report, p.119.
100. Alternatively, Ntare might have been a more resourceful 
diplomat than his critics have been prepared to admit.
It is possible, for example, that he was not unwilling to 
see Lugard do much of the running before being entertained 
at Ntare's court.
101. Lugard's Report, loc.cit., p.119
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With blood brotherhood and treaty making behind him, and unaware
that young Birere was, in fact, not Ntare*s son, Lugard resumed
his trek westwards and reached Lake Katwe on July 15. Here, he
built a huge fort, Fort George, and made it * impregnable to 
102
savages'. This, Lugard hoped would make it extremely
difficult for the Barasura, Kabarega's warriors to recapture
103
this much valued salt mine" the possession of which was
essential to the future success of the Company. Lugard had no
104
doubt that it would "bring in substantial returns," for salt 
was interchangeable for all the Country's products including 
ivory, cattle and £ood stuffs. Lake Katwe, he maintained, was 
with the exception of "the most fabulously rich quartz, of more 
value than would be a gold mine in the same locality."'^'* Whilst 
Lugard might have overstated the case, there is little doubt that 
the possession of the Katwe Salt works, was invaluable to the 
Company. And before embarking on his march*therefore, Lugard 
had to ensure that the whole of this area was impregnable and 
in the hands of a loyal and dependable agent- Accordingly, he 
decided to reinstate Kasagama as King of Toro in return for 
the following undertakings.
Xi) that Toro and all its dependencies, including 
Busongora and Bukonjo were entirely under the 
suzerainty of the British Company;
(ii) that he would obey the orders and instructions 
of the Resident in all matters whatsoever.
(iii) that he would do all in his power to prevent 
the importation of arms and powder into his 
Country or through it into other countries in 
the British Sphere of influence.
(iv) that no Europeans would be allowed to settle 
in his territories without the consent and 
approval of the Company.
102. Lugard*s Diaries, op.cit., p.239
103. Ibid., p. 252
104. Lugard's Report, p. 120-121.
105. Lugard's Diaries Vol.II, p.253.
106. Lugard's Diaries, Vol. II p. 287.
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(v) that all arms in Toro would be brought to the Company’s
Agent for registration and license, and that no arms should 
be held by anyone without his knowledge and sanction.
(vi) that he would recognise the Company's exclusive right to 
kill the Country’s elephants, that he would pay, at the 
direction of the Company’s Agent, the expenses for the 
building of forts, garrisons and stockades, and that the 
expenses for the Country’s development, and improvements 
should be defrayed out of the finances and resources of 
the Country.
(vii) that he would outlaw slave trading and raiding and endeavour 
to prevent his subjects from slave raiding in other 
countries and importing them into his Country.
With "the occupation of Toro un fait accompli", Lugard resumed his
trek to Kavalli. Here, he made contact with Selim Bey and his
troops, and without much difficulty, enlisted them in the service
of the Company and hurried back to Kampala, where he arrived on
31 December 1891, only to find the Country on the verge, yet again,
of an internecine civil war. Wprse, however, he was informed by
the Company, that, for reasons beyond their control, he was "to
withdraw from Uganda and the lake districts and return to Mombasa"
107
at once.
108This, as Lugard put it, "was a thunderbolt indeed." "It is the
second time',' he angrily retorted, "that a long spell of hard work in
Africa has been ended by a reverse so complete that all my toil has
seeemed to be merely waste - and worse. This collapse will be
109
terrible in its results." Lugard was in a quandary: He was
107. MacKenzie to Lugard 10.8.91. See also McDermott to Lugard 10.8.91.
108. The Diaries, Vol.II p.475.
109. The results Lugard had in mind may be summarised as follows:
(i) There would be a complete annihilation of the Uganda 
mission.
(ii) The Mohammedans would "swoop down and mop up the R.Cs."
(iii) Lugard*s solemn pledges to "Yafeti and Kasagana" and 
others that the British would never retire, would be 
contraverted.
(iv) The Company’s withdrawal would deal a severe blow to 
British prestige, from which it would never recover.
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greatly worried about the proposed evacuation, and "terribly 
concerned what to do; and how to obey [his] orders and yet 
save the people whose lives [would] be sacrificed for their 
trust in [us] if we [were] to leave them in the lurch.
"The whole matter',1 he concluded, was "a terrible pity".
As it happened, however, the calamity was averted, albeit temporarily. 
Unknown to Lugard, the Board's instructions "to retrench and retire" 
had already been countermanded and superceded by fresh orders under 
which the Company was to maintain its position until 31 December 1892.
In the event, however, Lugard decided to return home and campaign
against the proposed evacuation. He arrived in London in October 1892
and Immediately joined forces with the Church Missionary Society
"in agitating the question of Government and public support
for the Company to enable them to carry out" their charter and
113
treaty obligations and commitments in Eastern Africa.
Consequently, "another tardy move forward was made by a strangely
114
apathetic Government", and Sir Gerald Portal, H.M. Counsul-
General at Zanzibar, was appointed Special Commissioner for Uganda, 
and detailed to inquire into the best means of dealing with the 
Country.
110. The Diaries,op.cit, p.476
111. Ibid., p. 476
112. Bentley's telegram,, dated 11.11.1891.
113. MacKenzie to Lugard 10.8,1891.
114.. Cook, Sir Albert R., Uganda Memories, The Uganda Society 
1945. p. 17.
115. Rosebery to Portal - 10.12.1892. In the meantime the
Company was to receive a substantial subvention to enable 
them to prolong the occupation till 31 March 1893.
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1.2.4. PORTAL’S MISSION TO UGANDA
With an adequate staff and escort, Portal’s caravan left
Zanzibar in January and reached Kampala in March, and on
1st April, 1893, having reviewed "the Company's so-called
administration", of the Country, Portal hauled down the
Company’s flag, hoisted the Union Jack and declared Uganda
116
A British Protectorate. Shortly/ . stated, Portal’s
contention was that the Company "after five years' fair 
trial have failed to fulfil the conditions of their Royal 
Charter and have forfeited their right to retain it, and the 
Charter should therefore be cancelled.
Portal's investigations, on the spot, revealed " a most hideous
state of complications with discontent and war barely hidden under 
118
the surface." In his view, the company’s administration, of
which so much was made in Lugard’s reports, hardly existed, and
evidently the same was true of the company’s establishments,
stations, forts and stores* Thus* according to Sir Gerald, the
Company’s"stations" and ’^ posts’’ of which much is made in the
Director’s letters or in their reports to shareholders", were 
119"a mere farce". The whole of the Company’s system of
administration was categorised as "a scandal"; and Lugard’s
120reports as "works of fiction".
"I find Williams, Eric Smith, Macdonald and the 
missionaries, all sitting in open-mouthed astonishment 
at Lugard's reports which, I fear must be read only as 
vivid works of fiction. I also fear that Macdonald’s 
long and very careful report will be read with something 
approaching to consternation by the public who have been 
so enthusiastically chanting Lugard’s praises. The 
general impression here is that the. man is off his head, 
and I should not wonder if this were the case." 121
116. Portal, Sir Gerald.H. The Mission to Uganda, Edward 
Arnold, London (1894) pp.5, 148 and 216.
117. MSS. AFR.S.109.(Rhodes House, Oxford) . Portal Papers 
Portal to J.R*Rodd. 31.3.1893.
118. MSS.AFR.S.109 Portal Papers (Rhodes House,Oxford). Portal 
to Rodd. 31.3.93.
119. Portal to Rosebery. 25.6.1893
120. Portal to Rodd. 31.3.1893.
121. Portal to Rodd. 31.3.1893.
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Portal’s solution was simple and straightforward: the
revocation of the Royal Charter and the establishment of a
122
protectorate over Buganda and its dependencies. Direct
British rule was considered but ruled out for purely financial 
reasons.
Portal's settlement envisioned the appointment of an "English 
123
Commissioner" to advise the Kabaka and his chiefs; to
ensure the safety of Europeans, to prevent and suppress
civil war or rebellion; whether religious or otherwise,
to collect taxes, and above all, to encourage Commerce and
124
European enterprise. However, neither the Commissioner or
any of his staff were to engage in any trade of any kind, either
125
on their own account or in the name of the Protectorate Government,
and all were not to interfere in Buganda’s internal affairs save
where Europeans or other foreign subjects were concerned, or in
cases of "gross cruelty", injustice, or slave—trading brought
126
to their attention. For it was felt that it would be impossible
to "combine administration and trade in. the same hands without loss 
127
of dignity." He, however, insisted that the Commissioner and
his staff should encourage independent and. private trade indirectly
128
but positively through generous tax allowances and exemptions.
ThistPortal believed, would facilitate the prosecution of "profitable
129
commerce" and "lucrative trade."
122. Portal’s Report. C. 7303 (Africa No.2. 1894) p.35.
123. Ibid.p.36.
124. Ibid., p .36.
125. Ibid., p.36.
126. Ibid., p.36.
127. Ibid., p.36
128. Ibid., p.36
129. Ibid., p.36. . :
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"There can be no doubt [he concluded] that, with a 
prospect of security and of equality of treatment, a very 
considerable trade with Uganda, Usoga, and the neighbouring 
countries may be rapidly developed. The ordinary customs 
revenue which may be derived from such trade will go some 
way, even at first, towards the expenses of the commissioner 
and his staff, while no one with any personal acquaintance 
with these people would hesitate to admit that with a less 
restricted trade, the native demand for European commodities, 
already considerable., will rapidly increase." 130
These measures were embodied into the Portal-Mwanga Provisional
Agreement of 29 May 1893 by which Great Britain promised to send
"An English Commissioner for Uganda and its Dependencies", while
Mwanga, "with the object of securing British protection, assistance
131and guidance, gave the following undertakings."
(i) that Her Majesty's Representative should have 
the sole jurisdiction over Europeans, or other 
foreigners resident in Buganda;
Cii) that no warlike operations or serious matters of
State including the appointment of chiefs, or other 
officials should be made without Her Majesty's 
Representative's consent and approval;
(iil) that he should be bound by all and every act and 
obligation to which Great Britain was a party;
(iv) that the assessment and collection of taxes and 
the disposal of all the receipts should be under 
the control of Her Majesty's Representative;
(v) that H.M.Government should be responsible for
the levying, for their own use, of export and import 
duties on all goods, the property of H.M*Government 
and its officers excepted, entering and leaving the 
Country;
(vi) that the conduct of Buganda's foreign affairs should 
be in the hands of the Commissioner, and that no 
treaties or agreements with Europeans should be 
entered into without his knowledge and concurrence;
(vii) that slave trading and slave-raiding should be 
abolished and outlawed.
130. Ibid., p. 36
131. Enclosure No.l. in Portal's Despatch of 29.5.1893
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In 1895,, having been adopted by his immediate successor,
Portal's treaty was confirmed by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, and, until its repeal, five years' later, was the basis
133
of British rule m  Buganda and its dependencies. In the early
years of the Protectorate, however, British administration was 
limited to Buganda, and in particular Kampala and its environs.
Indeed, the Foreign Office, conscious of the "Uganda expense", 
was strongly averse to any extension of British rule beyond 
Buganda's boundaries.
This, as it happened, however, soon proved inexpedient, and in 
consequence, on 3 July, 1896, the Protectorate was, by means of
a notice in the London Gazette, extended over all the Countries
. . . 134
within the British sphere of influence. It was not until
1920, however, that the limits of the Uganda Protectorate were 
finally determined, even then, there were large chunks of areas 
where, for a variety of reasons, the Commissioner's writ 
did not run. Be that as it may, for the purposes of this study, 
the rudiments of British administration, particularly the 
establishment of local government institutions, the main concern 
of this thesis, may be said to have commenced in 1900. It was in
that year that Sir Harry Johnston, H.M.Special Commissioner for the
135 136
Uganda Protectorate, effected the "Uganda Agreement" which,
though specifically tailormade for the Kingdom of Buganda, was 
subsequently used as a model instrument in fashioning local 
government bodies elsewhere in the Protectorate, with, as this 
study shows, some distastrous results, not least of which was the 
underdevelopment oif a modern system of local government and per force,, 
the political institutions at the local and national levels, the pre­
requisites of an efficient and democratic government.
132. Portal, Sir Gerald, The British Mission to Uganda, 1894.
133. F.O.C.P. 7620 Johnston to Salisbury, 12.3.1900.
134. London Gazette, 3.7.1896.
135. F.0. 2/200 Salisbury to Johnston 1.7.1899.
136. Revised Laws, 1951 Vol.VI p.12.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE "NATIVE AUTHORITIES" AND THEIR STATUS 
| ---------------------------------------------
I
I
| 2.1.1. THE ANGLO-BUGANDA SPECIAL RELATIONS
| The period between 1900 and 1955 is of special importance in the
evolution of local government institutions in Uganda. It was 
during this period that the British, albeit unwittingly, laid 
the foundations upon which the pre-Independence local government 
reforms were built. The new scheme, though somewhat different, 
retained much of its pre-European hue and characteristics. It 
is pertinent therefore, before examining the former, to allude to 
! the constitutional arrangements which evolved that structure. Of
interest here are the Agreements with the hereditary rulers of 
Ankole, Buganda and Toro, and the Uganda Order in Council, 1902. ^
As regards the "Native Agreements", the "Uganda Agreement, 1900", 
an agreement between Johnston and the Kabaka of.Buganda was, in 
Constitutional terms, of more significance than the others. It 
set out in detail, the status of the Kabaka, his recognition by
H.M.Government "as the Native Ruler of his people" (Under Her
Majesty's protection and overrule), over whom he was to exercise
"direct rule through the Lukiko and through others of his officers
2
in the manner approved by the Protectorate Government.
Similar arrangements were shortly afterwards incorporated into the
3
Toro and Ankole Agreements of 1900 and 1901 respectively and
though based on the Buganda Agreement, and in the eyes of the law 
• . 4
at par with it, the latter were nevertheless of less stature 
and were more often than not disregarded by their condescending 
authors with some interesting and sometimes unexpected results, 
not least of which was the emergence of three distinct forms of 
"local government authorities"; viz, the semi-autonomous government 
of Buganda, the "Native Governments" of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro,
4
I. London Gazette, 15,8.1902. Buganda Agreement.1900, Revised Laws 
(1951) Vol.VI p.12. Toro Agreement, 1900,Revised Laws (1951) 
Vol.VI pp.2-66, Ankole Agreement 1901.
2. Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 6.
3. Uganda Laws, Revised Edition (1951) Vol.VI p.2.
4. All "Native Agreements" were in fact,unenforceable at law.
5. Some examples will be cited below.
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and the "District Administrations" in the Eastern and Northern 
Districts where according to the "pioneers1, there were no 
hereditary chiefs, and per force no "Native Agreements". Here,
British rule was based on the Uganda Order in Council, 1902, 
but was, in practice, modelled on Buganda's traditional system, 
the main features of which were set out in the "Uganda Agreement,
1900,  ^ of which the main terms are set out below.
The terms of "this discussive and inelegantly worded document" 
were the product of several years of Anglo-Buganda Co-operation 
in the establishment of British hegemony over Buganda and her 
adjacent rivals, Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, and not surprisingly 
was mutually beneficial to both parties. Itvthus, on the one 
hand, left"into the hands of the British Government the right 
of taxation, the control over the land and the power of life and 
death", and on the other hand, set out in some detail,; the
status of the Kabaka, as the "Native.Ruler over his people", gave 
him the honorific title of His Highness", ^  granted him 350 square 
miles of private estates, guaranteed him a civil list of £1,500 per 
aimum^} and so set him above his counterparts in the Protectorate.
His Kingdom was, at the expense of Ankole and Bunyoro, in particular, 
vastly enlarged and its boundaries redrawn accordingly. In return, 
albeit not as a quid pro quo, the new Kingdom was subordinated to 
the Protectorate Government; ranked as one of the six provinces 
into which the British Protectorate was divided; and its tax revenue 
merged with that of the British Government and its future administrative 
organisation, including the Anglo-Buganda relations, set out in 
detail and definitively settled.
The Kabaka*s Government, as the Government of Buganda was sometimes
called, was mutatis mutandis allowed to retain most of its traditional
features save that there was a shift of power from the Kabaka to
12
the three Ministers of State particularly the Katikiro or the
6. Cd. 910 (1902) The Uganda Order in Council, 1900.
7. Uganda Laws, Revised Edition (1951) op.cit., p.12.
8. De Smith,S.A., Constitutional Monarchy in Buganda, Political 
Quarterly, London, 1955, Vol.26. p.5.
9. F.0. 2/200 Johnston to Salisbury 12.3.1900.
10.Ibid.
11.Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 6.
12..Ibid., Article 10.
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Prime Minister, who henceforth, were to transact most of the 
Kabaka*s Government. He was, in addition to his executive and 
judicial powers to be the Senior Regent and ex-Officio President 
of the Great Lukiko, or Native Assembly. The latter, which, in 
the old days, was no more than an occasional gathering of Buganda’s 
notables and dignitaries, under the chairmanship of the Kabaka, was 
though, still an amorphous body, regularised and its powers cut to
13. These changes relate to the purely Native Lukiko as opposed 
to the Baraza, an Official Council, set up by Wilson in 1895, 
and over which the "Chief Administrative Officer presided 
in conjunction with the Kabaka"; where- the administration 
transacted all its public business with the Kabaka1s 
Government and where affairs of moment dealt with by the 
Native Council were reviewed "in the presence and guidance 
of a Government Representative" (CO 536/1/7456, Wilson to 
S/S Despatch No. 26 of 6.2.1906). So, until this system 
was allowed to fall into desuetude, there were in Buganda 
two Councils to carry on the work of local government, 
the purely Native Council (in which "all native questions 
were dealt with, and the official Baraza", the functions 
of which as indicated above, were supplementary to the 
legislative and judicial functions of the Lukiko, the 
need for which was stated as follows:
In 1894, I was struck by the possibilities of the
National Lukiko  It possessed both legislative
and judicial functions. Its effective power, 
however, was totally vitiated by party feeling 
and the Kabaka lacked strong authority essential 
to overrule the discondant elements. In 1895, 
circumstances led me to consider what scheme would 
provide the necessary controlling power over the 
Council without creating jealous apprehension that 
we were aiming at relieving the chiefs of their 
legitimate responsibilities. I decided to supplement 
the purely Native Lukiko by an official council 
which was known as the Baraza, adopting a Swahili 
title to distinguish it from the other Native 
Council (Wilson to S/S C.O. 536/1/7456).
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Thus the Agreement provided that:
"In addition to the three native ministers, who shall be 
ex officio senior members of the Council, each chief of 
a county (twenty in all) shall be ex officio members 
of the Council. In addition, the Kabaka shall select 
from each County three notables whom he shall appoint 
during his pleasure, to be members of the Lukiko, or
Native Council. The Kabaka may also, in; addition to the
foregoing, appoint six other persons of importance in 
the Country to be members of the Native Council.” 18
Besides being the "Supreme Native Court of Justice", the Lukiko's 
main functions were to discuss all matters concerning Buganda’s 
internal affairs and to forward its resolutions to the Kabaka for 
further consideration and decision before giving them effect.
The Kabaka could not, however, implement such resolutions until 
he had further consulted with the Commissioner whose decision 
was final and conclusive. In this matter, the Kabaka was obliged
19
to "explicitly follow the advice of Her Majesty's representative,"
and failure to do so was, as is indicated below, a very serious matter
indeed.
Further, Buganda's land was divided into two main categories. Nearly
all the arable land was granted to the royal family, the three
Regents and the leading chiefs, whilst the remainder called, "waste
land" was duly appropriated for "the Crown on behalf of and in trust
20
for the Administration of the Protectorate of Uganda." The
protecting power, however, reserved "to itself the right to carry
through or construct roads, railways, canals, telegraphs, or other
useful public works, or to build military forts or works of defence
on any property, public or private", save that no more than 10 per cent
of the property in question would be sequestrated without adequate
compensation and that compensation would, in any event, be paid "for
21
the disturbance of growing crops or of buildings." Despite these
safeguards, however, Johnston’s land settlement raised a number of
18. Article 11
19. Ibid
20. Cd. 256 (1900) Africa No.6. p.14.
21 Article 11.
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thorny issues, not least of which was the introduction of the
idea of private property, the concept of which was alien to the
Baganda. Secondly, Johnston's land deal may be criticised for
allowing the chiefs to "feather their own nests" at the expense 
22
of the Bakopi." In future, the Bakopi, the bulk of the
indigenous population,. were in Johnston's words, to become 
"unprotected tenants of the British Government instead of 
serfs." 23
"But a far more important result ensued. Land was no 
longer held direct from the Kabaka, or by old Butaka 
claim, but became private property. The change was 
complete. Presented with these huge areas of land, 
some chiefs started to sell part of their holdings 
to non-natives, chiefly European. The practice 
became a serious menace to the Country for whenever 
a chief wanted ready money for a bicycle (motor cars 
had not been introduced in those days), a typewriter, 
or a suit of English clothes, it was easy to sell a 
part of his land. Had this been permitted to continue 
unchecked, a large proportion of the land would have 
been alienated away from its native inhabitants, so 
the Lukiko passed the Land Law of 1908, which, while 
it authorised the sale of land to natives within the 
Protectorate provided that the owner of a mailo 
could not hand over his land to a non-native, except 
with the consent of the Governor and the Lukiko." 24
From the constitutional view point, however, the Agreement's 
most important provision was Article 6, which vividly stated 
that the Kabaka was to be the Supreme ruler of his people, albeit 
subject to British Overrule and protection. It stipulated that:-
22. Cook, A.R., Uganda Memories. Entebbe, 1944, p.129.
Some have criticised Johnston for bribing the chiefs 
into signing the 1900 Agreement. In particular, reference 
should be made to his memo of 13.2. 1900.
23. FOCP 7620, Johnston to Salisbury, 12.3.1900.
24. Cook. op.cit. p.129
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"So long as the Kabaka, chiefs and people of 
Uganda shall .... co-operate loyally with Her 
Majesty's Government in the organisation and 
administration of the said Kingdom, Her Majesty's
Government agrees to recognise the Kabaka ....
as the native ruler of the province of Uganda 
under Her Majesty's protection and overrule .... 
and shall exercise direct rule over the natives 
to whom he shall administer justice through 
the Lukiko, and through others of his office 
in the manner approved by Her Majesty's 
Government." 25
The significance of this provision can hardly be over-emphasised
and its vagueness not withstanding, was always looked upon by
26
many a Muganda "with almost superstitious reverence."
Indeed-, the whole-Agreement was regarded as "a charter of rights",
almost a constitution reference to which could justify or condemn
27
"any Government action or proposed policy." The Agreement, in the
eyes of the Baganda was in fact a treaty covering the relations of
the parties to it, and like a Statute subject to strict verbal
interpretation. Its textual weaknesses and imprecision were turned
to good advantage and, in due course, the "text gradually became 
28dogma. " Yet, ironically, the Agreement was not legally binding, 
it was in the nature of a gentleman's agreement, binding in honour 
only. In any case, Article 20 provided for its unilateral annulment, 
albeit on certain conditions, by the protecting power. Article 20 
stated that:
"Should the Kabaka, chiefs and people of [Buganda],pursue at 
anytime, a policy which is distinctly disloyal to the British 
Protectorate Her Majesty's Government will no longer consider 
themselves bound by the terms of this Agreement." 29
Inter alia. This meant that the Governor could, with impunity, suspend 
or terminate the Agreement and substitute for it alternative arrangements
as he saw fit. Witness the Suspension, in 1905, of the Ankole
25. Article 6 of the Uganda Agreement, 1900.
26. C.O.536/195/40199, J.E.W.Flood's minute of 26. 10.1937.
27. Sir Frederick Mutesa II, The Discretion of My Kingdom, Constable
1967, p.62
28. Ibid., p.62
29. Article 20, The Uganda Agreement, 1900.
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30
Agreement, 1901. Be that as it may, the British like the
Baganda, had very good reasons for upholding the terms of the
Agreement: among other things,"it solved the questions of "native
taxation"; the control of the land; the maintenance of the army
and"placed into the hands of the Commissioner the power of life
31and death over the people." And, although held to be tantamount
to r submission to British rule, the Agreement was respected and held 
in high esteem by many a British Officer:
"The existence of the Agreement is the Central fact 
of the Protectorate, and I am unable to think that 
it could be relegated to its proper place, presumably 
the background, even if it were desirable so to do." 32
Indeed, the Agreement was always regarded as "the bedrock of British
Administration" in Buganda, and in, consequence, all officers newly
posted to Buganda, particularly in the early days of the Protectorate,
were always urged to observe the terms of the Agreement, and subject
to the powers of guidance, advice and supervision, to remember that
"all executive work" lay in the hands of the Kabaka’s Government.
It was "settled policy" that effect should be given to the Agreement
33
in spirit and in letter; and until the decision of the Privy Council
34
m  the Swaziland case, it was generally held that any governmental
policy or action was subject to the "Native Agreements" in force.
The official view was that "what we have put our name to must be
35
inviolable if native peoples are ever to trust our word."
Nevertheless, it was widely accepted that the 1900 Agreement was not 
a good document by which to regulate the high contracting parties’ 
relations, and in due course, even its most ardent admirers were 
forced to concede that the Agreement was inimical to good, efficient 
and proper administration. Postlethwaite’s account of his experience 
in Buganda is illuminating; it reads:
30. For details see Morris, H.F., "The Murder of H.St.Galt"
Uganda Journal 24 (1?60) p.1.
31. F.0. 2/200 Johnston to Salisbury 12.3.1900.
32. C.0. 536/63/1909 Confidential Memo by Stanley Tomkins
33. C.0. 536/40080/1 Sir Philip Mitchell to S/S
34. Sobhuza v Millar and others [1926] A.C. 518.
35. Postlethwaite, J.R. I Look Back, London, 1947, p.91.
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"In the autumn of 1911, I returned to Uganda from leave 
and was stationed as Assistant District Commissioner, at 
Kampala. I felt at the time, rightly or wrongly, that 
we had no definite policy there. At every comer we 
run up against the Uganda Agreement and the powers of 
self-determination which that treaty had conferred upon 
the Baganda. We seemed neither to have the will to 
break the Agreement in the interests of Baganda, nor the 
willingness to accept loyally the position as it Was and 
develop on slower lines. We appeared to be eternally 
giving orders which were obeyed or not, at the sweet will 
of the Buganda Native Government, the entire virtual 
authority of which was vested in the Katikiro, Sir Apolo 
Kagwa." 36
In fact, Sir Apolo and his fellow Regents were more amenable and less 
obdurate than Postlethwaitd s rhetoric would seem to suggest. The 
enthusiasm with which the Hut Tax Regulations were implemented and 
the thoroughness with which countless government measures, many of 
which were ultra vires the Agreement were, at the instance of the 
Regents, effectively and efficiently, carried out by the divisional 
chiefs, speak for themselves - they tell a different story. Indeed, 
it was the Regent’s willingness and ability to work with the 
Protectorate Officers that shaped the latters1 attitude and 
implementation of the Agreement. In short, they had no cause for 
repudiating it, for the mere mention of the Agreement, as 
Postlethwaite himself noted was usually enough to spur the chiefs into 
action,with some -success, but, as he soon discovered,such success was 
occasionally tinged with some surprises ,too.
"Finally, I found myself one day with my District 
Commissioner and my Provincial Commissioner away on 
safari, faced with the position that an order for 
labour had been given to the native government and 
only about half the number required had arrived on 
the given date .... I informed the Katikiro that I 
considered that failure to meet our requirement 
constituted a breach of the Section of the Agreement 
which insisted on loyal co-operation and that unless 
the full number were forthcoming within twenty four 
hours, I required the Uukiko to be suspended until 
the matter had been referred to the Governor. The 
porters were immediately produced, but on my senior's 
return I found myself a very unpopular young man for 
this action." 37
36. Postlethwaite,op.cit., p.41
37. Ibid. p.42
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Such was the flexibility and effectiveness of the Agreement.
Nonetheless, its invocation or rather exploitation along the lines 
indicated above was fraught with difficulties, and in practice was 
always reserved for major issues of policy or principle. For 
routine matters, persuasion as opposed to confrontation, was the 
key word, and as noted above the use of the "ultimate weapon" was 
always discouraged and indeed, frowned upon by senior officers 
including the Governor. Instead, diverse procedures and practices 
were, with the consent and approval, of the Regents, actively 
developed that sought to avoid the. difficulties which strict 
adherence to the terms of the Agreement appeared to present. This 
meant, among other things, that Buganda1s internal affairs were, 
throughout the Regency period - 1897 - 1914 - superficially supervised.
It also meant, however, that Buganda’s autonomy was dealt a mortal 
blow. The authority and jurisdiction of the Provincial Administration 
were greatly enhanced whilst that of the Buganda government, and the 
young Kabaka in particular, was seriously eroded and, for the next two 
decades the Anglo-Buganda relations were, as the following discussion 
shows, anything but cordial. The young and fledgeling Kabaka was, 
on the one hand, struggling to maintain his prestige and authority, . 
and on the other, the Provincial Administration was vigorously seeking 
to extend its influence over Buganda's Internal affairs and administration 
which hitherto, as noted above, had been lightly, if at all, supervised 
by the Protectorate authorities. One of such matters over which 
Buganda had exclusive jurisdiction and over which the Protectorate 
Government sought to extend its influence, was tax administration; 
and though, by no means the cause celebre of the many Anglo-Buganda
38
battles, was from 1925 - 1932, the raison detre of the "badblood." 
between the reigning Governor, Sir William Gowers and the Kabaka,
Sir Daudi Chwa, and will serve as an example of the manner in which 
the Agreement was during this period, interpreted and implemented 
by the Protectorate authorities.
38. C.0. 536/145/14089 Sir Geoffrey Archer to S/S
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2.1.2. THE VIOLATION OF THE NATIVE TREASURY : INDIRECT VERSUS DIRECT RULE
Since time immemorial, the Kabaka's revenues were always administered
by his "Treasury11- over which one of the Country's most influential
and wisest chiefs presided. This official was known as the
"Omuwanika" or Treasurer, and, in the first twenty years of
British overrule, his powers and duties were unchallenged,
undefined, unregulated and virtually unsupervised: the Omuwanika
was largely left to his own devices. In 1922, however, the Governor
for the first time, learnt that the- "Native Treasury" was in serious
39
need of British control and supervision. Accordingly, the Buganda
Government were, "with considerable difficulty persuaded to agree to
inspection and audit of their accounts", but due to lack of suitable
British personnel, It was not possible to exercise the necessary
40
sustained control and supervision or influence. In 1925, however,
further efforts were made and the services of an accountant secured to
carry out a thorough inspection and examination of the Lukiko funds,
and, "though of much value in straightening out confusions and laying
down an improved system of accounting", the work of this officer
highlighted, as a by product, the need "for the exercise of a continuous
41
control and supervision by the Protectorate Government." There was,
apparently, "no proper machinery for detecting wastage, leakages,
peculation and malversation of public funds", instances of which were,
42
evidently, of frequent occurrence.
"It cannot, I am afraid be doubted that there is at present a
considerable wastage of these funds and that sums are occasionally
expended in a manner which must be considered questionable if not
43
definitely Improper.
’It was desirable, the despatch continues, that the Buganda Government
should be "taught to frame annual estimates of expenditure, to adhere
rigidly to these estimates in their disbursements and to adopt and
consistently apply a system of -vouchers and other safeguards essential
m 44to the handling of public funds.
39. C.0. 536/137/55416 Gowers to S/S. 9.11.1925
40. C.0. 536/137/55416. Gowers to S/S 9.11.1925.
41. Ibid.,
42. Ibid.,
43. Ibid.,
44. Ibid.,
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To this end, the Headquarters of the Buganda Government
organisation, the "Native Treasury" in particular, was to be placed
under the control and supervision of "a specially selected officer"
of the Buganda Provincial Administration, that is to say, one
45directly under the Provincial Commissioner. In the exercise of
his duties however, this officer though answerable to the District
Commissioner, was to "receive expert advice and assistance" from
the Central Government Auditor and, for the purposes of his office,
was to "have a room in the Buganda Government office block" at 
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Mengo. This arrangement, it was hoped, would enable him to 
instruct the Kabakafs government in departmental organisation and 
co-ordination and to give the continuous supervision required to 
ensure that his instructions were followed and put into effective 
operation.
Goweri quandary was,however, whether the Kabaka's Government would 
raise objections to his proposed scheme or whether they would
47
"loyally co-operate" as envisaged by the terms of the 1900 Aggreement.
Whilst Gowers/ proposals would, in the eyes of the British "meet with
48
the warm approval of the more intelligent Baganda and would be
49
"acceptable to at least a strong minority of the Lukiko", there 
was little doubt about the Kabaka's stance: It was believed that the 
Kabaka, who "was beginning to feel his feet and assert himself as the 
real ruler of his p e o p l e , w o u l d  view the posting of a British 
Officer at Mengo with some considerable reserve. Thus Gowers 
confided in the Secretary of State for the Colonies that his proposals 
were likely to meet stiff, resistance and warned him as follows:
45. C.0. 536/137/55416 Gowers to S/S 9.11.1925
46. Ibid., Gowers to S/S. 9.11.1925
47. Ibid., Gowers to S/S. 9.11.25
48. Ibid., Gowers to S/S. 9.11.25
49. Ibid., Gowers to S/S. 9.11.25
50. Ibid., Postlethwaite. op.cit. p.81.
51. C.0. 536/137/55416. Gowers to S/S. 9.11.1925.
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"It is possible that the Native Government of Buganda, 
who are of course very sensitive in the matter of their 
independence and special privileges, and a section of 
whom have very naturally formed an opinion of their 
administrative capabilities, not justified in fact, will 
raise objections to the posting of the officer referred 
to above and to the continuous financial supervision 
which I now propose to introduce. Every effort will 
be made to induce the Native Government voluntarily 
to accept the proposals. Should, however, an adverse 
majority opinion prevail, I would ask for your authority 
as a final resort to inform the Kabaka and his advisers 
that you have carefully considered the proposals, that 
you have decided that they are essential to the efficient 
internal administration of Buganda for the conduct- of 
which their loyal co-operation with the Protectorate 
Government is expressly required by paragraph 6 of the 
1900 Agreement, and that I am directed by you to insist 
that the proposals be accepted and brought into operation." 52
The Governor's dispatch was sympathetically received and read with
great interest, but Gower's proposed use of the "ultimate weapon"
was however, uoundly rejected, and he was accordingly advised:
"that all possible efforts should be made to induce the Buganda
Government to agree to the proposed arrangement voluntarily,
that no threats of compulsion should be held out to them", and
that should persuasion fail, the whole question should be referred
to the Secretary of State for further consideration and 
53
determination."
As it happened, however, the Buganda Government agreed, albeit reluctantly, 
to accept the proposed measures and duly instructed the relevant 
officials to "loyally co-operate" with the new financial adviser.
That, however, was not the end of the matter. The Kabaka was very 
apprehensive and fearful that Gowers! proposed scheme was a veiled 
threat to Buganda's autonomy and a harbinger of worse to come. He 
thus wrote to Sir Geoffrey Archer,an old friend and counsellor, (and 
a former Governor of Uganda 1922-1924), that:
"After careful consideration, I have decided to approach 
you on a matter which has been causing me‘ a great deal of 
anxiety and unrest in my mind as well as in the minds of 
the chiefs. There has been some changes of importance in 
the policy of Native Administration of the Protectorate since
52. C.0. 536/137/55416 Gowers to S/S 9.11.1925
53. C.0. 536/145/14089 S/S to Sir William Gowers 6.1.1926
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your departure from this country, and I fear these 
changes are not calculated to be beneficial to the 
welfare of the Baganda.........
Naturally these changes ..... have provoked my feelings
of fear and anxiety, which have been accelerated lately
by unfavourable rumours .... that it is the intention
of Sir William Gowers to take this opportunity, while
he is on leave in England to request the Secretary of
State for the Colonies to entrust him with full powers
to introduce more and drastic changes in the Native
Policy of the administration of the Protectorate,
which will necessarily prove detrimental to the welfare
of the Baganda, who have enjoyed from time immemorial
a settled form of government under their ’Kabaka and his
Council of Chiefs', although not on civilised lines but
based upon the time honoured native customs and traditions." 54
The effect of all these changes, many of which were manifestly 
contrary to the Agreement, was, in the Kabaka's eyes, "seriously to 
weaken his position as Kabaka and to undermine the authority of 
the chiefs". Hence, his "earnest and urgent" appeal to
Sir Geoffrey Archer, "to represent the matter properly to the proper 
authorities," ^  that is to say, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. To this end, Sir Geoffrey discussed the Kabaka’s 
memorandum with his uncle, Sir Frederick Jackson - himself a former 
Governor of Uganda (1911 - 1917) and both agreed that the Kabaka’s. 
case should be referred to the Colonial Office.
However, believing that he was in "a delicate position,. Sir.Geoffrey’s 
intercession, as it happened, was war-weary, tentative and somewhat 
too diplomatic and in consequence, did not have the desired effect. 
Archer’s comments and observations on his successor's interpretation 
and implementation on the Agreement are, however, illuminating. He 
was of the view that Gowei^ - interpretation and carrying our of the 
Agreement was both incorrect and inconsistent with accepted British 
policy and practice. He too, felt, that his successor's "direct" 
as opposed to "indirect" rule was in direct conflict with the terms 
and provisions of the Uganda Agreement, 1900, and indeed detrimental 
to the true interests of His Majesty’s Government in Buganda."
He found the trend of events, since his departure from Entebbe, rather 
disturbing and had little doubt that the Kabaka had a good case under 
the Agreement. Archer’s dilemma was, in view of his position, how
54.C.0.536/145/14089 Sir Dandi Chwa to Sir Geoffrey Archer. 27.9.1926
55.C.0.536/145/14089 Bishop to Ormsby-Gore 29.12.1927
56.C.0.536/137/55416 Daudi Chwa to Sir Geoffrey Archer. 27.9.1926
57.C.0.536/137/55416 Archer to Sir S.Wilson ,
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to broach the Kabaka1s allegations to the Colonial Office without 
breaking ranks or indeed, incurring the wrath of his former 
colleagues. It is against this background that Archer's"private 
and confidential" letter to a friend at the Colonial Office , the 
relevant part of which is set out below, must be assessed.
"I am placed in a position of some difficulty by a letter 
(with enclosures) which I received some time back from the 
Kabaka of Buganda, asking my intervention on his behalf and 
that of his chiefs in a matter which is causing him grave 
concern. I know as an ex-Governor of Uganda that I am 
entirely out of court, and I could properly say, as others 
no doubt will, that it has nothing to do with me. But I 
cannot but regard the matter as having a significance wider 
than any personal considerations, and I feel I should be 
failing in my duty were I to disregard the letter and the 
symptoms of anxiety it reveals. I am sure too, that you at 
the Colonial Office would wish to know what is passing in 
the native mind and all sides of a difficult question; and 
I feel therefore, my proper course is to pass the letter on 
to you as a privileged communication, and in strict confidence 
for personal information. I do not think that you will regard 
it as necessary or well advised in the circumstances, to refer 
the papers back to Uganda, which could only make bad blood.
Thus the fewer my own observations, in a delicate position, 
the better." 5 8
Having said that, however, Archer, proceded to recount Buganda1s 
historical retrospect, thus reminding them of the Kabaka's "special 
position" in relation to the Protectorate Government and, went on:
"It is a historic fact that before we came into the 
Country, before the arrival of any foreigner, the Kabakas 
of Buganda exercised traditional and hereditary authority 
over their peoples through chiefs appointed by them; and 
the perpetration of this system was expressly provided for 
and safeguarded in the formal Agreement entered into with 
the Baganda by Sir Harry Johnsfen on behalf of Her Majesty' 
Government. We did not create the feudal position: we
merely recognised and strengthened what we found. The 
Agreement recognised, in fact, a Native Government exercising 
full control over its own internal affairs under general 
British supervision only. Whether it was a good arrangement 
or a bad one may be, as most things are, a matter of opinion.
But nothing can alter the material fact that there has been 
set up in Africa under our administration by a formal document 
what' amounts practically to a Native State. We are now face 
to face with the issue - direct action versus indirect rule." 59
58. C.0. 536/145/14089 Archer to Wilson 5.1.1927.
59. Ibid.
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Appended to this material was Sir Frederick Jackson’s note 
in which he roundly castigated Gowers1 "practice and procedure 
in carrying out" the Agreement of which he was, incidentally, 
the co-author, and the terms of which he subsequently explained, 
clause by clause, to the three Regents before it was finally 
signed. Jackson’s opinion, . described by his nephew as "very 
authoritative and very conclusive", was that Gowers approach 
was "a flagrant breach" of the Agreement. He wrote:-
"I have read the [Kabaka’s] memorandum with interest 
and very great concern, as I cannot help but regard 
the attitude of the Government, in their interpretation 
and carrying out of clauses 6 and 9, as very distinct 
breaches of the Agreement of 1900, and I am not 
surprised at the Kabaka and the Lukiko being very much 
alarmed." 6o
Besides Archer's oblique approach, the Kabaka's cause was cogently 
and more directly espoused by the Bishop of Uganda,- then on leave 
in England, who, it would appear presented "the matter properly 
to the proper authorities" ^  with some salutary effect. Thus 
Ormsby-Gore told Sir William Gowers that:-
"The Bishop of Uganda came to see me the other day 
and raised a number of points. I was frankly a little 
disturbed by the Bishop's tone, and I am just a little 
concerned as to our future relations with the 
missionaries especially the C.M.S." 62
A resume of what transpired atthat encounter was subsequently reduced 
to writing and reads as follows:-
60. C.0.536/145/14089 Note-by Sir Frederick Jackson. 31.12.1926
61. C.0.536/145/14089 Sir Daudi Chwa to Sir Geoffrey Archer,27.9.1926
62. C.0.536/145/14089 Ormsby-Gore to Gowers - Private & Confidential
of 1.3. 1927
54
The Kabaka complains -
Ml. of the way in which appointments to chieftainships 
are now made. Under the Agreement, the Kabaka in 
consultation with the Lukiko, nominates subject to 
the approval of- the Government. In practice strong 
pressure is often brought to bear to secure the 
appointment of the Government's nominees, appointments 
being often made in virtual independence of the 
Kabaka's Government.
2. of the tendency to direct rule on the part of certain 
administrative officers. The Agreement provides for 
all internal administration to be left to the Kabaka's 
Government, subject to certain conditions. In many 
cases he complains, chiefs are instructed to report 
direct to the District Officers without reference to 
the Lukiko.
3. that whereas under the Agreement the Kabaka deals 
directly with Her Majesty's chief representative in 
Buganda, he now finds himself directly approached by 
other administrative officers, while he himself, can 
only approach the Governor through the Provincial 
Commissioner of Buganda Province." 63
Gowers' response to these allegations was equally forthright and 
pointed. He thus scoffed at the Kabaka for "using the Bishop as a 
medium of direct communication between himself and the Colonial 
Office", he was somewhat uncharitable at the Bishop's interference 
in political matters, and he summarily dismissed the Bishop's 
scathing attack on his interpretation of the Agreement in no 
uncertain terms and continued:
"I think that when the Bishop speaks of "native interests" 
what he has in mind is not the interests of the native 
population at large, but the interests of Protestant chiefs. 
I am afraid that I must agree that our relations with the 
C.M.S. are certainly likely to be difficult especially if 
the leaders of the C.M.S. intend to pose as 
the protectors of the native, and to be the direct channel 
of communication between the Native Government and the 
Secretary of State.
I have no desire to be anything but tactful with this 
organisation, but their tendancy to interfere in political 
matters will, if it continues unchecked, render the position 
of the Governor here extremely difficult." 64
63. C.0.536/145/14089 Ormsby-Gore's Summary of his private 
conversation with the Bishop of Uganda, and the latter's 
presentation of the Kabaka's case.
64. C.0.536/140/14089 Goweu to Ormsby-Gore.
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In the meantime, the Protectorate Government would continue to 
exercise its powers as it saw fit, and would not flinch from 
carrying out its responsibilities, including the execution of 
much needed, but unpopular, measures. It was strongly believed 
that a reversal of Government policies along the lines urged by 
the Kabaka and his advisers would do irreparable harm to British 
prestige and interests in Buganda. It was, for example contended 
that, it would be misconstrued, place the Governor in an invidious 
position, and increase the influence and power of the Buganda 
Government at the expense of the Protectorate Government.
Emphasis was placed on British overrule and the necessity for 
teaching the Buganda Government"to frame annual estimates of 
expenditure and other safeguards essential for the handling of 
public funds." ^
"I feel [Gowers insisted],1 need hardly emphasize the 
importance of the inculcation of these principles 
and insistence on their application at these stages 
in the administrative education of the Buganda Native 
Government."65
And so, it was done, and that, in broad terms, became Government 
policy and indeed remained Gowers' posture for the next seven years. 
Bugandab internal administration was, throughout this period, the 
1900 Agreement not withstanding, in the hands of the Provincial 
Commissioners rather than the Kabaka and his ministers, and the effect 
of this was subsequently summarised by the Kabaka in the following 
terms
"While in clause 6 of the Agreement the Kabaka's position 
is recognised by H.M.Government, yet in actual practice 
the Kabaka has no longer any control over his chiefs.
All the Native chiefs in Buganda are responsible to the 
Administrative Officers of the Protectorate Government 
for their various duties.
At present, in matters of the native administration of 
Buganda Kingdom, the Provincial Commissioner in charge 
of Buganda Province appears to occupy the position
65. C.0. 536/137/55416 Gowers to S/S 9.11.1925
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which was in.tended for the Kabaka in the Agreement. The Provincial 
Commissioner is now the direct ruler of the Native Chiefs 
of Buganda through bis District Officers. Any order issued 
to the Chiefs by the Kabaka or his Government has to be 
countersigned and approved by the Provincial Commissioner 
before it can be transmitted to the Chiefs concerned with 
the natural result that the chiefs now are beginning to lose 
their sense of loyalty towards their Kabaka, since he has 
now become to be looked upon by these chiefs as merely the 
headman or Superior Chief of the natives of Buganda on more 
or less the same level and receiving an annual salary from 
the Protectorate Government in the same way as they themselves.
The chiefs have now become mere agents of the Provincial 
Commissioner while the Lukiko is in reality a subordinate 
section of the Provincial Administration under the direct 
control of the Provincial Commissioner in charge of Buganda, 
and being the principal representative of His Excellency the 
Governor in the Province as the Supreme Ruler of the people 
of Buganda. At present, not even His Highness the Kabaka 
has direct access to His Excellency the Governor except 
through this officer." 66.
Gowers’ policies were however, maintained and in several important 
respects intensified by his immediate successor Sir Bernard Bourdillon 
Indeed, it was not until the Dundas Reforms of 1944 that British 
administration in Buganda was actually carried out in accordance 
with the terms and provisions of the 1900 Agreement. Already, 
however, the Agreement had in many ways been amended and as is 
indicated below, Dundas readjustment of Gowers’ policies was 
shortly afterwards reversed by his successor, Sir John Eathom Hall, 
the change of policy came too late to weather the gathering storm 
and was thus quickly reversed without much ado and the jire-1944 
Central Government crippling controls reimposed and, indeed, 
ruthlessly supervised.
66. C.0.536/145/14089 Sir Daudi Chwa's memorandum on the 
Uganda Agreement, 1900.
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2.1.3. THE 1944 DUNDAS REFORMS : THE REVERSION TO INDIRECT RULE
' ■ ' *  1 1  " ■  ■ ■ i ■ —  .... -  ■
Charles Cecil Farquaherson Dundas entered the colonial service 
in 1908 and served in various parts of the West Indies and Eastern 
Africa before proceeding to Uganda in 1940 in succession to his 
old friend and colleague Sir Phillip Euen Mitchell. Like his 
predecessor, Dundas had served in the Tanganyika Territory 
under Sir Donald Cameron and was an ardent advocate of the doctrine 
of indirect rule; yet he too, like Mitchell, did not, rather 
surprisingly, put into practice the tenets of his creed until 
as it happened,towards the end of his governorship.
Dundas* explanation for this otherwise ahomolous. situation was that the 
Provincial Administration though mot positively averse to any changes, 
were most reluctant to relax their grip on their charges. It would 
also appear, however, that Dundas was unaware "of the late Kabaka's 
strong criticism of the effects of the District Administration." 67
The District Officers, not unreasonably, were "apprehensive of a
falling off of efficiency immediately following the relaxation of
68close administration on the spot." They strongly believed that
the chiefs were in need of "constant stimulation and controlling",
and, in their view, the "Native authorities" were not sufficiently
advanced and the time they argued, was not yet ripe for these 
69
reforms. However, Dundas was not convinced.
"I take the view [he informed the Secretary of State] and 
my officers do not disagree, that if the time is now not 
ripe one can foresee no time when it willobe so; on the 
contrary it is my fear that indefinite continuance of. the 
existing position will but tend to retard progress in 
administrative development. Indeed, the argument adduced 
for the retention of the present practice only confirms me in the 
belief that the activities of the District Commissioners do 
too greatly tend to displace the Native Government and particularly 
so outside the vicinity of its headquarters." 70
67. :C.0,536/211/40080/1'. Dundas' to Secretary, of State.8.2.1944
68. Ibid. ‘
69. Ibid.,
70 Ibid.
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As noted earlier, Dundas was a staunch advocate of indirect rule, 
and was somewhat shocked to observe that many of his predecessors 
had largely ignored the terms and provisions of the Uganda Agreement 
of 1900.
"The form of administration in the Native State of Buganda, 
[Dundas noted], seems not to have changed perceptibly since 
it was first established under the Agreement of 1900, and the 
question one may ask [he went on ] is whether in the first place 
this form is entirely in conformity with the spirit of that 
Agreement, secondly whether after a lapse of fifty-three years 
a more forward, move in the direction of less dependent 
administration by the Native Government is not due." 71
"Fundamental in the Agreement" Dundas argued, "were the two stipulations 
that the Kabaka should be recognised as the native ruler, and that he 
should exercise direct rule over his people, subject only to the 
condition that he conform to the laws instituted by His Majesty’s 
Government; that he should co-operate loyally with that government
and rule in the manner approved by His Majesty’s Government under the
72
protection and overrule of His Majesty." Thus, the framers of
the Agreement, as Dundas robustly put it, "contemplated that the 
Bagankia should be ruled by their Kabaka and that our role was to be 
essentially advisory and supervisory, and that the protecting powefs 
role should merely be "advisory and supervisory"; and failure to 
observe this dichotomy was., in Dundas’ view fraught with appalling 
difficulties. He firmly believed that there were two possible 
effects of failure to move forward in the desired direction. "On 
the one hand, that we would be regarded by the Native Government and 
people as retarding their advance, on the other hand, that by keeping 
them in leading strings more than is absolutely necessary, we would
destroy their initiative and make them wholly dependent on ourselves
73
in effective management of their affairs."
"It is my fear [Dundas maintained] that the latter state 
has been brought about. It is, for instance", he noted,
"difficult to conceive of the present Buganda Government 
acting with the independence and sagacity of:;Mutesa, and 
his ministers when they accepted British protection and 
entered into the Uganda Agreement of 1900." 74
71. C.0.536/211/40080/1 Dundag’ memo, op.cit.
72. Ibid.
73. C.0.536/40080/1 Reorganisation of Administration in Buganda 
Inclosure to Dispatch of 8.2.44.
74. Ibid.
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This, according to Dundas, was partly due to the responsibility 
the officers felt for the efficient administration of Buganda, 
and partly due to the nature and character of British representation 
in Buganda, which too nearly resembled that of Privincial 
Administration in the rest of the Protectorate: the officers were
the same, had had similar training and bore the same
designations.^ It was, he believed, a recognition of this 
mistake that induced the change of style from Provincial 
Commissioner to Resident. The- District Commissioners, however, 
remained and the Kingdom which was supposed to be ruled by a Central 
Native Government from a central seat of Government was divided into 
Districts in which the District Officer inevitably displaced to some 
extent the superior central ethnic authority. In addition, the 
District Commissioner and the Resident too, occupied positions of 
superior power and influence in as much as they exercised authority 
over the non-native population and performed functions outside the 
scope of the Buganda Government. "In such a situation”, Dundas argued, 
"the Native Government could hardly count for very much, nor could 
it be expected to rely on its own authority and exercise initiative, 
least of all because our district boundaries created a certain barrier 
between the sphere of the central native government and that of the 
District Commissioner."^
As Sir Philip Mitchell pointedly observed:
"There is. indeed a certain fundamental incompatibility 
between an organisation under a Provincial Commissioner 
and District Commissioner on the one hand and the 
Constitutional status of the Kabaka and his Government 
on the other....... "76a
75. C.0. 536/311/40080/1.
76. Ibid.
76a. C.0.536/211/40080/1 Sir Philip Mitchell,Relations of the Protectorate 
Government in Uganda with the Native Government of Buganda.
Government Printer, Entebbe,1939.
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Mitchell went on to remark that detailed intervention and control
would become "an increasingly difficult, and in time, politically
dangerous, method of discharging the responsibilities of the British 
„77
Government.
Mitchell*s solution involved "a readjustment of the British Administration
78on a functional in place of a geographical basis," and a first step
"indicative of the. new orientation of Policy" was the alteration of the
title of Provincial Commissioner to that of Resident, and the
appointment of a judicial adviser on the Residency Staff. However,
District Commissioners were, somewhat surprisingly, not restyled
Assistant Residents. The second step was to be the institution of a
group of British officers at the centre - presumably at Mengo , under
the Resident. As Mitchell explained, "the effect of this readjustment
[would] be to substitute for the detailed supervision through District
Commissioners and their Assistants a less detailed but eventually more
powerful and effective influence by means of a group of advisers at
the centre under the Resident, through whom the Native Government
-[would] be guided and assisted in the pursuit of the objectives common
79
to it and the British Government."
Mitchell's scheme did not, however, make provision for the handling of 
non-native and township affairs with which the Buganda Government were 
not concerned.
Indeed, Mitchell, did not indicate how "a group of advisers at the 
Centre" were to carry out their administrative functions vis-a-vis the 
Buganda Government. Thus Cox, the then Buganda Provincial Commissioner,
1 1 , C.0. 536/211/40080/1 Mitchell's secret memo, op.cit.
78. C.0. 536/40080/1 Secret memo :Relations of the Protectorate 
Government in Uganda with the Native Government of Buganda.
79. Ibid.
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saw Mitchells planned reorganisation "mainly as a scheme for 
bringing his District Commissioners to Kampala, from which place
80
they would carry out their accustomed administrative duties."
While Cox might have incorrectly interpreted Mitchell1s intentions,
his interpretation nevertheless disclosed a serious hiatus in the
new scheme. It clearly highlighted, as Dundas put it, " a
complication presented by the dual functions of the British
81
Administration in Buganda."
It was to meet this situation that Dundas, Mitchell's successor, 
proposed to maintain "a District Commissioner in each of the townships 
of Kampala and Masaka . for the concerns of the Protectorate Government; 
and a Resident with Assistant Residents for the sole purpose of 
advising the Kabaka and his Government.
Dundas* plan thua envisioned "separate administrative staff for
the Native Government and Protectorate Government Affairs." He
held the view that those appointed to advise the Kabaka's Government
should be wholly devoted to the affairs of that government, and
unencumbered with alien affairs. He firmly believed that such Advisers
should be so placed as to "give undivided attention to the business of
82
the Buganda Government and free from other distractions." They should, he 
maintained be in the position of officers attached to a Government, for 
the purposes served by that Government and not involved in matters 
outside the purview of that Government . The establishment of such a 
position, Dundas hoped, would "clarify the true purpose" of the 
Protecting powerfe role in Buganda and would enable British officers to 
"see themselves as advisers to an authoritative Native Government and
83State, and not as the responsible administrators for a geographical area."
80. C.0.536/211/40080/1. Dundas* memo, op.cit.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
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Under these arrangements, the primary functions of the Resident
and his staffs would be to exercise "surveillance over the
subordinate native authorities, to represent the Protectorate
Government, to advise the Native Government, to report to the
Protectorate Government and advise the Governor in the exercise of
84
his over-riding powers." In other words, the role of British
Officers in Buganda would "be the supervision, guidance and liaison
85
rather than, inspection and executive control." The Resident would 
rank as the Senior Administrative Officer and would take precedence 
as such throughout Buganda. He would preside over the Provincial 
council and would be the co-ordinating authority for British activities 
and interests. And in matters affecting or requiring action by both 
administration, the Resident was to be regarded as the Senior and 
responsible Officer.
Protectorate matters at Kampala, Masaka and Mibende were to devolve on
a small group of "Protectorate Agents", whp though ranking as District
Commissioners, were to function under the direction of the Chief
Secretary to the Government and independently of the Resident; they
were to correspond directly with Protectorate Departments on their
respective business, and only rarely with the Resident, the object
being as Dundas put it "to relieve the latter of all pre-occupation
86
extraneous to his particular sphere." Their main duties were defined 
and set out in the Chief Secretary’s Circular memorandum dated October 11,194 
the relevant portion of which reads as follows:-
84. SMP. No.0.37/2 J.E.S.Merrick, Chief Secretary to the Government, to 
Heads of Departments, Heads of Provinces etc.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
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11 On them will devolve so much of the business of the 
Protectorate Government as does not come within the 
purview of the Native Government, that is to say chiefly 
Protectorate revenue and licencing. Townships and Trade 
Centre matters and non-Native affairs so far as these do 
not involve Native Government activities and interests.
This does not preclude Protectorate Agents from bringing 
to attention any matters coming to their notice which 
belong to the province of the Resident (for that matter 
the same applies to any officer in the public service) 
but unless instant action is called for they will not do 
more than report to the Resident; and they will not have 
official communication with chiefs nor intervene in matters; 
between them and natives under the jurisdiction of the 
Native Authority." 87
Dundas1 proposals thus envisaged "a clear distinction between
administrative functions in connection with Protectorate Government
88
business and Native Government affairs." This, Dundas hoped,
would bring British administration in Buganda within the four corners 
of the 1900 Agreement and, although, the new system's effects and broad 
practice were not fully and clearly developed, it was expected to run 
along the following lines.
(i) HAn Asian acquires a plot from a European. Here the 
Buganda Government is. not concerned and no reference 
to the Resident is needed.
(ii) If Crown land outside a Township or Trading Centre 
is to be acquired, the matter is one for reference 
to the Resident only if such acquisition involves 
disturbance of Natives.
87. SMP. No.0.37/2 op.cit.
88. Ibid.
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(iii) The Labour situation on a Sugar Plantation necessitates 
administrative action. If the matter is outside the 
jurisdiction of the Native Government it is one to be 
dealt with by the Protectorate Agent in collaboration 
with the Labour Commissioner. But if the affair concerns 
immigrant labour residing outside the plantation and among 
the indigenous inhabitants it may be one wholly within 
the province of the Resident or for joint action and in 
either event the Resident will assume responsibility.
Civ) A Chief collects taxes which he will pay in at the
Protectorate Agent’s office. The method of collection 
is not the concern of the Protectorate Agent but if the 
amount of collection reveals marked deficit on previous 
collections, he will notify this to the Resident.
(v) A native makes a complaint or petition to a Protectorate 
Agent against some action on the part of the Chief. The 
Protectorate Agent will advise him to go to the Resident 
or Assistant.
(vi) The Veterinary Department wishes to undertake innoculation
of native cattle and requires administrative assistance. In
Townships he will go to the Protectorate Agents, elsewhere
89
to the Resident."
Such, briefly was Dundas1 plan for the readjustment of British
Administration in Buganda, which, with the concurrence of the Secretary
90of State and. the Kabaka, came into operation on October 1,1944.
89. SMP. No.037/2. op.cit.
90. SMP.No.0/37/2 of 11.10.1944. J.E.S. Merrick, Chief 
Secretary to the Government to Heads of Departments,District 
Commissioners, Protectorate Aeehts ana „
___________________  m d  311 G°Vertment o n c e r s  in
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and marked a major step in the Anglo-Buganda relations. As noted, 
earlier, however, the Mitchell-Dundas reforms were shortly 
afterwards reversed by the latter’s successor, Sir John H Hall.
2.1.4. THE 1945 HALL REFORMS : THE RETURN TO DIRECT RULE
Like Mitchell, Dundas, as it happened, embarked on the foregoing 
changes virtually in the last months of his Governorship. Evidently, 
he was for several years, unaware that British policies and practices 
pursued by British officers in Buganda were inconsistent with the terms 
and intention of the Uganda Agreement of 1900, on which the Anglo-Buganda 
relations were based. He thus told the Secretary of State that:-
"I regard it as vital that the Native State should 
no longer be split into districts since the inevitable 
consequence of such a division is that the District 
Commissioner displaces the Native Government in 
authority and responsibility. In this connection 
certain reflections recorded by the late Kabaka 
Sir Dandi Chwa, which I have not seen in original 
but have been very recently quoted to me, are 
illuminating. Had I been earlier aware of the late 
Kabaka’s strong criticisms of the effects of the 
District Administration, I would have been inclined 
to close Mubende Station but I was led to believe 
that such would be unwelcome to the Buganda 
Government." 91
It would also appear, however, that the Mitchell-Dundas reforms did 
not have the blessing of the Provincial Administration.
"Understanding, [wrote Dundas] that the changes 
projected by my predecessor were agreed upon before 
my arrival in Uganda, the question I had to consider 
was when and how they could be effected. As to the 
timing, it has seemed that the accession of the young 
Kabaka, was opportune and since then the change in 
holder, of the office of Resident occasioned by the 
retirement of Mr. A.H.Cox., C.M.G., affords another 
appropriate moment to proceed further with the 
projected readjustment." 92
91. C.0. 536/211/40080 //Dundas to Secretary of State, 8.2.44
92. C.0. 536/211/40080/1 Ibid.
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Thus Dundas' plan had to wait for a more propitious moment : 
that moment, however, came, rather regretably, towards the end of 
his governorship. He left Uganda in the latter half: of 1944 and 
a few months later, his successor Sir John H.Hall, watered down 
and in some respects reversed his predecessor's administrative 
changes, and the pre-1944 system of detailed control and supervision 
which Dundas had began to relax reimpose.d. Hall's reasons for reversing 
the Mitchell-Dundas reforms were communicated to the Secretary of 
State by cable, the full text of which was as follows
"In the light of experience since reorganisation 
I have reached the conclusion that all Administrative 
officers posted in Buganda should be given powers as 
both Assistant Residents and Protectorate Agents under 
the Resident's control so that they can carry out either 
function as required. . It Is evident that the 
concentration of Assistant Residents in Kampala and the 
circumscribed functions of Protectorate Agents have 
militated1, against adequate touring and inspection and 
resulted In lack of contact with the local people and 
affairs, and in depriving (a) Protectorate Government 
of reliable information of the manner in which the 
Buganda Government is discharging their responsibility; 
and (b) Buganda of the official advice and assistance 
of which they still stand in need." 93
Hall's telegram seems to have been prompted by the "political riots"
which occurred in and around Kampala in January - February, 1945, which
he erroneously believed to have been caused by "the relaxation of
93a
control hitherto exercised by the British Administration." Ih^fact as
the Commissioner found, the "real origins of the disturbances were 
political" : some of the political influences at work were (a) certain
chiefs were dissatisfied with the work of the Katikiro; (b) during 1943 
and 1944 the Protectorate Government were desirous of acquiring land at
93. C.0. 536/211/40080/1 Hall's telegram to the Secretary of State 7.3.1945,
93a See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances which 
occurred In Uganda during January,. Entebbe,1945,pp.2-5.
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Makerere for the purpose of the College; they also proposed to
acquire land for an Empire Cotton Growing Research Station; there
was the question of "the big Indian Sugar Estate at Lugazi; and
there was a proposal for the amendment of the "Sacred" "Uganda
Agreement", 1900. All these issues were vehementuly opposed by
the land owners who were the instigators of the 1945 riots. These
grievances were given expression in a booklet: Buganda Nyafe (Buganda
Our Mother), described by the Commissioner, "as most subversive
publication". It was "bitterly anti-British" and gave a "garbled
and distorted history of the proposals to acquire land at Makerere
and elsewhere and refers to "English skill and fraud" and bribing
93b
of Chiefs by the Protectorate Government".
Clearly, the Dundas reforms had very little, if any, 
bearing on the disturbances, yet as Hall’s telegram indicates, they 
were the main casualty.
Hall’s readjustment of British Administrative organisation was thus
a negation of the policy evolved by Sir Philip Mitchell and loyally
executed by his successor, Sir Charles Dundas; and quite clearly
was contrary to the intentions of the framers of the 1900 Agreement.
Yet, rather surprisingly, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
had no difficulty in sanctioning the reversal of the Mitchell-Dundas
reforms endorsed by him a few months earlier. The Secretary of State’s
reply cable in deference to "the man on the spot" simply stated:
94
"I agree". A clear case of "the man on the spot1' knows best"
and indeed, no better example could be contrived. In the meantime,
however, the young Kabaka had already began "to show himself
95
independent of British Control#:" and, although he had acquiesced, and 
93b. See Report of Inquiry, op.cit.
94. C.0.536/211/40080/1. Secretary cfaf State’s Telegram to Hall.
95. C.0.536/211/40080/1. Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1945.
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indeed, "expressed his concurrence" in Hall's changes, he
nevertheless continued "to rule his people" without reference to
96
the Resident as he was obliged to do under the new regime.
Not unnaturally, Hall was up in arms at this outrage.
"My advisers and I have been seriously exercised of 
late by the increasing tendency on his part [that is 
the Kabaka] to take action without consulting the 
Resident and myself." 97
Such action, Hall maintained, was "in almost every case such as
to encourage the disloyal and anti-British elements in Buganda and
98
to discourage the loyal elements", so much so that the "inexperienced 
and bewildered young Kabaka" was ignoring his ministers and seeking 
advice from "persons of undesirable antecedents who were in greater
99
or less degree involved in the January disturbances in the Country."
In particular, the Kabaka was reliably reported to be consulting, as 
regards the day to day business of government, a rich land owner named 
Kisingiri, believed to be "violently anti-British" and not surprisingly 
the Kabaka-Kisingiri alliance: ^ag viewed with the utmost suspicion.
It was believed that "Kisingiri who [had] succeeded in debauching the 
Kabaka's father [was] pursuing the same course with his son."^^
Besides, Kisingiri , Mutesa's other associates included several ex-Budo 
masters who, in 1942, were dismissed or forced to resign for participating
in the so-called "Budo incident", one of the main features of which, was
—  102 
the outbreak of indiscipline at the school in that year.
96. C.0. 536/211/40080/1 Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1945
97. C.0. 536/211/40080/1 Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1945
98. C.0. 536/211 /40080/1 Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1945
99. C.0. 536/211/40080/1 Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1945
100. Ibid.,
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid. The "Budo incident" refers to allegations of homosexuality 
at the school.
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"In native circles [Hall noted] the unsavoury reputation of these
103
men is beginning to attach itself to the Kabaka himself." It
was also noted, however, that the Kabaka, the foregoing notwithstanding,
was "fundamentally a very nice youth, with a genuine liking for and
104
admiration of the British." But his was an unenviable position.
For, despite, his pro-British tendencies, the "young Kabaka was 
equally most anxious to appease the extremists and thus to show himself 
independent of British control." He was, as Hall put it,
"attempting the impossible course of at once keeping in with the
106
Protectorate Government and with his own anti-British elements."
Accordingly, the political situation owing to the absence of any firm
Native Government , the Kabaka’s vacillation, was rapidly deteriorating.
The disloyal elements had virtually "recovered from the shock administered
to them by the Protectorate Government’s unexpectedly firm and speedy
suppression of the disturbances and were once again busy with plot
and intrigue. The Chiefs, many of whom were "actively disloyal"
were "grossly neglecting their work, whilst the people who suffered
from this neglect, were sullen and discontented. The Residency Staff,
when on tour found themselves generally "ignored and sidetracked by
chiefs who believed that by so doing would find favour in the eyes of
108a Native Government believed to be anti-British in sentiment."
Consequently, the loyalists, the vast majority of people, were becoming
more and more, "discouraged and puzzled" .^Uga n d a ’s political and
administrative apparatus was, according to Hall, in "a serious state of
disrepair, in serious danger of breaking down;" and clearly in urgent
108b
need of corrective action.
103. C.0. 536/211 /400801/ Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1945.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
108a. Ibid 
108b. Ibid.
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Two main measures were, in Hall’s view :
"urgently needed: firstly to weed out of the 
administration those Bagandas who are really 
incurably evil and disloyal; and secondly,, to 
give both the educated classes and to the common 
people, fresh hope of a more enlightened, a more 
progressive and a more representative system of 
Government.” 109
However, Hall believed that neither of these measures could be 
successfuUy"carried through so long as the present weak and 
inexperienced Kabaka is nominally holding the reigns of power."
His enemies it was contended,were "far too strong and cunning for 
him and he’,' [as Hall put it] "a mere school-boy and believed by 
many to be a bastard - a belief sedulously fostered by his ill-wishers" 
[had] neither the prestige not the character to establish his 
traditional authority." Hall's elixir thus lay in "the early
removal of the Kabaka from Uganda and the introduction -into office 
of able loyal chiefs to act as Regents during the Kabaka's absence 
abroad; and the Secretary of State was advised accordingly.
".... as you will see from the accompanying record, 
my advisers and I are convinced that in the interests 
of the Kabaka himself, who, apart from ?these 
considerations, will quite probably be murdered if 
he remains here, and in the interests of Buganda 
and thus of the Protectorate at large, it is 
essential that he should leave the Country for a 
space of time, and should entrust the Government 
of Buganda to a loyal, firm and efficient Regency, 
who acting, as I am. assured that they will, in 
full co-operation with the Protectorate Government, 
during his absence, uproot disloyalty and carry 
through these political, administrative and fiscal 
reforms that the Country so badly needs in preparation 
for the return of our demobilised soldiers." 112
109. CVO. 536/211/40080/1. op.cit.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. ibid. .
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It was felt that "a selected period of study in England,
accompanied by the right social contacts and associations, would
do much to remedy the Kabaka1s defects of character," and would
give him the confidence and the prestige in the eyes of his own
113people, that was sadly lacking. To this end, the Kabaka,
preliminary to attending the newly proposed special course for
Administrative Officers, was to undergo a course of study in which
he would be specially coached in certain subjects, such as "littlego"
in which he was relatively weak. This period of coaching was, if
necessary, to extend to six months. Hall's strategem, was, on the
4th July 1945, duly sanctioned by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, and two months' later the unsuspecting Kabaka and his
party, consisting of Earnest Haddon, a retired Provincial Commissioner,
and Yosiya Kyaze, a former Finance Minister in the Kabaka's Government,
left Port Bell for Cairo, enroute to London, where they arrived on
28th September, in some flourishing circumstances. Both Hall and
the Secretary of State were most anxious that the Kabaka should receive
114
the treatment befitting his rank and position; and so it was done.
As regards clothing, for example, the Colonial Office was particularly 
concerned that the Kabaka should, rationing not withstanding, be 
adequately provided with clothing coupons.
"The Secretary of State attaches much importance to 
the visit of the Kabaka and he is anxious for political 
and other reasons that everything possible should be done 
to make things easy for him. We should accordingly be 
most grategul if you could see your way to furnishing 
us with a supply of coupons for the Kabaka and Chief [Kyaze] 
which will enable them to obtain a satisfactory wardrobe to 
start them off in this Country." 115
113. C.0.536/211/40080/1 Hall to Secretary of State, 26.6.1944
114. Ibid.. .
115. Ibid.
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Indeed, as the following letter to Messrs. Harrods Ltd., 
graphically indicates, no expense was spared.
"The Secretary of State desires that the Kabaka and 
[his party] should obtain their wardrobe and other 
purchases with the least possible difficulty. The 
Secretary of State would be grateful if an account 
could be opened to cover all the transactions between 
yourselves and the Kabaka, and it is suggested that 
this account should be in the name of the Colonial 
Office." 116
Clearly the Colonial Office was determined that the Kabaka should 
complete his education, cum exile, under the best possible 
circumstances. To this end, in addition to the above arrangements 
the Kabaka was to spend two years at Magdalene College, Cambridge, 
under Francis Turner, the brother of George Turner, the Principal 
of Makerere College, Uganda.
"Quite apart [minuted Cohen] from the advantage of 
the Kabaka passing from George Turner's care to his 
brother's, Magdalene College seems to us to be just 
the right College, not too big, with a friendly 
atmosphere and a moderate interest in games. I do 
not think [Cohen concluded] that a better place for 
the Kabaka to go to could have been chosen." 117.
116. C.O. 356/211/40080/1. J.L.Keith to Messrs Harrods Ltd, 14.9.1945. 
Almost similar letters went out to (1) Dr.W.W.Grave, The 
Registrar of Cambridge University, requesting the Senate to 
allow the Kabaka to matriculate; (2) Messrs. Few & Kester,
Haddon's Solicitors, regarding the re-letting of 3 Crammer Road, 
Cambridge; (3) The Board of Trade, Industries and Manufacturers, 
Dept. E, in connection with the International Refrigerator Company's 
licence for the supply of a refrigerator to the local dealers, for 
installation at 3 Crammer Road, for the use of the Kabaka;
(4) The Ministry of Fuel and Power, requesting the supply of 
extra coal; and (5) Messrs. Mackintosh & Sons Ltd., and the 
local Gas Company, regarding the restoration of central heating 
facilities at 3 Crammer Road, Cambridge.
117. C.O. 536/211/40080/1 A.B.Cohen to Dr.W.W.Grave,
Registrar, Cambridge University, 30.7. 1945*
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As has already been mentioned, the Kabaka and his party reached 
London towards the end of September and shortly afterwards, 
the unsuspecting Kabaka proceeded to Cambridge to commence his 
studies, and as might be expected, the young Kabaka was grateful and, 
indeed, was "most appreciative" of the foregoing arrangements for 
his reception and placing at Cambridge. He was, of course, unaware 
of Hall’s policy considerations behind these elaborate measures, and 
not surprisingly his own account of these events, inevitably differs 
from the one given above, and, in part reads as follows:
"The news that I was to break off my studies at Makerere 
and go to Cambridge came as a surprise to me, but a pleasant 
surprise. I was eager to go to England and. had no views 
on the real merits of British Universities. Cambridge 
was as good as any, Just how this decision was taken 
by the Oxford men that surrounded me - the Governor,
Sir John Hall, and George Turner,, the Principal of 
Makerere College, I do- not know, but it is one X have 
certainly never regretted. Ernest Haddon, a friend of 
my father’s and life-long friend of miie, was returning 
to Cambridge (118) and George Turner had a brother who 
was also at Magdalene and subsequently my tutor. These 
were, I think .... the deciding factors." 119.
In view of the preceeding discussion, it is interesting to note that 
less than two months earlier, Hall, had telephoned the Secretary of 
State that the Kabaka had approved the introduction of unofficial 
members of the Official dominated "Native Assembly" otherwise known 
as the Lukiko. Hall’s telegram was in these terms:
118. In fact Ernest Haddon was specifically released from his 
censorship duties in Uganda in order to accompany "the 
Kabaka and Chief Kyaze to Cambridge and there take 
charge of Yosiya" for which he was to be- suitably 
remunerated.
119. Mutesa, Sir Edward, The Desecration of My Kingdom, 
op.cit., pp 9 - 11.
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"At its last session on the 2nd March the Buganda 
Authorities agreed to a resolution put forward 
by the Kabaka for an alteration in the Constitution 
of the Lukiko to permit 31 seats out of the total of 
89 to be filled by unofficial representatives by 
local miluka assemblies." 120
Yet it is to be recalled that one of Hall’s two main reform proposals
"urgently required" but which could not be successfully carried through,
"so long as the weak and inexperienced Kabaka nominally held the
reigns of power" was said to be the reorganisation of the Lukiko:
a measure that had already been embarked upon with the approval of the
121
supposedly "unreforming Kabaka".
What is even more startling is that Hall, as is now known, was
vehemently opposed to direct elections to the Lukiko, which ironically
would have given the people "a more enlightened and more progressive
12 a
and a more representative system, of Government", of which he was the 
chief advocate.
It is also noteworthy that on certain issues of national and
constitutional importance, the "young and inexperienced" Kabaka was,
in fact, , more progressive than many of his more experienced
ministers and advisers, and his';people generally. Thus, for example,
on the question of African representation on the Legislative Council,
the Kabaka was more forward looking than his Government: all his
ministers were opposed to the idea, whilst the Kabaka, in Hall’s
122
words, "was strongly in favour of it." Furthermore, it is ironic
that Hall did not, "the appointment of a loyal, firm and efficient 
Regency" not withstanding uproot disloyalty, replace the old and less
120. C.O.536/211/40080/1 Hall to Secretary of State. 26.6.1944.
121. Ibid.
121a.Ibid
122. Ibid.
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educated chiefs by young and better educated men, increase the
representative character of the Lukiko", nor indeed, did he
endeavour to effect his projected "political, administrative and
123
fiscal reforms" while the Kabaka was at Cambridge. These were
the measures it will be repalled, which the Country, "so urgently
needed", and the introduction of which was given as the raison detre
124
for the Kabaka’s banishment. To this catalogue of broken promises
must be added Hall’s cool response to Creech-Jones’ 1947 despatch on
Local Government in the Colonies, and his subsequent and much criticised
African Governments Ordinance, 1949, which incidentally, he did not 
125
extend to Buganda. Be that as it may, Hall was, in 1951 succeeded
by Sir Andrew B Cohen, and the latter’s arrival afforded an opportunity
for the re-appraisal of the Anglo-Buganda relations, and, in particular,
the reconsideration of the 1944 Mitchell-Dundas reforms that were rudely
reversed by Hall before they could take root. For a while, the prospects
for reform looked bright and by March 1953 Cohen's planned administrative
and political reforms were beginning to emerge. In this connection,
Cohen's Memorandum on the Constitutional Development and Reform in
126
Buganda, is particularly noteworthy. Cohen’s proposed changes, the
most important of which were the reform of the Lukiko and the making
of ministerial appointments by the Kabaka, were, shortly afterwards,
however, marred by the declaration of a state of emergency and the
withdrawal of recognition from the Kabaka by the Protectorate Government,
127
and his deportation to England towards the end of 1953. The events
123. C.O. 536/211/40080/1. op.cit.
124. Ibid
125 See pp. 178-186supra
126 His previous record at the Colonial Office is recounted by Ronald 
Robinson: "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer, of Power, in Tropical Africa" in 
Decolonization and After, Morris-Jones,W.H. & Georges Fischer,(Ed.) 
Cass & Co.Ltd,1980 pp50-72)
127. Legal Notice No.190 of 1955.
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leading to this crisis are outlined below, and need not be 
rehearsed here, save to say that the causa belli, the Secretary of 
State’s after dinner speech to the African Dinner Club on
128June 30, 1953, had nothing to do with Buganda?s internal affairs.
Yet its aftermath had far reaching constitutional and political
consequences for both Buganda and the Protectorate generally:
for the former, the most important sequel was the promulgation of
129
the Buganda Agreement, 1955, under which Buganda1s autonomy was 
considerably enhanced and for the latter, the scramble for tribal 
autonomy and the destabilization of the Protectorate.
128. See p.78 infra.
129. See p.77 infra.
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2.1.5. THE BUGANDA AGREEMENT, 1955
Cohen's local government reforms in the eastern, northern and 
western provinces were matched by similar changes in Buganda.
Here the changes were foreshadowed by a Memorandum on Constitutional 
Development and Reform in Buganda issued by the Governor, with the 
consent of the Kabaka, in March 1953. It was agreed that responsibility 
for running certain social services would be transferred to the Buganda 
Government; that the number of elected members of the Lukiko would be 
increased from 40 to 60 and that a Committee system would be developed; 
that a system of local government would be recommended to the Lukiko; 
and that the Buganda Government would introduce the Personal Graduated 
- Taxation for the financing of the devolved services.
It was also announced that the Governor, with the consent of the 
Secretary of State, had agreed to effect some changes in the composition 
of the Legislative Council that would entail an increase in non-official 
representation, including three members from Buganda. The latter were 
to be selected by the Lukiko, or the Kabaka, if the former failed to 
do so. As expected, the Lukiko, for the second time, refused to elect 
Buganda's representatives; and somewhat unexpectedly, the Kabaka, too, 
at the instance of the Lukiko, declined to nominate them. The reasons 
for this are many, but difficult to disentangle, suffice it to note, 
however, that Buganda's attitude towards the Legislative Council was 
always negative. It was believed, for some strange reason, that the 
Protectorate Legislative Council had nothing to do with Buganda; that 
Buganda's active participation in its proceedings would diminish the 
importance of the Lukiko; and that it was incompatible, with the 1900 
Agreement. In any case, many felt that Buganda was under-represented 
whilst the Asian and European non-officials were over-represented.
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Worse, they wrongly suspected that the Protectorate Government was 
still hell-bent on an East African Federation, and that the projected 
changes were designed to smooth the path towards that goal. These 
fears were shortly afterwards exacerbated by the Secretary of State’s 
after dinner remarks that the unification of East Africa was an open 
issue and that the federation of the whole of East African territories 
was H.M.Government ’-s ultimate aim. Undertakings were immediately 
sought and given that there was no intention of imposing an East 
African Federation upon the people, against their wishes, these 
assurances, however, were viewed with suspicion, and further guarantees 
sought. In particular, the Kabaka demanded that Buganda should be 
placed under the supervision of the Foreign instead of the Colonial 
Office, and that Buganda’s constitutional status, vis-a-vis, Her 
Majesty’s Government should be reviewed and a timetable for independence 
drawn up, as soon as possible.
These demands were, not surprisingly, unacceptable to the British
Government and the Kabaka was advised accordingly, and urged to refrain
from making ridiculous demands. This, the Kabaka refused to do, and
130
was promptly deported to England.
On 23rd February, 1954, the Secretary of State told the House of 
Commons that the long-term aim of Her Majesty's Government was to 
build the Uganda Protectorate into a self-governing state; that the 
Country’s future government would be mainly in the hands of Africans; 
and that the Anglo-Buganda relations called for immediate examination. 
Three months later, the Government invited Sir Keith Hancock, Director 
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, to
130. Uganda Protectorate: Withdraw of Recognition from Kabaka 
Mutesa II of Buganda. (1954) Cmd. 9028.
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consult with the interested parties and to make proposals for 
reform. The Lukiko thereupon appointed a thirteen-man Constitutional 
Committee to hold talks with Sir Keith on the Anglo-Buganda relations. 
The Buganda Constitutional Committee, subsequently called the 
Namirembe Conference, published its findings on the 15th September 1954. 
The Conference^ ** Agreed Recommendations" were set out in 49 Articles, 
the first of which specifically declared that:-
"The Kingdom of Buganda under the Kabaka1s Government 
shall continue as heretofore to be an integral part 
of the Protectorate of Uganda." 131
Significantly, however, the "Recommendations", in describing the 
future relations between Buganda and the Protectorate Government, 
eschewed the words "province" and "unitary state" respectively.
Such nuances, though virtually meaningless, were of special 
importance to the Baganda, and crucial to the Conferences1 success.
Next, Articles 2 - 2 9  set out, in some considerable detail, the future 
relations between the Kabakaship, the Buganda Ministry, the Lukiko and 
the Protectorate Government.
The conduct of Buganda*s affairs was placed in the hands of six 
(formerly three) ministers, namely, the Katikiro, the Omulamuzi, 
the Omuwanika, the Minister of Health, The Minister of Education 
and the Minister of Natural Resources. The idea was to bring 
Buganda*s ancient political institutions and democracy into harmony, 
thereby placing the Kabaka above the storm-centre of local and 
national politics. Inter alia, the Kabaka was to be a Constitutional 
monarch and above criticism for his government*s. policy blunders or 
failures. He was to exercise his rule through the Lukiko and the six 
ministers so that they and not the Kabaka would be responsible for 
policy making and its implementation.
131. The Agreed Recommendations of the Namirembe Conference. Article 1.
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Of immediate interest here, however, were the proposed provisions 
for the transfer of certain services, as laid down in paragraph two 
of the Memorandum on Constitutional Development and Reform of March 1953. 
Provision was made for the establishment of joint Consultative 
Committees on education, health, natural resources, local government 
and community development. The main functions of these Committees 
were, the co-ordination of policy, the consideration of matters of 
mutual interest, the minimization of conflict between the two governments, 
and most importantly, to give the KabakaTs Government ample opportunities 
for commenting on proposed Protectorate policies. It was suggested 
for example, that the programme for the development of local government 
bodies proposed by the reforms of March 1953 should be reviewed by 
the Katikiro and the Buganda. Resident, in consultation with the local 
Government Consultative Committee.
Additionally, provision was made, for the first time, for the 
progressive development of local government services in the Kibuga 
(Buganda's Commercial Centre) trading centres and townships, excluding 
Kampala, Entebbe, Masaka and Mubende. The new local authorities, 
in the former areas, their large Asian communities not withstanding, 
were to be placed under the Buganda Government and provision made 
for the representation of all sections of the community on the proposed 
councils. Again, a committee comprising local residents and 
representatives of the Buganda Government, would study and oversee 
the implementation of these proposals.
The "Agreed Recommendations" were accepted by both sides: the
#
Governor, having buttressed his assurances on the East African 
Federation agreed to recommend them to the British Government, arid
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the Buganda Constitutional Committee, having agreed to Buganda’s
participation in the Legislative Council, undertook to recommend
them to the Great Lukiko. In the meantime, Councillor Mukwaba
had instituted legal proceedings in the High Court, the effect of
which was to test the Constitutionality of Cohen’s decision to
133
deport the Kabaka. In reply, the Crown argued that the
Governor’s decision was, in this case, non-justiciable, and that 
contention was upheld by the High Court. It was noted, however, that 
the Kabaka’s deportation was, under the circumstances, unlawfully made; 
the Governor had erroneously invoked Article 6 instead of Article 20 
of the 1900 Agreement.
Consequently, when the "Agreed Recommendations" were presented to 
the Lukiko, it was announced that the Secretary of State had, in view 
of the High Court’s decision, in the so-called Kabaka Case, decided 
to reconsider his decision regarding the Kabakaship and that providing 
the Lukiko accepted the "Agreed Recommendations", in toto, they would 
be given an opportunity to select a new Kabaka. The "Agreed Recommendations" 
were, in the light of the Secretary of State’s concession, accepted by the 
Lukiko and incorporated into a new Anglo-Buganda Agreement. Two months 
later the Kabaka was released and on 18 October, 1955, having made a 
solemn declaration of loyalty to the British Crown, signed the new 
Agreement,and,so pledged to abide by its provisions. The 1955 Agreement 
which, with minor modifications, incorporated the "Agreed Recommendations", 
had, as its principal effect the establishment of a Constitutional Monarchy 
in a Colonial setting. It placed Buganda in a special devolutionary 
relationship with the Protectorate Government, at the latter’s expense.
133. Mukwaba v Mukubira (1954) 7 U.L.R.74.
82
Hence forward, the Resident's functions were limited
(i) to advising the Kabaka's Government;
(ii) to keeping it informed of Central Government's 
policies;
(iii) to keeping the Protectorate Government informed
134
of important developments in Buganda.
The Agreement thus provided a more precise definition of the Resident's
\
powers and placed the Anglo-Buganda relations, more or less, along the
lines advanced by Mitchell and Dundas in 1939 and 1944 respectively.
The Resident lost his influence over the appointment and dismissal of
chiefs, and his advisory powers were to be exercised "in the full spirit
135of the Agreement". True, the Governor retained certain specific
powers over Buganda's internal affairs, but his former wide and
136discretionary powers were a thing of the past. Under the Agreement,
the terms of which were "legally binding" and subject to literal
interpretation, Buganda's autonomy was confirmed, and so too was the
137Anglo-Buganda special relationship.
Cohen's grand scheme for a unitary state was the first casualty, but the 
Agreement's most serious unforeseen consequence was the revival of the 
"African Local Government" idea and the weakening of the case for the 
development of an efficient and democratic system of local government.
For henceforth, all District Councils pressed for "Home Rule" on the 
Buganda pattern, and though, none were immediately successful, their 
efforts were not was ted :thfe±r .ambit ions were largely realised a few 
years later and given expression in the Independence Constitution, with 
as we shall see, some serious .consequences for national and political unity.
134. The Buganda Agreement, 1955, Article 35.
135. Agreed Recommendations, .op.cit.
136. Vide, Articles 12, 26, 27.
137. Article 2(7) & Legal Notice No.188 of 1955.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.1.1. THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE WESTERN KINGDOMS
The evolution of local government outside Buganda was characterised
by two main factors: the British obsession with tribal considerations,
and the extensive utilization of Baganda Agents "as Tax Collectors and
general intermediaries".  ^ Even in the Western Kingdoms of Ankole, .
Bunyoro and Toro, Baganda Agents were employed to instruct the local
2
chiefs "in the ways of native administration". In the case of Anfeole
and Toro, Lugard's earlier treaty arrangements were confirmed and
subsequently re-arranged on the Buganda pattern. In the case of Bunyoro,
however, no formal Agreement was made* Instead, the Country was treated
3
"as one immediately under the Protectorate Administration." But, in 
view of the Country’s cultural and political affinity with her neighbours 
with which Agreements were made, it was administered as if it were in 
treaty relations with the British Government. Her traditional leaders 
were, however, always reminded that their Country had been "acquired
4
by force of arms."
It would appear that Bunyoro was a victim of adverse publicity in the 
years immediately preceding the establishment of Colonial rule over 
the area. Bunyorofs heinous crime was that her rulers were strongly 
opposed to British overlordship.^ Indeed, efforts were made to resist
1. C.O.536/21/37925 Boyle to Bell. 4.11.1908
2. C.O.5.36/21^7825 Bell to Secretary of State 11.9.08.
3. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Secretary of State 4.8.04.
4. Ibid.
5. F.O.2/202/ Ternan to Salisbury 31.6.1899: Bunyoro1 s adverse publicity
abroad was spread by Samuel Baker, as he was then, following his
quarrel with Kabarega in 1872, when ,the latter refused to acknowledge
, the Khedive Ismail's suzerainty which Baker had offered, on behalf 
of his employers, the Egyptian Government, in return for Baker's 
acceptance to move against Kabarega's rival Ruyonga. Much of this 
Hostility is to be found in Baker's Ismailia, London, 1874.
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BunyoroTs incorporation into the Protectorate and the subordination
of her rulers to British overrule and protection. And, as a result
Bunyoro was always deemed "a hostile country.'1 and in due course,
"its ruler’s name became a synonym for treachery and guile",^ and
it was decided that Kabarega,that "inhuman fiend""should be driven 
0
out". And, so, in April 1899, the indefatigable Kabarega was,
9
having been "most effectively betrayed by the Wakedi", captured
and banished into exile, and his Kingdom placed "under the superintendency
of British officials".^
However, Bunyoro*s ancient system of government, through a hierarchy 
of chiefs, was retained and Kabarega's ten year old son vas put an the throne 
and placed under a regency; but as his appointment was "a Concession" 
the Regents were called "Guardians" and were to exercise their powers 
under the watchful eye of the British Officer in civil charge of 
the district.
As in Buganda, so in Bunyoro, a chiefly council was constituted, but 
unlike the Lukiko, the new council, otherwise known as the Rukurato, 
had no judicial, executive or legislative powers. It was purely an
advisory body.11 Shortly afterwards,however,a civilian,George Wilson was poste 
to Bunyoro. ■ and^ . . asked to introduce a system of civil administration
f
12
into the Country. He reorganised the divisional chiefs and with
See Lugard's Report, dp.cit. p.114.
Low.D.A. The British and Uganda, 1862-1900, D.Phil,Oxford 1957.
F.O.2/200 Evatt to Ternan. 15.4.1899.
Ibid.
Johnston to Evatt. 6.2.1900. UNA/EA 5/9.
It is interesting to note that Buganda was never considered "a 
conquered country", though Mwanga's antics like Kabarega*s had 
given rise"to a great deal of expense in men and money" the raison 
detre for placing Bunyoro "under the superintendency of the European 
officials" and thus denying them the privilege of concluding an 
Agreement with the British Government.
F.O.2/202 Ternan to Secretary of State. 31.6.1899.
F.O.2/858 Wilson to Sadler. 10.3.04.
6.
7.
8. 
9.
10.
11.
12.
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their consent, selected a Muganda Chief "to guide or influence the
13
others in gradually introducing the Uganda system of local government."
Subsequently, "an open Baraza, for the transaction of public business,
was established, and the effect upon the Country at large was promising
so much so that in 1901 a list of chieftainships were compiled and
14
submitted to head office for confirmation." This Wilson hoped would,
in two years1 time, if the new regime proved its "capacity for rule",^"*
be incorporated into a treaty with the British Government on the lines
16
of the Anfcole Agreement. In the event, however, Wilsons
"Provisional Agreement" was largely ignored by successive subcommissioners,
and it soon fell into disuse.^ Nevertheless, the divisional chiefs
continued to exercise certain concessionary powers, "somewhat on the
system obtaining in Ankole and Toro", albeit, under the close supervision
18
of the District Collector. Such jurisdiction, however,, though 
tacitly allowed, had never been statutorily defined, and it was to 
regularise this informal accord, the need for which was triggered by 
the Chiefs1 "excessive and inhumane punishments" that the "Unyoro
19
Native Courts ordinance" was passed and brought into force in 1905.
13. Ibid. The reason for this was stated by Wilson thus: "That system,
I suppose, is universally admitted to be the only one effective with 
this class of native."
14. Ibid. The structure of the traditional chiefs was streamlined and 
for the first time, their, powers defined. The Country was divided 
into 10 administrative areas called Sazas or Counties, and each 
placed under the hierarchy of chiefs on the Buganda pattern. In 
the exercise of his powers, each chief was answerable to the regents 
and the Rukurato over which Wilson himself presided. Other changes 
included the reconstitution of the Rukurato and the imposition of 
taxation to wit, the hut and gun taxes.
15. F.O.2/858 Wilson to Sadler. 10.3.04.
16. Ibid. was
17. Ibid. Towards the end of 1901 Wilson/succeeded by Bagge who in June 1892 
was relieved by Tompkins. The latter1s first administrative act was
to depose the young Kitahimbwa, and instal his elder brother Duhaga 
as King of Bunyoro. In 1903 Tompkins was replaced by Prendergast, 
who until he was invalided home in 1904 had championed the rights 
of the"down-trodden"peasantry at the expense of the chiefs. The 
difficulties brought about by these changes were compounded by the 
'unfortunate tendency to over look records", and not surprisingly 
Wilson's proposal for concluding an Agreement with Bunyoro was never 
carried out
JL£'. F.O.2/858 Wilson to Sadler 10.3.04.
19. F.O.2/858 Ennis to Sadler -
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The ordinance created a four-tier court structure, at the apex 
of which was a Court of Appeal over which the Collector presided.
The Collectors Court had full civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
all persons and over all matters in the district, and any person 
aggrieved by a decision of any of the inferior courts had a right
to present his case to the "Native Appeals Court" for further
. . 20
consideration and decision.
Below the "Native Appeals Court" was"the Court of the Lukiko" over
which the Omukama presided. The Court had both original and appellate
jurisdiction, and the power to hear and determine civil and criminal
causes, such as murder, manslaughter and all major civil cases where
the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute was in excess 
21of 50 rupees.
Next, the ordinance provided for the establishment of "Saza Courts"
coterminous with the administrative counties and presided over by 
22
the County Chiefs. In civil cases the court’s jurisdiction was
limited to causes in which the value of the subject matter in dispute
was 50 rupees or less, whilst its criminal jurisdiction was limited
to minor offences punishable with six months rigorous imprisonment
23
or 12 lashes, or where the maximum fine was 30 rupees. All the
Saza Courts had no appellate jurisdiction.
The lowest courts in the hierarchy were the "Sub-chiefs Courts", 
presided over by the Gombolola Chiefs. Like the County Chiefs’ 
Courts, the Sub-chiefs Courts had limited civil and criminal 
jurisdiction. Each court had power to hear and decide all cases
20. S.5. of No.l. of 1905
21. S.6. of No.l. of 1905
22. No.l. of 1905.
23. Ibid.
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provided that no greater punishment than one month's rigorous
imprisonment, or a fine of 5 rupees or 6 lashes was imposed. In
civil cases, jurisdiction was limited to causes where the amount of
24
the subject matter m  dispute was less than 15 rupees. In trying
cases, all courts were to be guided by a code of practice and
procedure drawn up by the High Court, the object of which was to
ensure that minimum standards were maintained throughout the district.
These, rules were, in fact, no more than a restatement of the rules
of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram pertem rule. It
was provided, for instance, that no man, subject to Rule 5, should be
25
condemned in his absence, and unheard. In criminal cases the
accused had a right to make a statement, put questions and call
witnesses, as he saw fit. Likewise, in civil cases, the parties had
a right to state their respective cases, call witnesses and were at
26
liberty to cross examine such witnesses. All cases were to be 
disposed of in accordance with the principles of substantial justice, 
without undue regard to technicalities of procedure, and without 
undue delay. ^
Considering that the magisterial "junctions of chiefs were inseparable
28from their political and administrative duties", the administration
had sought to place all the Chiefly Courts under the control of the
Executive rather than the Judiciary. It was contended that Native
Courts were Courts of Special Jurisdiction, that the Country was
not sufficiently advanced for a separate and regular system of inferior
courts answerable to the High Courts, and that, per force, direct
subordination to the High Cpurt of the jurisdiction exercised by the
29
Chiefs, was "a measure to be deprecated." In these early days, the
24. Noll, of 1905
25. Rule 5 stated: civil cases may be heard in the absence of the 
defendant when due notice of the time and place of hearing has been 
given to the defendant.
26. Rules 2,3 and 4
27 F.O. 2/875 Sadler to Lawnsdowne (Draft Rules).
2PV'F.0,2/894- Wilson to La nsdowne.10.2.04.
£9.. F.O.2/894 Sadler, to La nsdowrie 4.8.04,.___________ ^ ___________:_______
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administration was concerned lest the judiciary "might overturn
the coach by overloading it with technicalities unsuitable in native 
30
procedure." The official view was that:-
"the institution of High Court supervision over 
Native Courts in countries of crude conventions 
must inevitably lead to increased obtrusion of 
European interference into native methods of 
jurisdiction." 31
Worse, it was contended that the High Court judges, with their limited
knowledge of local conditions, could not in fact, exercise effective
control over Native Courts in rural areas. The only difficulty was
Ennis* contention on which his draft ordinance was based, namely, that
Native Courts, inso far as they exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction
were, under the order in Council of 1902, courts subordinate to the 
32High Court. Inter alia, this meant that these courts had to
exercise their jurisdiction, in accordance with the rules made by the
33High Court. The Commissioner was "strongly averse to this", however,
and in submitting the draft Ordinance to the Secretary of State, for
the Colonies, vigorously contested Ennis* interpretation of the Order
in Council, 1902, and strongly recommended the amendment, if need be, of
the Order in Council, so as to leave the control of Native Courts, in
34
the hands of the commissioner. To this, the Administrative Branch
30. It was principally for this reason that Wilson strongly argued 
"that the making of rules of practice and procedure be placed 
in the hands of the Commissioner, confident that there will be 
thus secured a sympathetic bond between administrative officers 
and native which is indispensable in promoting content among 
the people." (F.O.2/894 Wilson to Secretary of State.10.2.05).
31. F.O. 2/894. Wilson to La nsdowne. 10.2.05.
32. F.O. 2/895 Ennis to Wilson.3.1.05. Ennis* contention was based
on s.15(1) of the Order in Council, which provided that the High 
Court had " full jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all persons 
and over all matters in Uganda."'
33. As provided by s.22(l). Uganda Order in Council, 1902.
34. F.0.2/894. Sadler to La /nsdowne, op.cit.
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at the Colonial Office, did not demur, the Legal Department,
36
however, disagreed, but recanted after some arm twisting, and
37
put a liberal interpretation on s.22(1) of the Order in Council,
thus resolving the conflict and so enabled the Commissioner to frame
the requisite rules of practice and procedure, instead of the High
38
Court judges, as he wished, to the chagrin of the Judiciary.
The importance of this correspondence can hardly be over emphasised.
It underscores the importance the British attached to Native Courts 
in the development of local government institutions, and sheds some 
light on the origins of the dual control of Native Courts and helps 
to explain why this dichotomy of responsibility, despite its drawbacks, 
remained a central feature of British judicial policy until the late
35. F.O. 2/895 Bottomley's minute to Read 12.4.05. "The principle 
involved in the establishment, of these courts is based on the 
experience and local knowledge of Wilson and Col.Sadler, and it 
would be a mistake, to upset it."
Read's Minute reads: "Col.Sadler spoke to me strongly on this 
subject, and I concur In his views. The simpler the judicial 
machinery in these undeveloped countries the better. If Mr.Ennis' 
view is correct as to the interpretation of the 0 in C ., the 
difficulty is at worst a technical one and can be got over 
by amending the Order in Council."
36. F.O.2/895 Cox to Antrobus 18.5.05. Cox's minute reads:
"I agree with Mr. Risley. I th.ink it is essential that the Supreme 
Court should have powers of revision and control over Native Courts, 
otherwise as in the Gol'ddCdast extortion and officerism 
will be liable to spring up in the Native Courts. The Commissioner's 
fears as to technicalities are natural but unfounded.
37. S.22(1) provided: "Subject to the provisions of any Ordinance, 
the High Court may,with the approval of the Governor, make rules 
for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court and 
of all other Courts which may be established in Uganda."
38. F.O.2/895. In advising the Secretary of State, Antrobus stated:
"I think his fear [ie. the Commissioner's] is not unfounded 
and I would therefore proceed as proposed by Mr.Risley. The 
Commissioner when making rules will no doubt consult his legal 
adviser, or hopefully, the judges."
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1950s. Moreover, it settled once and for all, the future pattern
of Native Courts in the non-Agreement Districts; for the principle
of the "Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance", was extended to Busoga 
39later that year, and m  subsequent years, to the Eastern,
Northern and Western provinces, including the two "little Kingdoms" 
of Ankole and Toro to which we now turn* Of interest here are 
the "Native Agreements" and their interpretation by the Protectorate 
Government with special reference to the latter1s relations with 
the Ankole and Toro "Native Governments".
3.2.1. THE ANGL0-T0R0 RELATIONS: THE SETTING
The formal relations between the "little Kingdom of Toro" and the
Protectorate Government were regulated by the Toro Agreement of
40 . .
1900, and the subsequent subsidiary Agreements, the earliest
examples of which were the Toro Agreement (Poll Tax), 1910, and the
41
Toro Agreement (Judicial), 1912. The latter, as the names imply,
embodied central government policies of general application, throughout
42
the Protectorate, and will not be discussed here. The main Agreement, 
on the other hand, was based, albeit erroneously, on Toro’s indigenous
39. C.O. 536/2/33072 Sadler to Secretary of State. 16.8.05. The 
Ordinance itself was based on the System obtaining under 
Agreement in Ankole and Toro Districts.
40. For detailed accounts of the emergence of the Kingdom of Toro, 
see Ingham, K, The Kingdom of Toro in Uganda, Methuen, 1975;
Furley, 0, Kasagama of Toro, Ug. Journal. Vol.25 (1961)
pp. 184-198; and Vol.31 (1967), pp 183-190;Wilson, J.F.M. A History of the 
Kingdom of Toro In the. Western of Uganda to 1900. (MA Thesis,Mhkarere
University). I97Z.
*41. The Toro Agreement,1900, Uganda Laws, Revised Edition (1951)
42. -Toro Agreement (Rail Tax) , 1910.
Toro Agreement (Judicial), 1912.
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political institutions and was, throughout the Protectorate 
period, the core of the Anglo-Toro relations. Hence, its prominence 
of place here. It would appear, however, that though generally 
followed, it was on account of the events which pre-dated it, 
occasionally disregarded by divers - District Officers. It is 
pertinent, therefore, before examining the main terms of the
a
Agreement; including its interpretation and implementation, to 
cast, a quick glance at some of these events. The origins of the 
Kingdom of Toro, like those of its ancestor, the Kingdom of 
Bunyoro-Kitara, are shrouded in mystery, and not unnaturally, read 
like a fairy-tale. The same cannot, however, be said of its later 
revival in the 1890s, for, henceforth, the Country's history can 
fairly easily be eked out from contemporary records; and these show 
that the Kingdom of Toro was created a monarchy, as Kenneth Ingham puts 
it, through the "initiative of an adventurous Englishman and the 
opportunism of the son of a former ruler:" the adventurer was
43Captain F.D.Lugard and the opportunist prince was Daudi Kasagama.
The two, both inexperienced and relatively young men, met in Buganda, 
some 200 miles away from Toro, and their eventful encounter has been 
related by Lugard, and like Toro's origins, reads like an imaginary 
tale:
"On 5th July,. 1891 Zachariah came to see me, and 
brought four sheep and a quantity of food and co. 
as presents. He brought a young man, of an extremely 
prepossessing appearance. This young man together 
with an older man named Yafeti were, he said, close 
relatives of Kabarega*s and of the royal family of 
Unyoro. They say they can raise Toro to their 
standard, and that if they send on messengers 
there the people will not fly from us but will join 
us .against Kabarega whose tyrannies are detested.
Now all this reads like the variest fiction which 
I could possibly have invented to dovetail with my 
wishes. I cannot hope that it is true, Inshallah, 
this may yet prove a trump card." 44
43. Ingham,K. The Kingdom of Toro in Uganda, op.cit.p.3.
44. Lugard,F.'D. The Diaries of Lord Lugard, (Ed.) Margery Perham, 
Vols. 1,2,3, Faber and Faber, London 1959.
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Indeed, there is little doubt that Kasagama's arrival at Lugard’s
make-shift camp in Buddu in View of the-.'latter's plans to secure the
Salt Lake at Katwe w a s . a piece of good fortune. It was Lugard’s manna
and he seized it with both hands. He immediately set off for Katwe,
hurriedly traversed Ankole and, almost without resistence, captured
and garrisoned the Katwe Salt Lake and shortly afterwards resumed his
trek to the West. He arrived in Toro in early August, drew up the
Lugard-Kasagama Treaty and, on August 14, enthroned his protege, and
45
placed him under the direct control of Frederick de Winton. Lugard’s 
Co-adjunctor and the Company Director^ son. De Winton's brief was to 
support and uphold Kasagama’s administrative and judicial powers.
"Your immediate task [de Winton was urged] will be 
to accompany the King Kasagama on a tour through Toro, 
and assist him in every way to redress grievances, 
especially with regard to any wrongs done to the 
natives by the Soundanese, to establish law and order 
in the Country, and appoint officials and heads of 
districts and restore refuges to their shambas, and 
drive out any remaining chiefs of Kabarega's who 
return to pillage the Country and murder the people." 46
45. The Treaty's preamble specifically stated that:
"I, Kasagama, who am son of Nyaika, the last King of 
Toro, who Kabarega drove out and conquered, having 
now been brought back to my father’s Country, and 
made King of Toro by the British, do hereby bind 
myself by the following treaty, which has this day 
been made between Captain Lugard acting on behalf 
of the Imperial British East Africa Company on the 
one part, and myself and Yafeti my cousin on the 
other hand."
46. C.6848 (1893) Instructions to F.de Winton, Kavari,
November, 27. 1891.
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Kasagama's rule, was, however, limited to central Toro, the so-
called Toro proper, thus leaving Busongora, Butuku, Kitagwenda
and Mboga counties outside his jurisdiction. These sub-regions
were, for the time being, to remain under their former chiefs and,
of course, under de Winton's benign authority. Not unnaturally,
Kasagama resented these arrangements and he was caustically
reminded that he "had his hands very full" and that he had yet to
47
prove "his capacity for rule." Before Kasagama could do so,
however, the company intimated its desire to abandon Uganda, "as 
too great a burden". And, as might be expected, Kabarega, sooner 
rather than later realised the significance of the company’s 
withdrawal, and lostno time in attacking and overrunning Toro.
The news of Kasagama's plight reached Kampala in late December, 1893, 
and early in the new year, Col. Colvile, the new commissioner, 
dispatched an armed expedition, under Major Owen, to Kasagama's 
rescue, and on the 3rd March, 1894, the latter was, once again, 
having been forced to sign away his birthrights, "made King of Toro"; 
and though, too harsh and onerous, the Owen settlement was a watershed 
in the Anglo-Toro relations. Henceforward, Kasagamai was . accepted as 
the traditional Ruler of Toro, and in due course it became British 
policy to support and uphold his rule and dignity. However, this
47. The Diaries of Lord Lugard op.cit., ""I said that Kasagama had 
his hands very full at present to settle Toro proper and until 
he had done so, he need not come, to me with any questions or 
requests regarding Busongora. First I wanted to see his capacity 
for rule. If I found he could rule and settle his country, I 
would enlarge it, but first I wanted to see the heads of districts 
appointed, officers of state, a law of the land, a court of jiustice, 
etc., throughout all the country from No.l.stockatLe (Wavertree) 
on the North to Rwenzori on the west and No.4. on the South here. 
When he had instituted law and order i.here, I would add /Busongora - 
and perhaps Butuku, also the country to, the West of Rwenzori and 
to the boundary of British dominions,. but first I must see his 
capacity for rule."
94
commitment soon ran into difficulties, but was subsequently 
honoured and many of its elements incorporated into the Toro 
Agreement of 1900 between Kasagama and his chiefs on the one hand, 
and Sir Harry Johnston, on behalf of the British Government, on the 
other.
3.2.2. THE TORO AGREEMENT, 1900
Having detailed S.S.Bagge, the Collector, to prepare Kasagama and his
4 9
Chiefs for the proposed "Agreement", Johnston left Kampala for Toro 
in April, and in late June, in open baraza, set out in broken swahili, 
the terms of the third Anglo-Toro Agreement, somehow secured Kasagama f;s 
approval, and hurriedly returned to base, leaving the bemused chiefs 
to ponder over his unilateral settlement. In fact, the new charter 
was somewhat similar to the Owen Treaty of 1894. Thus for example, 
Kasagama was simultaneously "made King of Toro" and Saza or County Chief 
of "Toro proper", one of the counties into which, for administrative 
purposes, the Kingdom of Toro was divided.
48. The fact that kasagama owed his position to the British was viewed 
by some District Officers as a licence to do pretty much what they 
conceived to be in the interests of the country regardless of 
Kasagama1 s feelings or views on the matter. Many did not accord 
Kasagama, in the words of his mentor (Lugard) "the respect due to
a King". Instances abound whereby Kasagama was publically rebuked, 
humiliated and "fined as a low common thief ;|, Even the most ardent 
supporters of traditional rulers were inclined to regard Kasagama 
as a "pompous upstart". (See C.0.536/139/5766). On the other hand, 
Kasagama insisted on his. rightgul Kingly authority and autonomy 
despite the new situation. Consequently, he was always in trouble 
with officials, especially during the early years of British 
overrule. (See, 536/6/19337).
49. Having spent three months in Buganda negotiating the Uganda 
Agreement, 1900, Johnston believed that this would facilitate his 
Toro mission. There was, however, "consternation" when Kasagama 
and the chiefs heard of the tax proposals. Kasagama~believed, and 
subsequent events vindicated him, that a considerable number of 
people would migrate to the neighbouring Congo to avoid taxation. 
Additionally the wisdom of imposing taxation on a people without
. due regard to their ability to pay was questionable. But Sir 
Harry, owing to his mandate was in a hurry to concern himself 
with the niceties of tax policy*.
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Worse, Bwamba, one of Toro’s traditional counties was left in 
the hands of the District Collector, and excluded from Kasagama's 
jurisdiction. Having thus misinterpreted the Country's political 
organisation, and appropriated for the Crown all the waste and un­
cultivated land, forests, mines, minerals and salt deposits, the 
Agreement proceeded to make provision for the imposition of Hut and 
Gun taxes, the abolition of the traditional octroi, and the maintenance 
of law and order.^ Thus the Anglo-Toro relations could hardly have 
started on a more sour note. The "Toro Agreement” , 1900 was arguably
no "agreement" at all; it was an imposition from above, and , indeed
there was no consensus ad idem.
For the Batoro, however, their new constitutional settlement suffered 
from five major defects which, incidentally could have been avoided 
had its framers paid special attention to Toro's traditional system 
of government. These defects were, in 1906, fully set out in a 
petition, to the Protectorate Authorities, in the following terms:
"In our treaty.there are five matters which are not satisfactory 
to us.- We petition that they may be put right this time.
1. We do not want our King to have two positions, that 
of King and of a Saza Chief. We want him to be the
King of the whole country, but not to be reckoned
amongst the Saza Chiefs.
2. We want to add 4 more Saza Chiefs to the eight, who 
were not written down in the treaty, but who were Saza 
Chiefs in Toro before the treaty came. So we petition
the Government to Restore Mikaeli, Kimbugwa, Zakalia Kaima, 
Mariko Mukwenda and Tito Sekibobo. And when the district
50. Vide, the Toro Agreement, 1900. Articles 3 -6
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of Bwamba shall be settled, by the Government, we 
petition that Nicodemu Kasaija, be restored, he is 
the 5th Saza Chief.^ And we pe:tition that these 
5 be made equal to the other Saza Chiefs who are 
recognised in the treaty, having the same position 
and the same privileges to houses, guns, land (miles) 
and a tenth of the "musolo". And we promise that if 
these matters be so arranged, the whole country will 
go forward.
3. We petition that a Saza Chief may have power to appoint 
his heir, but when the Saza Chief dies, the Lukiko and the 
Government shall discuss whether to accept him. In the 
event of the heir being rejected the next of kin would
succeed. If Saza Chief turned out for his own fault,
his successor shall be chosen by the whole Lukiko and the 
Government representatives.
4. About the (miles) land we have not yet understood; we
petition that the matter be rediscussed and that we may
have the opportunity to talk it over.
5. The Kabaka agrees to allow his tenth as "Saza" Chief of
Toro to go to the 4 new S.aza Chiefs. But the tenth of
what shall be collected in the capital (kibuga) he wishes
52
to be given to the Katikiro as the reward of his work.
51. Here follows a list of chiefs who were to be made redundant.
52. Under the Toro Agreement, 1900, the Katikiro was granted 16 sq.mls. 
of private estate and 10.sq.mls. of official estate equal to that 
of the Saza Chiefs under his and over whom'- he had precedence.
"But he has never received any pay beyond what has been from
time to time doled out to him by the Kabaka." (Wilson to Secretary 
of State, dispatch No.82. at C.0.536/6/19339) also see dispatch 
No. 81. of 21.5.1906 at C.0.536/6/19338).
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The boundaries of the capital shall be fixed by
the Collector and the map be kept in the office.
And for the large amount of work which the Katikiro
will do all the Saza Chiefs who are written down
agree to bring to the King one-twentieth of the
rupees from the taxes which they will be given, and
Katikiro shall be given them by the King year by 
53
year.
The petitioners were thus anxious to bring the 1900 Agreement into line 
with the prevailing political realities that Johnston had overlooked 
and largely ignored at the time he thrust its terms down their throats.
Maddox’s account of the ceremony at which the Agreement was signed sheds
some light on the origins of Kasagama’s grievances and deserves a full 
quotation. It reads as follows:
"The natives were called together one morning and the 
document which was typewritten in English, was verbally 
rendered into Swahili by Sir Harry Johnston and 
translated into Luganda by the interpreter, Yosiya.
No questions were allowed, but the King and the Chiefs 
though asking time for translation and discussion, were 
compelled to sign it then and there, under penalty of 
bfeing instantly deprived of their, chieftainships. They 
therefore signed a document of the contents of which 
they were practically ignorant, and the same with the
Commissioner’s consent they brought it to me for
translation* Soon after this I had- some conversation
with Sir Harry Johnston and he consented to add the 
schedule respecting estates to be granted to some of 
the Chiefs in the Toro sub-division." 54
53. On the 16th January, 1906, the Lukiko drew up another petition re. 
the rights over mineral deposits, including salt, iron ore, gold 
and silver; and the reorganisation of the Sazas and Gcrmbololas.
In addition the Lukiko petitioned that the succession to the Omukamaship 
of Toro should be entailed in the family of Kaboyo, that "so long as 
the Kabaka and Chiefs of Toro shall abide by the words of the 
Agreement, no one who is not a Muto.ro by birth shall succeed to 
become a member of the Lukiko. Finally, the Lukiko demanded that 
"a certain mileage of forest be allowed to all the chiefs in their 
private estates, where forests occur, for building purposes."
54. C.0.536/6/19337. Maddox to Wilson. 3.9.1905.
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Kasagama*s allegations were, in 1901, looked into and sustained 
by the Commissioner’s trouble shooter, George Wilson, the then 
Deputy Commissioner.
Wilson’s findings are a terrible indictment of Johnston’s treaty 
making processes and are on all fours with Maddox’s account quoted 
above, and make interesting reading.
"In 1901, I was deputed by the Special Commissioner 
to look into certain troubles [in Toro, in connection 
with the Toro Agreement, 1900.] The whole country 
were as one in expressing feeling that the terms of 
the Agreement of 1900 were unjust to them [and that] 
it had been somewhat arbitrarily forced upon them and 
the missionary who had acted as interpreter in the 
original negotiations assured me that the natives were 
not far from correct. My experience in respect of the 
Uganda Agreement convinced me that while it contained 
principles vital to the Country's progress and general 
welfare, and so should be held sacred as far as 
fundamental elements were concerned, some of the details 
disclosed lack of local knowledge and so would bear, with 
some advantage, further consideration in arranging for 
their precise operation. The same policy would apply 
to Toro. There can be no manner of doubt [for example] 
that when Captain Lugard installed Kasagama as Kabaka, 
he in no sense meant him to be a Saza [chief as well].
Besides,, jurisdiction suffers, the system of native courts 
is deranged and altogether the chiefs deposed from the 
Sazaships by the Agreement hold an anomalous position, 
for though officially unrecognised in actual practice 
they have still to exert the authority of ‘ Saza chiefs 
in the maintenance of order and collection of revenue; 
and all this they do without remuneration other than 
voluntary and uncertain contributions from Kasagama." 55.
Wilson's recommendations were, however, rejected by the outgoing 
Commissioner, Col. Hayes-Sedler, who was unwilling to interfere with 
his predecessor's settlement. He nevertheless directed Knowles, the 
Acting Sub-Commissioner, Western Province, to inquire into the situation 
and report to the incoming Commissioner, Sir Hesketh-Bell.
55. C.O. 536/6/19337 Wilson to Sadler 17.10.1905.
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Rnowle’:s report, like Wilson’s, was generally sympathetic, to 
Kasagama's cause, and it too, vividly stated that the:
".. dissatisfaction said to exist among the chiefs 
relative to their Agreement with Her Majesty’s 
Government was valid; that the Agreement suffered 
from several defects and that the chief’s requests 
were just and fair; and advised the Commissioner 
accordingly.11 56
In view of the history of this controversy, however, Knowle's report 
was, in April, sent to the Colonial Office for further consideration 
and advice, and two months' later, the Commissioner received the 
Secretary of State's decision that the Toro Agreement 1900 should be 
amended in accordance with the wishes of the petitioners set out in 
Knowle’s Report.
Bell, however, had other ideas. He decided to shelve the Secretary of 
State's decision until, it was argued, he had had time to acquaint 
himself with the Country, the people and the issues involved. Kasagama 
was kept waiting and worse, in the dark. In fact, the real reason 
for Bell’s dithering was that he was totally against the proposed land 
settlement. He thus told Lord Elgin that:-
”This Government is already pledged to so large an 
expenditure on the delimitation of Native Estates in 
the Kingdom of Uganda, that I should greatly hesitate 
to advise your Lordship to allow a similar arrangement 
in the other provinces of this Protectorate." 57.
Unfortunately, however, Bell’s procrastination soon crystallised into
Protectorate policy, which though vigorously opposed by Kasagama and
his chiefs; and, in spite of its adverse effects on their morale,
authority and efficiency, was for the next ten years relentlessly
56. C.0.536/3/19337. Inc. No.3. to No. 80. of 21.4.1906.
57. C.0.536/6/19339 Bell to Lord Elgin.
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pursued by the Protectorate Governments: the Secretary of State's
ruling was, with the passage of time, completely ignored by both the 
Uganda Authorities and the Colonial Office. But Kasaigama and his 
chiefs never gave up the struggle; and in 1926, still unaware of 
Lord Elgin's favourable decision, decided quiet diplomacy having failed, 
to give public vent to their plight. They innocently believed that 
this approach might do the trick. But they were mistaken. Kasagama's 
public protest did not have the desired effect; it did not lead to 
a fair and just land settlement, on the contrary, it was misconstrued and, 
as the following discussion shows, it nearly cost him. his crown. He 
was publically ridiculed, humiliated and indeed, interdicted, albeit 
for a few months, from his Kingdom. He was exiled at Entebbe, courtesy 
of the Governor.
3.2.3. KASAGAMA'S "DISLOYAL" ADDRESS
Kasagama's unprecedented public remonstrance with his overlord, 
for the latter's failure to resolve the thirty year old land teaser, 
took the form of an open letter to the Western Provincial Commissioner, 
P.W.Cooper, at his farewell public Baraza, at Fort Portal. Kasagama's 
valedictory address, of which the following is a literal interpretation 
was as follows:-
nWe thank, God for keeping you well Mr. Cooper, for
the .time you have stayed here administering with us
without any danger in your life and we wish prosperity 
and peace until you reach your home. We inform you in 
the name of Toro that although you are going you have 
done absolutely nothing good for us by which we can 
remember you, you have left us only trouble as follows: 58
58. "It appears that one hour before the Baraza assembled this letter was
discussed with the Saza chiefs and the Katikiro. The Katikiro (a Muganda) 
strongly advised that the letter should not be read out, and refused to 
have anything, to do with it. In this he was supported by one Saza chief, 
namely the Kitunzi, while the remaining voted for the production and
reading of the letter. (Gowers to Secretary of State) . NOTE that this
is a translation, which apart from being disjointed, is apt to
xdsKpresent the Intentions of the original letter.
101
&d) You have made our country Crown land in a
wonderful way in which we cannot understand.
(b) We wrote a letter to H.E., our letter explaining 
about Butaka, you did nothing at all about it.
But you only hid it.
(c) We wrote our letter regarding salt, but you only 
hid it, and it never went.
(d) See now when you are going you brought a man who 
does not at all like our nation, Mr.Sullivan. 59
(e) Now we say good-bye to you. In our opinion we 
would not want you to administer us again. But 
only wish you prosperity with your wife to be in 
peace." 60
While admitting that there might be "some grounds for grievance in
the minds" of the landless chiefs, the Protectorate Authorities,
the Governor in particular, regarded Kasagama's letter as "insulting"
and "in reality a most improper, offensive and disloyal act directed
against the Protectorate Government [rather than] a public reproof of
61
the Provincial Commissioner."
59. Mr.Sullivan,D.C., Toro, 1922-1923 "showed a disposition to 
support the peasantry against extortion and oppression by the 
chiefs and in consequence was not a persona grata to the Mukama 
or the chiefs." Thus Gowers stated the reasons for naming 
Sullivan.. The Omukama's version of the story' runs:
"The cause of our mentioning Mr. Sullivan was this. When he 
was the D.C., Toro, there was no good co-operation between 
both His Majestic and Native Governments. When H.E. Sir G.Archer 
understood our feelings he transferred Mr.Sullivan to another 
station. Now when the people heard of his coming back to Toro 
as acting P.C. were afraid that the former trouble will happen 
again." (Kasagama to Gowers 13.3.1926)
60. C.O.536/139/5166 Enclosure No.l. to Conf. of 21.5.1926.
61. C.O.536/139/5166 Gowers to the Secretary of State 21.5.1926.
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The underlying motive, the Governor contended was "a political one",
namely, the determination to resist projected reforms which, though
admittedly for the benefit of the tribe as a whole, and the peasant
in particular, were unacceptable to Kasagama and his chiefs who feared
that they "would diminish the possibility of extortion and exploitation
62
of the peasant by the ruling classes." This attitude of mind,
Gowers explained was partly due to "the delay on the part of the
Government in formulating the new Land Law and the hope against
continued assurances to the contrary that freehold estates on the
63
Buganda model" would be granted to the landless chiefs.
Kasagama's letter was thus misconstrued and retribution meted out
accordingly: Gower's reaction was swiff and strong. Kasagama was
hastily despatched to Entebbe and interdicted there and kept away
from his people for two months. He was fined one thousand shillings,
ordered to read "an ample apology in open Baraza',' and forced to
"retract unreservedly the contents of his letter to the Provincial 
64
Commissioner."
62. tJ.Q,536/139/5166 op.cit.
63. Ibid
64. C.0.536/139/5166 Kasagama1s apology which was drafted by the 
Chief Secretary, was as follows:
"I, Daudi Kyebambe, Mukama of Toro, on behalf of myself and my 
chiefs, in the presence of all chiefs of Toro here assembled in 
full Baraza, and in the hearing of the people of Toro retract'fully 
and unreservedly the entire contents of the farewell address to 
Mr.P.C.Cooper, O.B.E., Provincial Commissioner, Western Province, 
as I now fully admit that it was expressed in insolent language 
and was calculated to give serious offence to His Majesty's 
Representative in Uganda.
I acknowledge the justice of the severe reprimand inflicted on me 
and also of the imposition of the fine of Shs. 1,000 to be paid into 
the Rukurato Fund. I desire to offer a humble apology to Mr.Cooper 
and to the British Administration. I hereby promise, that I will 
never be guilty of similar misconduct and that I will fulfil my 
duty in accepting loyally the orders of the Governor of Uganda 
and in following the directions of those officers of the Protectorate 
who are appointed from time to time to administer the District of 
Toro, and that it will be my endeavour to act in all matters in 
a constitutional manner."
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Gower's own account of these events sheds some light on the
Anglo-Toro relation over the preceeding years and reads as follows:
"For the past 30 years the Mukama's record has been one 
of consistent dislike of, and resistence to, the advice 
and guidance of the Officers of the Administration who 
have on various occasions been appointed to the Toro 
District. Written records by no fewer than 18 of these 
officers testify to this fact - three Governors have had 
to intervene .... and I attach copies of minutes from 
which it will be seen that each of my predecessors had 
occasion severely to reprove the Mukama and to convey 
to him a most serious warning. Following on the reproof 
and warning conveyed to him by Sir.G.Archer some two years 
the Mukama returned to Toro in company with Mr.Cooper 
and, until the event which forms the occasion of this 
report appeared to have appreciated the wisdom of adopting 
a more reasonable and courteous attitude towards the local 
administration.
While admitting that there may be some grounds for grievance 
in the minds of the Mukama and chiefs, I cannot admit that 
this in any way mitigates their action.
In view of the Mukama1s past record I was at the time 
considering the advisability of recommending to you that 
he should be suspended from office for a period of one or 
two months. However, on the 1st April, the Mukama put in a 
further written statement in explanation of his conduct.
After due consideration of all factors, I and the Executive 
Council agreed that the situation would be met by the reading 
in open Baraza of an ample apology by the Mukama and the 
payment of a fine by him and the Saza chiefs concerned.
Accordingly an apology was drafted and was sent to the Mukama 
with a covering memo by the Chief Secretary.65 .•
He signified his readiness to read the apology in open 
Baraza and duly signed the draft as a mark of his acceptance 
of the terms.
After the Mukama had accepted the terms of the apology, I 
accorded him a personal interview during which I told him 
that the incident could now be regarded as closed, and that
he could return to Toro and take up his duties  I think
the action I have taken has had a very salutary^ effect on 
the Mukama, and I sincerely trust this severe reprimand, and 
the fact that he was interdicted from office, for two months, 
will have taught him a lesson which he will not easily forget." 66
65. C.0.536/139/5166 Memo of 1.5.1926. The Chief Secretary's memo, 
inter alia, read as follows:
"His Excellency, the Governor, is constrained to make his feelings 
of strong displeasure by administering to you this severe censure.
 On receiving a written undertaking from you expressing your
willingness to comply with the above order, His Excellency will be 
prepared to cancel your interdiction and permit you to return to 
Fort Portal and resume your duties.
66. C.O. 536/139/5166 Gower to Secretary of State. 21.5.1926.
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So, for the umpteenth time, Kasagama was berated, humbled and
illegally punished for claiming his r.egal rights and privileges.
And, though there was no suggestion that he should be dethroned,
partly because he had committed no offence, or broken any law;
and partly because he was irrepressible, he was nevertheless told,
in no uncertain terms that he owed his position to the British,
that he should respect his mentors, and that he had nothing to grumble
about. Needless to say that these gross insults, though not uncommon,
in those early days of Colonial rule, were, in this instance, uncouth
and uncalled for. There is little doub.t that without Kasagama1 s
intervention and subsequent collaboration, the British would have
67
found the Barasura a hard nut to crack. Indeed, it was Kasagama
who turned some ten or so disparate counties into the Kingdom of Toro,
over which, under H.M.Majesty's protection, he presided, for over
thirty years. He. thus need not have been subjected to some of these
indignities; he clearly deserved better "tutors". His superior regal
qualities, however, were such that, though he lost many a battle, he
never gave up, and he did not suffer in vain. For, following his
unregal treatment, the Governor, albeit belatedly, and more importantly,
uncharacteristically, relented and appointed a two man. committee to
6 8
re-examine the issues in question.
In their report the committee rightly noted that the Toro Agreement,1900 
was vague and, in many ways inconsistent, with Toro’s indigenous political 
institutions, and that the land provisions were particularly inadequate , 
and unfair to Kasagama and his chiefs. They, therefore made specific 
recommendations on this and other grievances, including the status of 
Bwamba and the Salt Lakes’ tie venue s. These recommendations were
approved by the Secretary of State in 1927 and brought into force shortly
67. The Barasura were the dreaded Kabarega's warriors.
68. The Committee consisted of two government officials,
M r . C.E.Sullivan and Mr.H.B.Thomas.
69. See. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into t h * ,
Mukama and the People of Toro,Ug.Govt*Printer.Entebbe.19^%S. the
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afterwards, thus restoring the honour of the Toro leadership.
Their personal "Ekitibwa" was greatly enhanced and this began a 
new era of good and cordial Anglo-Toro relations, and until his 
death on 31 December, 1928, Kasagama did honour his pledges, and so, 
too, did the Protectorate Government. There is little doubt, however, 
that this uneasy truce was bought at too high a price; and the 
question which suggests itself is whether this abusive farce could 
have been avoided, or at least averted? It is not easy, at this 
point in time, to offer a categorical answer one way or the other, 
but the conduct of the Anglo-Ankole relations, discussed below, is 
refreshingly illuminating. It vividly shows that the Ankole 
Agreement, 1901, and as a corollary, the Toro Agreement, 1900, was, 
despite its weaknesses, a serviceable, flexible instrument, and that, 
with good will and sympathetic interpretation » Gower^ resolute 
and unyielding approach was unnecessary, unwarranted and, as. it 
happened, counter-productive.
70. C.O. 536/143/14001. 
15.1.1927.
L.S.Amery to Governor of Uganda.
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3.3.1. THE ANGLO-ANKOLE RELATIONS
The first British agents to reach Ankole were H.M.Stanley, in 1889,
and Captain F.D. Lugard, in 1891. Having made bloodbrotherhood
with the King’s emissary, Stanley effected a treaty under which
Ankole*s rulers, chiefs and elders surrendered "all their rights
to him", or his representative, they even went farther and agreed
to cede to him all "the sover£;ign rights of government over [their
Country] for ever." ^  These rights and privileges having been
granted to the Imperial British East African Company and confirmed by
Lugard's treaty with Ntare's envoy, were subsequently, on the demise
of the Company, in 1895, acquired by the Crown. But, it was not
until 1898, following Mwanga's revolt and flight to the German
territory, that the Acting Commissioner, Col. Ternan, decided to
bring Ankole under effective British administration. The Commissioner's
main concern was to ensure that the authorities in Ankole should not
give aid and comfort to the ex-King of Buganda and his allies. To
this end, he sent Macallister to Ankole, to establish a "Government
72
Station" at Mbarara and take charge of the Country. In late
December of that year, Macallister reached Ankole and found the
Country in turmoil: for the years 1895-8 were marked by various
calamaties, including famine, invasions, pestilence and succession
wars, a state of affairs that blended rather well with his plans.
He immediately capitalized on the prevailing chaos, pitched his
makeshift camp near Mbarara, and shortly afterwards, the youthful
King Kahaya of Ankole, whom he had earlier put on the throne, "moved
73
his village near the newly established"Government Station",
71. The full text of'the treaty is to be found in Hertslet's Map of 
Africa fey Treaty. Frank Cass & Co.London,1895.
72. UNA/A4/28, Macallister's Report, 1.6.1899.
73. UNA/A4/28. Macallister's Report, 1.6.1899.
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and so the Anglo-Ankole relations began. Several chiefs,
formerly independent of Kahaya's predecessors, were without much
difficulty, albeit, with "much blood shed" brought under the control
74
of the new regime, and forced to acknowledge Kahaya’s authority.
Prominent among these were Chief Musinga of Igara, Ndibarema of 
Buhweju,, and Nduru of Buzimba. And by 1901, the Kingdom of Ankole 
which originally consisted of four disparate counties, was a compact 
stretch of territory and three times its former size. It now 
consisted of ten administrative counties "of Bunyaruguru, Buzimba, 
Bwawezo, Ibanda, Isingiro, Mitoma, Ngarama (Shema and Kashiri), 
Nyabushozi, Nshera and Rwampara.
Kahaya's position, however, was as may be gleaned from Macallisterfs 
despatches, as precarious as ever.
"During the last month the virtual deposition of 
the Kabaka of Ankole and the appointment of chiefs 
to districts have caused some little excitement, but 
it may safely be said that the state of affairs is 
satisfactory. [Kahaya] at first objected to his loss 
of title and taxes. I told him that the chiefs would 
be expected to supply him with food, as he is their 
principal chief, but that I would not enforce any 
King’s taxes in future, it being a matter between him 
and his people, and quiet optional." 76
74. UNA/A4/28 Macallister’s Report. 1.6.1899.
75. The Ankole Agreement, 1900. See also F.O.C.P. 7694 (1901) 
Wilson to Jackson 3.8.1901. Further boundary adjustments 
were, so as to secure greater administrative convenience, 
effected by the Ankole Agreement (Boundaries) of 1923.
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Kahaya's powers and privileges were thus summarily curtailed and
his position somewhat weakened. Nevertheless* Macallister*s
arrangements were subsequently confirmed and embodied in the Ankole
Agreement of 1901; and the position of the ruling house of Ankole
and the status of the chiefs regularised. The Ankole Agreement
was, evidently drawn up, at the insistence of Kahaya and his chiefs,
"on precisely similar lines to those of the Toro Agreement", 1900.^
It is extraordinary that the Ankole chiefs who had recently been
to Buganda to study its systems of government at first hand, and had
apparently, been "struck with the manner in which local affairs [were]
discussed and conducted by the Regents and chiefs in the Lukiko at 
78
Mfcngo", should have asked the Commissioner in framing the Ankole
Agreement, to follow the somewhat inferior Toro example rather than the 
79
Buganda model. The chiefs, it seems, were merely concerned'with
the regularisation of their "emoluments-pecuniary and in land" rather
80
than the formal structure of local government and administration.
In any event, it is doubtful whether any other arrangement would have 
been acceptable to the Protectorate authorities; the Ankole leadership 
was evidently, still on probation. It appears that the Young Kahaya, 
despite his association with the British had not, as yet, been fully
81recognised by them, nor, indeed, by all the chiefs as their overlord.
And so, whilst it was British policy "to support the central authority 
82
of Kahaya" , the Commissioner was reluctant to conclude a comprehensive
treaty with him before he was satisfied that all the chiefs were
unanimous in their desire that Kahaya should be recognised as "the
83
principal chief of Ankole". Hence Kahaya's request for an Agreement
77. F.O.C.P. 7694 (1901) Jackson to Lan sdowne. 25.10.1901.
78. Ibid. '
79. F.O.C.P. 7694 (1901) Wilson to Jackson 14.8.1901.
80. Ibid.
81. Handbook of the Uganda Protectorate, 1902, p.62
82. UNA/A15/1 Johnston to Racey 20.12.1900.
83. F.O.C.P. 7694 (1901) Jackson to Lan sdowne. 25.10.1901.
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was for the second time turned down, but as on the previous 
occasion, the Commissioner promised to reconsider his decision 
at a later date. Accordingly, when George Wilson, the Sub- 
Commissioner, Western Province, visited Entebbe in July, 1901, the 
question, of the Ankole Agreement was once again the subject of 
discussion.^
It was decided that, if Wilson, on his return to Ankole, found that
Kahaya had the confidence of all the chiefs, and that the general
public had begun to appreciate the advantages of a settled administration,
then he could, if satisfied, enter into an agreement with him.
Consequently, on his return, the Sub-Commissioner, caused "a large
public Baraza to be arranged so that the Bairu and Bakopi could
85understand the drift of the proceedings,” in fact, the object of 
the Baraza was to ascertain whether Kahaya was in full control of 
the situation. Be that as it may, following Wilson's address, all 
the Ankole chiefs who were "in very fine attire" came forward and
86
offered their allegiance to Kahaya, and sighed the following petition.
"We the undersigned chiefs of Ankole, hereby agree 
to elect Kahaya* Kabaka of Ankole, and I Kahaya 
together with my chiefs, in full baraza, do hereby 
beg His Majesty's Sub-Commissioner to prepare an 
Agreement on the lines read out to us today, in 
full Baraza, to be submitted to H.M.s . Acting 
Commissioner for the Government of the Ankole 
district." 87
84. P.O^C.P. 7694 op.cit.
85 Ibid.. .*
86 Ibid. Inclusure No.4. Petition of King and Chiefs of Ankole 
for an Agreement.
87. Ibid.
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At long last, Kahaya and his chiefs had passed the test and an
Agreement with the British Crown was well within their grasp; Wilson
"congratulated them on their progress"and allowed'them time"to reflect on
88
what such an Agreement as they desired would mean to them."
For his part, however, Wilson had no hesitation that the proposed
Agreement would give Kahaya and his chiefs that sense of responsibility
89and confidence necessary to produce an effective local administration.
Indeed, Wilson believed that his agreement with Kahaya would give Ankole
90
"aumethodical system of local government." And so too did Jackson, 
the Acting Commissioner. The latter, thus told the Foreign Of fice ’that:-
"This Agreement Is, I consider a very fair one to the 
Kabaka and chiefs, and entails no actual out-of-pocket 
expenditure in the form of sqbsidies. It is one which 
will cause the Kabaka and chiefs to interest themselves 
in the question of taxation, and, in view of the fact 
that it was drawn up at their own special request by 
Mr.Wilson after he had ample opportunity of judging 
them and their capabilities, I venture to submit it 
with confidence for your Lordship’s ratification." 91
However, Lord Lansdowne, the Colonial Secretary, found Wilson’s 
Agreement inadequate and imperfect, and indeed, but for the reasons 
given .below, the Ankole Agreement, 1901, would not have been sanctioned.
"His Lordship observes that the Agreement is said to 
follow^the lines of that entered into regarding Toro, 
of which, however, a copy has not reached this Department. 
Lord Lansdowne approved the object with which it has 
been drawn. But although the Agreement is described 
as a draft it appears to have been signed by a number 
of natives who probably considered it as a completed 
document. For this reason, His Lordship is 
unwilling to criticise it in detail or to make 
alterations which would suggest themselves were such 
criticism undertaken, as the result might be to shake the 
confidence of the native signatories in the good faith 
of the administration." 92.
88. .F.O.C.P.7694 Wilson to Jackson 14.8.1901.
89. Ibid.
90 Ibid.
9 1 - by0 che° For*eigrf 0f^ent °n92. FO.2/587.Brooke to Jackson 30.1.02. fice on 30 January 1902
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The opportunity to amend Wilson's Agreement was thus lost, and 
despite its imperfections it;was, for the next sixty years, the 
cornerstone of Ankolefs system of ’Native Government', and 
administration, and indeed, the Anglo-Ankole relations.
Under the Agreement, the Kingdom of Ankole was divided into ten
administrative counties or Sasas on the lines of the Buganda pattern
9 3
and each placed under an officially appointed and recognised chief.
Hut and Gun taxes of three rupees each were imposed on all adult
males, and all traditional dues and obligations owed to chiefs
abolished. All the Country's"waste and uncultivated land, forests,
mines, minerals, salt deposits, revenues from Customs duties, taxes
94and other sources whatever" were vested in the British Crown.
In return, King Kahaya was recognised by "His Majesty's Government
.as the Kabaka or Supreme Chief over all that part of the Ankole
district which is included within the limits of the above mentioned
95administrative sub-divisions". He was granted an estate of
16 sq. miles in the Shema and Kashari sub-divisions, and a sub­
vention of 10% of all the taxes collected throughout Ankole. Next 
the agreement made provision for the.administration of justice and the 
maintenance of law and order. In particular, it was provided that:-
"Justice as between native and native shall be
administered direct by the recognised chiefs of the
ten sub-divisions. In all cases where a sentence 
of over three months' imprisonment, or a fine 
exceeding £5 in value, or where property of over £5 
in value is concerned, an appeal shall lie from the 
divisional native courts to the Lukiko of the Kabaka 
of Ankole.
93. Revised Laws of Uganda (1951) Vol.VI. p.2.
94. Ibid.
95. Clause 3.
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In cases where the imprisonment exceeds a term 
of one year, or property involved exceeds the 
value of £100, an appeal shall lie from the 
decision of the Kabaka or his Lukiko to the 
principal European Officer in civil charge of 
the district of Ankole. All c^ses between natives 
of the district of Ankole and natives of the other 
districts of the Uganda Protectorate, or between 
natives and foreigners, shall be tried by the 
British magistrates in the district of Ankole 
and shall be removed altogether from native 
jurisdiction." 96
The Agreement, concluded by declaring that "In all respects,.
Ankole would be subject to the same laws and regulations as were
97
generally in force," elsewhere throughout the Protectorate
and that it was "open to His Majesty1 s Government to annul the
Agreement, and to substitute for it any other methods of
administering the district, " which at the discretion of the
98
Commissioner, might seem suitable. Thus any infringement,
however minor, of any of the terms of the Agreement was fatal; but 
typically, the Ankole chiefs had no corresponding powers if the 
British failed to observe their part of the bargain, to suspend or 
terminate the Agreement.
Subsequently, the "Agreement counties", otherwise known as Sazas, 
were, for proper and effective local administration divided into 
Gommbololas or sub-counties, and each placed under a Gombolola 
chief* Each sub-county was further sub-divided into several 
administrative units and each division placed under the jurisdiction 
of a minor chief. The primary functions of these chiefs were the
96. Clause 6, the Agreement did not set out the composition of the 
"divisional native courts" and "the Lukiko". Indeed, it was not 
until 19|| , following the enactment of the Native Courts 
Ordinance, 1909, that "Native Courts" in Ankole were properly 
constituted.
97. Clause 7.
98 Ibid.
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assessment and collection of taxes and the administration of
justice in their areas. It was not until, 1911, however, that
the chiefly Courts were properly constituted and their powers and
jurisdiction defined and regularised. The "administrative functions"
99
of the Chiefs were not however formalised until 1919, and, rather
surprisingly, it was not until 1949 that the constitution and
composition of "the Lukiko" was statutorily defined. In that
year, following the enactment of the African Local Government Ordinance,
1949, the Governor issued the Eishenggero, or Native Council Proclamation
and Regulations., setting out the Eishenggerofs Constitution,
composition, powers and d u t i e s . I n  future, the composition of the
Council would consist of the Engaousi, Kihimba, Omu biki, the Saza Chiefs
102nominated and indirectly elected Councillors. The latter were
subject to re-selection, to serve for a term of three years, or until
the Council was dissolved. The Council had power to fill casual
vacancies, of course, and was required to meet, at least, twice a
year; the Omugabe, however, and, of course, the District Commissioner,
could, at any time, require the Councils Chairman to convene a general
meeting. Similarly, the Chairman could, at the instance of the Council
103.
itself, or at his discretion, call such a meeting.
99. Vide, The Native Authority Ordinance, 1919, and the Native Law 
Ordinance, 1919.
100. Legal Notice No. 157 of 1949 issued under the African Local 
Government Ordinance, 1949, S6(l).
101. Legal Notice No. 166 of 1949
102. Ibid
103. Ibid.
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The Council’s principal functions were to consider resolutions
on local affairs, the annual budget, and, subject to the approval
of the Standing Committee and the District Commissioner, the making
of bye-laws, in respect of the matters set out in the African
Authority Ordinance, 1919, Section 7, Sub-section A and B; and at
104
the request of the Governor, on any subject matter. Such bye-laws
had the force of law, breach of which was?an offence punishable by
104. Revised Laws, 1951, Cap.72. p.1048. Section 7 as amended, provided 
inter alia, that "any chief may from time to time issue orders to 
be obeyed by the Africans residing within the local limits of 
his jurisdiction as follows:
(1) restricting and regulating the manufacture and sale of 
liquors;
(2) prohibiting or restricting the holding of drinking bouts;
(3) prohibiting and restricting the cultivation of noxious plants
(4) prohibiting and restricting the carrying of arms;
(5) prohibiting conduct which might cause a riot or breach of
the peace;
(6) preventing the polution of water;
(7) regulating and prohibiting the wasteful cutting of trees;
(8) requiring male Africans to work in maintaining public
works;
(9) the provision of porters for Government officials;
(10) preventing the evasion of any tax or legal duty;
(11) regulating the movement of Africans;
(12) preventing the spread of infectious diseases;
(13) requiring Africans to report the presence of stolen property;
(14) the provision of food for sale on safaries;
(15) preventing landlords evictirigr tenants without good cause;
(16) for any other purpose which the Governor may by rule
authorise."
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imprisonment, fine, or both. Provision was also made for the
establishment of Council Committees and Sub-Committees, the making
of Standing Orders and the termination of appointments of 
106
councillors. However, the Council - and this is one of the main
defects of these constitutional arrangements - had no powers to provide 
basic local government services; it was mainly a deliberative chamber, 
and, although the Regulations ensured that the elected Councillors were 
in the majority, the Chamber was nevertheless dominated by the chiefly 
hierarchy: the chiefs not only elected the Council, but one of their
numbers, the Enganzi, was the chairman. Moreover, the pervasive 
powers of the District Commissioner tended to render the elective 
principle a sham. Furthermore, the idea of nominated Councillors, 
though understandable, was inimical to the future developments of "an 
efficient and democratic system of local government" advanced by the 
Colonial Office and set out in the Creech-Jones Despatch of 1947.
The rationale for the "nominated Councillor-device" was following 
practice elsewhere, to bring into the Council Chamber, experienced and 
skilled individuals, whose services would, otherwise, have been 
unavailable. Unfortunately, however, it did, as it happened, have 
adverse effects on the future development of local democracy; it 
effectively delayed the early introduction of direct elections, thus
f
depriving the people of their opportunity to participate in the running 
of their local affairs; it was a powerful instrument of patronage, it 
was susceptible to endless abuse and it set a bad precedent for the 
future.
105. Reg. 17(2) The maximum penalty awardable was six months' 
imprisonment or a fine of five hundred shillings or both 
such imprisonment and fine.
106. Regs. 11, 15, 16 and 19. See also Cap. 74 S.5.
107. Creech-Jones Despatch 1947. For details see below.
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In spite of these reservations, however, these Eishenggero 
Regulations were a step, albeit a minor step, in the right 
direction. They were most certainly an improvement on the Wilson- 
Kahaya Constitutional Arrangements of 1901. And, if Wilson thought 
that his treaty gave Ankole "a methodical Local Government" system, 
then these changes did bring the realisation of that notion a jot 
nearer. That, at least, was the intention. These faint hopes were, 
however, too optimistic and were regrettably never realised, partly 
because the Central Government seemed to have no will or inclination 
to bring that about, and partly because of Ankole’s negative attitude . 
towards the Anglo-Ankole Agreement, 1901, of which the following will 
serve as an example.
3.3.2. THE ANKOLE CHIEFS’ INALIENABLE. FREEHOLD ESTATES
The Anglo-Ankole relations, as aforesaid, were regulated by the Ankole 
Agreement, 1901, the main features of which were, as noted earlier, 
similar to Toro’s ; and, therefore, one would have expected that it 
would give rise to similar practical difficulties*it, in fact, did 
not, or rather more accurately, the Ankole leadership chose to ignore 
them. Indeed, of the three Agreement Kingdoms, the Ankole Kingdom, 
seems to have been more amenable to British overrule than her adjacent 
neighbours, Buganda and Toro. One of the reasons for this was that 
the main actors were, apparently, well satisfied with the terms of the 
1901 Agreement and, therefore, had good reasons, despite its weaknesses, 
to adhere to it and to uphold its sanctity. For their part, the Ankole 
chiefs, particularly Kahaya and Mbaguta, who for.the next forty 
years held the centre stage, were the chief beneficiaries of the Agreement: 
it was,' as already mentioned, drawn up at their request and on their 
terms; it confirmed their otherwise fragile chiefly positions; and,
117
perhaps more interestingly, it secured their "emoluments - pecuniary 
108and land". The Agreement thus having, in their view satisfactorily
met their more immediate needs, the Ankole leadership, unlike that of 
Buganda and Toro, was not indisposed to view their Agreement with 
disfavour. And, so did the British Authorities. They too, found the 
Agreement equally beneficial; as one of its architects put it, the 
Agreement entailed, on the British part, "no actual out of pocket 
expenditure", and more importantly, it caused, as Johnston, quaintly 
put it, "the Kabaka and chiefs to interest themselves in the question
of taxation", stressing, in terms of British policy of the Protectorate
. . 109
paying its way, the significance of the Agreement.
It is also pertinent, in assessing Ankole1 s posture on this matter 
of the Agreement, to note the role of the British main dramatis 
personae, particularly, that of its author, George Wilson. His 
friendly and civil demeanour in contrast to Johnston*s high-handed 
and cavalier approach to treaty-making, deserves special mention. He 
painstakingly went through the draft Agreement,with the chiefs, clause 
by clause; gave them ample opportunities for consultation and reflection, 
and generally, courteously treated them and accorded them their due 
respect. Furthermore, he even advised the Commissioner and the Collector 
Ankole, to actually, for at least the first two years, under enforce the 
Agreement thus giving the nascent chiefs time to acquaint themselves with 
the new order of t h i n g s . H e  wrote:-
108. FOCP.7694. Wilson to Jackson, 3.8.1901. See also 
Kabwegyere,T.B., The Politics of State Formation,EALB, 1974.
Karugire,S.R., A History of the Kingdom of Nkore,U0P.Clarendon, 1971; 
Karugire,S.R., Nurwa Mbaguta, EALB. 1973;
Karugire,S.R., A Political History of Uganda,H.E.B.London,1980.
Morris,H.F. The Making of Ankole,Ug.Journal,Vol.21(1957) p.l.
0berg,K., The Kingdom of Ankole in African Political Systems, Fortes 
& Pritchard (Eds.^OUP, 1940. pp. 121-161.
Williams,L.F., Nuwa Mbaguta,Nr.ganzi of Ankole,Ug. Journal.Vol. 10. (1946)
pp.124-135.
109. FOCP.7494, Jackson to Lansdowne,28.10.1901.
110. FOCP.7694, Wilson to Jackson, 14.8.1901.
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"I have to report that on the 7th instant in full baraza of the 
Ankole chiefs, the draft Agreement was signed by them. All 
the European residents were present, and to insure that the 
natives should clearly understand the full meaning of the draft,
I used a mission interpreter to check my own. It was translated 
into both Luganda and Luhima. During the week that has elapsed 
I have seen the chiefs on several occasions, but they have 
expressed nothing but an impatience to get settled down into the 
system laid down in the Agreement. As I have implied in my last 
despatch on this subject. I do not think it would be wise to 
anticipate a strict and thorough carrying out of the conditions 
of the Agreement for a year or two. Therefore, if you should 
approve of it, I should ask for a linient consideration from 
headquarters for their first efforts in giving effect to the 
Agreement, whilst here the collector should use every effort 
to let them know in a definite way the responsibility taken 
by them in signing it." Ill
And so it was done; and with one or two notable exceptions, the British
112
did keep their word. The Ankole Agreement thus began its long life m  
more congenial circumstances than the Toro Agreement, 1900, on which 
it was modelled, indeed hhis alone may be said to have been the secret
111. F.O.C.P. 7694 Wilson to Jackson 14.8.1901. Eis earlier dispatch 
to which reference is made details the steps which Wilson took to 
prepare Kahaya and his chiefs for the Agreement. For instance
' he gave them a week to reflect on what the Agreement they desired 
would mean to them, clearly laid down the responsibilities they 
would assume as chiefs in keeping order in their counties, and 
the risk their positions, would incur for failure to observe the 
Agreement, carefully outlined the Agreement and clearly made 
them understand that it would be submitted for approval. Contrast 
Maddox's account of the ceremony at whi/ch the Toro Agreement,
1900 was signed, at p. 97 Supra.
112. The Ankole Agreement was, following Galt's murder in Ankole, 
unilaterally suspended by the British Commissioner, on 19.4.1905; 
and it was not fully restored until 12.9.1912. In the meantime 
however, some useful parts of the .Agreement were adhered to as
if the whole Agreement was in force. For details of the murder 
of H.st.G.Galt, see Morris.H.F., the Murder of H.St.G.Galt.
Uganda Journal, Vol.24. 1960. p.1-15.
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of the success of British overrule in Ankole, and may very well have 
been the sop that shaped Kahaya’s attitude towards the British.
Whatever, the reason, Kahaya carried his chiefs with him; and so, 
unlike their Toro counterparts, the Ankole chiefs never challenged 
the terms of their Agreement; and though, proud of it, they did 
not, unlike the Baganda, consider it inviolable or unalterable.
Their readiness and, indeed, willingness to keep in with their masters 
even at their expense, may be illustrated by their submissive attitude 
towards the Central Government's deliberate misinterpretation of Article 7, 
of the Agreement, the main terms of which were as follows:-
"In addition to the percentage of the taxes, the Kabaka 
shall be granted an estate from out of the wastelands... 
provided that such estate may not include within its 
limits any large area of foreat or salt or mineral 
deposits. The Katikiro shall iA his official position 
as Katikiro, enjoy the usufruct of ah .estate to be 
allotted, out of the wastelands... of an area 10 square, 
miles, not, however, to include any large forests or 
any salt or mineral deposit within its limits. The 
recognised chiefs ... shall enjoy in their official 
capacity the usufruct of an estate of 10 square miles 
from out of the wastelands in their respective sub­
divisions .
The private estates to be guaranteed to Kahaya, the 
present Mugabe of Ankole, shall not exceed 50 square 
miles in area. The private estate of the Katikiro shall 
not exceed 12 square miles, and those of each existing 
chief of a sub-division as named in this Agreement,
10 square miles each." 113
The "official estates" were pure and simple perks, and were to be
enjoyed, as such, by the allottees as long as they held office, and
so it was construed by successive Governments and few would seriously
question this interpretation. What was not clear, however, was whether
these "official estates" were granted to the "Agreement chiefs" for
life, after which they would elapse and become Government or Crown
property, or whether they were, on the demise or dismissal of the
113. The Ankole Agreement, 1901,Article 7. Similar provisions were 
contained in the Toro Agreement, 1900.
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grantee, to be inherited by his successor? This point, was,
during the Agreements’ currency, never raised, and everyone concerned 
proceeded on the assumption that the "official estates" run with 
the office. The case for the alternative interpretation was never 
made out. The position of "private estates", however was a different 
matter. Some chiefs, quite rightly, believed, that their "private 
estates" were absolute gifts, granted to them in perpetuity by the 
framers of the Agreement (who incidentally, had no right to do so) 
presumably as kickbacks, or inducements for the acceptance of the new 
constitutional arrangements, or in some cases, as compensation for 
the loss of their traditional taxes, dues and tribute. Others, 
however, did not share this view, and so, too, for somewhat different 
reasons, did the Central Government, and it was sometime before this • 
conflict was satisfactorily resolved.. The inheritability or otherwise 
of "private estates" first came to the fore in 1904. Three "Agreement 
chiefs" were, in that year, dismissed for incompentency and mis­
appropriation of Government funds. They were deprived of their 
"titles and official estates", but were allowed to retain their 
"Agreement private estates" and, on their demise, their heirs were
allowed to keep 2 square miles out of the 16 square miles originally 
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allotted. Ten years later, in 1914 NasanairiMugurusi,' the then
i
Katikiro of Toro was, following his conviction for breach of the Game 
Regulations, and extortion, demoted, and in 1918, contrary to the 
Provincial Commissioner’s advice, dismissed and ordered to surrender 
his chiefly "titles and privileges" including his "official and private 
estates" allotted to him by the Agreement. The Government decision was 
based on Article 3 of the Toro Agreement, 1900, of which the relevant 
part was in these terms
114. Note that Article 3 para 3 provided that the "Kabaka and chiefs" were
to nominate their successors and that such nominees would be "recognised" 
by His Majesty’s Government as the successors to the dignity of the 
chieftainship."
115. C.O.536/120/4644.Jarvis to Secretary of State.18.8.1922
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"But should the Kabaka or the other chiefs herein named 
fail at any time to abide by any portion of the terms of 
this Agreement, they may be deposed, and their titles and 
privileges pass to any such other chiefs as His Majesty1s 
principal representative may select in their place." 116
The point at issue . was whether the term "privileges" in this provision 
included "private estates" granted to the "Agreement chiefs", and as 
such, subject to forfeiture on their loss of office. Many Government 
officials thought that it did, and so too, did their legal advisers, 
particularly Howe, the then Acting Attorney-General. Howe's opinion 
was subsequently "fully supported by Allan Hogg", the Attorney-General, 
on his return from leave; and the rulers of Ankole and Toro advised 
accordingly. The former accepted the Attorney-General's opinion as 
conclusive, but the latter strongly opposed it, contending that 
it was incorrect, and, in their view, inconsistent with the spirit, if 
not the letter, of their Agreement. They insisted that Article 3 should 
be read in conjunction with Article 7 paragraph 2 under which they were 
granted "official and private estates"; specifically this provided that
116. Article 3, The Toro and Ankole Agreements, 1900 and 1901 
respectively.
117. C.0.536/120/4644 - Ankole decision was communicated to the 
Colonial Office:-
"The Lukiko of Ankole have agreed that such estates should be 
forfeited by the holders when dismissed from their chieftain­
ship for misconduct and incapacity. They have further waived 
the claim which can be maintained under the Agreement that such 
estates should pass on in freehold to the successors of deposed 
chiefs, and have agreed that such estates should pass on 
forfeiture into the possession of the Lukiko and shall form a 
"pool" from which the Lukiko may grant estates for life only, 
to the successors of the deposed chiefs or to other chiefs as 
a reward for good service. This appears to me to be a 
satisfactory arrangement."
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"...... the recognised chiefs shall enjoy in their
official capacity the usufruct of an estate of 
square miles from out of the Wastelands in their 
respective sub-divisions. [That] the private 
estates to be guaranteed to Kasagama shall not
exceed 50 square miles .... [that] the private
estates of the Katikiro shall not exceed 16 
square miles .... and those of each existing 
chief of a sub-division as named in this 
Agreement, 16 square miles each." 118
The'Agreement thus made a clear distinction between "official estates" 
and "private estates"; the former were granted to office holders,
"to enjoy in their official capacity" whilst the latter were absolute 
gifts to the individual "Agreement chiefs" for their use as they saw
fit. Special attention was drawn to the use of the term "usufruct"
in relation to "official estates", and its omission in connection with 
"private estates".
This,Kasagama and his chiefs contended was proof that the word
"privilege" did not include "private estates". For them, the term
"privilege", as used here, referred to "official estates", salaries,
allowances and the various exemptions from the Hut, Gun and Poll 
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taxes. Besides, they believed that the Government's approach
was redolent with some insuperable difficulties, as may be gathered 
from the following excerpt:
"It is stated that there is no doubt that private estates 
were allotted in the Agreement personally to various chiefs 
prior to their deposition and that had a survey taken place 
at the time or title given, to the allottees without survey 
these estates would have been theirs for good in spite of 
the chiefs subsequent deposition. It was not the fault of 
the chiefs that Government has waited for over 20 years and 
not yet surveyed the estates. Even though survey was not 
possible some form of title might have been given. Had 
either course been taken then forfeiture would have been 
impossible. Older existing Government arguments a chief in
118. The Toro Agreement, 1900, Article 7 paragraph 2. The Ankole 
Agreement, 1901, contained a similar provision.
119. C.0. 536/120/4644 Despatch No. 482 of 18.8.1922.
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possession now of unsurveyed estates without title 
might receive title shortly on survey and then be deposed, 
but having received title to his land prior to deposition 
could he be deprived of his land, yet those through no 
fault of their own who had not received titles to their 
estates would have suffered forfeiture. Such would be a 
state of affairs contrary to equity and British justice.
Further, if an allottee has sold any part of his estate
prior to deposition and after obtaining his title, the
purchaser could not be deprived of it, because it formed
part of the original land open to forfeiture on deposition.11 120
In addition to the Attorney-General * s opinion, there were the 
Government maintained, good policy considerations for divesting the 
deposed chiefs of their large private land holdings.
"I cannot but record that in my opinion and that of other 
administrative officers it is a misfortune that men who have 
misconducted themselves and their heirs who hold no position 
now in the country should become large landowners and for the 
good of the country I should have liked to have seen such land 
forfeiture in part by resolution of the Lukiko and sanction 
to the Government and then registered in the name of the Lukiko 
and allotted to deserving chiefs for life." 121
There were others, among Government Circles, however, who were inclined
to agree with Kasagama*s own interpretation, but could not regrettably,
122
break ranks with their peers. They however, urged their immediate
120. C.0.536/120/4644 Jarvis to Secretary of State for the Colonies.
18.8.1922.
121. C.0.536/120/4644 Jarvis to Secretary of State. 18.8.1922.
122. "As Provincial Commissioner", Cooper told Jarvis, the Acting 
Governor, "the intention of the makers of the Agreement I submit 
that it appears clear that it was intended that those estates should 
not be forfeited but that they were given to the actual chiefs 
holding those positions-^at the time of the Agreements and this 
contention appears plain especially from the wording of the memo
by H.M.Commissioner dated July 13th 1906 known as the Toro 
Agreement 1906 and in which he definite ly distinguishes between 
estates, privileges and emoluments and clearly wishes to remove 
doubts in the native mind." (Cooper to Jarvis 25.2.1922)
See also a Minute on this correspondence, part of which reads:
"It seems to me that the personal estates are an absolute gift 
to individuals. This may have been grease for the wheels - but 
whatever the reason there does seem to be a clear distinction 
between the estates to be held by the holder of the office and 
the estates given to the existing holders. Therefore I agree 
with Mr. Cooper."
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superiors, albeit in private to abide, "at all costs" by the
123
terms of the Agreement.
Despite these exhortations, however, the Central Government was, 
for a number of reasons, unwilling to reverse its decision, and 
the Secretary of State was, inter alia, advised that:-
"The Toro Native Administration, is undoubtedly the most 
unsatisfactory in the Protectorate. A succession of 
Administrative Officers covering a long period of time 
have been unanimous in their unfavourable reports. The 
chiefs are idle and incompetent, and petty oppression of 
the peasantry by the chiefs obtains to a far greater 
extent in Toro than in other districts.
The chiefs however, are mainly lazy and unambitious, and 
dismissal from office is but a little punishment to them 
if they are able to retire to extensive private estates. 
I hope therefore, that the opinion of the legal advisers 
of the Government will be supported and that I may 
accordingly inform the Toro Native Government that the 
dismissal of a chief from office means also the 
forfeiture of his private estate'.1 124.
123. C.0.536/120/4664. Inclosure No.4. to Dispatch No.482 of
18.8.1922. Cooper to Jarvis 25.2.1922. Cooper's memo to 
the Acting Governer concluded thus:
"On the other hand, if it was the intention of the Governmiaht 
when making these Agreements and I believe that it was their 
intention, that the actual allottees at the time of the 
Agreement,should hold and possess these estates as freehold 
property' then this intention should be maintained at all 
costs in support of the good faith, of the British Government 
and other arrangements made based on the above policy for 
providing estates but not freehold for existing and future 
chiefs." See also C.O. 536/107/27057. Coryndon To Secretary 
of State. 31.5.1920; and Tel. of 18.3.1921, Re Land
settlement in Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and Busoga.
124. C.O. 536/120/4644.
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Compelling though these considerations were, they did not find
favour with the Chief Secretary’s brethren at the Colonial Office.
It was rightly felt that such extraneous factors had no bearing on
the issue, and that the Government's stance was, tinder the circumstances,
untenable. It was agreed that the Agreement "private estates" were
absolute gifts and that they could not be forfeited on the deposition
125
of the allottees. The Government's arguments were accordingly
summarily rejected, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies advised 
that:
"This dispatch deals with deposition for misconduct and 
incapacity and it ■ is apparently assumed that such 
circumstances would amount to a breach of the Agreement. 
The Provincial Commissioner and the Lukiko indicate 
that these grants are alienable. If the private estates 
are alienable, there is not much case for forfeiture 
on deposition." 126
This view was duly upheld and Jarvis told that his legal adviser's 
opinion, under the circumstances, was incorrect and unsupportable, 
and Churchill's terse reply to the Chief Secretary was as follows
"I am advised that these Toro private estates cannot 
be forfeited on deposition of the Chief but before 
coming to a decision on the matter, I should be glad 
to consider the arguments on which the contrary advice 
of the local legal officers was founded. 127
With that, Jarvis and his legal advisers had to be content; the matter 
was quietly dropped and the respective Ankole and Toro Governments 
informed that the "Agreement private estates" were alienable and immune 
from forfeiture on the allottee's death or dismissal; and so the absurd 
case of the chiefs' inalienable "fe simple" estates was resolved.
Indeed, any other solution would have made them a mere sham, and
125. C.O. 536/120/4644 See Minutes & Comments on Jarvis' dispatch.
126. C.O. 536/120/4644 Minute
127. C.O. 536/120/4644 Churchill to Jarvis 6.10.1922.
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though this did not seem to worry the Ankole leadership, it
graphically illustrates the point that the Ankole chiefs were,
in the eyes of their critics and Colonial masters, "spineless"
collaborators and "good and loyal chiefs", respectively. The
latter was, of course, sheer flattery and did not, in any case,
always serve the Ankole chiefs well. On the contrary, the more
they grovelled, the more they were patronised by their overlords:
witness for example, their passive but, otherwise exemplary record
in the wake of H.St.G.Galt's "Sad fate" at Ibanda, Ankole, on the
one hand, and the excessive collective summary justice meted out to
128
them by the British authorities, on the other hand. They were,
despite their innocence, severely and humiliatingly punished; two of 
their colleagues were summarily dismissed and deported from their 
chiefdoms; they were humbled by the appointment of a Muganda Chief, 
the•imposition of heavy taxes and fines; and the suspension of their 
coveted Agreement. And, although, most of these impositions had no 
legal basis whatsoever, they were promptly, unquestioningly and meekly 
accepted, suffered, efficiently enforced and carried out.
128. Shortly stated, the facts of this case were these:
While en route to Entebbe via Mbarara, the Acting Sub- 
Commissioner, H.St. George GaLt, was on the evening of 
19th May, 1905 cowardly speared to death by an unknown 
assailant. The local County and Sub-County Chiefs 
together with three named persons were immediately 
arrested, tried and"two principal prisoners" found 
"guilty of abating Galt's murder" and sentenced to 
death. They were, however, acquitted by the Court of 
Appeal, but were immediately re-arrested and deported to 
Kisumu and their fellow County men, though "thoroughly 
tractable, peacefull and well behavedj1 collectively
punished by the Authorities. For details see:
Morris,H.F. "The Murder of H.St.G.Galt", op.cit.
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Their flunkeyism was thus not always Veil appreciated, or indeed, 
adequately rewarded. This does not mean, however, that a more robust 
approach, as Kasagama found to his cost, would have served the Ankole 
Chiefs any better. They would, in that case, have had to contend 
with the* gubernatorial law, a.' euphemism for the Governors un­
written and unlimited arbitrary powers, and to that there was no 
redress, legal or otherwise. They were, arguably, in a no win 
situation; their plight is another example of the internal 
contradictions of British Colonial rule that led to its unexpected 
demise and thus forced the British to quit before the stated aims of 
their mission were satisfactorily accomplished. That, however, is 
another story.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.1.1. THE MAKING OF "DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIONS"
The imposition of British "Protection" over the non-Agreement areas
was, as the Uganda Order in Council, 1902, put it, "by grant, usage,
sufferance, and other lawful means''^ and though it is rather academic
to question the validity of this claim, there is little doubt that
His Majesty's seizure of power and jurisdiction over these areas was
2
protracted and invariably bloddy; and that some of the "means" used 
were far from lawful.: free beads, trinkets and pieces of cloth were,
in fact, the main instruments, and, of course, the "loss leaders". 
Additionally, there were "punitive expeditions", and one or two 
coups detat. However, having thus stated the means by which the non- 
Agreement districts were brought under British "Protection", the.Order 
in Council enjoined the Commissioner, whose task it was to administer 
the "Protectorate" to divide his domain into "Provinces or Districts
4
and with such sub-divisions", as he saw fit, save that he was to use 
local materials; and in consequence, no resources, financial or otherwise 
were provided; he was to use his initiative, and so he proceded to do. 
The Protectorate was duly divided into Provinces and Districts and 
placed under Provincial and District Commissioners respectively, and 
each detailed to administer his territory as best he could. There
t
was no formal blue-print, official policy or manual. Yet, rather 
remarkably, the administrative structure which emerged had similar 
features. Each district was sub-divided into several administrative 
units, on the Buganda pattern, and each placed under a titled chief
1. The Uganda Order in Council, 1902.
2. See, The early Uganda Colonial Reports through to 1930.
3. The term "punitive expedition" which pervades the early 
Colonial annual reports was a euphemism for mass murder 
and brutality.
4. The Uganda Order in Council, 1902, Article 6(1).
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and so, "a Subordinate black and administrative service"^came 
into being. The creation of this cone-shaped chiefly structure, 
inevitably varied from district to district, but Eden's modus 
operandi, in West Nile, set out in full below, was not uncommon, 
and will serve as an example.
"The [West Nile] District contains the following 
tribes: Madi, Kukhi, Kakwa, Lugwari,, Mada-Ai-ivu,
Alur, Okobu, Lendii, ... and talk different 
languages and are quite unintelligible to each 
other, except on their borders where they have 
intermarried. The variety of tribes and languages 
do not tend therefore to make Administration easy.
The Madi have acknowledged chiefs, but these have 
a great deal to learn and cannot be considered to 
have a firm hold over their men.
South of Mt.Wati and around Mt.Luku, the Lugwari 
are utterly unorganised, there is no chief, .and it 
is impossible often to locate even a village headman. 
Inter village fighting is rife, and- the only means 
of dealing with them will be by means of agents.
The Alur are far the most tractable of all the tribes. 
They own to chiefs, though'the only duty of a chief 
appears to be to exact a tribute in meat from his 
followers. One of the most satisfactory features 
of the year's work was the removal of^Omwech , Owin's 
brother, and the replacing of all the riverain Alur 
under Chief Owin* The constant fighting between 
the West Bank and the East Bank has now ceased, 
and the people are settling down quietly under Owin, 
who promises well both in strength and justice.
The other chiefs, Koba, Omach, Biddei etc., although 
reluctant at first, are now obedient to Owin.
With regard to the Highland Alur, Chief Mulla has 
toured with me the whole of his County, never before 
having been more than a few miles from his village, 
his County has been preliminary organised into 
counties under his chiefs, again divided into districts 
under District Chiefs, with County headmen under them. 
The principal will be adhered to, but many readjustments 
will be required before it is complete. The same will 
be applied to the Lugwari, but will be a longer process 
owing to difficulty of finding suitable chiefs.
Owing to lack of assistance, I am compelled to leave 
the Madi to their own deviaes.
5.C.O.536/186/40107 Mitchell to Bottomley, 23.5.1936.
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Eventually therefore I propose to have three forms 
of chiefs fully recognised, both for purposes of 
justice and tax rebate. Many of these posts for 
a time being unoccupied. My proposal is that 
every recognised chief should eventually as 
remuneration draw 5% rebate on his tax collections, 
but that the Administration should be prepared 
to pay out 5% three times over for the same tax, 
making a total of 15% rebate.
No chief owning to say less than 200 men would be 
recognised as such. (It is impossible to fix an 
arbitrary figure). Thus Mulla with 10,000 men 
would draw 5% on their tax and Nyuka with 200 
men, 5% on 200 taxes.
Mulla, with that number would be divided into 
sub-chieftainships, each of which sub-chief would 
draw 5% on the tax for which he was responsible.
Each sub-chieftainship would be again divided, so 
that each assistant sub-chief would draw 5% on the 
tax for which he was responsible, making a total 
of 15%.
Nyaku *s district would act vice versa. No one 
under Nyaku would be recognised for rebate, but if 
he and three or four other such chiefs could continue 
under one, that one would also draw 5% on the whole 
without affecting Nyaku and the others.
The amount of rebate would for some time vary in 
various localities, until responsible chiefs can be 
found or imported.
This arrangement in its elasticity could, I consider 
be suitable to such a district as this, and would 
obviate that tendency of petty chiefs to claim 
independence, in order to obtain rebate. It affects 
his rebate,whether he is independent or not.
Apart from the question of rebate, these are the lines 
on which the district is being organised. In the first 
degree, is the chief who will always be independent.
In the second degree, such as over several whom it is 
hoped eventually to place one of the first degree. 
After then, the Administration cannot recognise a 
chief, though at first he may not be embodied in a 
large community. With the settlement of the district 
there will be a considerable amount of movements among 
the natives, and when they have had time to settle 
down, the chieftainships will be divided up by natural 
boundaries, so as to avoid some chiefs having people 
at a distance settled amidst another chieffs men, as 
in the case when a chief claims allegiance according 
to family groups.
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The general policy is to consolidate the people 
as much as possible under big chiefs, to 
strengthen their hands, and to throw responsibility 
and onus on to them. As far as possible the natural 
chiefs are made, bu.t preference is given to the 
man. who can be a chief, and if necessary, a man 
is imported, as in the case of Hamisi, in Mullafs 
Countryand Baruka at Arua."6
That mutatis mutandis, was the way in which British overrule was 
established in the non-Agreement districts throughout the Protectorate. 
That this process was not as flawless as EdenTs Report can hardly be 
over emphasised. It would be strange indeed, if it were otherwise, 
and a reading of a random sample of Eden's colleagues reports bears 
testimony to this; the record shows that the establishment of British 
rule in these areas was slow, arduous and not without difficulties. In 
addition to the "punitive expeditions" mentioned above, the introduction 
of "alien chiefs", mainly from Buganda, was another source of worry and 
a blot on British Colonial rule, and was, as the proceding material 
shows, the subject of much criticism and was subsequently done away 
with altogether. It was always resented by the hapless segmentary 
societies, and it, almost in every case, gave rise to "extortion and 
petty tyrannies." ^
Despite these drawbacks, however, the importation of "suitable chiefs" 
was universally adopted and utilised without qualms. Yet, again, 
however, there was no common policy, let alone official guidelines; 
each District Officer was free to proceed as he saw fit. This, not 
withstanding, however, the general approach was, once again, almost 
the same everywhere for, both the "System" and its peddlers, the 
"agents" were drawn from the same source, Buganda, and the whole soon 
assumed a common pattern; so much so that Salmonson's efforts in
Kigezi, detailed below, will be used' to illustrate the manner in
6. Annual Report,West Nile District, 1914-1915.
7. C.O.536/41/26752. Jackson to Secretary of State, 14.7.1911.
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which chiefly bureaucracies were created in the segmentary societies. 
Specifically, the Kigezi experience will vividly demonstrate that 
"District Administrations" as local British rule was, in these areas, 
called, were the handiwork of District Officers and their "black 
poodles"; that the "Agency System", though widely used was, in fact, 
not always conducive to good local administration;that its wholesale 
and indiscriminate adoption was one of the first central government 
blunders; that its deployment was, in the long run, counter-productive 
and that in many cases it was not in fact necessary.
4.1.2. THE ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL RULE IN KIGEZI t THE LOCALE.
g
In common with her Eastern and Northern counterparts, Kigezi as
an administrative unit was created by the combined efforts of the
British and their collaborators, both indigenous and foreign.
It derives its name from a small lake called Njgezi, now dried up,
in Nyakabande Sub-district near to which the Kivu mission, under
Captain Coote established a. garrison In 1909. Formally Kigezi
was not a compact whole; it consisted of the three chiefdoms of
Bufumbira, the habitat of the Banyarwanda, Rujumbara inhabited by 
the Baharoro, Butambi of Banyabutumbi , and Rukiga, ^ 
the home of the Bakiga, meaning "men of the mountain". And,
although there were chiefly hierarchies in the three principalities,
there were none in the. "difficult country" of Rukiga. ^  The Bakiga,
though nominally part of Rwanda, never acknowledged the authority, of
any chiefs other than their clan heads. The highest indigenous
political organisation was the clan, of which there were about 30,
8. Mitchell, Sir, Philip, "Address on Indirect Rule", 17.7.1936
9. The mountain ous district of Kigezi with a total area of 2024 
square miles lie's in the extreme south west of Uganda and borders 
Zaire on the west and Rwanda on the south. For a short history of 
Kigezi, see Denoon, A. (Ed.) A History of Kigezi in South West Uganda. 
Uganda. Press Trust, Kampala, Uganda, 1971. particularly parts 2,3,4 & 5
10. C.O.536/59/18496.
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each of which was subdivided into several lineages, of which there 
were 9 5 . ^  Here, traditional government, mainly the maintenance 
of collective security and order, was in the hands of elected heads 
of lineages and their subordinates. These men were chosen by their 
peers on account of their bravery, or some other special qualities 
held in high esteem by the local population.. Lineage heads were 
responsible for rule making and the hearing of cases, save that 
serious offences were heard by adhoc assemblies of village elders, 
presided over by the head of the clan or lineage. Cattle and land 
causes were also dealt with by elders in council. There was provision 
for appeals and trial by ordeal. The elder^* authority was backed 
by the lineage*s public opinion, the members of which ware the bulwark 
of the local customs and mores. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
upon arrival in 1911, Critchley-Salmonson., the first Political Officer, 
found that the local machinery of government was too elementary for 
his immediate needs and in consequence proceeded as an executive action, 
to draw up "a scheme for the organisation of Rukiga1* and its government. 
First, the disperate principalities, Bufumbira, Butumbi, Kayonza, 
Rujumbiira arid the segmentary Rukiga were reduced into an administrative 
district, and the name Kigezi given to the whole. The former chiefdoms 
were reduced to administrative counties under their old traditional 
chiefs, whilst Rukiga, which hitherto had had no paramount chief, was
11. I am indebted to Nuha Karaza of Ruhita, Kabale for this 
information. (August 1979) Karaza is an elder and former 
local chief, who has been described as "an oral library 
of Rukiga history."
12. UNA, SMP 3851 Provincial Commissioner, Western Province to 
Chief Secretary, 12.3.1914
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having been divided into administrative sub-counties, placed
13 ...
under a Muganda Agent, one Yowana Ssebalijja. Ssebalijja was a 
Roman Catholic evangelist who had served in Ankole for many years, 
before he was respectively selected to accompany the British Section 
of the Uganda-Congo Boundary Commission, 1907-1908, and the Kivu 
mission, 1909 - 1910 arid so began the Bugandanisation of Rukiga. As 
elsewhere, the principal argument for the importation of alien 
chiefs, as- the following extractshows was, ,fhat the Bakiga had no 
chiefs and in consequence incapable of gDveming or ruling themselves.
13. UNA.SMP 1857. D.C.Ankole to Chief Secretary, 24.5.1912.
"With regard to Agents and Followers, I have gone into the 
question very thoroughly with Mr. Critchley-Salmonson and 
have the honour to submit the following as the arrangements 
which have appeared to us most suitable:-
(i) In Makaburrfs countrya.I.Muganda "Adviser" @ Rs.25.00 p.m.
(ii) In Rukiga (including Chinchizi, Kayonza and Rushenyi) :
(a)l head Agent (not "Saza") Yowana Sebalijja @ Rs.50.00 p.m.
(b)l Sub-Agent for E.Rukiga, Yonazani Basakabalaba @ Rs.20.00p.m.
(c)l Sub-Agent for Kayonza-Chinchizi @ Rs. 10.00p.m.
(d)14 followers @ Rs. 3.50.p.m.
This, scheme was almost identical with that submitted by Captain Reid 
ia his No.K.4/12 of 12.1.1912 and was supported by the same 
arguments as those submitted by his successors as noted here.
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"I am of the opinion that the Bakiga people 
consisting of 10,000 able-bodied men will not 
be in a position to govern themselves by 
themselves for many years; owing to the absence 
of any tribal organisation; or rule by the Chiefs, 
such as is usually found among primitive people.
The tribe is so split up into numerous small clans, 
all bitterly opposed to one another, that any cohesion 
is an impossibility to exact any obedience from the 
various clans, to any clan headman in the capacity 
of a tribal chief without great difficulty and 
which would be free from bloodshed. Rukiga may 
be described as a district where the impossible 
is always happening, and the inevitable never 
comes off." 14
That in a nutshell was the classic justification for employing 
foreign agents. These Agents it was argued, would bring cohesion 
where nonfcexisted; would teach the indigenous people to obey British 
commands, including the assessment and collection of taxes, the 
maintenance of law and order, and the hearing of cases. Officials, 
holding such views, gave the Bakiga's capacity for rule very little 
if any, consideration.
Henceforth, Rukiga was to be divided into five subdivisions and each 
placed under a salaried Muganda Agent, with the rank of Gombolola 
Chief; and "five sensible Bakiga heads of clans placed under him, 
as Sub-Gombolola Chiefs". ^  The Agent's main functions were to 
teach their charges the art of government and administration, and in 
particular, tax gathering and the hearing of local disputes. The 
latter, despite current legislation was to follow the following pattern:
14. SMP. 3851, op. cit.
15. Ibid.
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"I would recommend that the Gombolola chiefs and the 
Sub-Gumbolola chief s sitting in Lukiko, be allowed to 
hear cases of a petty nature and that fines as shown 
in Enclosure 2 be allowed; these fines to be divided 
in the proportion of 1/4 to the Saza Chief and 3/4 to 
the Chiefs who constitute the Gombolola Lukiko; the 
amounts to be entered in a book and inspected by the 
District Officer. No sentences of imprisonment or 
flogging to be allowed and any other cases not 
mentioned to be sent to the District Court. A fee 
of Rs. 11 for hearing cases to be allowed, and 
divided among the chiefs who constitute the 
Lukiko.” 16
These home-spun judicial arrangements did not, however, follow the 
existing relevant legislation,^ and were subsequently readjusted 
accordingly. Somewhat uncharacteristically, however, Sullivan did 
not dwell too much on "native taxation". He simply announced that
16. SMP.3851. The schedule of cases triable by Gombolola Courts 
was as follows:
CRIME
(i) Adultery
(ii) Refusing to obey chiefs 
orders as to clearing 
roads, etc. attendance at 
Lukiko.
(iii) Minor cases of assault.
(iv) Assaulting chiefs- or 
threatening to use 
spears.
(v) Minor cases of theft 
such as Water pots,
Spears,, Food, Honey
(vi) Allowing goats or cattle Up to Rs. 5/- Compensation to be given 
to trespass into other out of fine.
peoples food shambas.
(vii) Acts towards armed 
followers and official 
followers Lukiko messengers, 
when carrying out orders of 
Lukiko to be considered as 
acts against the Chief but 
triable by the District Officer.
17. SMP. 3851 P.C.W.P. to C.S. 12,3.1914
FINE
If wealthy, 1 cow, peasants 10 goats 
all to go as compensation (According 
to Native Custom)
First offence. /50
Second offence 1/00
Third offence 2/00
Up to Rs. 5/- Compensation to be 
given out of fine up to one half of fine. 
Rs. 5/- If chief assaulted is not member 
of Lukiko, to receive compensation of 
half the fine.
Up to Rs. 5/- compensation to be given 
out of fine.
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a small sum would be set aside out of which tax rebate would be 
+
18
paid to the chiefs and their "official Baganda followers."
These arrangements were approved by the Governor and Sullivan 
urged to implement them at once, "lest the chiefs should change their
19
minds, [and] mal$e the introduction of the Scheme more difficult."
Already, however, the Baganda Agency was increasingly coming under 
severe criticism, and some officials were beginning to voice their 
reservations, albeit privately.
"I have the honour to draw your attention to a system 
now in vogue, of administering certain districts in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces through the Agency of 
Baganda, and it is with regret that I find myself 
obliged to criticise and in disagreement with a policy 
which I cannot help but condemn as a whole, as obsolete 
unsound and unjustifiable." 20
Even the system’s most ardent supporters were, , while setting
it up, beginning to be disillusioned with their protege’s handiwork.
Thus, in 1913, the Kigezi District Commissioner reported that:-
18. SMP 3851 C.S. to Governor 26.3.1914. Part of the Minute reads:
"The local petty chiefs are apparently ready to acquiesce in 
it now and are prepared for it. If a delay of 4 or 5 months 
occurs, before it is introduced, they may change their minds, 
or disturbances may occur, and quarrels arise which would 
make its introduction more difficult."
19. Ibid.
20. C.0.536/41/26759 Jackson to Secretary of State. 14.7.11.
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"On assuming charge of the District, the Native 
Administration was in an embryo state, and the 
agents appeared to be exercising too much liberty, 
and the natives were not taking sufficient part in 
the administration of their native country."21
He found this state of affairs very uncomfortable and proceeded to
curtail the Agents’ judicial and administrative powers. He promptly
decreed that all Agents were to act. as "Advisers" rather than
substantive chiefs; that they were to be sparingly employed; and
that they were to be "carefully supervised" in order to avoid "any
22
cause for complaint against them" by the local population.
Besides his "armed followers", each Agent, was to support no more than
three private followers. The "official followers" were to hold their
free plots of land and offices as long as their work remained satisfactory;
and though these followers could take gainful employment as clerks,
or roadheadmen, they were debarred from holding chiefly offices, and
no alteration to this list was to be made without the District
Commissioner's approval. The non-Agent Baganda were to be registered,
charged rent and were to remain in Kigezi at the District Officer's
pleasure; and no gang of Baganda sycophants were to hold any official
23
position without his consent."
This, the District Commissioner hoped would go a long way to eliminating *
the dangers and abuses to which the Baganda Agency was susceptible. He
was too optimistic, however. In 1914, he joined the army and left his 
plan uncompleted; and his successor does not appear to have been
21. SMP 3851. ''-dp.cit.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. _'. i.
"These drafts, except for some small amendments, were
prepared by me when I was in Kigezi last year in 
consultation with Mr. Sullivan, the Assistant District 
Commissioner in charge, who was anxious that the Scheme 
should be initiated." per Chief Justice to Chief Secretary. 
26.10.1915.
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properly detailed to execute it. Indeed, he appears to have
been oblivious to his predecessor’s criticism of the Baganda Agents.
For it was not until 1915 for example, that Sullivan’s judicial
9 /
arrangements were implemented.
Somewhat extended powers were given to Sub-Divisional Courts, and
provision made for appeals from the new courts to the District Court
at Kabale. The County Court was to consist of three members appointed
by the Governor and was to .sit monthly. The maximum punishment it
could impose was a term of three months’ imprisonment or a fine of
150 rupees, whilst the monetary limit on the value of the subject
matter in dispute was set at 200 rupees. The jurisdiction of the
Sub-Divisional Courts, which were to sit weekly, was considerably
less than that of the County Court, and there was no right of appeal ■
25
from the former to the latter. All appeals lay to the District
Court, and, as elsewhere, the new chiefly courts had no jurisdiction 
to hear the following cases:
(a) Offences committed in urban areas;
(b) Civil and criminal cases in which the parties were in
Government Service, including messengers, clerks and 
Askaris;
Cc) Breaches which were punishable as offences of any
Special law, eg. Arms, Game, Forest, Fiscal, Mining;
(d) Matrimonial causes other than those arising from a
marriage contracted under, or in accordance with local 
law and custom. 26
24. SMP 3851. op*cit.In civil cases the value of the subject matter 
in dispute was increased to Rs. 75/- while in criminal cases, 
the Courts were empowered to impose a fine not exceeding RS.30/-.
25. Ibid. .
26. Ibid.See * Proclamation of 29 October, 1915.
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Sullivan’s proposals envisioned the establishment of a comprehensive
network of Native Courts, but owing to the outbreak of hostilities
in 1914, the Chief Justice advised against it, and it was not until
27
1920 that such courts were established throughout the District.
Meanwhile the courts in Rukiga had been the subject of reorganisation, 
and the Bakiga had accepted the changes with equanimity, and like 
the District Commissioner., they, too, were evidently well satisfied 
with them.
27. SMP 3851.op.cit. Proclamation of 20 January,'1920, cancelling 
the Proclamation of 1915 (Rukiga) : of 1917, (Rujumbura 
and Rwanda); and of 1918 (Kinkizi and Kayonza).
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"As regards para 7 of the Chief Justice*s letter, 
the number of cases tried in the Native Courts of 
Rukiga to date is 146 of which 9 were heard in 
the County Court and 137 in the Sub-Divisional 
Courts.28 The Courts appear to be
working satisfactorily. Minor cases of assault 
are the commonest cases met with. Cattle cases 
and civil claims also occur in some numbers. All 
Native Courts keep records in their books of the 
cases heard, showing briefly names of parties, claim 
or charge and the judgment of the Courts. Up to 
date 2 cases have been revised by me, no appeals 
have been made.1^
28. Ikumba Sub-Div.ct. heard (11) cases, Buhara (12),
Nyarushanje (43), Mpalo(66), Bukinda (5).
29. SMP 3851. D.C.Kigezi to P.C.Western Province, 7.11.16.
Paul Ngorogoza's account of the early court proceedings 
is illuminating. He writes:
"At first, the chiefs had no court buildings, and they dealt 
with cases in their residences, playing indoor games, such as 
that played with stones. When the accuser and the accused were 
talking, the chiefs would be busy playing their game, "One,two 
three, four". Preoccupied with these things, they would ask 
the complainant ; and defendants "What have you said? Repeat 
what you have said". This greatly inconvenienced the litigants, 
because the chiefs did not pay attention to what they were saying, 
before leading their "one, two, three, four", and whilst the 
calabashes of drink were in their hands. Their clerks deserve 
sympathy because they had no desks to write on or chairs to sit on 
and had to write when they were seated cross-legged, but these 
things were gradually improved later. COurts. were built and 
equipped with strong chairs and tables for the chiefs and clerks 
to sit on while writing. However, there was no remarkable 
improvement until 1920 when the District Commissioner Philips, 
brought Baziba clerks to deal with cases and letter writing in 
the towns, where cases were judged in Swahili."
(P.Ngologoza, Kigezi and Its People. EALB* 1969, p.57).
The authdr, Paul Ngologoza, O.B.E., K.S.G. was born in 1896 
at Rubaya, Kigefci. He was first appointed Chief in 1923, becoming 
Murtdoa-' Chief in 1925 and Gombolola Chief in 1929. In 1936 he 
was appointed Saza Chief, a post be held until 1946 when he 
became the first Secretary-General of Kigezi. In 1956 he was 
appointed Chief Judge and in 1959 became Chairman of the 
Appointments Board. He retired in 1960, but is still active 
in the Country's affairs.
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Elsewhere, however, the "anti-British elements", or rather the
*
"freedom fighters" were, with some success, challenging the District 
Commissioner’s authority. They were violently opposed to British 
rule and its attendant machinery and impositions, including taxation.
"East Rukiga was thrown into considerable disorder 
by the anti-European preaching and claims of sovereignty 
of two natives known as Muhumuza and Kigeri." 30
The District. Commissioner thus noted and advised the Governor, that 
there were sporadic "attempts to undermine European authority" in 
these areas; and "in the interests of British prestige and the 
welfare of the people", a series of "punitive expeditions" were,
31
with severe reverses, sent to capture the movement’s ringleaders.
30.C.O.536/48/3552. Reid,Political Officer Kigezi to Governor 4.1.12; 
Reid's affidavit reads in part as follows:
"In-October 1914, whilst I was outside Nyindo's village I was 
attacked by Nyindo's bowmen who actually shot at me and Abdulla, 
Government Agent Kigezi. During the night war drums were beaten 
all night in Nyindo's village and this beating of drums was 
accompanied by shouting to the effect that "we are going to 
drive the Europeans out of the Country". On the following morning 
Nyindo, with over 1200 men of whom a large number were natives 
from German territory, attacked the village of the loyal chief 
Musakamba at whose principal village I was encamped. A large 
number of huts were burnt and several loyal natives were killed." 
See also CO.536/82/5688. Dispatch No.346 of 20.12.1916.
31.CO 536/86/46246: Thus MacDougall’s affidavit re: deportation
of Chief Musinga of Kayonza in 1917 in part reads:
"In 1914, after the outbreak of war, Mginga left Kayonza without 
permission of any sort and went to Izomba in German East Africa. 
Mginga was not seen again until February 1917 when he was arrested 
Mginga was absent from his Country and consorting with the enemy 
throughout the period that the war was waged in and around the 
District of Kigezi."
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Such "punitive measures" however, tended to fuel rather than quell
the rebellion, and it was not until 1918 that the Bakiga resistance
32
finally succumbed to the thunder of the mighty maxim gun, and it 
was not until then that the District Commissioner's Iregemony was 
effectively established over these areas.
In the meantime, his authority was confined to his standing camps 
and its adjacent areas. Even here, however, his position was 
precarious; the collection of taxes, for example, was "not to be 
unduly pressed", for the people had, as yet, to accept his overlord­
ship and his "Agents" had to proceed with caution, and it was not
until 1919, that the whole administrative district of Kigezi was
33
brought under his effective control. It was, as it happened,
in that year too, that the Chief's executive powers were, for the
first time, respectively set out in the Native Authority and the
34
Native Law Ordinances, both o£ 1919.
The object of the Native Law Ordinance, 1919, which was drafted and 
published in March 1914, but enactment deferred until after the war, 
was to provide for the Constitution of Native Councils and the 
progressive development of native and customary law. Yet again, however, 
the need for legislation was dictated by practical rather than theoretical 
considerations.
32. CO 536/86/46246: Dispatch No.191 of 10.7.17. Deportation of 
Mginga ex Chief of Kayonza.
33. KDA SMP 1857. Grant to D.C. Ikumba. 11.10.1912.
34. Uganda Laws, Revised Edition (1951) pp.1046-1053.
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"Instances have occurred in which action has been taken 
locally which has purported to alter native law, such 
action can have no validity and although it is most 
desirable that the gradual upward trend of native 
opinion should be reflected in an improvement of native 
law, yet it is obviously inadvisable that any alterations 
should be made which have not been fully considered and 
which are. not in accordance with the general native policy . 
of the Country.
It may well happen too that an administrative officer 
holds entirely different views from those held by his 
predecessors on such subjects and if the matter is left 
entirely to local, authorities he may exact his influence 
with the native chiefs to reverse the action which has 
been taken." 35
These "Native Councils" unlike the "Lukiko", had no legislative
powers. Like the "Lukiko", however, each Council had power,
subject to the Governors disallowance to prescribe penalties for
breaches of customary law; to effect alterations in "Native Law"
and to hear and determine cases both civil and criminal within their 
36
jurisdiction.
Of more importance, however, was the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919,
which though, not novel, since it "contained nothing new that was not •
37
already in existence, and in practice throughout the Protectorate."
defined, the powers and duties of the chiefly hierarchies that
constituted the "Native Authorities". Each chief was empowered to
maintain law and order in his County or sub-county and was to continue
to exercise his enormous traditional powers and those held under various
38
Protectorate Ordinances. He was, for example, responsible for the 
prevention of crime; the arresting of offenders, with or without a 
warrant, save that such arresteres were, in serious cases, to be brought
35. CO.536/95/5271-6 Dispatch No.282 of 21.7.1919.
36. Cap. 62
37. UNA. SMP 5568 (1919).
38. Cap. 72. S.3.
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before the District Commissioner within 24 hours. This provisioif
was directory, however, its breach did not invalidate the arrest,
39
but could well lead to the Chief’s censure, or reprimand. Each
chief had broad powers to issue orders either on his initiative or
at the instance of the District Commissioner, on a wide range of
40
specified subjects, , and failure to obey any of such orders, was
a criminal offence subject to a maximum fine of 150 shillings; or
41
two months' imprisonment, or both.
40. S.7. for the Specified Subjects see p. 114 supra.
In addition S.6. provided:
Subject to any orders of the District Commissioner any chief 
may direct any African within the. local area of his jurisdiction 
to attend before him, or before a native court, or before any 
Government official. Any African who when so directed to 
attend before any such person shall, without reasonable excuse, 
fail to attend as and when, directed may be arrested by or 
under the orders of such a chief arid taken before such person 
as aforesaid.
41. S.12 as amended in 1925 by 14 of 1923. S.4.
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Most of these powers were new and certainly wider than many a chief
had possessed before. Consequently, the extensive supervisory powers
of District Officers, not withstanding, the existence of these wide
powers soon led to arbitrary and autocratic rule, "extortion and
inefficiency", and, it was some time before this situation was
42
satisfactorily resolved.
42. One of the objects of the Ordinance had been to give District 
Commissioners "close control" over the chiefs, and this 
sentiment was given expression in S.13. which, inter alia, 
provided:- Any chief may be fined any sum not exceeding 
Shs. 600 or sentenced to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding six months in case he shall be convicted of any 
of the following acts or neglects, that is to say:
(a) If when directed by a D.C. to meet any Government
Official, he shall, without good and sufficient 
excuse, neglect to obey such direction;
(b) If he shall, without lawful excuse, neglect to exercise
the powers conferred upon him by this Ordinance;
(c) If when directed by a D.C. to issue orders he shall
without lawful excuse, neglect to issue the orders 
directed;
(d) If he shall, without lawful excuse, neglect to enforce
any orders issued by a D.C. under this Ordinance;
(e) If he shall, without lawful excuse, neglect to cancel
any order under this Ordinance when directed by a D.C. 
so to do;
(f) If he shall, without lawful excuse, neglect to enforce
any lawful orders issued by a Chief to whom he is 
subordinate;
(g) If he shall be guilty of any abuse of authority conferred
on him by law or native custom.
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4.1.3. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BAGANDA AGENCY
Kigezi1s administration was, until 1920, almost entirely in the
hands of "alien chiefs", who had steadily increased since they were
43
first introduced into the Country, in 1913. Even the principalities
of Bufumbira, Kaycn.za, Kinkizi, and Rujumbura were, as mentioned
earlier, under the supervision of Baganda Agents, who were the medium
of communication between the District Officer and the local population.
These Agents were, among other things, employed on the grounds that
there were no Bakiga chiefs, of sufficient standing and authority to
exercise control over their own people; that they would instruct local
44
headmen "in the ways of native administration", teach the people to
make roads, build rest houses, cultivate cash crops, and generally
45
"exercise a civilising influence" over their charges.
Nearly all British Officials took the view, as it happened, quite 
wrongly, that there were:
"no persons in the district of sufficient intelligence 
to act as chiefs, in the sense of the word as used 
among uncivilised tribes elsewhere; hence any thing 
in the way of native administration is difficult both 
to start and carry out." 46
In the County, of Rukiga, the situation was even more complex. The
Bakiga were split up into small clans; they recognised the authority
of no chief, and many clan heads, though prepared to work under an
Agent, were averse to their subordination to their peers from different
47
clans, and of course, from different tribes.
43. Kigezi District Archives, Annual Report for 1919/20.
44. C.O. 536/21/37925. Bell to Secretary of State. Dispatch 200 of 11.9.1908.
45. C*0. 536/41/26752. Jackson to Secretary of State, Dispatch 202 of 14.7.11.
46. Kigezi District Archives. Annual Report for 1913.
4?. Nuha Karaza, Oral Communication, August 1979.
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The British, under these circumstances, had no difficulty in
concluding that the system of employing foreign agents, was the
only method of administering the district, not withstanding that
government, by and through these Agents in the Eastern and Northern
Provinces, had already been attacked by the Governor "as obsolete
48
unsound and unjustifiable." Indeed, arrangements for the 
replacement of all "alien Chiefs" by local chiefs in these districts 
were well under way.
Several District Officers were well aware of these short-comings
and were anxious to avoid them* But the whole question was frcfcight
with much difficulty. On the one hand, there were those who argued
that a summary breaking up of the Agency System would be followed
by disastrous results, for not only would "considerable loss of
revenue be incurred, but a fatal blow would be given to the cotton 
49industry." On the other hand, there were those who, though not
oblivious to the Agents* achievements, were concerned that the Agents 
not only exercised too much power, but that "their overbearing and 
domineering attitude "to their charges was dfetrimental to British 
interests, and that their misconduct was "the direct cause of 90% of 
so-called rebellions in areas where British rule had never been 
personally u n p o p u l a r . W o r s e ,  some Agents were accused of murder 
and other serious crimes. Jackson, thus told the Colonial Office 
that the Agents,in the process of.#-
48. C.0.536/41/26752. op.cit.
49. C.O.536/52/37001. Wallis to Secretary of State. Dispatch 436 of
28.10.12.
50. Kigezi District Archives. Annual Report for 1919/1920.
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"educating their wild and savage pupils, do a good 
deal of killing all of which, in the native mind, is 
duly credited to the "Sirkal" or in other words, the 
District Commissioner, tied down to his station, 
and alone, perhaps 40 or more miles away .... 
is not fair to the natives, nor is it fair to the 
District Commissioner." 51
The use of Luganda as the official language and the attempts to 
impose it on the local populations was, yet another source of concern, 
criticism, resentment and offence.
"The language has been the most material influence 
in misleading the indigenous population as to the 
governments attitude towards alien customs and 
misleading the Baganda as to their own position 
ilTYfie country. In short I cannot, but consider its 
employment in this district to be a distinct political 
error. The local population has been submerged,in­
coherent,and voiceless; their demands, needs and 
aspirations have only reached the government 
indirectly, coloured by Baganda intermediaries - 
who have been from time to time confused by volcanic 
upheavels arising from resentment of them by the 
people whom they have, perhaps unconsciously 
misrepresented." 52
However, British attitude, towards these strictures and the agency 
system generally continued to be somewhat ambivalent and each District 
Commissioner was, for the most part, left to his own devices.
However,, a majority of officers, despite the individual officer’s
inclination to do away with the Agents altogether appear to have
53
plumped for a gradual removal, of their proteges.
51. C.O. 536/41/26752 Jackson to Secretary of State. 14.7.11.
52* Kigezi District Archives. Annual Report for 1919/1920.
53. C.O. 536/50/22189. The policy followed in many districts was 
along the following lines: "As soon as it is found that an
Agent aided chief can be entrusted with the conduct of the 
affairs of his district, the Agent is removed and the chief 
left to carry on the work." Governor to Secretary of State. 
Dispatch 248 of 18.6.12.
Further, owing to the war and the subsequent shortage of 
administrative staff, it was found necessary to retain many 
of these Agents for a longer period than would otherwise 
have been the case.
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Thus, though the removal of the Agents from Kigezi was commenced 
in 1920, it was not completed until 1930. Here, the end of the 
Baganda Agency began with the dismissal of five Agents for mis­
conduct, the abolition of all Kiganda chiefly titles, the 
introduction of Swahili, as the official language, the appointment 
of Baziba Swahili-speaking clerks and the removal of all non- 
Swahili- speaking Baganda clerks.
Shortly afterwards, Yoweri Luwanga, a Muganda Adviser, Ikumba sub-county,
was withdrawn, leaving Joseph Kalimalwaki, a Mukiga, in' sole charge of
the sub-county and thus began the process of employing local material
54
for local administration. The appointment of an indigenous chief 
in Rukiga, "a very sound move carried out by Mr. Adams", the Assistant 
District Commissioner, had a profound effect on the Bakungu-lower chiefs - 
and the Bakiga generally.^ Henceforth,. the local chiefs, mainly 
Bakungu, showed "more and more interest in their position and more 
ambition to advance; and a decided improvement in the performance of 
their duties. Kalimalwald.fs exemplary service and the salutary effect 
his appointment had on his compatriots led, despite the Agents1 
attempts "to create an impression of indispensability" to the further 
retirement of alien Agents in favour of indigenous c h i e f s . F o r  
extraneous reasons, however, progress in this direction was painfully 
slow. One of the most important factors which hampered the smooth 
implementation of the "Kigezi for the Kigezian" policy was the terror
54. Kigezi District Archives. Annual Report for 1923.
55. KDA* File No.9. Philipps to Provincial. Commissioner, 6.2.29.
56. KDA. File No.9. Philipps to Provincial Commissioner. 6.2.29.
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inspired by the supernatural activities of the anarchic Nyabiingi 
movement which made it imprudent to dispense with the services of the 
County Agents, who alone, so the British thought, were unaffected 
by Nyabiingi1s i n f l u e n c e s . W h e r e a s  therefore, there were "enough 
Bakiga competent in both character and ability, to fill all the 
Gombololas of their own tribe"; and there was "no reason for retaining" 
Baganda Sub-Agents in Rukiga, none were appointed until 1929, when 
following the final cdllapse of Nyabiingi’s movement, seven such 
appointments were made.
In the same year, Rukiga containing 20,000 taxpayers, was divided into
two counties, Rukiga and Ndorwa, and each placed under an indigenous
Saza chief; viz: Fwomushana and Mukombe respectively. Both chiefs
were, according to official reports, able»diligent and excellent
administrators. They were variously described as "quite stolid,
58
reliable, loyal and exceptionally strong and energetic" chiefs.
Each had already "stood a period of prolonged test in charge of the
59
most difficult Gombololas throughout the district," and, indeed 
had had "long years of exemplary service; spoke good Swahili; and had 
"an unusual driving force of character," and as might be expected 
both had "undergone an intensive course of instruction in their duties" 
before appointment and had acquitted themselves well.^ Additionally, 
and perhaps more importantly, both chiefs, had been "put in with success 
to clean up Gombololas outside their tribal areas left in a state of
57. KDA File No.9.op.cit. Philipps ^  Ptovihcial Commissioner. 14.2.29.
58. KDA File No. 2650, See also Confidential Reports re Mukombe, Rwo- 
mushama - upon appointment.
59. KDA File No.9. lo.cit.
60. KDA 1102/487 P.C. to. C.S. 16.12.1929.
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anarchy” by Baganda Sub-Agents; thus putting to an end any lingering 
doubts in the minds of the British, as to the ChiefTs capacity for
Having thus cleared the psychological barrier, the indigenous chiefs 
had no difficulty in meeting the requirements of the District 
Commissioner, and his glowing praises, once reserved for the Baganda 
Agents, began to be showered upon them.
"Practically all chieftains in the District are now 
occupied most satisfactory by indigenous chiefs.
They are, on the whole, both more capable and more 
honest than the class of non-indigenous Sub-Agents 
previously in charge of Gombololas. There are two 
Gombololas, on borders and occupied by many alien 
natives of petty trade class, which it may be wiser 
to keep for a year or two in charge of carefully 
selected non-natives of the District." 62
The two Gombololas in question were Ruhinda in Bufumbira and Kamwezi
in Rukiga. Even here, however, the hey-day of the Baganda Agency was
at an end; elsewhere the services of "Advisers and Agents" were,
forthwith, terminated and local chiefs installed with "highly
63
satisfactory results? The "petty broils, interclan quarrels and
bloodshed" the fear of which had forced the hands of successive District
Officers to employ alien chiefs, thanks to the good sense of the men of
64
the mountains", did not materialise. The withdrawal of the Agents
was, contrary to current conventional wisdom, followed by "a more effective 
administration and a more enthusiastic co-operation" between the people 
their own chiefs and the British Authorities.^
61. KDA File No. 9. D.C. to P.C. 7.5.1929, see also File No. 7.
62. KDA File No. 9. D.C. to P.C. 28.11.1929.
63. See SMP 3851op.cit. District Commissioner's Report.
64. KDA Provincial Commissioner's letter No. 1102/487 of 16.12.29.
65. Ibid.
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Some would no doubt argue that, but for the "civilizing influence"
of the Agents, the Bakiga would never have recorded, within such a
short period, such advance and successes. A ca. sual perusal of
66
contemporary records, however, suggests otherwise, these reveal 
that the local "clan heads, headmen and elders" could, from the 
outset, quite easily, have administered their areas without too much 
difficulty, the meanial tasks performed by the Agents, particularly 
the collection of taxes, the maintenance of law and order, were by no 
means beyond their ken. Many were, however, fiercely opposed to British 
overrule and were, therefore, unavailable for appointment. Thus the 
importation of "chiefs" was not solely due to lack.of local talent; 
on the contrary, the Baganda Agency was a potent instrument of Colonial 
Rule; the Agents were not chiefs, but, like their British superiors, 
rabid imperialists.
Besides, having served as guides, companions porters and clerks, many 
an Agent expected and was invariably appointed a "chief" in return for 
his past free services. His chieftainship - the spoils of office - was 
in view of the collector's meagre financial resources, his remuneration 
albeit in kind, and had, therefore, nothing to do with the paucity of 
local "chiefs", or the inability of segmentary societies, such as Kigezi, 
to muster a handful of tax collectors, administrative and judicial 
operatives to serve British interests without the supervision of alien 
intermediaries. However, the British as aforementioned, had other ideas, 
and it was not until 1929 that the Bakiga were, subject to the supervision 
and control of the District Commissioner, ^iven their "Home Rule".
66. K.D,A. No.1102/487. op.cit.
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4.2.1. THE INFORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PROTECTORATE GOVERNMENT AND 
THE NON-TREATY DISTRICTS.
The relations between the Protectorate Authorities and the various 
district administrations were, initially conducted within the legal 
framework of the Uganda Order in Council, 1902.^^ The Order, however, 
did not comprehensively prescribe the manner in which the administration 
of these districts was to be carried out and by whom; it merely empowered 
Her Majesty's Commissioner, to divide the Protectorate, for administrative 
purposes, into provinces and districts. In him was vested all rights of 
government, including the power to legislate for the administration of 
justice, the raising of revenue and for the general governance of the 
Protectorate. And, it was in.the exercise of these powers that the 
Commissioner placed each Province under a Sub-Commissioner, and each 
District under a Collector, the respective precursors of the Provincial 
and District Commissioners. Each administrative area was further sub-- 
divided into administrative Counties and Sub-Counties, and each sub­
division placed under a local chief. The latter's. functions yere,/-during the 
early days of the Protectorate, administrative, judicial and fiscal, 
and in the exercise of their powers, each chief was under the control 
and supervision of the Commissioner, through the Collector in charge 
of the District. Whilst some of the chieftainships were traditional 
and hereditary, a good many were the Collector's creation, and in many 
ways, like their creator, the Protectorate civil servants.
At the same time, however, they were the "Local Authorities" ini.their 
areas, and as such, were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, 
the collection of taxes and the welfare of their people. Each chief 
thus owed allegiance, both to the "Local Authority" of which he was an
67. The Uganda Order in Council, 1902. The London Gazette,
August 15, 1902, pp. 5307-5311.
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integral part and the Protectorate Governments of which he was a 
paid lackey. His was thus an enviable position, and any dereliction 
of duty, or indeed, any failure to come to the District Officer’s 
expectation, was, as Chief Aliko found to his cost, always ruthlessly 
dealt with and the culprit taught an unforgettable lesson.
"A thorn in the side of the successive Administrations 
in the person of ex-chief Aliko was removed in January....
This will very considerably strengthen the chiefs as 
showing the Mandi the ultimate even if differred fate 
of those who defy the authorities.” 68
The dismissal of Yosiya, the 16 year old King of Bunyoro, and the 
installation of his brother, Andereya is another case in point.
The facts of this case, set out below, shed some light on the 
constitutional relations between the chiefs, the Central and the Local 
Authorities, and will serve as an example.
In 1899, "a thorn in the flesh of the British” in the person of Kabarega, 
the indefatigable and the most famous of Bunyoro’s rulers, was, together 
with Mwanga, the Kabaka of Buganda, captured and subsequently deported 
to the Seychelles Islands and was succeeded by his infant son, Yosiya. 
Major Price, the military officer in charge, was detailed "to run both 
the civil and military affairs" in Bunyoro, and according to Wilson, 
"threw himself heartily into the scheme , which he believed worked 
admirably".^0 Subsequent frequent changes in officials, however, 
threw;./the scheme into neglect, and in 1900, when Wilson went to Bunyoro 
he"found the youngster running riot with all sorts of non-descript 
characters in his enclosure'.'^ Young Yosiya was duly cautioned
and "reinstated on the throne and taken on. tour of his country*"
and a few months' later sent to Kampala to meet the Buganda Regents.
68.ArLnual Report, West Nile District, loc.cit.
69.F.0.2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne 4.8.1904.
70.F.0.2/858 Wilson to Sadler 
71.Ibid.
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The verdict, according to Wilson, was that "young Yosiya had
improved vastly" and, on Wilson’s return to Bunyoro, in 1901, he
found his protege "with a following of the best chiefs, and altogether
72
with increased prestige." Shortly afterwards, however, Wilson, was, 
in quick succession, succeeded by Stanley Tomkins and Stanley Bagge, 
in 1901 and 1902, respectively. These "changes threw [Wilson’s]
Scheme into neglect", and disarray, and once again, unfavourable reports 
about Yosiya’s misrule and conduct began to appear, and culminated in 
the Regent’s petition, for his removal, of which the following is a 
verbal translation
"To our distinguished chief Mr.S.S.Bagge, we bring to 
your notice a very serious matter from our Baraza. The 
Saza chiefs are greatly troubled at heart on account of the 
doings of our King, Yosiya who rules on us.
In the first place he is perfectly devoid of wisdom, a 
thorough fool and does, not understand matters. He is 
also thoroughly heathenish.
Therefore, Sir we beg of you very much to find us 
another King who is worthy to reign over us. We have 
chosen one, a man of power who thoroughly understands 
the affairs of the Country a man of great wisdom whom 
we approve to reign over us, his name is Andereya Bisereko, 
he it is who knows out; customs, and he is an older prince 
than Yosiya. All is signed Sir. We the Saza Chiefs of 
Bunyoro." 73
Similar charges, were made by Bagge, Lloyd and Tomkins and in consequence'
Yosiya was unceremoniously deposed "before the situation became worse,
74
and whilst it could be done without risk of disturbances." The 
Secretary of State was accordingly informed that the "semi-imbecile"
Yosiya was unsuitable, that it was impossible to ’’foresee" that his 
Kabakaship would be in any way very beneficial to either the administration 
or his people, and that, in view of all the circumstances, he had been 
deposed and replaced by his elder brother, Andereya, "a bright, intelligent 
lad of twenty, much liked by the people, and who gives promise in every
72. F.0;v2/858 op.cit.
73. ;Ibid*
74. Ibid. : : ~
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way of becoming a chief useful to us and his Country."^ . The
76
accent was, of course, on Ma chief useful to us," and, in practice,
that was a euphemism for co-operative, loyal and subservient chiefs.
In Eden's words, "every petty chief", [who] was inclined to be
77
independent, was deposed and replaced by a. suitable chief." Similarly, 
Sadler's account of Yosiya's character and suitability for office 
included the following illuminating passage:
"Although warned by the Regents, from time to time 
where he, [that is Yosiya] went wrong, there has been 
no tendency to improve and latterly he has taken to 
assert his position, and decline to listen to advice.
He appears to have inherited some of the worst of 
Kabarega's tendencies, and shows no signs of any 
desire to do otherwise than idle and follow his 
natural instincts. That, in effect, was the most
serious charge against 'the boy' and indeed, the
reason why he and his mother, described 'as a bad 
woman and a vicious intriguer', were deported to 
Buganda." 78
The early years of the Protectorate thus saw a general "weeding out" 
of the "misfit, malcontents and agitators", and the introduction of a
new breed of useful and "suitable chiefs". These "upstarts" were
given the "emblem" of authority, endowed with traditional rights, 
including the privilege to tribute and corvee, and placed under the 
control and supervision, of the Protectorate Government through the 
District Commissioner. Each chief, under the watchful eyes of the 
District Commissioner, was responsible for the day to day administration 
of his area, the maintenance of law and order, the provision of 
"Burungibwansi" the administration of justice, the ccrf.ection of taxes, 
the enforcement of Protectorate laws including the multifarious edicts, 
orders and directives issued by the District Commissioner and the various 
departmental field officers, and thus his inferior and vulnerable position 
emphasised.
75. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne. op.cit.
76. Ibid.
77 See Eden's Report, op.cit.
78. F.O.2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne. op.cit'.1
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Having thus set up "suitable" chiefly hierarchies replete with
traditional powers and reorganised the local indigenous political
institutions along the Ankole-Buganda pattern, the administering
power soon found it necessary to provide a uniform legislative code
under which the preceeding ad hoc arrangements were to be nurtured,
guided and, for the purposes of British rule, put to good use.
However, owing to the outbreak of the 1914 - 1918 European War, it
was not until 1919 that the 1914 draft legislation: the Native
Authority and the Native Law Ordinances were enacted and brought into
force. Under the former "An Ordinance to make provision for the
Powers and Duties of Native Chiefs and for the Enforcement of Native
Authority", the chiefs1 traditional powers were defined, vastly
79
increased and consolidated. It was laid upon the chiefs, as a primary
responsibility, the duty to maintain order, including the prevention
of crime, and were, for this purpose given powers to arrest, search
and seizure; and were in addition, empowered to issue orders having
the force of law, on a variety of subjects, of which the most important
80
were concerned with law and orde^, corvee, and housing accommodation.
79.. Cap.60. Section 3, The Native Authority Ordinance, 1919.
80. Cap.60. Section 7, Native Authority Ordinance, 1919, later
renamed "African Authority Ordinance, 1949, the recital of 
which was: "An ordinance to make provision for the Powers
and Duties of African Chiefs and for the Enforcement of African 
Authority". ' Section 7B covered 16 topics ranging from 
the "distilling of native intoxicating liquors " to
the "preventing of eviction of natives without good cause
from land occupied by them."
159
The Native Law Ordinance, 1919, made provision for the recognition
or constitution of local chiefly councils and, empowered them,
subject to the approval of the Governor, to alter Native Law and to
81
fix penalties for its breach, or infringement.
The chief's magisterial powers were, simultaneously increased and
brought under the ambit of one ordinance, the Native Courts
Ordinance, 1919, and inter alia, provision made for the "enforcement
82
of tribal authority". Section 45 'specifically stated that:-
"The Supervisory Courts may, should they deem 
fit, for the enforcement of the. lawful orders of 
Native Courts of recognised tribal chiefs or 
Councils of elders, try persons disobeying such 
orders and on conviction impose a sentence of 
imprisonment of either description not exceeding 
six months or a fine not exceeding rupees five 
hundred or. both." 83
Furthermore, the chiefs were, in most districts, recognised to a greater 
or lesser extent, as having authority over the allocation of land within 
the limits of their chief doms* Thus by the- early 1920s, the position 
of chiefs vis-a-vis the protecting power had already been reduced to 
a common pattern: They were statutory magistrates, law makers, and
81. Such Councils were recognised or constituted thus:- 
Busoga District Council : Date of Legal Notice 1/3/1920.
Ankole & Toro District Councils : Date of Legal Notice 13.6.1920.
Acholi, Bunyoro & Lugwari District Councils: Date of Legal Notice 1/3/1921 
BugisiA District Council : Date of Legal Notice 16/3/1925.
Teso District Council : Date of Legal Notice, 15/11/1925.
82. See, No* 24 of 1919
83. S.45 of No.24 of 1919.
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executive operatives, whilst their position in relation to the 
District Commissioner was akin to that of "Agent and Principal", the 
latter being the Principal or "Supreme Chief". He was the link between 
the Protectorate and the Local Authorities. In him were vested enormous 
and varied powers of intervention in local affairs, and many a chief, 
all of whom were his appointees, looked up to him for advice and 
guidance. Yet, they also owed allegiance downwards to their local 
communities and were responsible for their peoples’ welfare. There 
was, as yet, however, no clear distinction between Protectorate and 
Native Affairs; there was as witness Sir Philip Mitchell's remarks, 
on "Indirect Rule’^ lh 1936,. shortly after .his^arrival in the'Country, 
one single "Administration". ' Her . w r o t e ■
Ii
I
I
l
| "There is no division of function between bhe British
| Government and the Native Authority by subject - nothing
I resembling dyarchy. With a few exceptions such as the
I raising and control of armed forces, which are and must
be reserved entirely to the British Government,, the division 
may be described as horizontal rather than perpendicular; 
that is to say that In principle, no branch of the 
administration is entirely British or entirely Native, but 
that up to a point, all are Native, in their simpler, or 
at any rate, their local aspect, and thus British: it is
moreover exiomatic that in the sphere of administration 
j (excluding large townships where different issues arise)
the point at which the division occurs aught to be 
constantly rising, until the native Africa executive 
administration is the function of the local native 
administration 84
To this end Mitchell enacted two ordinances, the Native Administrations
(Incorporation) Ordinance, and the Native Administration Tax Ordinances, 
85
both of 1938. The former an enabling piece of legislation, was the
first legal recognition of the changing character of "District Native
84. Mitchell, Sir Philip, "Address on Indirect Rule", 17/7/1936
85. Nos. 8 and 16 of 1938.
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Administrations11, and made provision for the constitution of "rulers,
chiefs or other native officials", virtuiti officii, as corporate
bodies having a separate existence and a separate legal personality
with perpetual succession, the right to acquire property, the right
86
to sue and be sued. Mitchell believed that this arrangement would
make the beginning of the end of the first phase of the existing
"horizontal relationships between the Protectorate and the Native 
87
Authorities." The slow speed at which Mitchell1s plan was 
implemented, however, negatived the importance of the Ordinance, 
and was evidently dictated by the unwillingness of many a District
88
Officer to free the chiefs from the district officer1s apron-strings.
86* Section 4 of No.'S.,' of 1938.
87. Mitchell, Address on Indirect Rule, op.cit.
88. Thus ithilst Buganda was brought under the Ordinance immediately 
after its enactment in 1939, the Western Kingdoms and the Kigezi 
District Administration were not "incorporated" until 1944 and 
1950 respectively. None of the District Administrations in the 
Northern Province, had been incorporated when the 1938 Ordinance 
was repealed by the District Councils Ordinance, of 1955.
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Mitchell's other enactment, the Native Administration Tax Ordinance,
1938, had as its main objectives the rationalisation of local taxation
and the establishment of a new tax for "Local Authorities", thus
enabling them, for the first time, to raise the bulk of their own
89
revenue locally and without the fiat of the Central Government.
Meanwhile, the extensive judicial legislative and administrative 
powers which the chiefs wielded, were increasingly causing grave 
concern among certain section&of the Administration., The defects of 
the chiefly hierarchies, systematically set up in the preceeding thirty 
years were beginning to surface: the System presented enormous
opportunities to the unscrupulous chief, and regrettably, many a chief 
did !succumb and indulged in "petty oppression" of the peasantry or 
simply amassed wealth at .the expense of his charges, and in consequence 
lost their respect and support and, in serious cases, lost all control 
and influence over them to the detriment of local administration.
More importantly however, the position of "Civil Servant Chiefs", 
was in the light of the new government policies, increasingly becoming 
more anomalous and more difficult to defend.
"You cannot establish native authority upon a basis 
of chiefs selected and appointed by the foreign power: 
you may get, by this means, a useful temporary agency 
of administration, but it will not be native:. That is 
not to say that it is impossible ever to create a new 
native authority, but it is very difficult and a very 
slow process; and if, there is a real traditional native 
authority ready to your hand, it is also unnecessary and 
generally unwise." 90
89. Cap. 188.
90. Mitchell, "Address on Indirect Rule" op.cit.
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In fact, it was the System's proneness to produce "local tyrannies"
and nepotism, together with its most insidious twin by-products that,
in 1937 prompted the Teso District Commissioner to institute, among
other things, "a series of Councils at District, County, Sub-county,
91
and Parish levels, with lay nominated councillors in the majority."
The idea was, firstly, to neutralise the immence personal authority
of the chiefs, and secondly, to enable the growing number of young
educated elite, to participate in the proper administration of their
areas. It is important to note, however, that the chiefs were invariably
the chairmen of the new councils, that the nature of their authority and
responsibility vis-a-vis the new councils, was not stated, and that their
position remained, undefined. This, not withstanding, however, the Teso
experiment was, during the next decade, extended to other Districts,
save that Councils in the Agreement areas remained dominated by the
local chiefly hierarchies. In 1949, statutory effect was given to these
arrangements and tentative efforts made to determine the constitutional
relations between the chiefs, the central and local government 
92
administrations.
Under the Ordinance, the chiefs were to be "Officers of the African
Governments", but were to be appointed by the Governor, or such other
person authorised by him,, and though "Officers" of District Councils
were, in the exercise of their chiefly duties, to be wholly responsible
to the Central Government Authorities, some of their important powers
93
were, however, vested in the hew District Councils.
91. Lawrence J.C., The Position of Chiefs in Local Government in 
Uganda. JAA. ?ol.V. 1953 pp. 69-72.
92. Vide, the African Local Governments Ordinance, 1949.
93. See, The African Local Governments Ordinance, 1949.
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It is worth noting, however, that the chiefs were active members
of District Councils and as such were able to bring their influence
to bear on these and other matters on which they had had vast
experience.. They were however,, no longer the sole keepers of their
peoples' consciences and were beginning to lose some of the draconian
powers, they formerly possessed. They had ceased to be law givers,
government advisers, or sole "judges"; their magisterial powers were
increasingly being exercised by the non-chiefly magistrates. The
formal definition of the chief's position, however, did not go hand
in hand with reality. In actual practice, the chiefs "though the
executive officers of the local government., were still largely responsible
94
to the District Commissioner," Moreover, the headquarters organisation
of the new African Local Government, "despite the high sounding offices,
such as Secretary-General, remained very much what its predecessor had
been - little more than an extension of the District Commissioner's
office from which advise and direction were sought on the most trivial
95
of administrative matters."
Such were the visible manifestations of "the belief in indefinite time 
ahead" Syndrome,^ of which the following was a typical expression:
94. Morris*H.F., "The Framework of Indirect Rule in East Africa", 
in Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice* Morris,H.F & 
Read.J.S., Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1972. p.34.
95. Ibid. a '
96. Cohen, Sir Andrew, British Policy in Changing Africa,
Routlege and Keegan Paul, London, 1959. p.26.
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"In another ten years we shall have a black race 
managing its own local affairs almost completely 
and accustomed to honesty and justice and 
therefore not prepared to stand either dishonesty 
or oppression* I said ten years, make it twenty 
if you like or fifty or a hundred and fifty: it
does npt matter. What does matter is that the 
essential civilizing work should be done by means 
such as we are using of helping, obliging if 
you like - the African to civilize himself*11 97
This belief that "time was on their side" was, as late as 1959, still
strongly held by a majority of British Officers and is plainly
evident in their constitutional proposals and submissions to Wallis
98
and Wild in 1953 and 1959 respectively.
For example, the Government * s memorandum on the Wallis Report 
begins with:
"Government regards the Report as a most valuable 
document and in general considers that the recommendations 
should be accepted as. the basis for future policy. Some 
details of the proposals are not regarded as acceptable 
in full, nor can all the recommendations be put into 
force immediately. Councils must be given time to gain 
experience and the pace at which the recommendations 
can be carried into effect will necessarily vary from 
district to district." 99
Even more startling,, in view of Government policy on local government, 
the cornerstone of which was."the development of an efficient and 
representative local government,"^^ was the Provincial Commissioner’s 
contention "that it was essential to preserve the powers of the chiefs.'
97. Mitchell, Sit- Philip, African Afterthought s. Hutchinson, London, 1954.
98* Wallis, C.A.A., Report of an Inquiry into African Local Government 
in Uganda. Government Printer, Entebbe, 1953* Wild J.V. Report of 
the Constitutional Committee, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1959.
99* Government Memorandum on the Report by Mr.C .A* G. Willis of An
Inquiry into Africal Local Government in the Uganda Protectorate, 
1952. p.l.
100. Ibid.
101. Wallis Report, loc.cit.
101
P-
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Yet, as Wallis tersely noted: "it is not possible to maintain
simultaneously the two positions, one, that the power of the chiefs
shall be preserved, and two, that more powers shall be given to local
102
government bodies." Inevitably, "as the power of local authorities
103
increases, so the position of the chiefs must change*" Indeed,
the process had, albeit, unnoticed, already begun., the District Councils,
as noted above, had the power to make by-laws for precisely the same
subjects as those on which the chiefs were empowered to issue orders
by virtue of the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919* There were thus,
104
"two sources of law on the same subject, in the same area." This,
Wallis felt, was untenable, and argued that the Government should 
formally recognise the chiefs1 changed position by repealing section 7 
of the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919, thus relieving the chiefs of their 
law-making powers and effectively making them local councils* "enforcement 
officers". Wallis believed that "the system of a recognised chief­
tainship [did] not mix with the System of [representative] local 
..106
government. He wrote:-
"The chief*s responsibility for maintaining law and 
order is now one of his most important duties, but in 
spite of the Native Authority Ordinance, he really 
performs, it in a personal capacity. The adoption of 
a policy of local government means that the personal 
rule will gradually give way to the rule of law. This 
in turn means that the discretionary power of 
individuals, over the public will be replaced by the power 
of officials, whose actions are regulated by a law 
of general application in the territory." 107
102. fhe Wallis Report.op.cit. p.60
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid. p.60. r- -
105. Ibid. p.60.
106. Ibid. p.61.
107. Ibid. p.60-61.
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Wallis' recommendations were, with some reservations, 'accepted 
by the Government and embodied in the District Administrations 
(District Councils) Ordinance, 1955.
Under this legislation, of which the principal object was "to devolve 
greater responsibilities on District Councils and to better define
108
their position in relation to the administration of the Protectorate*"
the position of the chief vis-a-vis the District Council and the Central
Authorities was further defined and the term "chief" itself given a
new meaning, namely, "any person or any one of a class of persons
109
recognised by the Governor as a chief," Section 66(1) provided
that:-
"Subject to its Staff regulations, a council may employ 
at such, remuneration as it shall determine such officers, 
chiefs and employees as it shall think necessary for the 
efficient discharge of its functions and subject to its 
staff regulations may dismiss any person so employed: 
Provided that the Governor may direct that officers and 
chiefs of any class or classes shall not be engaged or 
dismissed save with his consent: And provided further
that in any district where all or any officers, chiefs 
or employees are traditionally employed by any person 
then the Council shall act on behalf of such person." 110
108. No.1. of 1955.
109. Ibid. S.2.
110. ibid., S.66(1) and S.66(3) stated that:- 
Notwithstanding the provisions of S. i) and (2) of the section 
no chief of or above the rank of sub-county chief or its 
equivalent shall be dismissed or subject to disciplinary action 
save in accordance with disciplinary regulations made by the 
Governor in Council which shall prescribe:
(a)~ the punishment that can be awarded to such chiefs;
(b) the person or persons who can award such punishment;
(c) the manner and procedure for inquiries into the conduct 
of such chiefs and the person or persons who shall 
conduct such inquiries, and
(d) such matters as shall be necessary to assure the speedy 
and just determination of complaints in regard to the 
misconduct of such chiefs.
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This, inter alia, meant that, in future, all chiefs were to be 
local government employees and, as such, the "Local Authorities" 
executive officers; and were, subject to certain exceptions to be 
appointed and dismissed by the employing district administrations 
through their appointments committeess* They were thus to continue to 
serve two masters in the discharge of their various duties and 
responsibilities. Indeed, the future success of S*66. largely depended 
on its interpretation and implementation by the Officers of the Provincial 
Administrations. Already, however, some of their commentaries upon it, 
did not augur well for the future* Thus, for example, a year after the 
1955 Ordinance came into force, one District Commissioner, categorically 
stated that:-
"The effect of the District Administration (District 
Council Ordinance) on.the position of chiefs, Is not 
likely to be immediate* One of the Provincial 
Commissioners,, speaking in the debate on the Ordinance 
in the legislative council said! "although this Ordinance 
ia a rather formidable piece of legislation, there is 
nothing revolutionary in it; it is merely legalising 
much of what Is already being done**..." The effect 
of the Ordinance is not revolutionary, but evolutionary. 
No one can gauge the exact pace of this evolution but 
the function which the chiefs at present perform are 
so vital to administration that any violent change 
is out of the question* The debt owed to chiefs is fully 
recognised by the Protectorate Government as is shown 
by the official Memorandum on the Wallis Report:
"both Protectorate Government and local government bodies 
depend very largely on the chiefs to give effect to 
their policies in the field, and they must continue to 
do so until there is such large corps of technical staff 
available than at the present* Any sudden change in the 
position of chiefs would probably have most grave results 
and might lead to a complete breakdown of administration, 
Chiefs are, in fact, an indispensable part of the local 
government structure," 111
111* Lawrence. J.C.A. "The position of chiefs et*el. op * cit.p.192.
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Thus, in spite of the Ordinance, and official rhetoric notwith­
standing, the chiefs' position remained, as some unofficial members
& 112of the Legislative Council put it, "uncertain, invidious and embarrasing",
and so it remained until the end of British overrule in 1962, and
so it remains to this day; and sadly, there is no scintilla of
evidence of any movement. This, as one observer put it, "is a confused
constitutional position of which the chiefs are happily unaware, since
113
few of them know what the Ordinances contain."
Unfortunately, however, this blissful ignorance was bought at too high 
a price and at somebody's expense. Nor is this an isolated example, 
in fact, it can, without too much ingenuity, be repeated ad nauseam.
Moreover, like Colonialism - its benevolent benefactor - this legacy, 
the beneficiaries of which are yet unborn, is sure to remain a 
controversial matter for many a year to come.
112. Lawrence, op.cit.
113. Wallis. Report of An Inquiry, op.cit. pp. 59-60.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE REFORMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
5.1.1. THE PRELUDE TO CHANGE
The preceding material, the Kigezi example, in particular, shows that 
the British were, throughout the interwar years, proccupied with the 
extention of British hegemony over the eastern, northern and wedtern 
provinces. Their primary objectives were the maintenance of law and 
order, the imposition of taxation, the modernization of indigenous 
local tribunals and the formation of chiefly hierarchies. The latter 
were the main link between the people and the collector, and indeed, 
were the local executives. There was, as yet, however, no definite 
or common local government policy: each officer was left to his own
devices, and his approach was inevitably dictated by local conditions, 
the exigencies of the moment and administrative convenience. The 
introduction of colonial rule was thus the work of f,the man on the 
spot", and not surprisingly, his handiwork varied from district to 
district and from time to time. It was highly personalised and in some 
cases too autocratic: both the Provincial Commissioner and the Governor
were rarely involved in local issues. The collector, and later the 
District Commissioner, was in full command of his charges. Yet, the 
general administrative pattern which emerged had many common features 
of which the exercise of power~by and through central government 
appointed chiefs was, despite its disadvantages, the most dominant 
and the most important: this was largely due to the universal imitation
and adaptation, regardless of local conditions, of the Buganda System; 
and the fact that this System was as alien as, say the English or the 
French was generally disregarded. The fact that it was of African origin 
v was sufficient to commend it for general application to the Nilotic and
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Bantu acephalous societies. But as indicated earlier, its introduction 
was not without its critics,^- and as time went on, it became 
increasingly difficult to defend, and by 1947, even its most ardent 
supporters were beginning to voice, albeit in private, the dangers of 
the monster they had helped to create.
"To begin with this system served its primary purpose 
of maintaining law and order, but it patently provided 
no outlet for the energies and ambitions of the growing 
number of educated or semi-educated Africans, who by the 
third decade of the. present Century were beginning to chafe 
at the nepotism, petty tyrannies and "closed shop" of the 
chiefs' class, many members of which were completely illiterate 
and all of whom depended on the backing of Government for 
their power and authority, instead of on tribal sanction and 
consent.. Moreover, it was obvious that local self-government 
on democratic lines., could not be achieved unless the 
administrative machine was overhauled and broadened."2
Yet again, these criticisms had already been anticipated by some
progressive officers, and modest reforms carried out on an experimental
basis. The pilot scheme was initiated by the Teso District Commissioner,
as early as 1920, and involved the "setting up of local Councils based
on the Councils of Elders which most tribes at one time possessed in
3
some shape or form." This experiment, apparently, "showed sufficient
promising results" that it was "adopted in neighbouring districts", and
4
was subsequently universally used throughout the non-treaty states.
This conciliar system was,, in fact, foreshadowed in the Native Law 
Ordinance, 1919, which, paradoxically, had as its main object, the 
curbing of the predilections of certain District Commissioners to tamper 
with customary law at variance with their own notions of justice and
1. See the preceding chapter pp. 137-147.
2. Kennedy's"Note". op.cit.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
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morality, without the sanction and consent of the indigenous 
population.^ The constitution and composition of these councils 
varied from district to district, but by 1940, the general pattern 
was more or less settled, and the structure of "Native Councils" 
in vogue in Busoga, set out below, though not typical, was by no 
means uncommon. According to the Provincial Commissioner, these 
arrangements consisted of chiefly councils at the District and Gomolola 
levels only**, the Saza Councils, the official line went: "are not
necessary and are merely a duplication."^
The new District Council consisted of the Kyabazinga, the Secretary, 
the Treasurer, the Saza Chiefs, the clan heads, the Mutara, elected 
representatives and the non-official nominees. The latter were drawn 
from local dignitaries, leading farmers, traders and teachers and held 
office at the District Commissioner's pleasure. The main functions of 
this august body were:-
(a) to pass the annual Native Administration budget.
(b) to consider and recommend any matters which may 
be referred to them by the District Commissioner, 
and to perform any other duties which may from 
time to time be assigned to them by the Provincial 
Commissioner.
(c) to consider resolutions and recommendations received 
from local Councils, and from Standing Committees, 
and.to frame resolutions for the consideration of the 
Provincial Commissioner.
(d) to make proposals for the alterations, or additions 
to customary law and native jurisprudence generally.
5. See the explanatory memorandum by the Attorney-General. Under 
the 1919 Ordinance: the Governor could constitute or recognise 
Native Councils for the sole purpose of altering native law and 
custom. It is to be noted that such Councils already existed in 
the Agreement areas, albeit, in a very crude and elementary form.
6. See Tongue'is confidential despatch to the D.C. Busoga.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. All the nominated representatives were to be appointed by 
the Provincial Commissioner.
9. Ibid. The total membership of the Council was set at 120 councillors. 
The proceedings of this Council were formal and were governed by 
rules of procedure framed, with the approval, of the P.C. and
by the District Commissioner.
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The Gombolola Councils, which were "less formal bodies", and 
were designed to "perform much the same duties as Parish Councils 
in England",^ consisted of:-
"Owe : Gombolola, Miruka chiefs. All or an 
elected number of Mitalla chiefs, Local Clan 
Heads [and the] Representatives of the 
peasantry." 11
Needless to say that the Councils of Busoga, like their counterparts
elsewhere in the Protectorate had no executive powers: they were
entirely advisory, totally dominated by the Chiefs and in reality,
12
"no more than a section of the District Commissioner's office."
"The chiefs, from the head of the Saza to the Abe - Miruka" run the
official line, "must clearly understand that they derive their position
and authority solely from their appointment by Government; that they
are government servants and only hold office as long as they perform
13
their duties to our satisfaction."
10. See. Tongue's Confidential Despatch, op.cit.
11. Ibid. The chief functions of these Councils were:
(i) to consider and discuss generally all matters affecting 
the welfare of the people in the Gombolola and the ways 
and means of effecting thi3 and to carry out instructions 
and orders given by the authorities with regard to health, 
agriculture.etc.;
(ii) to frame resolutions with regard to the development or 
modification of Busoga Customary law;
(iii) to provide non-official members for the Gombolola court.
12. Dundas, Sir.. Charles. Native Administration in Uganda.
Government Printer, Entebbe, 1941. p.l.
13. Tongue's Confidential Despatch, loccit.
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It soon became clear, however, that the establishment of these
Councils, though an advance in itself, was of little value; it was
14
imperative that they should be given positive executive powers.
Many officers were, however, against such a move; they felt that 
further structural changes were necessary before any devolution of 
power could take place. In reality, however, the main problem was 
the District Commissioner's fears that such "premature devolution" 
would inevitably lead to inefficiency and loss of revenue.
Consequently, progress in this direction was painfully slow. Never­
theless, modest efforts were made "to strengthen the existing Councils 
on a democratic basis" and attempts made to secure "competent and 
selected executives", by broadening the "franchise.
The first step to this end was taken in Buganda, in 1945. In that 
year, the Lukiko passed an electoral law for the election of non-official 
Councillors to all local Councils in Buganda.^ This move towards 
democracy, however, did not involve any devolution of executive powers 
to the Councils, indeed the chiefly hierarchy remained dominant and 
responsible to the Kabaka, and not surprisingly, the 1945 reforms did 
not, as anticipated, generate much interest in local affairs, or drive 
the "educated young" in their droves, to seek elective council office, 
on the contrary, they voted with their feet.
14. Dundas, Native Administration in Uganda, op.cit.
15. Dundas1 memo, op.cit.
16. Under this legislation, the elected unofficials were 
approximately one-third of the membership of the County 
and Sub-county Councils, whilst in the Lukiko they 
held thirtyrrone out of eighty-nine seats.
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In the meantime, the Conciliar System in Buganda was gradually 
extended throughout the Protectorate, and by 1947, there were 
everywhere a chain of councils, based on the territorial divisions 
into which each District was divided and there were several local 
variations to suit local requirements. Thus, for example, there 
were in the Eastern Province, four categories of Councils: the District 
or Tribal Council, the County Council, the Gombolola or Sub-Chiefs* 
Council and the Muruka or Village Council.^ And as in Buganda, so 
in the Eastern Province, the representation of unofficials was secured 
by a system of elections, the modus operandi of which was as follows:-
"On every grade of Council there is a large unofficial 
majority and as far as possible every type and grade of 
society is represented. The election of unofficial 
representatives is left entirely to the people themselves 
and no attempt has been made to frame regulations as to what 
procedure should'be adopted. The African has his own methods 
and if left to himself usually obtains something like unanimity 
in arriving at the final choice. Each Council is the 
Electoral -College for the Council above; but by virtue 
of the popular election for membership of the Muluka Council 
which, it must be emphasised is the basis of the whole system, 
no person amongst the "popular representatives" or the minor 
clan or Sept Leaders, can serve on any Council unless he has 
originally been chosen by the people of his village or its 
equivalent to a seat on the Muluka Council. Similarly, when 
his term of Service on one of the higher Councils is completed 
he must be re-elected to the Muluka Council before he can 
be eligible to serve a second time on any Council. There is 
thus no short-cut to the Tribal Council for would-be professional 
politicians.
If any member of a lower Council is elected to a higher Council 
he automatically resigns his seat on the lower Council and someone 
else is elected in his place thereon. By this means no one can 
normally be a member of more than one Council, though in 
exceptional circumstances, e.g. when a chief is Head of a 
major Clan and has a seat on the tribal council by virtue of 
that Headship, is at the same time a member of the lower Councils 
by virtue of his Chieftainship, he can sit on two Councils. There 
can accordingly be no complaint regarding anybody having to 
waste a large part of his time on council business.
17. Kennedy's "Note" op.cit. p.l.
18. Ibid.-
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The term of office of elected members was fixed at three years,
save in Miluka Councils where it was twelve months, but one-third
of the Councillors on each Council fell due for replacement or re-
election every year. Thus whilst continuity was maintained, provision
was made for the yearly injection of fresh blood into the Council.
But following the Buganda example, these Councils had no executive
powers: they too were purely deliberative and advisory chambers,
and were answerable to the District Commissioner. Yet according to
contemporary official records, they were "popular with the people",
19
and membership thereof ras "regarded as an honour." Their more positive
functions however, were two-fold: they provided "an antidote to
oppression and to the further seizure of power by the chiefs", and
secondly, they enabled the local communities to participate, albeit on
20
a very limited scale, in the management of their local affairs.
The chiefly element, however, remained dominant and unchanged. Worse, the 
electoral arrangements coupled with the Council’s lack of real powers 
tended to discourage the growing number of young educated men and women 
from becoming Councillors.. This, it is contended, is the explanation 
why the chiefs did not, as anticipated, oppose the establishment of 
these Councils. It is also felt that the inadequacy of these arrangements 
was largely responsible for the postponement, until 1955, of the necessary 
reforms. It is doubtful, however, whether the "man on the spot" had 
the desire or the inclination to effect such changes. Thus it took a 
Labour Secretary of State, for the Colonies, the Rt.Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones, 
to initiate the next move forward. He too, however, was responding to 
some pressing problems, and more importantly, to some outside pressures, 
particularly, the "Allies", and his proposal's for local government reforms,
19. Kennedy’s "Note" op.cit. the gubernatorial authority, unscathed.
20. ibid.
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the details of which are discussed below, are illuminating; and 
incredible, though it may seem, this was the first time that the 
Colonial Office had, on its own initiative raised a major policy 
issue relating to "Native Administration". Hitherto, "the man on 
the spot" had always had the first and last word on the matter; his 
decisions were seldom, if at all, overruled, and sure enough, as 
shown below, Creech-Jones' policy was no exception; it was met with 
criticism, delay and worse.
5.1.2. THE CREECH-JONES* PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
"Since I took office as Secretary of State in October 
I have been considering some of the basic problems of 
African. Administration, and I think it right that 
I should now address you on this subject, since our 
success in handling these problems and the extent to 
which we can secure the active co-operation of the 
Africans themselves, may well determine the measure of 
our achievement in the programmes of political, social 
and economic advancement on which we have now embarked.
I believe that the key to success lies in the development 
of an efficient and democratic system of local government. 
I wish to emphasize the words efficient, democratic and 
local ..... because they seem to contain r the kernel of 
the whole matter: local because the system of government
must be close to the common people and their problems, 
efficient because it must be capable of managing the 
local services in a way which will help to raise the 
standard of living, and democratic because it must not 
only find a place for the growing class of educated 
men, but at the same time command the respect and support 
of the mass of the people."20a
Such, broadly, was the crux of the new policy and its rationale. Clearly,
Creech-Jones* approach to local government in the Colonies was markedly
different from that of his predecessors; he was more forthright, positive
and direct. Local government, he argued, would "provide the people with
their political education and the channel, for the expression of their 
21
opinions." He also maintained that an efficient and democratic system
of local government was "essential to the healthy and political
20a. The Secretary of State to the Governors of the African Territories.25/2/4
21. Ibid.
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development of the African Territories", and that it was "the
„ 22 
foundation on which their political progress was to be built.
This, he believed, would eventually enable the people to run their
own internal affairs without too much Central Government intervention.
"Without an efficient system of local government,[ he 
insisted], the great mass of the African population 
will derive only partial benefits from the monies 
voted for development by the Colonial Legislatures 
and the grants made under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act." 23
The "African Governments" wer.e accordingly urged to give these"questions
the very closest consideration" and were'directed to submit , within "three
months" their "views on these points and to report on the steps which
24
you are taking to deal with them".
Whilst most African Governments replied almost immediately and their 
responses were positive and promising, the Uganda Government’s reply was 
nearly three months* late, ambivalent and tentative, and it was not 
until 1948 that the Governor, Sir John Hall, unveiled his personal 
plan for reform.^
"It is a matter of prime importance to devise 
some unifying process which over a period of years 
will tend to provide a sense of common interest, 
common purpose - and later, it is hoped of common 
nationality - and at the same.time to encourage 
and not impede the growth and development of 
indigenous policital institutions.
The Uganda Government hopes to find this unifying 
process in a progressive development, both in 
executive responsibilities and in their representative 
character, of the System of Councils with official and 
elected members at the level of province, district, 
parish and village; These Councils, will be of little
22. Creech-Jones. op.cit.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Halls’ despatch of 29.8.1947. : His Excellency, the Governor, wishes
the people of Uganda to know that, with the full approval of the Secretary 
of State, it has been decided to extend and develop Local Government 
throughout the Protectorate by encouraging Native Governments, 
Administrations and Councils, to .assume greater responsibilities than 
hitherto for the administration of their own areas. Thus Africans will be 
enabled to take a greater part in administering their own local services."
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value as an educative factor or as an outlet for
political aspirations unless they are given both
at the district and at the provincial level real 
financial and executive responsibility. Deliberative 
and advisory functions will fiet be enough. 11 26
The accent was on "the progressive development of local councils at
the provincial, district and parish levels and on their "official 
27
character". The existing System of Councils was to be directly
linked with the Legislative Council and the Central-Local financial
relations accordingly adjusted. All "Native Administrations" were
to be given "greater responsibilities than hitherto for the administration
28
of their own areas."
Hall’s intentions were, however, shortly afterwards, "modified by the 
recommendations made at the Provincial Commissioners' Conference.... 
that draft legislation should be prepared giving the Governor power
(a) to constitute provincial, district and other
grades of Councils;
(b) to endow the Councils with authority
(i) to legislate in certain specified matters 
of local government including the levy of 
local taxation and the enactment of native 
laws;
(ii) to pass the native administration budgets;
(iii) to act in such advisory and executive capacities 
in matters of local government as may be approved 
by direction of the Governor."29
These proposals were incorporated into a draft Ordinance which defined 
in some detail,, the Councils' executive and legislative powers, and 
submitted to the Provincial Commissioners' Conference held on the 
1st and 2nd July, 1948, for their review and revision. Instead of
26. Hall's answering dispatch, op.cit.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. The Wallis Report, op.cit.
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making verbal amendments, however, the Conference reversed its 
previous decision, effected major changes and recommended the enactment 
of "a simple, short and flexible instrument" so as to allow the various 
circumstances of the district to be treated by separate regulations for 
each district, and that "Local Governments" should be constituted 
consisting of:
"(a) Councils; and
(b) Local executive officers appointed by and
30
responsible to the Governor."
These changes were duly accepted and the bill on which the African Local 
Government Ordinance, 1949, was based was drafted and had the following 
as its aims:
"The object of this bill is to reconstitute the System 
of African Local Governments throughout the Protectorate.
These Governments will be composed of two parts, the 
executive and the deliberative. The executive part of 
these Governments as established by this bill makes no 
change in the System at present in force. On the 
deliberative side the System of local councils which 
has gradually been built up over a period of years is 
put on a regular basis." 31
Thus the draft Ordinance was at variance with the Governor1 s proposals,
the Provincial Commissioner's recommendations and was clearly inconsistent
with the Secretary of State's policy set out above: there was "no change
in the existing system," indeed, the Councils' executive powers were
32
based con the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919. That was the Uganda
Government's response to Creech-Jones' unequivocal dispatch, the core of
30. Wallis' Report, op.cit. .
31. The draft bill : objects and reasons., per the Attorney-General.
32. Cap.74. No.2. of 1949.
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which was the "development of an efficient and democratic System 
of Local Government" throughout the Protectorate. It is hardly surprising 
therefore.,that the African Local Government Bill was unfavourably received, 
both within and outside Uganda.
Despite this reception, however, the Bill was duly enacted and, its 
contents not withstanding, the preamble proudly proclaimed that:-
"And whereas in order to devolve greater responsibility 
upon African local authorities it is desirable to 
reconstitute such councils, to increase their powers 
in matters of local government and to define their 
position, in relation to the administration of the 
Protectorate." 33
In fact this was not entirely true; the 1949 Ordinance did not, as
the "objects and reasons" of the draft Ordinance indicate, make any
"change in the System at present in force," it merely put -it "on a 
3 A
regular basis," in other words, the existing ad hoc councils, the 
handiwork of individual officers, were regularised and placed under 
the umbrella of a single instrument: the African Local Governments
Ordinance, 1949, of which the following provisions were the most 
important.
Section 3 and the Regulations issued under it made provision for the 
establishment in each district, Buganda excepted, of an "African
f
Local Government", consisting of chiefs, a district council and
33. The African Local Government Ordinance, 1949.
34. Ibid.
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lower councils. The chiefs were to be appointed, or their
%
appointment approved by the Governor, or some other person authorised
by him, and were to be responsible to the Governor, or such other
36
authorised persons for the proper exercise of their duties. Every
chief; was to administer such Protectorate laws as he was "legally
competent to administer and in particular the provisions of the
African Authority Ordinance and any bye-laws lawfully made" by the 
37
District Council. Thus, the chiefs were still regarded as central 
government agents rather than local government officers. Their real 
government duties were therefore incidental to their main duties set 
out in the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919. Similarly, section 5 
was reminiscent of the old order and clearly contrary to the intentions 
of the framers of the new policy in the Colonial Office. It simply 
stated that:-
35. Vide,
The Busoga District Council Proclamation. L.N. 8 of 1949 
The Bukedi District Council Proclamation. L.N. 9 of 1949 
The Bugishu District Council Proclamation. L.N. 10 of 1949. 
The Teso District Council Proclamation L.N*11 of 1949.
The Karamoja District Council Proclamation.L.N..44 of 1949 
The Acholi District Council Proclamation. L.N. 45 of 1949.
The Lango District Council Proclamation L.N. 46. of 1949.
The West Nile District Council Proclamation. L.N. 47 of 1949. 
The Madi District Council Proclamation. L.N. 48 of 1949.
The Kigezi District Council Proclamation L.N. 139 or 1949. 
The Eishengyero of Ankole Proclamation L.N.157 of 1949.
The Bunyoro-Kitara Rukurato Proclamation. L.N.158 of 1949.
The Toro District Council Proclamation. L.N. 159 of 1949.
36. S : 4(1)
37. 9 : 4(2)
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"The District Commissioner in charge of.any district 
may appoint such financial, standing and advisory 
committees as may be necessary for the proper 
administration of such district. Such Committees 
shall consist of such persons as the District 
Commissioner shall think fit to appoint and shall 
be presided over by the District Commissioner.11 38.*
Having thus ensured the close central government control over the
new local government bodies, the Ordinance proceded to provide for
the making of regulations and the establishment of councils at the
Provincial, District and Village levels. Inter alia, the Regulations
prescribed the constitution of the councils and the election of the
councillors, and ensured that each council had a majority of elected
members; the latter being indirectly elected by the lower councils in
the "Local Council hierarchy." Each district council was to meet
twice yearly, or as directed by the District Commissioner, for the
transaction of its business, namely, the consideration of Budget
proposals, the passing of resolutions and the making of bye-laws for
40
the good rule and government of the area under its jurisdiction.
Such bye-laws however, were subject to the Governor’s approval and
were limited to the subjects set out in paras (A) and (B) of S.7 of
41
the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919, and breach of any of the
provisions of the Council’s bye-laws was an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a maximum period of six months, or a fine of five
42
hundred shillings, or both. Such, broadly, was the Government’s
final interpretation and implementation of H.M. Government * s local 
government policy. Quite simply, the 1949 Ordinance was an anti-climax
38. S.5.
39. ;See L.N. 17 of 1949 i the Bugishi District Council Regulations, Reg, 
12(i) and (ii).
40. Reg. 18(1)
41. Reg. 17(1)
42. Reg. 17(2)
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and thoroughly disappointing, and not surprisingly was the subject
of adverse comment both within and outside the Country. Firstly, the
African Local Governments as such had no functions or responsibilities
other than those arising from the Native Administration (Incorporation) 
43
Ordinance, 1938, the re-vamped Councils had no responsibilities ,for 
their bye-law making powers were subject to the disallowance powers of 
the Provincial Commissioner or the Governor; and so, too were their 
budget decisions and resolutions.
Thus, the Bukedi District Regulations, 1949, specifically stated:-
"The Council shall complete its consideration of the 
budget of the finances of the Local Government for 
the ensuing year by 31st October and shall forthwith 
forward its resolution on it to the District Commissioner. 
The District Commissioner on . receipt of the budget 
resolution from the Council shall forthwith forward it 
to the Protectorate Government with his recommendations.
In due course the budget resolution shall be returned to 
the. District Commissioner with the instructions of the 
Protectorate Government thereon." 44
The position of the District Commissioner, as chairman of the Standing
Committee of the District Council, of which he was not even a member was,
to put it mildly incongruous, as well as anomalous, and equally, so
was the position of the chief,, an ex-official member yet an officer of .the
African Local Government, albeit, selected by and responsible to the
Governor. In practice, the main defects however, was the lower council*s
lack of any duties let alone executive functions, other than their
45
triennial duty of selecting members of superior councils. And, not
43. SS. 4 and 7
44 The Bukedi District Council Regulation, 1949. Reg. 19(2) 0) and (4). 
45. Vide, Wallis Report, op.cit. p.11.
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unnaturally, this gave rise to a feeling of frustration and to 
unreasonable demands that all "local issues" should be referred to 
the lower councils, which thus on occasion, became embroiled in some 
central-local contentious matters, many of which were unsuitable for 
discussion at that level. Worse, the new councils had no new sources 
of revenue. For the 1949 Ordinance, despite Hall’s earlier intentions 
to adjust the central-local financial relations, was silent on the 
matter; the District Councils’ powers of taxation continued to be 
derived from the Native Administrations’ Tax Ordinance of 1938.
Despite these strictures, however, Hall’s reform efforts were by no 
means worse than worthless; the Ordinance gave the hitherto informal 
councils some legal status: recognised the elective principle,
including the unofficial majority element in all local councils, and 
arguably, made some contribution, albeit minimal, towards local democracy.
Its fatal effect was to run counter to current local government literature 
and, in particular, the Secretary of State’s dispatch which postulated
46
"the development of an efficient and democratic system of local government."
In the words of a report submitted to the Cambridge Summer Conference in 
1951:-
"Local government bodies should never be set up for 
their own sake as an administrative exercise, or to 
be important agents of Central Government: . but 
should always be built around the administration of 
at least one service in an autonomous fashion." 47
That regrettably, is precisely what Hall’s reforms did and did not do: 
they fully met the former but not the latter bidding. Local Administrations 
were still regarded as "important agents of Central Government"; they
0
46, Creech-Jones Dispatch, op.cit.
47. Proceedings of the Cambridge Summer School Conference,1951.
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were the weak link between the people and the Centre, and it was 
to strengthen this bond that the 1949 Ordinance made provision for 
the establishment of advisory councils, at the provincial level, 
to bridge the gulf between the Central Legislative Council and the 
local District Councils.
5.1.3. THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS : THE CENTRAL-LOCAL COUNCIL LINKAGE
This, it was hoped, would enable the people to "assume a greater share
48
in the responsibilities of the Government of the Protectorate as a whole," 
and would ultimately replace the existing system of African Appointment 
to the Legislative Council by a system whereby
(a) "The Eastern and Northern Provincial Councils shall
each elect from amongst their members two African 
representatives;
(b) In the case of the Buganda Province, His Highness the 
Kabaka will continue for a time to nominate one of 
his ministers, and the Buganda Lukiko shall elect 
from amongst its members a second member;
(c) In the Western Province the Provincial Council 
shall elect from among its members one representative, 
and a second representative shall be nominated in turn 
by the Mugabe of Ankole, the Mukama of Bunyoro and 
the Mukama of Toro." 49
Thus, these Councils were to act as electoral colleges, and not as 
"Regional Authorities", and clearly were not to be the highest tier 
of "Local Government" either, but rather Protectorate Agencies, for 
the selection of the African members of the Legislative Council, and 
in some important respects, decidedly inimical to the new local 
government policy. Hall's plan was, however, duly adopted and 
incorporated into the African Local Government Ordinance, 1949 of 
which section 8(i) provided that:-
48. Hall's Dispatch, op.cit.
49. Ibid.
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"The Governor may, if he sees fit* establish by order 
published in the Gazette, a Provincial Council in any 
Province to consider matters affecting the whole province." 50
It was provided, however, "that no power shall be given to a Provincial 
Council to make laws or bye-laws, otherwise, its debating powers were 
virtually unlimited. ^  The same could not be said of its executive 
or legislative powers, however, it had none, and like all Councils, it 
too, was under the control of the Protectorate Authorities. Thus, 
Section 8(2) simply authorised the Governor, by virtue of section 6(2) 
to prescribe:-
(a) the constitution of the Council;
(b) the appointment or election of members of 
the Council;
(c) the manner ' and reasons for which
membership of the Council may be terminated
(d) the periodic dissolving of the Council or 
parts of it;
(e) 'the powers of the Council;
(f) the frequency of the sittings of the Council
and the procedure whereby and. manner in
which the Council shall conduct its business 
including the number of members that shall 
constitute a quorum of the Council. 52
Such Councils, were in 1949, set up by Executive Orders in the Eastern,
Northern and Western Provinces. These orders were,, mutatis mutandis,
in similar terms and the Western Province Provincial Council Order,
53
examined here will suffice as an example. According to this Order,
the Privincial Council was to consist of twenty members; four ex-official 
members, one from each district; eight elected members, each District 
Council electing from among its own members two representatives: one of 
whom was to be a chief, and the other, a non-chief and neither employed 
by an African Local Government or the Protectorate Government; and eight
50. Cap.74. No.2. of 1949. S.8(i)
51. Ibid. S.8(2)
52. Ibid. S.
53. Legal Order No.210 of 1949
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nominated members: of these four were to be selected by the 
Provincial Commissioner, while the hereditary rulers of Ankole,
Bunyoro, Toro and the Kigezi District Council Standing Committee 
were each to nominate their representative.^
The Council was to meet at least once a year, or as directed by 
the Provincial Commissioner. Its main business was. to consider 
resolutions submitted by the Provincial Commissioner, the Constituent 
District Councils, or by any two members from two different districts; 
and if required by the Governor to select, subject to the Governor's approval 
from its own elected or nominated members, the Western Province Representative 
member to serve on the Legislative Council. Council resolutions were to 
be submitted to the Provincial Commissioner and the relevant District 
Councils for information, and, in appropriate cases, for consideration and 
implementation.”^ ' Such resolutions, however, could not be considered 
by the Provincial Council, unless and until the Council’s Standing 
Committee, over which the Provincial Commissioner presided, had had an 
opportunity to examine them. The Council held its first meeting, at
Masindl, from the 14th to 15th February, 1950. It was opened by the
Provincial Commissioner, but its plenary sessions were presided over by 
the local chairman the Katikiro of Bunyoro.
One of the preliminary issues with which the Council had to deal, was
appropriately enough, the question of the "official language", for use 
in Council and Committee meetings. It was summarily resolved, at the 
instance of the Chairman, that members should use their local languages, 
which, in the circumstances, were not dissimilar. Next, the Council
54. Ibid. Regs. 4, 6,. 7 and 8.
55. Reg. 17(1),(a),(b),(c) and (2).
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sent "a message of loyalty"^ to the Governor; elected its first 
Legislative Council representative; made proposals for the amendment 
of Regulation 18 of their "Constitution” , the establishment of a 
Common fund, the supply of drugs to Hospitals, Health Centres and 
Dispensaries and the introduction of an education rate of tax; and 
in addition, made the following suggestions for the Governor's 
consideration and advice:-
"(a) The higher scale of pay enjoyed by Protectorate
Government employees tends, to undermine the morale 
of Native Government employees. The prestige of 
Native Governments suffers as a result. It is 
recommended that a happy media be found for Scales 
of Salary.
(b) The Provincial Council recommends that Block 
Grants be given to Native Governments by the 
Protectorate Government so as to enable the former 
to carry out their work more efficiently.
.(c) The Provincial Council recommends that consideration 
be given by Government to pay to Native Government 
Treasuries a percentage of the. revenue derived from 
the following: forest produce, minor townships,
hides and skins, minerals, swamps, Katwe Trading 
licences, etc.
(d) The Provincial Council recommends that junior members
of certain departments of the Protectorate to Government 
should be under Native Governments in matters of 
discipline and that in matters of policy they should 
remain, under the Protectorate Government (ie.
Education, Agriculture, Medicine, etc.)
(e) The estimates in connection with Subventions are 
sometimes incomprehensible. The Council recommends 
that every effort be made to make them understandable 
to Native Governments." 57
Such was the range of issues which the Council grappled with at its 
first brief session, and a perusal of the Minutes of the Council, despite 
the clear words of the Ordinance to the Contrary, shows that most members 
behaved as if they had wide and unlimited executive powers: it is possible
that, the Councillors wished to behave as if they did, or that none had had 
access to the Ordinance or the relevant Regulations, or that they simply
56. Minutes of the Council meeting, February 1950.
57. Ibid.
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chose to ignore them. Thus, for instance, the resolutions submitted
by the Kigezi District Council did not conform to Regulation 17(b);
they mostly dealt with wide-ranging matters of purely local concern,
58
and many were ultra vires the powers of the Provincial Council.
Similarly, the election of Kamesey the Assistant Agriculture Officer, 
Masindi, by the Bunyoro Central Council, as their representative on 
the Provincial Council was unconstitutional: it was Contrary to
59
Regulation 8(1) of the Western Province Provincial Council Order, 1949.
Despite these initial difficulties, however, the Council's first meeting 
was by all accounts a success. Most of its resolutions were adopted and 
promptly carried out by the appropriate bodies. Following this modest 
success, however, the Council's promising start was soon dissipated, 
partly because it had no positive functions, and partly because the 
.first session revealed that it was more than likely to degenerate into 
a "troublesome forum", and most unlikely to fulfil the aims and 
objectives for which it was created. The Council's second meeting was 
thus poorly supported, the Provincial. Commissioner was, for example,
"for unavoidable reasons"^0 unable to address the Council; and though, 
some of the items for discussion were imaginative and of some constitutional 
significance, the Council's proceedings were lacklustre and uneventful.
The Council, like its counterparts elsewhere, soon fell into desuetude 
and Hall's mechanism for linking the periphery to the Centre thus brought 
to an abrupt and ignominious end.
58. K.D.A. ADM. 18 of 8.1.1950
59. Legal Notice No,2lo of 1949
60. The Second Minutes of the WPPC Meeting of 4.7.1951. There were, 
in addition, five absentees, including two "heads" of districts.
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5.1.4. THE COHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS
The third phase of local government reform was ushered in by the
newly appointed Governor, Sir Andrew Benjamin Cohen, in January, 1952.
Having been a leading member of the African Department at the Colonial
Office in London, Cohen was closely associated with the policies of
61
Creech-Jones on devolution, and his attitude towards local government 
reform was, not unnaturally, expected to be different from that of his 
predecessors; and as it turned out, these expectations were not unduly 
disappointed. It soon emerged that the new Governor was keen to foster
a unitary form of Central Government, together with a strong system of 
Local Government, and that he was anxious to develop both simultaneously. 
As regards the latter, Cohen’s intentions were clearly stated in his 
first annual report for 1952.
"The Government attaches the greatest importance to the 
development • of a modern, representative and efficient system 
of local government which it considers to be the foundation 
for progress. Through efficient local government social and 
economic services can be built up and political training 
provided for the people at the same time as satisfying their 
legitimate desire to take part in the management of their 
own affairs. " 6 2 .
61. Cohen was, in fact the architect of this policy. For a 
detailed study of Cohen’s contribution to decolonization, see 
Robinson R, "Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Power in Tropical * 
Africa, 1940-51" in Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer (eds.) 
Decolonization and After, Frank Cass & Co.Ltd., 1980.pp.50-72.
See. also Lapping, B» End of Empire, Granada Publishing, London, 1985.
62. Colonial Report on Uganda,. 1952. p.11. : A sum of £350,000 was set 
aside to cover the cost of building a local government training 
centre at Entebbe, with the object of supplying local government with 
more efficient and better trained staff. A new Secretariat post at 
Executive level namely Secretary for Social Services and Local 
Government was created for the implementation of the new local
.government policy. Such was Cohen’s commitment to the political 
development of the Protectorate.
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Cohen found the African Local Governments Ordinance, 1949, singularly
inadequate for his purposes, and within months of taking office, he
invited his former colleague at the Colonial Office, Claude Wallis,
to inquire into and report on local government in the Eastern, Northern
63
and Western Provinces; and his Report*s opening remarks are worth 
quoting in fully. He wrote
"There are in Uganda two constitutional ideas 
about local government. The first is the idea 
expressed in the Secretary of State*s despatch 
of 25th February, 1947. This despatch suggested 
that policy should be directed to building up an 
efficient and democratic (later changed to 
representative) system of Government. The second 
idea is that of native states. The contrast may 
be put this way: the first idea refers to the
local part of government and the second idea refers 
to the Government of the locality.
These ideas are mutually exclusive; yet both are in 
the field. Consequently, it is not easy to find 
anyone who can readily define Government policy 
in respect of the internal administration of the 
Country. There is doubt even about the Government’s 
own intentions. On the one hand, it has subscribed 
to the first idea by nominally accepting the policy 
outlined in the Secretary of State’s despatch. On 
the other hand it has passed an Ordinance (No.2. of 
1949) which in Clause 3 says "In each district there 
shall be an African Local Government which shall 
consist of etc., etc.," This Ordinance is an 
expression of the second rather than of the first 
idea. Unless the meaning of English words is to be 
distorted out of all recognition, the term "an 
African Local Government" must mean in Uganda what 
it would mean in England. There it could only be 
used of an African State such as Liberia or 
Ethiopia." 64
63. The problems of local government in Buganda were 'at the time, 
the subject of consultation between the Protectorate Government 
and His Highness’s Government, and thus were outside Wallis’s 
brief. So, too, were the problems of urban local government.
64. Wallis' Report of An Inquiry into African Local Government 
in the Uganda Protectorate. 1953 paras, 9 and 10, p.13.
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That was the position at Entebbe; the position in the districts 
was, as Wallis found, equally disturbing. Again, Wallisfs account 
of this confusion is worth repeating here. He wrote:-
"All the Standing Committees made it plain that they 
are bent upon reaching the status of a native state.
The object is to achieve a constitution as like that 
of Buganda as possible, and they believe that they 
will eventually supplant the Protectorate Government 
as the Government of their areas in nearly all affairs. 
In short they aim at Home Rule and think that this was 
the Protectorate Government’s intention in handing over, 
as they say, the power to govern their areas. Moreover, 
it seems to them that this is the logical development 
of past administrative policy. Clan barriers have 
been broken down, sections have been amalgamated, a 
tribal organisation has been created and a tribal 
loyalty has been developed. In their own estimation 
they have arrived and they cannot understand why 
the Protectorate Government, having granted them the 
name of Governments, still withholds the realities of 
power and still resists the appointment of rulers 
of paramount chiefs, and the officers appropriate 
to a native state. There is scarcely any feeling 
yet among Africans for Uganda as a unified Country . 
with a. sense of common interest and common purpose. 
Consequently, there was little speculation in the 
Standing Committees about the possible form of a 
Central Constitution. If pressed, they would 
usually talk of a federation of states, each with 
its own Ruler and Ministers." 65
65. Wallis Report p. 13. Nor were the chiefs alone, some British
Officers held the same view, thus the Northern Province District 
Commissioners, while agreeing with "the principles of fostering 
the idea of a Uganda as a single state,, felt that the idea of 
a federation of local Governments might be the ultimate 
development most in keeping with the native idea." Minutes 
dfthe District Commissioner’s Conference, Northern Province, 
November, 1952.
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The significance of these extracts is twofold: firstly they reveal
some of the causes and effects of previous policies, and secondly, 
they shed some light on the pitfalls awaiting Cohen’s proposals for 
reform; and it was to counteract these widely and strongly held 
views that Wallis urged the Government to adhere to the following
A unitary form of central government on parliamentary 
lines covering the whole Country, and 
Local Government on British principles but adapted 
to Uganda conditions - at various levels beneath the 
Central Government.
For Buganda:-
(i) A Provincial Government on parliamentary lines 
at Mengo - linked with the Central Government 
in accordance with the 1900 Agreement, and
(ii) Local Government on British principles at Saza 
and lower levels - deriving power from the Mengo 
Government.
For Toro, Ankole, Bunyoro
To fit the general framework of local government, 
but due regard to be paid to the special position of 
the Rulers.'1 67
Having thus outlined the general structure of Central and Local 
Governments, Wallis proceeded to make detailed proposals for the 
organisation, constitution and composition of rural local government 
in the Eastern, Northern and Western Provinces taking "the English 
System of Local Government as his model." ^  centreP^ece
66v See Wallis’ Report, p.14. The reasons for this are fully set out 
at page 14 of the Report, and the relevant part reads as follows:- 
"To resolve the mcertainty ^  choice among possibilities should 
be made and the choice made known to everyone. Only the broadest 
statement is necessary; no details need be worked out yet. But 
not until the choice is made known will it be possible to frame 
a coherent policy about local government."
67. Wallis’ Report p.15. Quety/% whether Wallis’ Scheme for Buganda 
and to a certain extent for Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, was any 
different from the existing regime, of which he was so critical 
and sought to change in his Report.
68. Wallis' Report p.55.
plan:-
66
"(a)
Cb)
(c)
(d)
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his plan was the proposal for the devolution of power, including
*
the power of local taxation. It was proposed, for example, that 
all local authorities, with the exception of Karamoja, should be 
given responsibility for the following local services, primary 
education, dispensaries, environmental health, local water supplies,
69
local forests, roads and extension work in agriculture and industry.
"I am assuming," he wrote, "that the long range policy of the Uganda 
Government is to establish local authorities, not agencies."^ Hence, 
Wallis’s recommendation for the devolution of taxing powers, to enable 
the local authorities to carry out their new functions. Accordingly, 
it was recommended that all local authorities should have the power to 
levy a graduated poll tax, as opposed to the flat rate poll tax which, 
in his words, was "the most primitive form of taxation known to man"7^
He recommended that the Central Government should force the pace by:-
"(a) abolishing poll tax;
(b) reducing the Subventions for education by a like amount;
(c) pegging, the African Local Government tax at a fixed level;
(d) insisting that any further revenue should be raised by 
graduated assessments." 72
Next Wallis considered the position of the chief and his place in local 
government. Taking the view that "an official who draws a salary from a 
public body should not be a member of that body, " Wallis suggested that 
Councils should only consist of appointed and elected councillors; it was 
his contention that there was no place in local government for the 
distinction between official and unofficial members. He also took special
69. Wallis’ Report, op.cit., p.46
70. Ibid. pp.25-26
71. Ibid^p.25 . ' -
72. Ibid. p.26. ,
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exception to the existing system of indirect elections through the
medium of Chiefly Councils, on account of its complexity and failure
73
to meet its stated aims. He accordingly recommended that m  
future, elected councillors, who were 'to command a majority over the 
appointed members, should be directly elected by the public on the 
basis of one. man, one vote.^
Finally with a view to placing local government bodies, urban as well 
as rural, under a single ordinance, Wallis recommended the repeal of 
the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919, the Native Administrations 
(Incorporation) Ordinance,.!the Native Administration Tax Ordinance 
both of 1938, and the African Local Government Ordinance, 1949, and 
the passage of fresh legislation based on "the latest research into 
local government in Africa11, much of which was, in his words, "applicable 
to U g a n d a . T h i s  Ordinance was to state, in broad terms, "the 
maximum scope of local g o v e r n m e n t , g i v i n g  the Governor power to 
establish local authorities and to vary their powers according to 
local conditions, the ability of individual authorities, and was to 
differ from the existing miscellany of legislation in several respects.
In particular, the new Ordinance was inter alia:-
"(i) to provide local taxation;
(ii) to prescribe the maximum powers of local authorities
in detail under departmental headings;
(iii) to spell out the bye-law making powers of local 
authorities;
(iv) to provide for public direct elections and the
appointment of councillors; and
(v) to list local authority services, both mandatory and
permissive." 77 *
73. Wallis" Report, op.cit., p. 48
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
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Wallis’s proposals were accepted and many given expression in the
District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance, 1955; and in
78
the Regulations made under it. By the Ordinance, the objects of 
which were, to make provision for the "Constitution of District Councils,"
the Governor was empowered to establish such Councils, and to delimit
79 . .
their powers. Each District Council, a body corporate, was, m
addition to County Chiefs, to consist of a majority of wholly elected
members, and was to have a chairman and a vice-chairman. Each Council
was to meet at least three times a. year. Its meetings, committee
meetings excepted, were to be open to the public, save that the chairman
80
had power, if necessary, to exclude the public. Every Council was
required to keep minutes of all Council and Committee meetings, copies
of which were to be open for inspection by members of the public. However,
the chairman had power to issue an order providing that Council Minutes
81
should not be available for public inspection.
Each Council was given power, subject to the approval of the Provincial
Commissioner, to make standing orders for the regulation of its
proceedings including provision for the payment of travelling, attendance
and subsistence allowances. Subject to its Constitutional Regulations
each Council had power to appoint three named Committees and any other
82
such Committees as it saw fit. All Committees were to have power to
co-opt members provided, at least two-thirds of each Committee were
83
members of the Council. With the exception of their bye-law
78. No.l. of 1955.
79 S. 3(1)
80 S.9
81. SS.12 & 13.
82. S.14(1) and (2). The Statutory Committees were: education, finance 
and appointments committees.
83. S.19(1)
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making powers, the passing of estimates, the imposition of •
taxation, and the borrowing of money, every council had power to
delegate to any of its committees, with or without restrictions,
84
any of its functions as it thought fit. All Committees, the
»
Education Committee excepted, were responsible to the appointing
Council. The Education Committee, as under the 1949 legislation, was
semi-autonomous: though a committee of the Council, up to a half of
its membership, including the chairman, was appointed by the Provincial
Commissioner. Further, it was specifically provided that this
Committee1 s decisions were "not subject to confirmation, alteration or
. .. 85
amendment by the Council. The other two statutory committees,
though responsible to the Council, were also charged with specific 
functions for which they were the responsible authorities. The Finance 
Committee’s duties were to draft estimates,make recommendations on 
financial affairs, keep under review financial policy and advise the 
Council accordingly; whilst the Appointments Committee was responsible 
for the appointment of chiefs and other employees, and the implementation 
of S.69 of the Ordinance, the terms of which were as follows
"A Council, with the prior approval of the Provincial 
Commissioner, shall make regulations to be known as 
"staff regulations" for the following purposes relating 
to persons in or desiring to enter its employment -
(a) maintaining discipline;
(b) regulating appointments, remuneration, promotion 
termination of appointments, dismissals and leave;
(c) providing for interdiction and the salary to be 
paid during interdiction;
(d) regulating the payment of allowances, the grant of 
advances, and the terms and conditions of service 
generally; and
(e) such other matters relating to departmental procedure 
and the duties of officers, chiefs and employees, as 
the Council considers can best be regulated by such 
regulations."
84. S.19(1)
85. S.21(6). - ....
86. No.1. of 1955. S.69(1)
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Hitherto, the position of the Chief had been uncertain, he had
executive, legislative and judicial powers and was an officer of
87
the African Local Government. Yet, he was a Government appointee, 
and was in the exercise of some of his duties, a Government Agent.
It was to resolve this uncertainty that S.69(1) was inserted into 
the Ordinance. Henceforth, every Chief was to be appointed by his 
Councilfs Appointments Committee, save that in respect of Senior Chiefs, 
the Committee's powers of appointment and dismissal were fairly
- gg
circumscribed and subject to the Governor's surveillence. This
provision described as "the most radical in the Ordinance" was the
subject of much debate, both in and outside the Legislative Council.
Many members argued, for example, that the Chief’s position was untenable-v
that in a nutshell, he was being required to serve two masters; the
appointing Council and the Central Government respectively. This and
other related arguments were, however, summarily dismissed by the
89
Government and its supporters. Indeed,, the Government was quite
satisfied with their proposal, for one thing, the proposed clause was
"merely legalising much of what was already" in vogue; and as the
Attorney General pointed out, the Chief's posotion was, under the Bill,
90
adequately protected.
87. Vide. The Chief's powers under the following Ordinances:
Native Authority Ordinance, 1919.
Native Law Ordinance, 1919.
African Law Governments Ordinance, 1949 
The Courts Ordinance, 1940.
African Authority Ordinance. 1955.
88. S.66(3)
89. Thus for example, according to Cox,, the Provincial Commissioner*Western 
Province, the government was entirely happy with the Chief's position. 
He said: "I have more direct contact with chiefs than most members of 
this Council, and I cannot see what all this is about. I cannot see 
that the Chiefs will be in any difficulty whatsoever." (Legislative 
Council Debates 34. Session.12.1.55).
90. Ibid.
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"It is intended," he said, "that these Regulations 
should make provision for a proper inquiry before 
a chief is dismissed. It is therefore assumed that 
the chiefs will not be able to be dismissed because 
they are unpopular with a political clique that 
happens to have a large say in the District Council 
affairs." 91
This argument, however, did not deal with the whole issue: it
merely covered the Chief1s tenure of office; his constitutional 
position remained anomalous and potentially untenable. His loyalty 
would in many cases, have to be devided between his two masters: 
the District Council of which he was the Executive Officer, and the 
Central Government of which he was an employee.
As mentioned earlier, the position of the Chief was a curious one, and
was, incidentally well established in law: under the Native Authority
Ordinance, 1919, the Chief was a legislator: under the Native Courts
Ordinance, 1919, he was a judge: under the African- Local Government
Ordinance, 194^ he was an officer of the African LocaL Government, but
he was appointed or approved by the Governor and was responsible to him:
and under the Native Authority Ordinance, 1919, he was responsible to the
Central Government for the maintenance of law and order. Many a chief,
as noted earlier was, however, oblivious to their enormous powers and
92
perhaps because of this, many, did very well, indeed. The same could 
not however, be said of the British Authorities, they knew the contents 
of the legislation, but they were, for short-term expediency or political 
reasons, most unwilling to regularise the Chiefs' anomolous position. It 
suited them well and, in their eyes, legal nuances did not count for much. 
Thus, the Government’s response to Wallis’s proposal that the Chiefs' 
magisterial, executive and legislative powers should be abolished, was 
forcibly put as follows:-
91. Legislative Council Debates op.cit.
92. Wallis’s Report, op.cit. pp.59-60
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"Government recognises that there is likely to be
a gradual change in the position of chiefs as local
government bodies gain experience and strength, but 
this process cannot be hurried. Both the Protectorate 
Government and the Local Government bodies depend very 
largely on the chiefs to give effect to their policies 
in the field, and they must continue to do so until there
is a much larger corps of technical staff available than
at present. Any sudden change in the position of the 
chiefs would probably have most grave results and might 
lead to a complete breakdown in administration. Chiefs 
are in fact an indispensable part of the local government 
structure. It is agreed that the judicial and executive 
functions of the chiefs should be separated as soon as 
possible,, but it is considered impracticable to appoint 
all Presidents and Members of Courts by name. It would 
be preferable, it is thought, to codify existing District 
Administrations Orders, rather than to attempt to pass 
a series of new bye-laws on the same subjects." 93
Some tentative steps were, however, taken in 1957 and efforts made
94
"to insulate chiefs from political and other influences," thus 
acknowledging, albeit, obliquely, the force of their critics’ arguments.
Section 69 was duly amended and the appointment of chiefs placed in the 
hands of independent Appointments Boards, but the Chief’s legal position, 
vis-a-vis, the Central Government and the Local Government bodies remained 
unchanged. The control of the chief was still a thorny and sensitive issue.
The Government was, however, as regards Wallis’s proposals for the
devolution of power, more forthcoming. Inter alia, provision was made
for the prevention of crime, the arresting of offenders, the control
of pests, the maintenance of nurseries, the relief of famine, the
provision of medical services, the establishment of trading centres, and
95
the organisation of social and sporting activities. The Government’s
93. S.M.P.C. 4772 of 20.2.1952
94. Colonial Annual Report, 1957.
95. Section 34 (i) - (xxi)
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aim was, apparently, to draw up a comprehensive list of services
which Ma really progressive authority might be performing at the
96
end of, say, 10 or 20 years." Hence, though, none of the existing
authorities was capable of "taking over these services, except roads", 
the listing of these functions in this fashion was regarded as a good
thing in itself, in that it would "give local authorities something
• .. it 9 7to aim at.
Whether in fact that was the case, is a nice question. It is note­
worthy, however, that provisions of this kind were widely advocated, 
and indeed, were invariably inserted in most local government ordinances 
of the day.
Additionally, subject to the Provincial Commissioner’s approval, provision
98
was made for the making of bye-laws, on a wide variety of subjects,
99
including the enforcement of hue and cry, the regulation of native
m a r r i a g e s , t h e  control of drinking and brewing of beer,^^ the
102
regulation of [sic] borrow |>its or other excavations.
96. Wallis's Report, p.55.
97. Ibid.
98. Section 36(1) - (xxxviii)
99 S.36 (xxxiv)
100. S.36 (xxxii)
101. S.36 (xxx)
102. S.36 (xxii)
These bye-law making powers, however, were subject to the 
Provincial Commissioner's veto power. S.40 stated that:
The Provincial Commission may at any time after having given 
to a Council reasonable notice and having considered the 
representations of the Council thereon, make or amend any 
bye-law which such Council is empowered to make or revoke 
any bye-law made by such Council or by him.
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Of more Immediate importance, however, were the financial provisions, 
considered later, the most radical of which, was the provision for the 
imposition of the Personal Graduated Tax, which it may be noted, was 
a condition precedent to the devolution of responsibility. In other 
words, the transfer of services to any District Council, was contigent * 
and dependent upon that Council’s willingness and undertaking to 
impose the new levy.
5.2.1. THE DISTRICT COUNCILS’ CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS
The District Administrations (District Councils) Ordinance, 1955
was an adoptive as well as an enabling legislation. Firstly, Local
Authorities were free to decide whether or not to come under it, and many
as it happened, did not adopt it. Secondly, it empowered the
Governor to establish District Councils and to prescribe their
"Constitutional Regulations" as he saw fit, providing of course,
that one or more Councils were willing to come under the Ordinance.
Consequently, a detailed examination of the Ordinance without a
corresponding perusal of the Constitutional Regulations, made under it,
is apt to be misleading and incomplete. For the flesh which covered
the bare bones of the Ordinance is to be found in these Regulations.
Here, are detailed, the rules governing the composition of Councils,
the Councillors’ qualifications and disqualifications, the appointment
of local government officials, the appointment of Committees and other
matters not dealt with in the parent ordinance. The actual details of
these Regulations varied from area to area, but the Kigezi District
Council Constitutional Regulations., 1956, embodied many of the common
103
features, found in others, and will serve as an example.
4
103. Vide, Legal Notice Nos: 10 of 14.1.1956 and 11 of 18.1.1956.
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Under these regulations, the Kigezi District Council was to consist 
of 61 official and non-official members. The official side was to
consist of ex-officio and elected official members. The ex-officio 
members were the Secretary-General, the Treasurer, the Clerk of Works, 
the five County Chiefs and Kigezi*s representative on the Legislative 
Council. The elected official members on the other hand, were to 
consist of two Sub-County and two Village Chiefs elected by the Ndorwa
County Council from among its members and one Sub-County and one Village
Chief from each of the four remaining counties, elected by each of the 
County Council from amongst its own members. In contrast, the thirty-three 
non-official members were to be directly elected by the male tax-paying 
public. The electoral process, which was both cumbersome and complex
was, briefly stated as follows:-
Each Village Council was to nominate one of its members as a candidate
for election to the District Council and to submit their nomination to
I the Secretary-General and to the Sub-County Chief in charge of the area.
!
| Every Sub-County Chief was to publish the candidate’s name at its office
| for public scrutiny before the election. On polling day, at least three
!
j weeks after nomination, he was to summon all male tax-payers to assemble
j
at the Sub-County headquarters for the election of their representative.
Elections under these rules - the first direct elections in the Protectorate - 
were held throughout Kigezi in early February, 1956. All tax-payers 
gathered at the Sub-County headquarters between 10.00 a.m. and 12 noon 
on polling day and lined up behind the candidate of their choice.
There were no well organised political parties and the elections were 
largely fought on religious grounds. In most areas the electorate had 
been instructed by their leaders to divide the votes amongst their co­
religionists so as to ensure the election of the "mission sponsored"
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candidate. In some areas, however, the presence of a substantial
non-christian population produced something approaching a free vote.
Here, instead of voting in accordance with the wishes of the Church,
the pagan voters lined up behind the candidate of their own choice.
In a few wards, where one religion or the other was dominant, the
situation was complicated by other considerations: such as Clan loyalty,
family feuds, and personal vendettas. These and other considerations
formed the basis of many a vote. And, though religious antagonism may
not be the soundest of reasons on which to contest local government
elections, it was, in this case, the causa causans. As one official
observer put it : "These elections were organised by the Administration
104
and fought by the Church," and the latter’s efforts were, as the 
following table shows, not wasted.
Roman Catholics Protestants.
Ndorwa County 4 7
Rukiga County 4 2
Kikinzi'County 1 4
Bufumbira County 1 4
Ruzhumbura County 0 6
Of these councillors, 13 were school masters, 8 farmers, 5 catechists, 
5 traders and 1 surveyor. There was an 80% turn out on polling day 
owing to the missions’ interest in the outcome of the election; and 
despite their "action groups" and "pressure tactics", no disorderly 
incidents occurred.
104. KDA/ADM. 20, DC to MOLG 17.2.1956
105. Ibid.
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Having thus made provision for the appointment and election of 
coun.cillors, the Regulations proceeded to outline the administrative 
machinery of the Council. It was provided that the Council should 
meet at least three times a year and whenever requested so to do by 
the District Commissioner; and all council meetings were to be 
chaired by the Secretary-General. Provision was made that the bulk 
of Council business should be transacted by its Committees, viz: 
the Standing Committee, Finance Committee,. Appointments Committee,
Tender Committee, Forestry Committee and Trades Committee. All 
committees, with the exception of the Appointments Committee, over 
which the District Commissioner presided, were to be chaired by members 
of the Council.
The functions of the Council were divided into two broad categories, 
mandatory and permissive functions. The former consisted of ten 
functions as opposed to the twenty listed in the Ordinance and ranged 
from the establishment of tree nurseries to the establishment of 
registries for marriages, birth and death. The second category, the 
so-called permissive list, though more comprehensive than the mandatory 
schedule was also shorter than that in the Ordinance: it covered 26
out of the 37 topics listed in the Ordinance. Thus, subject to the 
prior approval of the Provincial Commissioner, the Council had power, 
inter alia, to perform any of the following functions:-
(i) provision of services for the improvement of agriculture; .
(ii) controlling tribal hunting and fishing;
(iii) preparation and provision of housing schemes;
(iv) making of roads, paths, culverts, bridges and water courses;
(v) maintenance of building standards. 106
106. S.19.
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Likewise, the Council's bye-law making powers under the Regulations, 
were not as extensive as provided for under the Ordinance. In 
addition to the bye-laws relating to the transferred services, the 
Council, with the prior approval of the Provincial Council, had power 
to make bye-laws relating to seven specified matters, including the 
regulation of excavations, the performance of communal labour, and ,
the prohibition of the growing of n-oxious p l a n t s . T h e  Ordinance was 
thus more comprehensive than the "Regulations" made under it.
5.2.2. THE 1955 ORDINANCE IN PRACTICE
The main plank of Government policy since 1947 had been to extend and
develop local government by encouraging local authorities to assume
greater responsibilities, thus enabling them to take an active part
108
in the administration of their areas. The second limb of this
policy, and the most important was the development of "an efficient
109
and democratic system of local government." Towards this goal the
Government first issued the African Governments Ordinance, 1949. The 
Ordinance, as noted earlier, brought the disparate "African Governments" 
under one umbrella, but was a far cry from the Government’s declared policy. 
Some years later, however, following the publication of the Wallis* Report, 
the Government issued the District Administrations (District Councils) 
Ordinance, 1955. Yet again, however, the pre-legislation intentions 
were not fully incorporated into the new Ordinance.
It thus will not have escaped notice that the gulf between the ante and 
post legislation official rhetoric was quite considerable. Indeed, as is 
shown below, it was to grow wider and wider as the Ordinance was applied
107. S.20
108. Hall's "Announcement" of 11.3.1948.
109. Creech-Jones' dispatch of 25.2.1947.
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to the various districts that chose to come under it. Suddenly, 
it was realised that District Councils had to be effective working 
organs of local government before they could assume their new 
statutory powers and since, this was not the case, the Ordinance's 
most progressive provisions were accordingly reversed, and the District 
Commissioner's pre-legislation close supervision and controls reimposed 
and the legislation thus rendered nugatory. For example, towards the 
end of 1957, the Chiefs1 Disciplinary Rules were drastically amended so 
as to give the:-
"Protectorate Government better control over Chiefs 
and other Senior Officials in the Council's Service 
so that any abuse of power by Appointments Committees 
could be prevented from reacting; adversely on the 
interests and efficiency of staff." 110
True, the District Commissioner was, under the Ordinance, no longer 
chairman of the Council's committees, and most of his former powers were 
now in the hands of the Provincial Commissioner, but in reality, he 
still wielded enormous powers. In Kigezi, for instance, he was 
chairman of the most important committee, the Appointments Committee; 
had power to appoint up to seven members of the Council; and all local 
chiefs were responsible to him in respect of the maintenance of law 
and order and in the exercise, of their other numerous statutory functions
The argument that Councils were in embryo simply because they had never 
been given responsibility and allowed to exercise it without the ever 
watchful eye of the District Commissioner was usually brushed aside and 
totally ignored. Emphasis was, once more, placed on the negative, rather 
than the positive aspects of local government; local politics were
111
110. Colonial Annual Report, 1957, p.7.
111. And the transfer of his powers to the Provincial Commissioner 
was symbolic rather than substantive.
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frowned at and efforts made to prohibit councillors raising
political issues, contending that politics had no place in local
government, that party politics would interfere with the proper
functioning of Councils, and that that would do ’’incalculable
112
harm to the progress of the Country1.1
The Annual Report for 1958, thus bluntly stated that:-
"Outside Buganda, District Councils continued in most 
cases to perform their functions satisfactorily, but,,, 
their efficiency was reduced by dissention between 
opposing factions within them. In one extreme case 
a Council became completely ineffective and it was 
necessary for it to be resolved, a new Council was 
formed with all the representatives being elected by 
taxpayers throughout the District. During the year 
steps were taken to insulate chiefs and other 
persons employed by District Councils from political 
and other influences. The District Councils' Ordinance 
was amended to provide for the replacement of 
Appointments Committees by independent Appointments 
Boards to be appointed by the Governor, and at the 
end of the year arrangements for the establishment of 
these boards were well advanced." 113
Further changes were subsequently made and several Constitutional
Regulations amended so as to provide for the election of the Chairman
from among the non-official Council members, in place of the ex-officio
Chairman, thus acknowledging albeit reluctantly, that the position of the
Chief as set out in the Ordinance was both anomalous and potentially 
114
untenable. Indeed, it. is now possible to state categorically that
the position of the "Official Councillor" was in practice untenable. 
Already, it will have been inferred from the foregoing discussion that 
the Government was beginning to appreciate the Chief's predicament;
112.
113.
114.
Western Province Annual Report. 1959. p.50.
Colonial Annual Report, 1959. The 1959 Report is in similar 
terms, and to minimise the possibility of Councils being 
prevented from functioning on any occasion through the action 
of a minority faction, several Constitutional Regulations were 
amended to reduce the quorum from 2/3 to 1/2. (Annual Report 
1959). p. 6.
In Ankole,for example, the Regulations were amended to permit the 
separation of the two posts of Enganzi ar*d chairman of the Council. 
Provision was also made for the establishment of the Ankole Appointments 
Board for the appointment of the Enganzi and other Senior Officials.
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hence the efforts to insulate him from "political and other 
influences". These reforms, however, did not go far enough, and 
it was left to individual councils to effect further changes to
maintain the insulation of the executive from local politics as they
115 . .
saw fit. Clearly, the retention of ex-officio councillors on
Councils as a link between the Council and. its executive officers
«ras a great mistake. And, as may be gleaned from the following, the
practice was neither fair to the chiefs not to the non-official
councillors.
"The District Council, the quorum of which had been 
reduced in the previous year in order to make it less 
easy for a minority party to hamstring the proceedings 
by boycott, again met four times. Acrimonious and 
wasteful sessions took place against a background of 
general unwillingness to take responsibility on any 
major issue. Chiefs and officials found themselves 
in the unenviable position of having the power to sway 
the balance by their vote - and were the target for 
the animosity of both sides." 116
The Acholi' experience, which was by no means uncommon, underscores the 
chief’s dilemma; and highlights the demerits of placing him in the 
invidious position of holding the balance of power.
One of the cardinal aims of the 1955 Ordinance had been to enable the 
Government to encourage local authorities to assume greater responsibilities 
than hitherto for the administration of their own areas. It was felt that
115. These varied from area to area, but several councils endorsed 
the view that ex-officio members should cease tp sit as Council 
members or at least have no voting powers, and many implemented 
this principle. (See for instance, the Northern Province, Annual 
Report for 1960).
116. Northern Province Annual Report for 1960. p.5.
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the existing legislation which was devoid of any reference to local 
services was quite unsatisfactory. In the words of a paper presented 
at the Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration, 
at Queens’ College, Cambridge in 1951:-
”The primary function of a local government body is to 
provide civic services and though it must have legislative 
powers, these should be regarded in the main as. incidental 
to the provision of these services. Local government bodies 
should never be set up for their own sake as an administrative 
exercise, or to be important agents of Central Government, but 
should always be built around the administration of at least 
one service in an autonomous fashion." 117
In line with this reasoning, Wallis recommended, and the Government 
accepted that, at least, primary education, dispensaries, local water 
supplies, local forests, roads and extension work in agriculture and 
animal industry, should be the subject of devolution. By the time 
the 1955 Ordinance came into force, however, Governor Cohen had already 
left Uganda and the Ordinance was half heartedly implemented by his 
successor, and it was some time before the Ordinance’s devolution provisions 
were given effect, even then, however, with qualified enthusiasm. In 
1960, the responsibility for primary education was transferred to all 
but five districts in the Eastern, Northern and Western Provinces. Five 
districts were still not yet under the legislation. Besides, primary 
education, the only other service to be devolved was water supply, save 
that agricultural extension work was transferred to two districts, Acholi 
and Bunyoro. For each of the transferred services there was a Standing 
Committee which, with the aid of seconded staff, was responsible for 
carrying out the service on behalf of the Council.
117. Africa No. 1178 (1951)
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Although the transfer of these services was the first phase of an 
on going devolution programme, no further transfers were to take 
place before October, 1962. That there were practical difficulties, 
few would deny. That many, if not all, of these difficulties were self 
inflicted wounds is equally clear and that many of these were not 
insurmountable is also self evident. Yet, the Government, having 
passed the necessary legislation seemed unable to implement it. One 
of the most important and certainly the most frequently cited impediment 
was that the people were "backward and uncivilised", and that, of 
necessity, were incapable of running their own affairs; hence, the 
argument went, the need for keeping them under the watchful eye of 
the District Commissioner.
Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the people wers "incapable o i  self-
governing", the question which suggests itself but which is infrequently
asked, is, why these people, after several decades of British rule, were
still "backward and uncivilised?" Clearly, one of the reasons for this
is that the people had never been given the necessary training, or given
the opportunity to do their own thing, albeit, under supervision. The
official insisted, however, that the people "were not ready - they had
much to learn. This argument too, Macaulay had met more than a century 
118
ago." Harold Macmillan* as he then was, thus recalls and continues
"Many politicians of our time are in the habit of 
laying it down as a self-evident proposition that no 
people ought to be free till they are fit to use their 
freedom. The maxim is worthy of the fool in the old 
story, who resolved not to enter into the water till 
he had learnt to swim.. If men are to wait for liberty 
till they become wise and good in slavery, they may 
indeed wait forever." 119
118. Macmillan^H. (now the Earl of Stockton). Pointing the Way, 
Macmillan London Ltd., London, 1972 p.118. quoting 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays. 
London. 1851. p.19.
119. Macaulay.T.B., "Essay on Milton" p.19. quoted by 
Macmillan, Pointing the Way, ibid. :.p.H8.
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The moral of the story is clear enough, and it is not surprising, 
therefore, that the Cohen reforms, the prerequisite of which was 
"a hands on experience" did not take root. They were too early and 
too much. The people were not, at least in the foreseeable future, 
expected to run their own affairs, and, in consequence, were, for 
obvious reasons, not shown the ropes. None, including the most 
optimist expected the process of decolonization to begin before the 
year 2001. The idea that self-government would, in the fulness 
of time, be given and taken, was a possibility many British Officers 
did not take seriously. The unique dilemma facing the would-be 
reformer was to colonize and decolonize at the same time, and that 
was the predicament against which the postwar reforms were conceived 
and implemented; and not surprisingly, as the preceding material 
vividly shows, the attempt was, from the outset, doomed to failure.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS
6.1.1. THE EARLY URBAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION
The organisation of urban local government unlike its counterpart in 
rural areas, owes little to indigenous historical antecedents. It is 
a direct product of Protectorate legislation. The seminal instrument 
of which was the Preservation of Order by Night Regulations, 1902,* 
made under article 99 of the Africa Order, 1899. As the name implies 
these Regulations were solely concerned with the preservation of peace
1. FO.2/588,Cir.2 of 1902 - King’s Regulations. The Regulations are
interesting reading and are reproduced below for ease of reference:
1. From and after the date of these Regulations, no ngoma, Kinanda
maulidi, native dancing or drumming shall be permitted between
the hours of 9pm. and sunrise, in any street or open space of 
any town or area to which these Regulations may be applied, 
without leave first being obtained.
2. Any person wishing to hold any ngoma or dance as aforesaid 
must first obtain a permit in writing from the Collector or 
such person whom he may appoint, who may grant or withhold 
permission at his discretion.
3. There shall be charged for every such permit for an ngoma ya
pepo, two rupees; for any other ngoma or dance as aforesaid,
one rupee, provided that no fee shall be charged for a permit 
to hold a maulidi or other religious celebration.
4. Any person obtaining a permit for an ngoma or dance, as
aforesaid, will be held responsible for the maintenance of due 
order there at, and in the event of a disturbance or breach
of the peace taking place, will be held liable for breach of
the Regulations, unless such a person can prove that the 
disturbance or breach of the peace that may take place has 
been occasioned by causes beyond his control.
5. No person shall use the streets of any town or area to which 
these -Regulations maybe applied between the hours of 9pm and 
sunrise unless he carry a light or be furnished with such 
pass as the Collector may from time to time authorise or 
prescribe or be able to satisfy the police as to his 
respectability in such other manner as the Collector may : 
consider sufficient.
6. These Regulations maybe applied in whole or in part by the 
Commissioner to any town or area of the Uganda Protectorate 
and adjoining territories by public notification.
7. Any person convicted of a breach of these Regulations will be 
liable to imprisonment of either description for a term not 
exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding two hundred rupees.
8* These Regulations may be cited as "The Preservation of Order
by Night Regulations, 1902. "
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and quiet in the newly, and indeed, largely European established
Government Bomas and townships. The Regulations were too specific
and too limited in scope, and were shortly afterwards repealed and
2
replaced by the Uganda Townships Ordinance, 1903. The Regulations 
are, nevertheless of historical importance. They, inter alia provide 
the earliest example of imposed administrative law and its application. 
Moreover, they shed some light on some aspects of Government policy 
about urban local government during the early years of the Protectorate.
At that time, the main consideration was the development of centres in
which Europeans could live in leafy and salubrious surroundings, and
from where the adjacent rustic areas could be administered. So, as
new districts were brought under British rule, headquarters were set
up and centres established where "Europeans could live free from the
3
dangers of tropical diseases." To this end, special measures,
including the virtual catharsis of the indigenous communities, were 
instituted to make way for European habitation. The original aim
was apparently to prevent the spread of sickness, but it also, as
. # 4
it happened, led to the segregation of the races. Indeed, the
very idea for the establishment of these attractive conditions for 
"European enterprise" was part and parcel of a more complex question.
It was according to Mair, "one of the major problems of policy which 
any African Administration"^ had to decide, for on that depended every 
other policy decision, including the siting of government stations, the 
pattern of urban growth, the form of urban local government and the 
administration of urban justice. For example, Portal’s principal 
reason for transferring his headquarters from Kampala to Entebbe, was 
the latter’s salubriousness.
2. The ordinance is considered below.
3. Cmd.9475 (1955) (East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955) (hereinafter 
called the "Dow Commission" after its chairman), page 201.
4. Ibid. p. 216
5. Mair, L. Native Policies in Africa, Routledge & Sons,1936.p .8.
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"I moved the headquarters from that close, unhealthy 
and altogether hateful spot Kampala, to a lovely 
place on the lake; two great grassy hills like 
the Kingsclere Downs rising almost straight out of 
the water." 6
In many instances, however, the siting of government posts was 
haphazard and fortuitous. Besides, not all townships and trading 
centres owe their origin, siting and growth solely to European 
enterprise. Some conurbations of some sort, were evidently in 
existence longer before the advent of British rule. Entebbe,
Masindi, Mbale and Mengo may be cited as examples. These were, however, 
the exception rather than the rule. The foundation of towns in East 
Africa was largely a European affair.
"Except on the coast there were few towns in East 
Africa prior to the establishment of European 
administration. Away from the coast there were 
a number of organised concentrations of huts which 
surrounded the headquarters of hereditary chiefs 
north and west of Lake Victoria; but these were 
temporary growths which bore no resemblance to the 
permanent urban centre as we know it to-day.
During the nineteenth century, a number of trading 
centres were set .up in land by Arabs. Towns 
developed along the routes which were opened up 
into the interior by European enterprise from 
the beginning of the present century, especially 
as a result of the building of railways. A 
number grew up around the lake ports. As new 
areas were brought under European administration 
headquarters were set up which were the origin 
of many of the larger towns in East Africa today."7
6. Portal. G. The British Mission to Uganda, 1894, pp.252-3. 
Johnston gave similar reasons for his choice of Jinja. He wrote: 
"I have decided to transfer the civil headquarters of the 
Administration in Busoga District to Jinja from Iganga.
Iganga is not a very healthy place and it Via so to speak, 
’nowhere' and commanding no important route: whereas Jinja 
is of great importance as being at the Rippon Falls, and 
commanding what may become a very important transport route 
along the Nile." FO.2/666.
7. Dow Commission p. 200.
By 1903, The Boma or Government station which until then had 
formed an oasis amidst a conglomeration of fouts, was beginning to 
acquire the air of a township in contradistinction to its neighbourhood. 
Hitherto, the question of urban development had been given, if at all, 
little consideration mainly because most towns were largely official, 
they were patronized by Government officials and their fellow country folk 
in industry and commerce. However, the rapid expansion and growth of the 
Asian and European communities, particularly at Entebbe and Kampala, and 
the increasing difficulties in enforcing ordinary administrative and 
sanitary measures, led to the promulgation of the Uganda Township
g
Ordinance, 1903, which though designed for Entebbe was, as it happened, 
for the next forty years the legal framework within which urban local 
government was nurtured.
THE TOWNSHIPS ORDINANCE 1903 
The inadequacy of the Preservation of Order by Night Regulations, 1902 
alluded to above, led to the enactment of the Townships Ordinance, which 
laid down the procedure for the establishment of townships, the responsibility 
for their administration, the levying of rates, and the making of bye- 
laws, the need for'which was, according to the then British Commissioner, 
as follows
"It is principally in the interests of Entebbe that 
legislation has now become desirable owing to the 
rapid development of the town, and increase of population, 
and the difficulty in enforcing ordinary administration 
and sanitary and other measures for the safety and 
convenience of the public within the town without 
properly defined powers. It is right too, that the
residents in the town should now bear a proportion
of the cost of policing the town and keeping it clean.
A certain amount of revenue, too, will be obtained 
by the permits issued under the Fees and Royalties 
Regulations."9
8. Ftcr.2/592.. Sadler to Lansdowne. 18.8.1902.
9. F.0.2/592. Sadler to Lansdowne. 18.8.1902. : The Fees and Royalties
Regulations referred to formed part of the Draft Townships Regulations,
but were severed from the latter by the Foreign Office, redrafted and
approved for issue separately as the Fees and Royalties Ordinance, 1902.
The Ordinance authorised the Commissioner to fix feejs or charges in respect 
of markets,slaughterhouses,P ^ I l c cattle sheds,dog licences,cattle pounds'
F.0.2/588 .
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Additionally, there were certain local matters including the
indiscriminate digging of holes, the storage of kerosine, the
illegal hawking of goods, which the Authorities were anxious to
suppress, but could not do so satisfactorily without statutory
powers.^ Indeed, the case for legislation was overwhelming; the
Collector was eager to obtain the necessary powers for the provision
of water supply, street lighting, "particularly in the Indian and Native
11
portion of the town," and the collection and removal of night soil.
Legislation was thus, once again, dictated by local conditions in
contradistinction to a pre-deterained Government policy about urban local
government. However, having clearly identified the problem, the
Government proceeded with commendable dispatch. The Legal Vice-Consul
was briefed and directed to prepare an Ordinance, the principal object
of which was to enhble the Commissioner to deal with the preceding
matters, as he saw fit. In framing the Regulations, Ennis, the Legal
Vice-Consul, took as his model the relevant legislation in force else-
12
where in the Colonies. The result was a set of detailed Rules and
10. F.O. 2/592. Ennis* memo. Incl. No.4. in Dispatch No.219 of 
18: August, 1902.
11. Ibid.
12. F.O.2/592„ Ennis to Sadler, 9 June, 1902* In part the memo reads:
"I have followed to some extent the East Africa Regulations on the
different subjects dealt with, viz: the Street Cleaning and 
Lighting Regulationsy the Nairobi Municipal Regulations, 1900 and 
the Building Regulations 1901.. I have also been guided by the 
Sanitary Board Regulations of the Federal Malay States and such 
other literature on the subject, I have been able to find;
and throughout I have consulted the Collecter, Entebbe."
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Regulations that left the control of township matters in the hands
of the Commissioner. Ennis* draft ordinance was, in accordance with
the Uganda Order in Council, 1902 submitted to the Colonial Secretary 
13
for advice. In theory, no legislation could come into force without
his sanction and in this matter, he had wide discretionary powers. He
could, for example, allow or disallow, wholly or in part, any
ordinance and upon such disallowance, the legislation in question would,
if already in force, though without prejudice to anything lawfully done or
14
suffered thereunder, cease to have legal effect forthwith* Thus, though 
the intended effect of these provisions was to enhance the Commissioner*s 
influence and prestige, they had the unfortunate effect, whether by 
design or otherwise, of further diminishing the civil liberties of the 
individual. It is important to remember, however, that at that time, 
the individual's rights, political, legal or otherwise, were not of 
major concern, to the British authorities. The Government's priorities 
lay elsewhere, and partly because of this, no ordinance, however, repressive 
had ever been countermanded by the Colonial Office. In this case, however, 
the Secretary of State's disallowance powers were exercised and the draft 
legislation recast and returned to the Commissioner with instructions to 
consult with his counterpart Sir Charles Eliot, in the neighbouring East 
Africa Protectorate, or Kenya, as it is now called. The Secretary of 
State's reasons for this were set out in his terse dispatch to the 
Commissioner and were as follows:- __
13. The Uganda Order • in Council-J.902, London Gazette, London 1902. 
pp. 5308-5311, Article 12(1). states:
"The Commissioner may make ordinances for the administration of 
justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, 
order and good government of all persons in Uganda."
14. Ibid. Article 12(5) provided that:- "The Secretary of State may 
disallow any ordinance....." These provisions were revoked in 
1920 and these powers vested in the Legislative Council and the 
Governor respectively. See the Uganda Order in Council, 1920, 
articles 8 and 9.
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’’With regard to the draft Township Regulations, I am to 
inform you that Regulations on the same subject had been 
prepared by His Honour Judge Cator (when on leave in this 
Country) for issue in the East Africa Protectorate. These 
draft regulations have been referred back to Sir C.Eliot 
for further consideration- Copies of them are now sent 
to you with a printed copy of a draft ordinance based on 
those submitted by you. In view of the desirability of 
such matters being treated in the two Protectorates with 
as great uniformity as passible, I am to request that
you will consult with the authorities in the East Africa Protect­
orate with a view to the submission to the Secretary of 
State for approval of a draft ordinance and Rules embodying 
provisions suitable for adoption in both Protectorates.
The provisions of the ordinance should be of as simple 
a kind as possible and should be framed so as to give power 
to the local authorities to settle details according to 
local conditions." 15
Ennis's original drafts were accordingly streamlined and fresh legislation
prepared in accordance with the instructions of the Foreign Office. The
end product was a short and simple enabling ordinance, the Uganda
Township Ordinance, 1903 and a set of comprehensive and complex rules
the Townships Rules, 1904.^ The ordinance which came into force in
early September, 1903, empowered the Commissioner by proclamation, in the
Gazette, to declare any place, in the Protectorate, a Township}^ and to
18
make rules for its health and good government.. Subject to minor
limitations, the right to make rules included the power to levy local
rates, impose fees and charges including, penalties for the breach or non-
observance of any Rules provided that no such penalty exceeded two months1
19
imprisonment or a fine of 200 rupees, or both. Despite these wide
15* F.O. 2/588 Landdowne to Sadler. 21.10.1902."The Foreign Office
draft was prepared on the Model of the Central Africa Protectorate 
Regulations with sundry modifications, rendered necessary owing to 
the existence of the Roads and Buildings Regulations in East, Africa."
16. No.10. of 1903 and Official Gazette No-.105 of March 1904.
17. SS. 1 and 2.
18. SS. 4 and 5.
19. S. 6 .
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powers, however, the Township Ordinance was* in some respects, far
from satisfactory. The Ordinance’s main weakness was that if left
the control of township affairs despite the Secretary of State’s
directive, to the contrary, in the hands of the Commissioner, rather
20
than the local township authority. The result was that urban affairs 
were the responsibility of the Collector who had neither the time nor 
the staff to oversee their proper administration and development, and 
not surprisingly, many a township’s affairs did not receive the 
Collector’s deserved attention. However, there were in the eyes of 
the Commissioner, very good reasons for this. In addition to flexibility 
or more accurately, expediency, there were, as the following extract shows, 
several reasons why the Secretary of State’s instructions were ignored 
by the ’’man on the spot” and his advisers.
. 'Vere we to appoint a Board now it would mean that • 
a grant in aid would be necessary, and the municipal 
revenue would not be likely to meet expenditure for 
some years; it would also mean a variety of questions 
connected with roads, sanitation and other municipal 
matters would be raised by the Board which are at present 
dealt with by the Administration and should continue 
to be so dealt with, for at least a year, if not longer.
With the exception of three or four European firms, and 
the native bazaar, Entebbe is exclusively occupied by 
Government officials. 21
With his brief to preside over a self-financing Administration, and 
unwilling to soak "the poor urban dweller," Sadler was thus most anxious 
to keep an eye on urban affairs and it was not until 1914 that Local 
Sanitary Boards were appointed for the Protectorate’s main urban centres. 
The affairs of the minor townships, however, remained under the direct 
control of the District Commissioners and were throughout the Colonial era 
the responsibility of the Central Government.
20„ F.O. 2/588/ Lansdowne to Sadler. 21,10.1902.
21.. F.O. 2/857 Sadler to Lansdowne. Dispatch No. 105. of 7.4.04.
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6.1.3. THE TOWNSHIP RULES, 1903
As indicated earlier, the principal object of the Township 
Ordinance, 1903, was to enable the Commissioner to improve Entebbe1s 
salubriousness for European habitation* In particular, the Government 
was anxious to make provision for the supply of wholesome water, the 
provision of modern civic amenities, the suppression of nuisances and 
the eradication of vermin. These and other kindred matters were 
extensively dealt with in the Township Rules, 1903, which, though 
gazetted in March 1904, did not actually come into force until two 
long years later; and even then were partially implemented, and 
it was not until 1909 that the entire corpus of these Rules was fully 
applied to Entebbe as originally planned* This undue delay was, rather 
ironically, entirely due to the Commissioners unwillingness to over­
burden himself and his "impecunious" sub ordinates with local taxation.
He was under pressure from a vociferous minority of officers who were,
"not in the habit of paying rates" to refer the whole rates issue to
22
the Colonial Office* He duly obliged and pursued their cause somewhat 
relentlessly. He erroneously believed that H.M.Commissioner was, by 
virtue of his office exempt from local taxation. He thus emphatically 
asserted that:-
"I am under the impression that in no colony does 
an officer administering the Government pay taxes of 
any sort* I know that this is so in the West Indian 
Colonies in which I have served, and I believe also 
in West Africa. The Governor represents the Sovereign 
to whom in theory all taxes are due, and it is therefore 
considered unreasonable that he should pay dues to 
himself." 23
Bell’s spirited defence, however, cut no ice at the Treasury, the 
mandarins in Whitehall were not impressed* Their view was that the 
Commissioner was, despite a paucity of precedents, liable to pay local
22v C.0.536/27/2723. Inc.No.2. in Dispatch No.180 of July 7, 1909.
23* C.0.536/16/11996. Bell’s minute of 21.1.1907.
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taxes, and advised the Secretary of State accordingly. He, too,
24
however, "had considerable difficulty in finding precedents".
The cases in which the Governor’s ratability was raised were 
exceedingly rare, but, as usual, not without actual precedents.
In 1887, a somewhat similar point was raised by Governor Pendall
25
of Grenada, but was summarily rejected by the Foreign Office.
It was held that the Governor was not exempt from taxation and
Bell’s submission was, in accordance with, this decision, politely,
26
but firmly rejected, and advised accordingly. The Governor was
liable to taxatioh. Nor did Bell’s contention that "the officer 
administering the Government in a colony represented the Sovereign" 
fare any better. It too, was summarily dismissed and the Governor 
advised that:-
"It is not the case that a Governor (or 
Commissioner) represents the Sovereign in all 
respects.. He only does so to the extent of his 
Commission, as may be seen from a reference to the 
cases of Commissioner v. Kyte, and Musgrove v. Pulido 
quoted in Tarring’s 11 Laws relating to the Colonies", 
pp. 38 et seq." 27
Indeed, a cursory glance at the headings in any elementary textbook on
the British Constitution would have revealed that the Governor’s position
was dissimilar to that of a Viceroy and that the former’s privileges
were derived from his Commission and limited to those expressly or ’
28
impliedly conferred on him by the appointing authority. But, for
24* (JiO.536/16/ 1196M>p.c£t., StQgg's minute 29.8.1907.
25. See Draft Dispatch to the Governor of Grenada at 25987/87.
26* C.0.536/16/11996. Secretary of State to Bell. Conf. of Sept.23,1907: 
The Secretary of State’s dispatch, in part, reads:
"The general rule in the Colonies, is, in the absence of special 
legislation, that the Governor pays all taxes levied on individuals to 
which he would be liable if he were a private person,, in the’ present 
case, I am advised that if the fees are of that nature, they should be 
paid accordingly." (C.O. 536/16/11996)
27. C.O.536/16/11996 Secretary of State to Bell. Conf. of 23.9.1907.
28. See Phillip s. O.Hood, & Jackson Paul* Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, Sweet $ Maxwell.London. 1978. pp.678-679.Wade,E.C.S. & Phillips,
G.Godfrey, Administrative Law,Longman,London*1977. • De/-Smith. S. A. 
Constitutional and Administrative Law. Penguin. Lon don. 1977.
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some reason, Bell chose to rely on his experience and was not unduly 
disappointed. However, that was not the end of the matter, for Bell 
had another string to his bow. He totally ignored the Secretary 
of State*s dispatch, bid his time, and had the temerity to refer the 
same question to the Secretary of State for further consideration.
In view of his previous rebuff, however, Bell*s second tale was more
refined and disarmingly told. His theme was, however, still too miserly
and dogmatic. Thus, while admitting that the amount of fees involved
was "trifling", he insisted that "a general principle" was involved and
that he was indisposed "to create a precedent which might have a far
reaching effect on [his] successors", and he advised the Secretary of 
29
State accordingly.
"I have the honour to ask for Your Lordship*s 
instructions and to express the opinion that to 
pay such rates would undoubtedly be considered a 
hardship by officers appointed previous to Your 
Lordship’s despatch of January 12, 1907.** 30.
This, Bell believed would sway his superiors at the Colonial Office.
He so desperately wanted a favourable reply., however that he even
resorted to unseemly means, intimidation and scare tactics. He thus
informed the Secretary of State that his previous ruling that Government
Officers were liable to pay rates was inconsistent wit.h the latter *s terms
and conditions of employment, and that the Officers concerned intended to
insist on their contractual rights, particularly, the right to "free 
31
quarters". Allegedly, the recalcitrant officers intended to submit
and indeed, to insist that the term "free quarters" in their employment
29. C*0. 536/27/27231 Bell to Secretary of State.. 7.7.1909.
30. C.O. 536/27/27231 Dispatch No.;80 of 7.7.1909.
31. Russell’s Minute of 2.,7.1909. Inc. No.2. in Dispatch No. 180. above.
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contracts, meant, quarters "free of all rent, rates, taxes and other 
32
outgoings."
Apparently, such was the case in Nigeria and Bell was unaware of any
special reasons for giving a different interpretation to the relevant
phrase in the instant case. In any case, Bell contended that any other
approach of interpretation would, in his view, require fresh legislation
which according to local legal opinion, "would create class differentiation"
33
and thus offend the elementary canons of equal taxation.. BellVs legal 
adviser1s opinion that the enforcement of the Rating Rules "should be 
carefully weighed" was quoted with approval and the Secretary of State 
advised accordingly. ^
Bell’s arguments were, however, once again, rejected, arid though, greatly
exercised by the tone of his dispatch, the Secretary of State did not
remonstrate, let alone, censure the Commissioner's intransigence. But,
having learnt, for the first time, that his previous ruling had been ignored
the Secretary of State was anxious to ensure that the new ruling would be
carried out. He thus reiterated his decision, in no uncertain terms,
insisted on its immediate implementation and strongly urged the Commissioner
35to submit detailed periodic reports on the working of the Rating System. 
Despite an incessant and thorough perusal of the relevant papers, however,
t
no such reports have been discovered, indeed the correspondence on this 
matter seems to have ended with the Colonial Secretary's exhortations; 
the Governor as usual, having the last laugh* The importance of this 
duel, however, can hardly be over emphasised; it sheds-'* some' IJLght-on some
32* Ibid. (Russell was Crown Advocate & Legal Adviser to the Government).
33. Inc. No.l. in Despatch No.180 of 7.7,1909.
34. Inc. No.2. in Despatch No.180 of 7.7.1909.
35. C.0. 536/27/27231 Secretary of State to Bell.
of the problems with which this thesis is concerned, and in particular,
*
the Colonial Officefs role in policy formulation, the relations between 
the Secretary of State and his "man on the spot", vis-a-vis, the 
administration of the Colony or Protectorate* Its significance here, 
however, lies in the fact that the rating of official tenements was 
the pith and substance of the entire urban legislative programme, and 
there can be no doubt that the wholesale derating of government "free 
quarters" would have emasculated the new urban policy.
"Entebbe is so completely an official town that
if officers, are not rated, the municipal receipts
must be small* I fail to see why
all residents should not contribute towards the
necessary expenditure for improving its salubrity." 36
But Bell and his associates had other ideas, and as, indicated above, 
the Secretary of State1s ruling, notwithstanding, they seem, whether 
by design or otherwise, to have successfully swatted the assessment 
rules, and some would say, the entire urban policy. Indeed, Bell's 
niggardly and Scrooge-like demeaner in this matter did not augur well 
for the future, it set the pace for the under-development of local 
government in urban areas, and it was not until 1947 that the vestiges 
of his approach were finally put to rest, the scars, however, remained, 
incalculable harm had already been done, and the Local Government (Rating) 
Ordinance, 1947, could haTdly have began in more inauspicious circumstances 
its fate was thus sealed.
36, G.O. 536/14/28430 Wilson to Secretary of State, 13.7.1907.
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6.1.4. THE TOWNSHIP RULES, 1903 : FURTHER PROVISIONS
Besides the Rating Rules, the Township Rules, 1903, provided for 
the lighting and cleaning of streets, the demolition of insanitary 
buildings, the construction of sanitary premises, the removal of 
nuisances, the control of bakeries and abattoirs, the abatement of 
fires and street noises, the impounding of stray pets, the regulation 
of public markets, and the preservation of law and order in urban 
areas, particularly between the hours of sunset and sunrise. The 
rules were thus as comprehensive as they were complex, and though 
specifically designed for Entebbe, they were subsequently applied to 
other townships without modification and apparently without too much 
difficulty. But the same eannot be said of the way in which they were 
enforced by individual officers, and indeed, by the Courts. An 
examination of the few reported cases reveals that the authorities had 
real difficulties in administering and applying individual rules to 
individual cases. It seems that a good many enforcement officers had 
little time for the nuances and the niceties of the law; instead, many 
preferred, it would seem for the job in hand, to follow their own 
instincts, and on being challenged to resort to the criminal code to 
justify their otherwise, illegal and arbitrary actions.
37
Rex v. Valji Bhanji and Co., 1911 , is a case in point
This was a-l>etition, for revfts-ianr by a firm of Indian Traders, against
their conviction by the Kampala Town Magistrate, under s. 188 of the 
38
Penal Code, 1900, for the disobedience of the District Commissioner's
37. Uganda Law Reports, Vol.2, p. 14.
38. The Penal Code, 1900, section 188, now section 166 of Cap.22.,
provided that:
"Any person who unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, 
and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread
the infection of any disease dangerous to life, is guilty of a
misdemeanour."
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order to fill up a choo on their premises* The petitioners argued
that their conviction was bad in law, in that the authorities had
erroneously invoked s.188 of the Penal Code, 1900, instead of Rule 74
39
of the Township Rules, 1903 In fact, both the District Commissioner
and the petitioners were wrong: the alleged disobedience was not to
an Order made under Rule 74 of the Township Rules, 1903, but to an Order 
which purported to be made under Rule 5 of the Township Rules, 1910, the 
terms of which were as follows :-
"Upon notice being given by the District Commissioner
to the occupier of any house in a township that any choo
or sanitary arrangement upon his premises is insanitary,
the occupier shall within a period to be stated in the
notice, not being less than 24 days, fill up such choo
or remove or otherwise deal with such sanitary
arrangements as the District Commissioner shall direct." 40
The evidence for the prosecution that the District Commissioner had 
to issue a general notice that all privies and native choos, in Kampala, 
should be closed. And the question for the Court was whether he had, 
under Rule 5, such power to issue such a notice for the indiscriminate 
closure of privies and choos, or whether, in the exercise of his powers, 
the District Commissioner had to inspect each and every sanitary 
arrangement under his purview before making a valid order.
39j. The Township Rules, 1903, Rule 74 provided that:
"Where it appears to bhe Collector that any accumulation of weeds,
undergrowth, manure, refuse or other noxious matter ought to be 
removed, the Collector shall give notice to the owner of occupier 
of the premises or land upon which such accumulation occurs, to 
remove the same within 48 hours; and should the owner or occupier 
fail to comply with the order, the government may undertake the 
work and charge the occupier or owner with the cost incurred."
40. The Township Rules, 1910. Rule 5.
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Held, That the District Commissioner had no power to issue an 
order, by means of a general notice, for the filling of privies 
and choos; and that the notice to be valid had to be specific in 
each case^ That is to say that before making a closure order, the 
District Commissioner had to satisfy himself that the sanitary 
arrangement in question was actually insanitary, and in urgent need 
of closure.
"In our opinion the Rule indicates that the District 
Commissioner should come to a decision as to whether 
a particular choo or sanitary arrangement is insanitary, 
a decision which should be exercised on reasonable 
grounds in each case." 41
! Yet another case which lends support, to the contention that the
r
[ authorities disregard for the Township Rules and let it be said the
i  42
Rule of Law is Ha.ji Tomachi Sulemani v. Jinja Township Authority, 1923.
This was an appeal from a magistrate's decision refusing the appellant's
claim for compensation, arising from the demolition of their property
|
; made by the District Commissioner, under the Township Rules, 1916, the
|
| relevant provision of which provided that:
i
!
| "Whenever it appears to the Township Authority that
| the immediate destruction of any building is necessary
or desirable for the purpose of preventing the spread 
| of disease, the Township Authority may apply to any
! Magistrate for an order authorising such destruction
and if the Magistrate is satisfied that such destruction 
is necessary dr desirable for the said purpose, he shall 
make such order and direct the payment of such 
compensation (if any) as to him may be just." 43.
41. 2 ULR.1911 p.14
•42. 3 ULR.1923 p.129.
43. The Township Rules 1916, Rule 92.
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In this case, n© demolition order was sought by the Township 
Authority, but they were satisfied that the immediate removal of 
the appellant’s building’s roof was necessary to check the spread 
of the much dreaded plague. The case was dismissed on other grounds, 
but the facts of the case are germane to the contention that a good 
many enforcement agencies had considerable difficulties, intentionally 
or otherwise, in applying individual rules to individual cases. But as 
the two preceding cases indicate., these operational difficulties, or 
rather flagrant abuses, had, rather regrettably very few critics. The 
victims were largely illiterate Asians, and the idea of bringing .'an action 
against the District Commissioner - their Bwana Kubwa or boss - for 
failure to observe some obscure Township Rules, of which many were 
blissfully unaware, did not figure much in their imagination* Besides, 
such law suits were fraught with difficulties. The authorities, as we have 
seen, had carte blanche powers that were virtually judge-proof; very 
often the victims had no real legal remedies, and as Sulemani's case 
demonstrates, the judiciary did not always protect the interests of the 
little man : the judges appear to have been more executive-minded than 
the. Executive. Thus Sulemanife appeal was unceremoniously dismissed 
and the District Commissioner’s arbitrary action upheld without commenting 
on its illegality, or disapproving of it, or indeed, laying down some 
ground rules for the future* True, the judiciary had a duty, in
f
appropriate cases, to support the Township Authorities, and this seems 
to have bfeen the main consideration in these two cases and few would quarrel 
with that. Equally, however, the Courts had a legal duty to uphold the 
rights of the individual; and though, the judges’ cavalier attitude, 
displayed in these decisions, is, given the Colonial Milieu,hardly 
surprising, there is little douht that such "hard decisions" brought 
the law into disrepute and thus, arguably,, discouraged the would-be 
litigants - hence the paucity of decided cases.
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6.2.1. THE LOCAL SANITARY BOARDS
Until 1914, the Township Rules, 1903, as amended, were
successively administered by the Collector, the District Commission
and the Local Sanitary Committees, consisting of the District Commissioner-
the chairman and executive officer - the District Medical Officer of Health,
44
and the District Engineer. The duties of these Committees were to
inspect and advise upon the general sanitation of the town, the supply 
of wholesome water, the siting and sanitation of streets, the erection 
of buildings, the disposal of sewage and refuse, the prevention of Malaria, 
and the control of infectious diseases. The Committee was free to meet 
at such times and at such places as it saw fit or as was convenient for 
the carrying out of their duties, save that they could be required to 
hold meetings by the Provincial Medical Officer of Health or at the 
request of any two of its members.
In 1914, however, the Rules were drastically altered and provision
made for the appointment of Advisory Local Sanitary Boards, as the urban
local authority1 bodLes responsible for the administration of the Township
Rules within their jurisdiction* It was provided that in every township
there should be a Local Sanitary Board, consisting of the District Commissioner
the President and Executive Officer - the District Medical Officer of Health,
the local representative of the Public Works Department and in the larger
45
townships, some Asian and European non-official members.. Each board 
was to meet whenever summoned by the President, who was at liberty to 
call meeting as he thought fit, and whenever so requested by two or more
44.» Cirs. 14 of 18.6.1912 and 4 of 18*4.1914. The first towns to have 
Local Sanitary Committees were Entebbe, Kanpala, Jinja, Hoima, Mbale 
and Mbardra.
45* In July 1914 three unofficial members were appointed, to be members of 
the LSBs for the Townships of Kampala and Port Belland Jinja 
respectively.
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Board members. The Board's duties were identical to those of their 
predecessors, the Local Sanitary Committees and were, as before, mostly 
carried out by the Executive Officer, and in 1916 this informal 
arrangement was recognised and given statutory force and enlarged at the 
expense of the Board.
"The Executive Officer, or other officer duly 
authorised in writing by the Township Authority, 
in case of emergency or in case no other member
of the Board is available, shall be entitled to
exercise all the powers and do all the acts as
may lawfully be done by the Township Authority _
and all acts done by him shall be deemed to be
done by the Township Authority.11 46
These powers were in 1929, further extended and provision made for the
Executive Officer to institute law suits in the name of the Board
without their prior authorisation. At the same time, and rather ironically, 
membership of the Board was increased and provision made for the 
appointment of more non-official members* For. example, the Kampala
Local Sanitary Board was enlarged from 7 to 12 members and the number
of non-official members doubled. All members were, however, still 
appointed by the Governor and all held office at his pleasure: the
Boards were still an integral part of the Central Government and were 
largely run by its officials. Board meetings were normally held twice 
a month and were presided over by the District Commissioner.
There were no Committees* Much of the Board's business was planned 
and directed by individual Board members especially the Executive Officer., 
the Medical Officer of Health and the Executive Engineer.. In addition,
to his administrative duties, the Executive Officer was responsible for
46. Rule 17(7) of the Township Rules. 1916.
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the preparation of the assessment list and the collection of rates, 
fees and other municipal charges. Public health, sanitation and 
other related matters were under the direct control of the Medical 
Officer of Health; while the environmental planning, the design and the 
construction and maintenance of roads, public buildings and related 
matters were under the control of the Executive Engineer: the
47
Township Authority was thus almost entirely in Government hands.
Indeed, it was wholly financed and controlled by the Central Government, 
whilst its receipts, such as rates, bucket fees* market rents, and 
charges were all paid either directly or indirectly into the Protectorate*s 
coffers- Besides, several of the Boards* services were in practice, 
invariably run by the appropriate Government Departments and the cost 
charged onto the account of the Township Authority. Thus, outside Kampala, 
the construction and upkeep of all urban roads was carried out by the 
staff of the Public Works Department, under the direct control of the 
Executive Engineer who, though a member of the Board, was of course, a 
civil servant. Iii fact, the duties of the Boards were so closely inter­
woven with Government Services that it was difficult clearly to delimit 
the powers of the Township Authority. The nature and extent of this 
administrative and financial nexus is well documented and the following, 
excerpt will serve as an example:
"The finances of the township are undeir the control of the 
Board, but this is largely nominal, being limited to 
preparing the annual municipal budget and submitting to 
the Government for sanction- In actual practice the Board 
is precisely in the same position as a government department, 
since the Board*s annual estimates can be, and usually are, 
amended as the government considers desirable- Indeed, the
47. As the Report of the Local Government Committee, 1930, pointed out:
"The Staff of the Township Authority is housed in the District 
Commissioner*s office. Consequently, with the District Commissioner 
as President and Executive Officer, the organisation develops into 
a branch of the Provincial Administration.." (Rept. p.5.)
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mvnicipal revenue and expenditure are incorporated
in the Protectorate Budget. The Board is subject
to the same financial controls as Government departments.
All receipts and expenditure are passed through the 
Government accounts, and the sanctioned expenditure 
cannot be varied without the prior approval of the 
Government." 49
The principle of central control which was the essential element 
here, continued to bedevil the relationship between the Government 
and the Local Sanitary Boards for several years. There were 
several reasons for this, not least of which was the publics1 
lack of interest in the management of their municipal affairs.
Most of the potential urban electors were as one astute observer put 
it: "birds of passage, here today and gone tomorrow." ^  There was,
accordingly, hardly any demand, even in the major townships, for some 
semi-autonomous urban local authorities. The hub of the matter was 
the financing of municipal services* The rate-p ayLng public, almost 
exclusively Europeans and Asians, preferred, "at the cost of having no 
municipal vote, to allow the Protectorate Government to balance the 
municipal budget out of Protectorate funds.1'"^ For the grant of 
local autonomy would, of necessity, mean increased responsibilities, 
including higher rates; and this, they were not prepared to accept.
And in consequence, many urban dwellers were indifferent and the 
Government, for their part,, were not at all unhappy with the existing 
arrangements. Nevertheless, they were well aware that these arrangements 
were far from ideal. Accordingly, in 1930, having reviewed the machinery 
of local government in urban areas, the Local Government Committee
48.. Report of the Local Government Committee, 1930.p.2.
49* Ibid. p.3.
50. toirams Report., op.cit. at p.24
51. Thomas & Scott., op.cit. at p.78.
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recommended that interest in municipal affairs should be encouraged
and stimulated by the introduction of an elective system, at least,
for the appointment of a portion of members of the various Local 
52
Sanitary Boards, In particular, the Committee considered that
the stage of development then attained by Kampala was sufficiently
53
advanced to warrant a considerable degree of local autonomy.
The Committee therefore recommended the establishment of a Municipal 
Council for Kampala, in place of the Local Sanitary Board, but sadly, 
insisted that the Governor should have power to dissolve or suspend the 
Council, if in his opinion, the Council’s duties were not being carried 
out in a proper manner. The Council was to consist of 19 members of 
I whom 13 including 6 non-officials were to be nominated, whilst the
remainder were to be directly elected by the local government electors 
on the basis of one man - one vote. For this purpose, Kampala was to 
!' be divided into four Wards: Nakasero (2 councillors), Old Kampala, (1
i
j councillor , East Kampala (1 councillor) and Town Ward (1 Councillor).
!
i
i  The Committee, however, felt that the time was not yet ripe for the
I
preparation of a full electoral roll such as would be hecessary for a
| completely elected municipality. Hence the Committee’s recommendation
|
that a list of electors should be prepared every two years for each
election. The right to vote was to rest upon registration and the
occupation, as owner or tenant of immovable property or premises within 
the urban area; or being resident or having a place of business in a 
ward, and in recept of an annual income of not less than £120; or being 
the wife of a qualified voted.
52. Report of the Local Government Committee, 1930, p.6 .
53. Ibid. p .5,
54* Ibid. p.8.
55. Ibid. p.34.
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Any person of either sex whose name was on the Electoral Roll
would be entitled, subject to the usual legal restrictions, to
stand for election as a councillor for a term of two years. The
Committee also recommended that all races should be eligible for
membership of the Council, but that no one should be eligible unless
he could speak, read and write English to the satisfaction of the 
56
Returning Officer, a stipulation which virtually defranchised 
the majority of urban dwellers.
Finally, it was recommended that the Council should have its own, 
as distinct from the Central Government, executive staff consisting 
of the Chief Municipal Officer, the Medical Officer of Health, the 
Executive Engineer, and the Finance Officer. In the first instance, 
such Officers would be on secondment from the Government, but the Council 
would have full executive control over thenu -In particular, it was 
proposed that the Chief Municipal Officer who was to be in attendance 
at all Council Meetings (without a vote of course) should be under 
"the general control of the President, or of the Standing Committee, 
or of the Council" as a whole.^
These proposals were, with modifications, subsequently incorporated into
58
the Local Government (Municipalities) Ordinance, 1947 , and thus the
legal framework, for the proper development of urban local government, 
at least, in the larger townships, would be well and truly established. 
Unfortunately, however, as has been remarked in connection with local 
government arrangements in rural areas, legal provisions of this nature, 
though well meant, did not at times accord with reality; and no better example 
could be cited than this Ordinance which, though a model instrument, at least 
in theory, was in practice, as is shown below,an anti-climax - it was
disappointingly implemented, thus robbing it of its content.
56. Local Government Report op.cit.p.34
57. Ibid.p.34
58. No.34 of 1947.
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6.2.2. THE MOVE TOWARDS MUNICIPAL COUNCILS
Until 1938, urban local government was, as alluded to above, in the
hands of the various Local Sanitary Boards. In that year, however,
the management of urban affairs was placed in the hands of the newly
59
created Township Authorities, and though still under the control 
60
of the Governor, the new Urban Authorities enjoyed greater executive 
and legislative powers than their predecessors. Thus, for example, 
they had complete autonomy to make standing orders for the regulation 
and conduct of their own. internal affairs and subject to the Governor*s 
approval, to make bye-laws for all or any of the following purposes:
(a) the prohibiting or regulation of the hawking
of wares or of the erection of stalls on or near 
any street;
(b) the establishment, management and control of 
pounds and the powers and duties to be exercised 
by pound masters;
(c) the seizure, impounding and sale of stray animals
and the disposal of the proceeds of such sale;
(d) the preservation, control and management of streets
and open spaces and of trees and shrubs in public 
places;
(e) the control and management of public recreation 
grounds or parks including the charges for 
admissions into inclasures.
(f) the general control and management of cemeteries
and crematoria. 61
The maximum punishment for any breach of any of these bye-laws, was
62
a fine of up to 200 shillings, or a custodial sentence of thirty days. 
However, a bye-law could further provide that, in addition to any penalty, 
any expenses incurred by the Authority in consequence of any infringement 
should be paid by the party responsible for the violation of the bye-law.
59. Cap.102 Uganda Laws(1951 Edition) p.1397. S.4(1)
60. S.4(2), 4(3)
61. S.31
62. S.32.
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Despite these powers, however, none of the Township Authorities
had an independent existence. They were appointed by the Governor
and were under his control. Even Kampala, despite its importance
and the growth of unofficial participation in the management of its
affairs, was still run as a branch of the Provincial Administration,
like any other minor rural trading centre, and it was to deal with
this anomalous situation that the Municipalities Ordinance, 1947 was 
63
enacted. It had as. its main objective, the devolution of power 
to the major Township Authorities in the Country. The Ordinance, based 
on the lines of that of Kenya and the then Gold Coast, provided for 
the establishment of Municipal Councils, or Boards, the provision of 
local Social Services and the imposition of local rates. Having 
empowered the Governor to declare any area to be a municipality, to 
prescribe the Composition of Municipal Councils or Municipal Boards 
and provided for the making of rules for Council elections, the Ordinance 
proceeded to prescribe the administrative machinery of the new urban local 
authorities.
Under the Ordinance, every Municipal Council was a body corporate, under
a special denomination, having rights and duties, particularly of taking
and granting property, of contracting obligations, of suing and being 
64
sued. Each Council had power, subject to the Governor’s approval,
to appoint certain named chief executive officers, to establish named 
departmental committees and to delegate any of its powers to any of its 
Committees, sub-Committees or Officers, as,in its discretion,saw fit.^
63* Cap.103. Uganda Laws, (1951 Edition) p. 1411
64. S.6.
65. S.16 (1)
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The Council’s general powers were contained in part four of the 
Ordinance and included: the making of bye-laws for the good rule
and government of the municTpalityj. thef'construction and maintenance 
of public roads, gardens and parks; the provision of public transportation; 
the maintenance of dipping houses, slaughter houses and fire brigades; 
and the provision of housing accommodation - municipal housing,
("Council Estates") and mortgage advances.^
Finally, the Ordinance provided for the central local financial 
relations^ and set out, in some detail, the new urban authorities’ 
sources of income, the main heads of which were:-
Central Government Grants, local rates,, fees, charges, dues, rents and
a variety of miscellaneous sources, including one-half of all fines
imposed in respect of any contravention of any bye-law; premiums on
68
the sales of Crown Land, and the proceeds of sales of by-products.
The foundation was thus laid for the steady development of an efficient 
and representative system of local government in urban areas throughout 
the Protectorate.
In 1948, Kampala, the Protectorate's Capital, was declared a Municipality
■ . 69
and brought under the Ordinance with effect from 1 January, 1949, and a
Municipal Council consisting of 26 entirely nominated Councillors set
up, including a Mayor and a Deputy Mayor.^ The Council was organised
into five functional committees and four departments under appropriate
executive officers responsible for general administration, finance, public
health, public works and planning. The municipality was rated under
66. S.31
67. Part V. SS.52-71.
68. S.53
69. L.N. No.250. of 1948.
70. L.N. No.241. of 1949 and 243 of 1950.
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the Local Government (Rating) Ordinance, 1948^ from which source 
it derived about 42% of its revenue. This, however, was quite 
inadequate to meet the Council’s needs and the municipality was in 
receipt of grants in aid, some of which were mandatory whilst others 
were discretionary? and as a quid proquo its annual estimates were 
subject to the Governor’s approval. Otherwise, the municipality had 
autonomous powers in contradistinction to the provincial townships 
which had no independent existence.
This disparity between Kampala and her rustic urban sisters was, in 1954, 
summarised by Buchanan, the recently appointed Local Government 
Commissioner, as follows
"In my study of urban local government in Uganda, I am 
struck by the very great gulf between the autonomous 
Kampala Municipality (population 40,000 approximately), 
with a budget of 410,000 and estimated capital 
expenditure of over million in 1954, organised under 
a Mayor, Council and principal departments on the normal 
British model, albeit subject to fairly strict control 
of Government at this stage - between this municipality 
and the Townships Authorities which have no independent 
existence, no financial responsibility, almost no conciliar 
existence., Separate from the Government officials who 
conduct various urban services and which are, in effect, 
just minor government agencies organised departmentally." 72
This distinction between these two authorities, both in principle and 
in fact, was a reflection of the policy enshrined, on the one hand, in 
the Townships Ordinance, 1938, and on the other, in the Municipalities 
Ordinance, 1948, under which the Urban Authorities and the Kampala 
municipality were respectively governed. Another anomaly which was 
the bugbear of urban local government administration and practice was 
the sharp differentiation made between the urban and the peri-urban
71. Cap. 104. Uganda Laws, (1951 Edition) p. 1455
72. Buchanan, L.M. Report on Urban Local Government in Uganda, 
Entebbe, 1954, p.l.
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areas. Thus, though, in law, the Municipal and Townships Authorities 
had full jurisdiction over all persons within their boundaries, there 
were, in practice, two and some times three Authorities with concurrent 
jurisdiction over some urban dwellers. In Kampala, for example, the 
indigenous urban dweller, though legally under the jurisdiction of the 
Municipal Council, was, in fact, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Kabaka's Government, to whom he paid taxes, though he derived no benefits 
in return; while the European or Asian,, living in Kampala paid his 
rates to the Municipal Council, and was naturally subject to its 
jurisdiction. The reasons for this have already been alluded to and need 
not be rehearsed here, suffice it to say that they had a deleterious 
effect on the development of urban local government, and led to the 
subordination of all urban authorities to the Central Government.
With a few exceptions, their accounts were kept as part of Central 
Government accounts, whilst a member of the District Commissioner's 
staff invariably acted as the Executive Officer, while the District 
Commissioner, Kampala, Jinja and Mbale excepted, was always the Chairman 
of the Urban Authority within the limits of the administrative district 
over which he presided.
These arrangements, though convenient, and under the circumstances, 
perhaps inevitable, held up the introduction of responsible and 
democratic government in the urban areas. No township, not even the 
Municipality of Kampala had had an elected Council; all members of 
urban authorities, large or small, were appointees of the Governor.
Throughout the 1950s these arrangements were the subject of adverse
73
comment by the East Africa Royal Commission (1953-1955), the
73. East Africa Royal Commission Report. 1953-1955, Chap.19.
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Commissioner for Local Government (1954) "and the Uganda 
Relationships Commission, 1961.^ For instance, the latter 
Commission having examined the development of urban areas throughout 
East Africa, tersely commented that:
"In the past too little attention has been paid 
by East African Governments to the problems tahich
arise from this development." 76
This, in their eyes was due to the theory and practice of Indirect
Rule which "concentrated on the development of rural tribal societies,
neglected the training of an educated urban elite and encouraged the
view that the town was an unsuitable habitat for Africans^  Indeed,
the Commission was struck by the general "tendency to look on the
78
Westernised African with suspicion," and not surprisingly, therefore
there was no machinery for the administration of African affairs within
the limits of urban areas v. For example, the Kampala Municipal Council,
the largest and most advanced in the Country, had no African Affairs
Department; the indigenous urban dwellers were, thus under the jurisdiction
79
of the Kabaka*s Government, rather than the Municipal Council.
74. Report of the Urban Local Government, op.cit.
75. Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961. Chap.16.
See Also Wallis' Report, p. 67.
76. Royal Commission, p.200
77. Ibid. p. 201.
78. Ibid.
79. The Baganda together with the other indigenous urban dwellers were
under the jurisdiction of the "Kiburga" and the "Omukuluwe Kibuga"
and lie outside the scope of this study.
For a detailed account of the Buganda Government vis-a-vis, the 
"Kibuga", see P.C.W. Gutkind, The Royal Capital of Buganda,
The Hague, 1964.
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The Royal Commission also found that, while the Boma was satisfactorily
administered, the African areas whether within or outside the municipal
80
boundaries, were often without an effective administration. The 
responsibility for these areas was shared by the Central Government and 
the adjacent Local Authorities, but their spheres were confused and ill- 
defined: there was uncertainty and overlapping. Accordingly, the
Commission listed four requirements which, in their view, were needed 
to remedy these anomalies:—
"(a) an overall policy for urban development which 
took all the factors in the urban situation 
into account;
(b) an administrative machinery for the supervision 
and execution of this policy;
(c) an administrative system for dealing with these 
special requirements of the African population; 
and
(d) the improvement, as an emergency operation of 
the deplorable conditions in the peri-urban 
African quarters." 81
To this end, the Commission strongly recommended the appointment of a
Local Government Specialist to advise the Government on this and other
kindred matters. His first duty would be to study the different facets
of the urban problem, the administrative organisational needs, and the
82
formulation of the overall policy along the lines indicated above.
Next he was to monitor and oversee the urban development, and, in 
particular, the co-ordination of the views of the different departments
t
concerned with urban affairs. Wallis, too had recognised the need 
for this king of appointment, but unlike the Royal Commission, he was 
apprehensive about the division between town and country which this 
appointment entailed.
80. Royal Commission, p. 237
81. Ibid. p. 237.
82.. Ibid.
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"I understand that approval has already been given to 
recruit one experienced local government officer and 
that he will probably be placed in a new section of 
the Secretariat dealing mainly with urban local 
government. If any of the three officers mentioned 
in paragraph 195 is also recruited I assume that he 
will be placed on the staff of the Secretary for 
African Affairs, who is responsible for African rural 
local government. No doubt contact will be maintained, 
but this dichotomy cannot be a good thing. If the 
Government is to be in a position to observe and guide 
the development of local government as a whole it will 
be advisable to bring both urban and rural local 
government under a single direction. In my opinion, 
single direction is more important now during the 
formative .years than it may be later when the system 
has been established. " 83
He emphasised the need for co-operation, uniformity and unanimity, and
hoped that the proposed appointees would discharge their individual
........... 84
responsibilities in. perfect harmony. These proposals were accepted
by the Government, and shortly afterwards, one Buchanan, lately of the
Sudan Civil Service, was named Commissioner for Local Government and
detailed to make proposals for refprm.
Buchanan’s first assignment was to study and report on certain aspects
of urban local government, including the central-local financial
relations, the amelioration of particular difficulties, and the consequential
amendments to the existing urban legislation. Like the Wallis and Munster
Commission before him, he too, was critical of the Government’s past
85
policies and said so in no uncertain terms.
Buchanan’s Report which appeared in 1954, premised its recommendations on 
the assumption that the system of urban local government would be based, 
with modifications to suit local conditions, on the British model. He
83. Wallis’s Report, p. 68.
84. Ibid. p. 68
85. Vide, p.240 Footnote 7.2 supra.
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took the view that a formal system of central-local government 
relations in urban areas was "pointless - and indeed dangerous", 
unless it could be related to agreed objectives formulated from 
the answers to the following two questions:-
(a) What is the system required to achieve? and
(b) What are the circumstances in which the system 
is to operate? 86
The new system of Urban Local Government was thus to be determined by 
the answers to these two questions, the first, in particular.
"In regard to the first question, I assume the
following fundamental principles to be acceptable:-
(i) local government should be regarded not merely 
as a method of executive action but as a major 
element in the promotion of democratic 
institutions;
(ii) the individual citizen should be given the 
opportunity to play a definite part in local 
administration through representative machinery;
(iii) the central machinery of government should be 
confined to matters which cannot be satisfactorily 
dealt with in any other way, and to major issues 
of policy domination by a centralised bureaucracy 
should be avoided.
(iv) the need for flexibility, variety and experiment 
in the administration of local services should be 
recognised." 87
Given this conceptual framework, the Commissioner proposed that
the Central Government should grant a large measure of autonomy to
Urban Local Authorities compatible with the duty of the Central
Government to safeguard particular standards and services of common 
88
national interest. Since, however, several towns (approximately 100) 
were too small to be autonomous as envisaged by the Commissioner, and
86. Report on Urban Local Government, p.2.
87. Report on Urban Local Government, p.2.
88. Ibid. p.31
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indeed, were unlikely ever to develop into financially viable
local government units, it was recommended that they should be
brought within the ambit of the District Councils responsible
89
for the areas m  which they were situated. On the other hand,
however, he strongly recommended that Jinja, Mbale, Masaka, Tororo
and Soroti should be given special attention and encouragement to
proceed as rapidly as possible along the road to the independent
status indicated above. But he strongly recommended that the major
townships such as Entebbe, Gulu, Fort Portal, Lira, Mubende and
Mbarara should continue to be run as small Protectorate enclaves
90
in conformity with the Township Ordinance 1938, and that the number
of non-official members should be brought to parity with official
members, and a non-official chairman appointed together with a Town
91
Clerk, as principal adviser and chief executive officer.
Finally the Commissioner considered the "delicate matter" of representation
92 .
on the Kampala Municipal Council. Hitherto, representation on the
Council, though "representative" of the most important interests,
. 93
except the ratepayers as such, was nevertheless undemocratic.
The most serious weakness of that system of representation was its non­
responsiveness to popular influence: there was "no public goad or
94
public restraining influence." which could readily be felt by the
Council. The Mayor was evidently conscious of this and was apparently
anxious that councillors should "begin to identify themselves with
95particular areas (possible electoral wards of the future") Having 
thus reviewed the representation question, the Commissioner continued:
89. Report on. Urban Local Govemment,p.l.
90. Ibid.p.30 .. . .
91. Ibid. p.25
92. Ibid. p.25
93. Ibid.p. 25.
94. Inid. p.25.
95. Ibid. p.25.
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"This matter will need full discussion but the 
sooner a proportion of councillors are elected 
the better for the general health of the Council.
It is my experience that such matters are better 
tackled in stages but unless there are strong reasons 
to the contrary, I suggest that in principle the 
sooner a start is made the better; the potential 
electorate of Kampala is no less capable of 
understanding elections and their object than that 
of Nairobi and Khartoum or Lagos, or any other of 
the principal towns of Africa where elections 
are ordinary occurrences." 96
Buchanati’s recommeridationswere accepted and embodied in the Urban
97
Authorities Ordinance, 1958, and m  the rules and regulations
issued under it. The existing legislation was repealed and both
major and minor towns placed under one Ordinance. Part 1 of the
Ordinance set out the administrative machinery of the principal 
98
townships, and made provision for the declaration of municipalities,
the establishment of Municipal Councils, the election of appointment of
99Municipal Councillors,'including their powers, duties and privileges.
Each Council was vested with the duty to control, manage and govern 
the Municipality, to safeguard public health and to maintain public 
order within the limits of its jurisdiction.^^ Every Council was, 
among other things, empowered to establish, acquire, erect, maintain
and control systems of street lighting, clinics, dispensaries, health
and innoculation centres, public baths, and swimming pools, botanical 
and zoological gardens, public weighing machines and public monuments. 
Subject to ministerial approval each municipality had power to pass bye- 
laws for the well-being of its inhabitants, the prevention and suppression
of nuisances and for the good rule and government of the municipality
n  i02 
generally.
96. Report on Urban Local Government p.25.
97. No.16.' of 1958.
98. SS.3 to 7.
99. SS.8 to 13.
100. SS.29; 30.
101. S.30(1) and Schedule 1.
102. S.42.
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I
! Elsewhere the management of urban affairs was left in the hands,
103
either of a Town Council, as in Masaka and Mbale, or a Town Board
104
as in the more smaller urban and trading centres. Under these
arrangements, the Town Council or Town Board, appointed by the Minister, 
could be granted, at the discretion of the Minister, similar powers to 
those exercised by the Municipal Councils, or at the other extreme 
even fewer than they previously enjoyed. The pre- 1958 structure
was thus retained. And so was the dual system of urban and rural 
local government based on a racial instead of geographical consideration.^
The second weakness of these arrangements was the existence of too many
small urban areas with inadequate resources, population and areas to 
support and provide essential civic services. Thirdly, and more 
importantly, though the Ordinance had made provision for local elections 
and the Government had been implored, by its expert ’advisers, including
I Wallis and the Munster Commission, to make arrangements for direct
! elections at least, of a proportion of councillors in the larger
municipalities; both the Kampala and Jinja Municipal Orders of 1958 
placed the appointment of Councillors in the hands of the Governor, rather 
than the Ratepayers.
103. Legal Notice No. 342 of 1958: The Masaka Tctfh Council Order,1958.
104^ Legal Notice No. 341 of 1958: The Mbale Town Council Order, 1958.
105. Legal Notice No. 344 of 1959: The Town Boards Order 1958.
Legal Notice No. 343 of 1958: The Urban Authorities (Application
to Towns)Order, 1958 The first schedule of this order applied 
certain powers contained in the first schedule of the parent ' 
ordinance to the Towns as follows: (a) Sub-paragraphs (a),(d),
(e),(f),(g),(i),(j),(m),(o),(q) (r),(s),(u) and (w) . (b),SS.39.
41, (69,(70) (71) and (7) of the Ordinance. The Second Schedule 
(1) applied s.4(2); (2) applied ss.6,20,27,28,31 to 33 inclusive,
37. 38. 40, 47 to 52 inclusive and 54-58 inclusive of the Ordinance, 
(3) applied S.59 with modifications and 41 applied Part IX of the 
Ordinance to Masaka and Mbale respectively.
106. Vide, Munster Commission.
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Like Col.Sadler (in 1902) the Government was anxious to retain its 
grip on the evolution of urban government and the conduct and management 
of municipal affairs. The reasons for this were many and various.
The following paragraph from Buchanan’s Report to which reference has 
already been made, summarises the matter rather well.
"This delicate matter is probably best ventilated in 
discussion only at this stage, and any jnhplementation 
of agreed proposals timed to coincide with other likely 
constitutional changes, such as extended boundaries, an 
increase in councillors,, a general settlement of central 
local financial relations, and consequential amendments 
to existing legislation." 107
In consequence, it was not until September 1962, that elections were
108
held in the Kampala, Jinja and Mbale Municipalities, and even then
not all municipal councillors were popularly elected. Thus only 12
of the 31 members of the Kampala Municipal Council were directly
elected, while the rest, as heretofore, were appointed by the Central 
109Government. Similar arrangements were mutatis Mutandis made in
respect of the Jinja and Mbale Municipalities, and subsequently became 
one of the characteristics of Urban Local Government institutions. The 
administration, like its predecessors, found it both expedient and 
convenient to retain general control over these Urban Authorities.
The ratepaying public was still largely apathetic and the government was 
not unwilling to let sleeping dogs lie. It is thought that the Asian- 
European factor was largely responsible for this state of affairs. For 
it was felt that a genuine reform of Urban Local Government would set 
"a bad precedent" in that District Administration would most certainly
demand similar treatment and the authorities were not prepared to hazard
107. Buchanan. Report on Urban. Local Government, op.cit. p.25-26
108. L.N. 120 of 1962; see also L.N. 150-& 208 of 1962.
109. L.N. 339 of 1958.
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that risk. Thus local government in urban and peri-urban areas was 
consistently and deliberately underdeveloped by the Colonial power, 
for its progressive reform would, it was feared, influence events 
elsewhere; and by their successors partly because it was not practical 
politics-- - _ -
In the case of the former, the necessary reforms were clearly incompatible 
with the basic tenets of Colonialism, and despite the rhetoric to the 
contrary, there was, as indicated above, no serious attempt to devolve 
power to the periphery. Most of the "model instruments" examined 
here were, it is contended, simply placed on the statute book to placate 
Government critics, both at home and abroad. Hence the massive gulf 
between the legal provisions and their implementation. Again the 
inescapable conclusion is that the development of urban local government 
was, for policy reasons, stunted by the Colonial power; it was 
sacrificed at the alter of "efficiency" and Colonial dogma.
251
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ANTECEDENTS QF LOCAL AUTHORITY FINANCE
7.1.1. THE FINANCING OF PROTECTORATE ADMINISTRATION
The British Government, having reluctantly accepted responsibility
for Uganda, was as has been mentioned, most anxious to establish
self-financing Protectorate Administration.^ This policy was first
expounded by Sir Gerald Portal’s despatch to the Earlof Rosebery,
2
dated November, 1893. Portal’s Scheme, the object of which was to 
relieve the British taxpayer of the Uganda expense, was embodied in 
his Provisional Agreement (the details of which have already been
3
noted), with Buganda on 29 May, 1893. This treaty, was adopted by
his successor and subsequently ratified by the Secretary of State, and until
1900, was the basis of H.M.Commissioner’s taxation powers.
1. F.O. 2/200 Hill to Johnston. 1.7.1899.
2. C.7303. Portal to the Earl of Rosebery. 1.11.1893. The relevant • 
portion of Portal's despatch reads:
"The fourth suggestion is that the direct administration of 
Uganda should be undertaken by Her Majesty's Government. This is 
the solution which would recommend itself most strongly to the 
missionaries-, and even to many among the Waganda themselves.
I regret, however, that * I am unable to recommend it for
the acceptance of Her Majesty’s Government. So many English 
Officers would be required for the conduct of such an administration, 
so great would be its expenses, and so inadequate, at all events 
for several years to come, its returns, that the advantages 
conferred upon Uganda by such a system could hardly, it appears 
to me, be commensurate with the sacrifices made by England." 
Accordingly, Portal recommended the declaration’of a Protectorate 
for "its moderate cost to H.M.Government is more than outweighed 
by the advantages which it will confer upon British Commerce .... 
and upon all the Countries within the British sphere of influence 
in East Africa." (C.7303. Portal to Rosebery.1.11.1893)
Portal's approach was subsequently aggressively pursued by the 
Treasury and soon crystallised into official policy and was the 
basis of indirect rule.
3. C.7303 Portal to Rosebery 1.11.1893.
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It appears, however, that little use was made of this provision, 
for the next five years Buganda was the scene of successive wars 
and war-like operations; and, as a result, ’native taxation1 was 
rendered almost impossible. At the same time, however, the 
pacification of the Country gave rise to considerable Government 
expenditure. And the cost which Portal had put at £20,000 per annum 
had by 1899 risen to £300,000; whilst the establishment of a Government 
post in the interior had rendered the building of a rail link inevitable, 
with the result that:
"The British taxpayer had, before the close of the 
century, contributed in all a sum approaching six 
million sterling towards an undertaking which, in 
its inception was a concession to public idealism."
Such was the backwater against which H.M.Special Commissioner,
Sir Harry Johnston was invited "to place the Administration of the 
Protectorate on a permanent and satisfactory footing*"5 and in
4. Thomas.H.B. & Spencer A.E. A History of Land and Surveys,
Government Printer, Entebbe, 1938. p.61
5. F.0. 2/200 Salisbury to Johnston. 1.7.1899. The relevant part 
of the despatch reads as follows
"The main object of your appointment is to place the Administration 
of the present Protectorate on a permanent and satisfactory footing. 
The political position of the Protectorate is somewhat peculiar, 
inasmuch as a portion of it is under the nominal dominion of the 
King of Uganda, with whose predecessors a treaty was signed on 
behalf of Her Majesty’s Government on the 29th May, 1893. In 
this portion of the territory, therefore, the revenue is collected 
in the name of the King, and it is through him and on his account 
in the first place, that such revenue and expenditure should be 
dealt with as though collected and expended on behalf of Her 
Majesty’s Government. You will pay special attention to the 
possibilities of raising the present revenue, whether by Hut 
Tax or otherwise, without risk of arousing the susceptibilities 
of the natives or pressing unduly upon their resources."
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particular to devise financial arrangements for making the
g
Protectorate Administration self-financing. He was strongly
advised to pay special attention "to the possibilities of raising
revenue by a Hut Tax or otherwise* albeit "without arousing the
susceptibilities of the natives or pressing unduly upon their
resources".^ These policy considerations were given prominence
8
of place in the Uganda Agreement, 1900 and subsequently incorporated 
into successive tax ordinances, with which this chapter is concerned. 
The object is to present a historical sketch of this legislation and 
its implementation and the evolution of the central-local financial 
relations. It is hoped, given the Governments1 tax policy, that this 
approach will throw some light on how the canons of taxation such as 
equity and ability to pay were subordinated to other considerations, 
the financial needs of the Central Government, in particular, and 
the effect this had on the future financing of local government 
authorities and the development of local government in general of 
which it was an essential part.
6. F.O. 2/200 Hill to Johnston. 1.7.1899
7. F.O. 2/200 Hill to Johnston. 1.7.1899. Similar instructions 
were given to Col.Hayes Sadler, the first substantive 
Commissioner for Uganda. He too, was to make the Protectorate 
pay for its occupation. Hill's instructions were specific and 
unequivocal. The Foreign Office despatch to Sadler stated that:
"A matter of the first importance is to raise revenue without 
pressing hardly on the natives or hampering European Commerce."
8. Revised Laws of Uganda 1951.
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7.1.2. THE HUT TAX REGULATIONS, 1900.
Johnston reached Kampala on 20 December, 1899 and three days later
met the Buganda leadership and, without more ado, launched into the 
terms of the proposed Agreement and went on:-
"The form that I propose that taxation should take
is that of a Hut Tax of the value of 3 rupees per 
annum, and a Gun Tax of 4 rupees per annum. This 
gun tax would mean that anyone who possessed or 
used a gun or pistol or several guns or pistols, 
would have to pay 4 rupees per annum., without 
which licence he would neither be allowed to j j 
retain in his possession or use such weapons."
Having thus"broached the subject to the Regents and other leading chiefs,"
Johnston found that "they were not only prepared before hand for the
12
proposal, but were prepared to view it favourably." Nevertheless,
the chiefs took a robust stand and asked for more time for consultation
with the and their missionary advisers. And though "the Country
13
was ripe for these measures", and Johnston had hoped for a quick 
response to his proposals, he did not receive the Regent*s reply until 
January 1900. For, while they readily accepted the principle of taxation, 
they nevertheless sought certain modifications. In particular, they asked 
for a reduction in the rate of the hut tax and for the postponement of 
the gun tax, for at least a year or so. They vehemently argued that 
the peasantry were too poor to bear the tax burden on the ground that 
the Country had not yet recovered from the ravages!, of wars of attrition 
of the last decade. In view of his instructions, however, Johnston had 
very little room for manoeuvre. Accordingly the Regents1 proposals were 
politely but decidedly rejected. In particular, Johnston was averse to
9. Cir. No.10. of 16.3.1900.
10.F.0.2/204 Johnston to Salisbury 24.12.1899.
11.F.O.2/204 Johnston to Salisbury, Despatch No.27. of 24.12.1899.
12.Ibid.
13.Ibid.
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the idea of subsidising the Kabaka. In particular, he found the
%
'Regents1 proposals for extra allowances, in lieu of their participation 
in the taxation of the country, more than he could bear,^ but he was 
not unduly obdurate.
"I have been careful to take into consideration vested 
interests and in all cases where the country possesses 
chiefs able to govern their people and to cooperate with 
us in the collection of taxes I have proposed to pay those 
chiefs subsidies to the extent of 10% of the value of the 
taxes collected by them, this subsidy to be regarded as 
their share of the local taxation" 16
. Additionally., the Regents were, each offered generous, estates, in land, 
a salary of £200 per annum, and total exemption from taxation. And, 
as might be expected, Johnston*s tax proposals were accepted in toto, 
and incorporated into the Uganda Agreement, 1900, in which it was 
stated thats-
"In order to contribute to a reasonable extent towards 
the general cost of.the maintenance of the Uganda 
Protectorate, there shall be established the following 
taxation
(a) A hut tax of three rupees, or 4s per annum, on any 
house, hut, or habitation, used as a dwelling-place.
(b) A gun tax of three rupees, or 4s per annum, to be 
paid by any person who possesses or uses a gun, rifle, 
or pistol." 17
In future, each dwelling-place of whatever description was to be subject 
to taxation, but as this provision would have caused hardship, it was 
agreed that a collection of not more than four houses in a separate
14. F.O.2/204 op.cit.
15. F.O.2/204 Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 12
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and single enclosure and inhabited by a man and his family should, for
tax purposes, count as a single dwelling-place. Besides, temporary
shelters, rest houses, churches and schools were exonerated from the
new levy. So, too, were the residences of the Kabaka, the Queen
18
mother, the Regents and the Saza chiefs. Furthermore, the collector
had power to exempt or to grant relief to any tax payer who, in his
opinion was too poor or destitute to be taxed, and his decision was
final. The assessment and collection of taxes were, however, left in
the hands of the Saza chiefs who, in this matter, were accountable to 
19
the. collector, . .The.proceeds of.the.hut.tax.were to.be handed.over . . .
intact to the Commissioner, as Bugandafs contribution towards the
general revenue of the Protectorate, In return, it was agreed that
"no further interior taxation" was to be imposed without the agreement
20
of the Kabaka and the Lukiko, This arrangement, however, did not 
affect the question of "exterior taxation",•to wit township rates, 
water charges and market dues. Nor did it exonerate the peasantry 
from their traditional obligations relating to military service, the 
upkeep of roads, or tribute.
In order to enable the individual to discharge his tax liability 
without too much difficulty, the Commissioner was empowered to make 
regulations for the payment of taxes in labour or in kind, in lieu 
of cash as he saw fit.
Such regulations were issued within a week of the signing of the 
Agreement, on 16th March, 1900. The Hut Tax Regulations consisted 
of 5 articles, including a schedule of about 30 items which at stated
18. Articles 10 and 12
19. Article 12
20. Ibid. The meaning of "exterior taxation" is discussed below,- pp.267-270
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rates were to be accepted in lieu of cash* Eight hundred cowrie 
shells, for instance, would count for one rupee, so too, would 21bs. 
of cleaned rice; 81bs. of uncleaned rice; lOlbs. of wheat, and 401bs.
21
of English potatoes; whilst a cow and calf would count for 45 rupees. 
The animals, wild and tame; the goods and produce handed in, in lieu 
of cash, were to be sold as soon as possible, while ivory, rubber and 
other readily saleable articles were to be sent to the Coast for sale, 
or export.
In a predominantly agricultural economy, the provision for the payment
of taxes in kind was not only imaginative, equitable and perhaps
inevitable, it also made for convenience. This common sense approach
to taxation had the desired effect, the results were startling.
Within a few weeks of the introduction of the hut tax, people began to
bring in all manner of creatures as they could lay their hands on; and
Government centres were soon filled with animals and produce of all
kinds. Such was the response that the Deputy Commissioner had to ask
the collectors not to proceed "with undue haste in the collection of 
22
taxes." They were advised to exercise great care in accepting
produce in lieu of cash; they were to ascertain in advance whether
or not the produce tendered was easily and readily disposable; and
were urged to "refuse to accept all but sound, healthy, animals", and,
in forwarding them from one centre to another, all such animals,
including livestock were to be "driven slowly and for short distances 
23
each day." The payment of taxes in kind, however, was soon running 
into other difficulties, mainly because insufficient arrangements had 
been made for the reception, storage and disposal of the more exotic 
tax receipts.
21. Cir. No. 10 of 16.3.1900
22. Cir. No. 29 of 1.8.1900
23. Cir. No. 29 of 1.8.1900
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"Collectors are probably aware that, great losses, through 
deaths, have occurred in the livestock accepted in lieu 
of cash in payment of taxes. At certain stations deaths 
have amounted to 10% per week and in certain instances 
where livestock have been sent from one district to 
another, deaths have reached 60% during a journey of 20 
days. With regard to the animals which are still alive 
there is little or no prospect of their being converted 
into cash in lieu of which they were accepted." 24
The Administration was in a quandary. So, on his return from Fort 
Portal, Johnston invited the Regents and other leading chiefs to 
Entebbe to review the methods by which taxes should be paid. As a 
result the existing Hut Tax Regulations were drastically streamlined
and collectors "requested ordinarily to desist from accepting
i . 25
livestock" or perishable food staffs in payment of taxes. As a
temporary measure, however, the Commissioner authorised the acceptance
j  of the following wild animals for special purposes at the stated
I
rates:-
I
[ .
"Young zebras alive and in good condition - 60 rupees 
| Young zebras, partially trained and easy to deal with * 90 rupees
Wild pigs in good condition * 3 rupees 
Young elephants in good condition * 3,000 rupees 26 
Young hippopotamus in good condition * 300 rupees"
It was emphasised, however, that'In preference to any other method,
Hut and Gun Taxes should be paid in Rupees", but that where this would
cause hardship, ivory at the accepted rates, or India Rubber of good
quality would still be accepted in lieu of cash; whilst those unable
to pay their taxes in cash, ivory, rubber or wild animals would be
required to work for a month - tax labour - in lieu.of each Hut or Gun
tax. Johnston had always recognised that he would have to exercise
"great discretion, caution and patience," in his dealings with Buganda,
27
and in particular, in the important question of "Native Taxation".
0
24. Cir. No. 29 of 1.8.1900
25. Cir. No. 39 of 11.10.1900
26. Cir. No. 34 of 11.10.1900
27. F.O.2/204 Johnston to Salisbury, Despatch No. 27 of 24.12.1899
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In May 1900, therefore, he issued a circular to all the collectors and
28
assistant collectors echoing his brief - the relevant part of which 
was as follows
"HM special commissioner desires to impress on officials the 
need for gentle and prudent measures in connection with this 
tax for several years to come, until the Natives of the 
Protectorate have come to realise the advantages of a civilised 
Administration and the fairness in principle of native 
contribution towards the expenses of that Administration.f> 29
In the meantime, recalcitrant tax payers were to be remonstrated with
and urged to pay their taxes voluntarily. Upon their continued refusal
to pay, their names were to be noted; they were to be given no advice,
assistance or protection against their enemies, and were not to be
allowed to settle on''Government land, or trade in Government centres,
30
or.register as labourers or porters. As far as possible, tax
administration was to be left in the hands of the Chiefs, and no police
or soldiers were to be employed in the collection of taxes, save with
31
"the direct consent of the. Commissioner". The main aim was to
cultivate the goodwill of the tax paying public, with an eye to voluntary
compliance, the testimony of which was the absence of punitive sanctions.
It is well to remember, however, that the chiefs, under the Agreement,
were immediately under the control and supervision of the Commissioner;
and that any dereliction of duty was punishable by instant dismissal,
fine or imprisonment as Chief Kiimba, among others, discovered to his 
32
cost. Moreover the Kabaka's civil list and the chief's stipends were
. . .  33
dependent on effective tax administration ; and more ominously the 
Agreement provided that:-
28. F.O.2/200 Hill to Johnston Despatch No. 1 of 1.7.1899.
29. Cir. No. 22 of 10.5.1900
30. Cir. No. 34 of 11.10.1900
31. Ibid.
32. Crown v. Kiimba 1 ULR, 1910, p.97
33. F.O.2/204 op. cit.
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"Should the Kingdom of Uganda fail to pay to the Uganda 
Administration during the first two years after the signing 
of this Agreement, an amount of native taxation, equal to 
half that which is due in proportion to the number of 
inhabitants; or should it at any time fail to pay without 
good cause or excuse, the afore said minimum of taxation; 
Her Majesty1s Government will no longer consider themselves 
bound by the terms of this Agreement." 34
These, rather than tax offences, were the real sanctions. Johnston had
estimated that his tax measures would in the financial year 1900-1901,
35
at least, bring in some £15,000; in fact the actual amount realised
36
was far in excess of this figure. Despite this initial success,
however, the Hut Tax was the subject of criticism on account of its
inherent defects. In the first place, the Hut Tax as the name implies
37
was a tax on any house, hut or habitation used as a dwelling-place, 
and as such was a premium on good housing in that it led, as Fisher's 
contemporary account graphically illustrates, to overcrowding and 
insanitary conditions.
"In one small beehive hut, having no partitions, there would 
be originally a man and his wife and children, one or two 
goats and several fowls. On the introduction of the Hut Tax 
the father in law and mother in law came and took up their 
quarters there, and so halved the payment. To these would 
be added a newly married brother and his bride, who now had 
an excuse for not troubling to build a separate hut: thus 
the tax was reduced by mutual arrangement to one rupee each 
man.Of course there were a few stray bodies to do odd jobs, 
and all these were packed in the hut at night, to say nothing 
of the rat and insect life that was legion," 38
Secondly, the Hut Tax was regressive in character, the tax burden being 
heaviest for the poorest tax payer, since the amount paid by the poor
34. Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 20
35. Cd. 256 (1900), Johnston's Preliminary Report on Uganda
36. Cd. 671 (1901), Johnston's Final Report on Uganda.
Johnston after stating the various methods of payment continued:
"In this way we gathered in taxes of face value approaching 
£60,000, but the actual cash value which we banked, so to speak 
was not more than £34,000 - twice the amount I had estimated as 
the results of the first year's taxation."
37. Article 12
38. Fisher, A.B. Twilight Tales of the Black Baganda, London, nd. p.33
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represented a very large proportion of his money income; in many 
cases this proportion approximating 100 per cent. It follows that 
the tax bore most heavily on the poor. Thirdly, it was alleged that 
the Hut Tax tended to differentiate between the married and the 
unmarried state. This argument was refined by the commissioner, 
inhis confidential despatch to the Secretary of State, the relevant 
portion of which was that:-
" The tax is often given as an excuse by young Baganda for not settling 
down and marrying that as soon as they do so they become 
liable to the tax," 39
In many instances, therefore, the commissioner, continued:
"they prefer to remain as they are, leading openly immoral 
lives, to settling down in married state. From the 
Missionary Societies of all three denominations, I hear 
the same story, and the incidence of the tax is looked 
upon by them, for this reason, as operating to some extent 
against the successful result of their teaching." 40
Fourthly, the Hut Tax was susceptible to endless abuse, partly because
it was only payable by owner-occupiers, and as a result, the tax
41
could easily be evaded "altogether by having no domicile". Fifthly,
it was alleged that a good many potential tax payers migrated from
Buganda into the neighbouring districts, "with the view of escaping
42
taxation altogether". It may be noted, however, that this argument
39. F.O.2/858 Sadler^to Lansdowne, Conf.. No. 1 of 6,7.1904
40. Ibid.
41. F.O.2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne. He said among other things that: 
"There are numbers of young men in Uganda, separated from their 
parents, who either live together in one hut paying one tax between 
them, or who evade the tax altogether by having no domicile."
42. F.0*2/589 Jackson to Lansdowne Conf. Despatch No. 43 of 25.1.02 
The relevant portion reads: "Regarding emigration from the 
Protectorate into the German Sphere,! believe in 1900 and even 
at the beginning of last year, a few people did leave Uganda 
and Ankole and crossed the frontier into German Territory with 
the view of escaping taxation altogether. A good many also 
migrated from Uganda into Toro, Unyoro, and the Bukedi country 
for the same reason."
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raises a separate issue; it does not go to the root of the matter, it
merely indicates that the tax paying public had not accepted taxation
with equanimity. In other words, the Hut Tax as such, was not the,
direct cause of migration. This too is the explanation why many a
tax payer indulged in tax evasion by devising "all kinds of cunning to 
43
avoid payment", in kind or otherwise.
43. Fisher op. cit.|aJ.4. Such schemes included the following: 
fWhen the tax gatherer was expected, the owner of the hut 
would go off and pay his long lost brother a protracted 
visit, leaving his wife to face the wrath of the baffled 
"Publican" or to be taken hostage* Others packed up wife 
and family, leaving kith and country, and fled to,the wilds, 
sooner than put in a few day's work each year to enable 
them to meet the tax."
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7.1.3* THE UGANDA POLL TAX AGREEMENT, 1904
It is evident that the Hut Tax, despite its revenue yield, was in
several respects unsatisfactory, and therefore, was, from its
inception, doomed; and not surprisingly, early in 1903 the Regents
sought leave to impose a Poll Tax, in lieu of the Hut Tax. It was
proposed that "a tax of three rupees" should be imposed on "all males
45
between the ages of 18 and 65", so as to ensure a more general 
distribution of taxation than hitherto, the idea being
"to reach those who are able to pay, but who, not possessing 
huts, at present go free, to. prevent. evasion of the tax by. 
overcrowding in huts and particularly to remove the great 
distinction made by the Hut Tax between married and unmarried 
state." 46
The Commissioner, on receipt of the Regents1 petition, however,
"demurred to the three rupees on the ground that it would be a heavy
47
burden of taxation on the country." He pointed out that the proposed 
tax would mean that every man between the ages- of 18 and 65 would be 
liable
"for the amount now paid by the hut, and although it was 
proposed to exempt huts occupied by women only, in many 
cases many huts would have to pay two or three times what 
they do now." 48
That, indeed, was the raison d'etre for the Regents1 proposal, which
had, as its principal object, the closing of that loophole. Rather
ironically, however, the Commissioner saw it differently, and was
45. F.O.2/858 Regents to Tomkins 8.1.04
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid. Sadler to Lansdowne 6.7.04
48. Ibid.
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inclined to uphold the status quo. Equally, however, the Regents, who 
were apprehensive about the decrease in revenue and the effect this 
might have on their stipends, and in particular on Buganda’s ability 
to meet her treaty obligations were adamant. And, in consequence, 
the Commissioner had several meetings with them, the object of which 
was to consider the Commissioners proposals, including a Poll Tax of 
2 rupees. The Regents were, however, averse to a lower tax rate 
proposed by the Commissioner, and strenuously argued that if a Poll 
Tax of 2 rupees were imposed, they would be unable to meet their 
commitment under the 1900 Agreement, and that, if that occurred, the 
Agreement, as Johnston intimated, might be terminated. Evidently,
Johnston had told them that
"if there were a falling off in the amount of tax paid, ......
the Agreement would not be binding;" 49
and that the Chiefs were not ready to countenance. Consequently, 
in order to resolve this impasse, the Commissioner proposed, and the 
Regents accepted, that, in addition to the existing Hut Tax of 3 rupees 
per annum, a Poll Tax of 2 rupees should be imposed "on marriageable 
young men living apart from their parents or guardians".^ And so, 
the Uganda Poll Tax Agreement, 1904, was conceived and executed on 
September, 23, 1904* .
"In addition to the Gun Tax and Hut Tax of 3 rupees there
shall be payable by each adult male subject of the Kabaka,
who is not liable to pay the Hut Tax, a Poll Tax of 2 rupees
per annum, provided always that such tax shall not be payable
by persons who live in the house of their parents or guardians
and contribute to the payment of the Hut Tax of the said house." 51
49. F.O.2/858 Regents to Tomkins 8.1.1904
50. F.O.2/860 Sadler to Lansdowne, 6.7.1904
51. Uganda Poll Tax Agreement, 1904, Article 1
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Thus, the Poll Tax Agreement, despite its stated objectives, did not
deal with the drawbacks of the existing Hut Tax legislation. For example,
the Agreement did not remove the differentiation drawn by the Hut Tax
between the married and the unmarried state. Indeed, it made the
distinction worse at the expense of matrimony. Witness the dual system
of taxation and the two-tier tax rate. Worse still, it did not tackle
the question of tax evasion by over-crowding in huts, which incidentally,
was one of the principal objectives for the imposition of Poll Tax in
contradistinction to the Hut Tax: Indeed it exacerbated the situation.
The proviso to the first Article, which granted tax relief to male adults
living with their parents or guardians was, as it happened, a tax dodger's
charter. The term "guardian", in particular, was unfortunate: it was
52
susceptible to endless abuse, being "open to too much construction".
It was not, according to one bemused official, beyond the bounds of 
imagination for anyone to
"foresee the possibility, among people with the natural 
intelligence of the Baganda, of the young men ultimately 
evading the tax by a wholesale adoption of guardians." 53
In practice, the more lasting defect of the Uganda Poll Tax Agreement, 
1904, was the introduction of a dual system of taxation which subsequently 
became a feature of British tax legislation at the expense of good tax 
administration;it made for complexity. It is also noteworthy that 
there was "no tax of a precisely similar nature in the colonies" or
Protectorates under the administration of the colonial office; and, but
for its local acceptability, the Marquess of Lansdowne, the Secretary of
. 54
State for the Colonies, would not have sanctioned it.
52* F.O.2/860 Wilson to Lansdowne Despatch No. 271 6.10.04
53. Ibid.
54. C.0.536/860 Lansdowne to Sadler, op. cit.
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.1.4. THE GUN REGULATIONS 1900
The Gun Tax, despite the nomenclature, was in reality not a tax, but 
a system of licensing guns, rifles and pistols. The licence was 
payable by any person who possessed, or made f,use of a gun, or any 
weapon discharging a projectile by the aid of gun powder, dynamite, 
or compressed air."^ However, it was provided that
"A native who pays a gun tax may possess or use as many as 
five guns. For every five or for every additional gun up 
to five, which he may be allowed to possess or use, he will 
have to pay another tax.” 56
Similar, and somewhat interesting exemptions were granted to the 
Kabaka, the queen mother, the three Ministers of State, the Saza 
chiefs, the members of the Lukiko, and all land owners with more than 
500 acres of real property. The Kabaka, for instance, was credited 
with 50 gun licences, and, each of the three Regents, 20 free gun 
licences per annum.
Arguably, the Gun Tax was neither a tax, nor a revenue licence. Its
principle object was to curtail the circulation of firearms in the
country, thus keeping in check the destruction of the highly prized
e l e p h a n t s a n d ,  indeed, succeeded in demilitarising the country.
For a large number of guns were "brought in, the people preferring to
58
give up their guns to pay the tax". In consequence, the Gun Tax only
59
realised £103 m  1900-1901 and £159 in the following financial year, 
and was shortly afterwards phased out.
55. Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 12
56. Ibid.
57. Cd. 256 (1900) H.M. Special Commissioners Preliminary Report, p.7
58. F.O.2/594, SadlerTs Report on the Working of the Hut Tax, 1902'
59. Ibid.
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7.1.5. THE BUGANDA TAX CODE 1900: "INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR TAXATION"
As has been mentioned, Johnston*s main &sk was to establish a self-
financing British administration over Buganda. He was, it will be
recalled, enjoined to endeavour to raise revenue "whether by a hut tax 
60
or.otherwise11. However, he was to proceed with caution, in particular,
he was told not to "risk arousing the susceptibilities of the natives
61
or to press unduly upon their resources." To this end, Johnston 
concluded the "Uganda Agreement", 1900, and it is well to recall the 
relevant tax provisions, the terms of which were as follows:-
"The taxes agreed upon at present shall be the following:
*(a) A hut tax of three rupees, or 4s per annum, on any 
house hut or habitation, used as a dwelling-place.
(b) A gun tax of three rupees, or 4s per annum, to be paid 
by any person who possesses or uses a gun, rifle or pistol•* 
The Kingdom of Uganda shall be subject to the same Customs 
Regulations, other Regulations, and so forth, which may, with 
the approval of Her Majesty, be instituted for the Uganda 
Protectorate generally, which may be described in a sense as 
exterior taxation, but no further interior taxation, other 
than the hut tax, shall be imposed on the natives of the 
province of Uganda without the agreement of the Kabaka, who 
in this matter shall be guided by the majority votes in 
his native Council." 62
The Agreement thus envisaged the establishment of two different sources 
of revenue - "interior and exterior" taxation. It seems, the maintenance 
of H.M. Represeii&tive and the Administrative machinery was intended to 
be thrown on the Protectorate, and it was to give effect to this policy 
that two .taxes were imposed - the hut and gun taxes. It was hoped that 
these two "primitive" taxes would yield sufficient mvenue to maintain 
the Protectorate. The "Uganda Agreement" thus specifically stated that:-
60. F.O. 2/200 Hill to Johnston, 1.7.1899
61. Ibid.
62. Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 12.
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"In order to contribute to a reasonable extent towards the 
general cost of the maintenance of the Uganda Protectorate, 
there shall be established the following taxation for 
Imperial purposes, that is to say, the proceeds of these 
taxes shall be handed over intact to Her Majesty1s representative 
in Uganda as the contribution of the Uganda province towards the 
general revenue of the Protectorate." 63
It is equally clear, however, that the intention of the Agreement was to
impose only such taxes as would suffice for the financing of British
overrule; it was not intended, it would seem, to raise more funds than
would meet the needs of that Administration, without the agreement of
the Kabaka and the Lukiko. So, while the Agreement gave the British
"a benign authority to advise the Kabaka and to impose taxes (duly 
64
specified)", it did not, contrary to anticipations expressed at the 
time of the Agreement, wholly "surrender into the hands of the British 
Government the right of t a x a t i o n " n o r  indeed, did it solve "the 
question of the taxation of the natives".^ It would appear, for 
example, that "interior taxation", was within the Kabaka1s prerogative 
rather* than the Commissioner's, and, if that was the case, the 
Commissioner's taxing powers, upon which the success of Johnston's 
settlement depended, were not as unlimited as was generally claimed.
The question for consideration is, briefly, this:- What additional 
taxes, if any, could the Commissioner impose over Buganda, with or 
without the Kabaka1s consent? In considering the Commissioner's taxing 
powers, in this respect, the meaning of "interior" and "exterior" 
taxation - "a most unsatisfactory phrase in the Agreement", has to be 
ascertained.^ According to Ennis, who first raised the issue as early 
as 1903, the phrase "interior" and "exterior" taxation could be 
construed in two ways:-
63. Article 12 of the "Uganda Agreement," 1900
64. UNA, Smp 119/1909 Acting Commissioner's Minute of 8.7.09
65. F0CP 7620 (1900) Johnston to Salisbury 12.3.1900
66. Ibid.
67. CO 536/43/56670
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"(a) That IEvenue and charges to be collected under laws 
applied generally to the whole Protectorate are to be deemed 
"exterior" while revenue from laws of local application is 
to be deemed "interior" taxation.
(b) That the revenue and charges to be collected under laws 
of general application, and which have an exterior element 
in them, as in customs involving exports and imports and 
Porter Regulations applying to the engagement of porters 
for work outside the Kingdom are to be deemed "exterior" 
taxation; while revenue from laws of general application 
without any such exterior element, and laws of local 
application is to be deemed "interior" taxation". 68
Clearly, neither construction was without reproach. Ennis1 first 
construction, for instance, would have permitted the imposition of 
income taxation over Buganda, if an income tax ordinance were enacted 
for general application throughout the Protectorate. Such legislation 
would have conferred unlimited powers of taxation on the Administration. 
Yet Article 12 expressly stated that "no further interior taxation, 
other than the hut tax, shall be imposed on the natives of (Buganda). 
without the Agreement of the Kabaka" and the Lukiko.^ This privilege 
was one of Buganda*s most cherished rights in the Agreement, and there is 
little doubt that the Kabaka would have strongly resisted any attempts, 
from whatever quarters, to whittle it down.
Ennis* second construction, which was based on an ambiguity in the 
Agreement was not without its ironies. For example, it would have had 
far reaching financial consequences for the revenue authorities. It 
would have rendered many revenue measures, under which licence fees and 
charges for specific services were collected, ultra vires the Agreement; 
and the Protectorate would, without doubt, have vigorously contested 
it; for it would have increased the Kabaka*s powers of taxation at their 
expense. Not surprisingly, therefore, Ennis was inclined to favour 
the first of his two interpretations:
68. UNA, SMP 119/1909
69. Article 12
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"That revenue and charges to be collected under laws applied 
generally to the whole Protectorate are to be deemed "exterior" 
taxation; while revenue from laws of local application is to 
be deemed "interior" taxation." 70
The Administration was accordingly informed that they could impose, 
without the Kabakafs consent any tax providing that such tax was of 
universal application; and that "no further interior taxation" could 
be imposed without a fresh Anglo-Buganda Tax. Agreement. Ennis' 
interpretation was well received in certain ranks of British 
officialdom but was, in fact, never officially adopted. It was 
considered injudicious, owing to the negotiations which were in progress, 
regarding the abolition of the hut tax, to broach the matter to the 
Kabaka and his advisers; the issue was quietly dropped. But, as the 
following discussion shows, that was not the end of the matter.
7.1.6. THE KABAKA1S "BARREN PRIVILEGE"
The question under consideration involved the whole principle of taxation 
in Buganda, and was no doubt of some considerable importance. Upon it 
depended the Commissioner's power of taxation. That part of the 
Agreement which gave rise to this difficulty was the notorious Article 
12 quoted above. As the preceding discussion illustrates, its terms 
were, from the British point of view, far from satisfactory; they were 
couched in vague and obscure language, and Ennis' constructions, 
notwithstanding the Kabaka*s residual rights in relation to taxation, 
meant that no taxation, "interior"or otherwise could be imposed in 
Buganda without the royal assent; witness the "Uganda Agreement"
(Poll Tax), 1904. But, suppose the Commissioner wished to impose an 
income tax or some other form of taxation, could he, without the Kabaka's 
consent do so, without breaking the Agreement? There was no direct 
provision in the Agreement, but Article 6 specifically stated that "the 
Kabaka shall co-operate loyally with Her Majesty's Government in the
70. UNA, SMP 119/190
271
organisation and administration” of Buganda.^ This, it was thought, 
implied that the commissioner could insist on his advice, and that the 
Kabaka was obliged to accept and execute it. According to the Crown 
Advocate, however, this interpretation of the Agreement was incorrect, 
and obviously, contrary to the terms of the Agreement.
His contention was that the Kabaka could not be compelled to "explicitly
follow the advice" of the Commissioner against his will. Indeed, he
argued "that, as regards taxation, practically the whole power" was in
72
the hands of the Kabaka and the Lukiko. The Crown Advocate realised 
the dire consequences which his construction might' engender and was ' 
obviously anxious to find a way out.
"A fourth course might be to hold this part of the Agreement 
as void for uncertainty. I submit the question whether an 
amending agreement should not be made. In my opinion, this 
would be the best way out of this difficulty." 73
In the meantime, the Commissioner was urged to refer the matter to the
Secretary of State for further consideration and determination.
Accordingly, Sir Hesketh H. Bell, sought Lord Crewe*s advice and
received the following reply
"The matter is one of much difficulty, but I am advised that 
the interpretation which Mr. Russell in the memorandum enclosed 
in your despatch has put on the relevant clauses of the Agreement 
is the correct one. It therefore appears that the legality 
of certain existing taxes is open to question. In the circumstances 
I would suggest that it would be advisable to call a meeting of 
the Buganda representatives, at which proposals would be submitted 
for modifying the Agreement so as to read that no tax, beyond those 
already in force, shall be imposed without the consent of the 
Kabaka, unless it applies to all inhabitants of the Province, 
whether natives or others. This would have the effect of 
legalising ex post facto the existing taxes and would also, I 
think, give the Government all the power for the future which 
is necessary." 74
71. Article 6
72. UNA, SMP 119/1909 Russell*s memo of 7.7.09
73. UNA, SMP 119/1909 Russell’s memo of August 1907
74. U NA, SMP 119/1909 The Earl of Crewe to Bell 2.10.1908
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In the light of this decision, the Crown Advocate was asked to 
reconsider the whole question and if need be to prepare an amending 
agreement. Naturally, he was gratified to learn that the Secretary 
of State had confirmed his opinion, but he was unable to chime in 
with Johnston’s proposal for the amendment of the "Uganda Agreement," 
1900.^ Russell’s view was that the Kabaka would be most reluctant 
to accept the proposed amendment, and that,^ in view of the Secretary 
of State’s ruling, he could not be compelled to do so; and that, in 
any case, such an amendment was inconsistent with the general tenor 
of the Secretary of State’s despatch.^
"To acquire power for the Government to impose taxation on the 
Baganda, without the consent of the Kabaka, provided that 
such taxation applied to all the inhabitants of the Province 
whether natives or others, would give, in effect, almost 
absolute powers to the Government and would take away the 
security from taxation contained in the Uganda Agreement,
1900. For instance, under such a power a general income tax 
might be imposed without the consent of the Kabaka. Such a 
power would be a complete alteration of the clause of the 
Agreement under consideration, the interpretation of which 
has been stated by the Secretary of State to be that the only 
taxes or fees which could be imposed on the Natives of 
Buganda without the Agreement of the Kabaka would be such 
taxes and fees as were collected under laws of general 
application which have an exterior element in them, as 
customs involving exports and imports and Porter Regulations 
applying to the engagement of porters for work involving 
a journey outside Buganda. Having now ascertained what is 
the meaning of the Agrement in reference to taxation I submit 
that it wouid at the present time be injudicious to raise 
the matter." 78
Bell was accordingly advided "that this matter should for the present
79
be allowed to rest". He believed that the Government’s position
would not in any way be prejudiced by such a delay; and that the
Kabaka and his people would "have a much needed rest in respect to
80
their charter, the Uganda Agreement, 1900. Russell’s opinion was
75. Russell's memo. op. cit.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid*
78. Ibid
79. Ibid
80. Ibid.
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accepted by the Governor, and the proposed amendment, the object of
which was to enable the Governor, without the Kabaka*s approval, to
levy taxes in Buganda, "was postponed sine die, because of the
81
suspicious attitude of the Baganda". The matter would presumably 
have ended there, but, in framing the "Uganda Agreement" (Poll Tax),
1919, the Governor, Sir Robert Coryndon, sought to modify the existing 
tax arrangements unilaterally, without the Kabaka*s consent. Unlike 
his predecessors, Sir Robert was a no nonsense Governor.. He believed, 
the Agreement notwithstanding, that the power of taxation resided in 
the Govenor, pure and simple. He strenuously argued that the Kabaka*s 
power, under the agreement, was, in practice, no more than a mere "power
.............................Q2
to argue on points of taxation." This, Coryndon contended was "a 
83 i
barren privilege", for His kajesty*s Government has the power to 
compel their acceptance of any proposed tax, partly because of its power 
to determine the percentage of the rebate returnable to the Native 
Government, and also the allocation of the total sum to the salaries 
of the Kabaka, his ministers and chiefs, and partly because of the 
provision in the Agreement which the Native Government is required to
ii84
co-operate with and be guided by the advice of His Majesty*s Representative.
And, as a corollary, the Government could amend the "Uganda Agreement",
1900,"regardless of the wishes of the Kabaka and his Council, so as to
85
allow the Governor to increase taxation without their consent." , He laid 
great stress on the essential point in Article 11 by which the Kabaka was
86
required to "explicitly follow the advice of Her Majesty*s Representative."
81. Colonial Office minute at C.O. 536/43/56670
82. Coryndon to S/S. Conf. of 30.6.1919
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid,
85. ibid;
86. Article 11 of the Uganda Agreement, 1900
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This, according to Coryndon implied that in matters of internal 
administration, including taxation, the Kabaka was obliged to seek 
and follow, "loyally" of course, the Governors advice or that of his 
field officers. He thus told the Secretary of State that:-
"I see no reason why the Secretary of State need hesitate to 
remind the Kabaka that the concurrence with the provision I 
quote above is essential if the Agreement is to be maintained. 
Upon the weight accorded to the advice of the Government on 
matters of internal administration, I draw your attention to 
Lord Granville’s dicta that "the position in which Her 
Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness (the 
Khedive) imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the 
object of securing that the order of things to be established 
shall be of a satisfactory character, and possesses the element 
of stability and progress. My opinion of the Uganda
Agreement is becoming stronger. We will have continued 
bother with that document as the years pass, chiefly as to 
mining terms and taxation. They do value the agreement very 
greatly as their charter, but while I believe that such an 
instructment should remain, I think it should be recast on 
m o d e m  lines, of course, without robbing them of any real 
content. But it will never be satisfactory if done by their 
Governor. A weighty official should come out from England 
and complete the horrific task and then retire." 87
Coryndon realised that there would be considerable difficulties in 
carrying out his reforms. He was equally determined, however, that
there should be "a definite end to friction upon all future taxation
, ,,88 proposals.
"There is no doubt that the Baganda look on the Uganda 
Agreement, 1900 as a "sacred document", and the whole 
people would regard a proposal to alter its spirit with 
the gravest concern." 89
Thus, though, Coryndon was inclined "to do away with the Agreement 
altogether, with its "vagueness and obscurity of language and its 
unnecessary restrictions"; he proposed "to retain the Agreement, but 
to excise from it the whole provision by which no future taxation
87. Coryndon to S/S op. cit.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid,
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90
can be imposed except by agreement with the Native Government," He
strongly felt that the Governor should have the power to impose taxation
without having to knuckle under the Kabaka, Coryndon1s plan was to
place "the Baganda upon the same footing with regard to taxation as any
91
other tribe" in the Protectorate,
"His Highness and his advisers must remember that the Baganda 
are only one of many tribes in the Protectorate and must be 
administered with them; that no native tribe can retain the 
power to obstruct any measure which the Government believes 
to be in the interests of the people", 92
Thus, though the "Uganda Agreement", 1900, was binding in honour only,
it could not, interestingly enough, be unilaterally altered by the
Governor, the Kabaka1s consent was a condition precedent to its
alteration, Coryndon*s proposals were thus doomed to failure. He *
had to secure, by cajolling, the Kabaka*s consent; he could not enforce
his orders, and that, understandably, Coryndon found der**aning. He
thus persuasively argued that the protecting power had, under the
Agreement, the power to "insist on the adoption of the policy they 
93
recommend.**
The Colonial Office could find no general provision to that effect, and was 
at a loss to know what to do.
"It may be an anachronistic Agreement, it may give much 
trouble to the administration and occasion loss of possible 
revenue, but there is the issue: and how can the Secretary 
of State authorise a procedure pther than strict adherence 
to the Agreement? In any event if the Secretary of State 
does decide against the Governor, it will be a *victory* for 
the Buganda chiefs at the expense of the Administration. We 
must word the reply to the petition that we give the maximum 
support to the Governor compatible with the general decision." 94
90. Coryndon to S/S op. cit.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Lord.Milner, S/S, to Coryndon 29.9.1919
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Coryndon was accordingly advised that the proposed poll tax Agreement 
should be made acceptable to the Kabaka and the Lukiko; and was, with 
tongue in cheek, sympathetically told:-
"I have given close attention both to your own arguments and 
those of the Native Government, and after full consultation,
I feel that while I am most reluctant to withdraw my support 
from you in the matter I could not advise His Majesty’s 
Government to alter or amend the formal Uganda Agreement, 1900, 
unless the Kabaka and the Lukiko were willing to agree to such 
amendment or alteration, which would appear to be out of the 
question at present." 95
Thus, though, the Secretary of State appreciated Coryndon1s dilemma,
and, of course the need to uphold the Governor’s dignity, he, nevertheless,
conceded and held that the Agreement had to "take precedence over
96
such considerations, however, inconvenient" that may be. So, the
Kabaka’s "right to argue on points of taxation", far from being, in Coryndon*s
97
WQrds, "a barren privilege", was virile, sacrosanct and inviolable.
That, that was the case,, given the fact that the Agreement was not
98
legally enforceable, is one of the many telling ironies of Colonialism.
It vividly highlights some of its contradictions and dilemmas, and 
serves to explain some of its notable failures.
95. C.0,536/93/50670 Milner to Coryndon, Conf. disp. 29,9.1919
96. Ibid.
97. Coryndon to S/S op. cit.
98. All Native Agreements were binding in honour only.
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2.1. THE TAXATION REGIME UNDER THE TORO AND ANKOLE AGREEMENTS
Article 5 of the Ankole Agreement, 1901, bluntly stated that:-
"There shall be imposed henceforth on the natives of the 
Ankole district the same taxation as is in force by 
proclamation in the other provinces or districts of the 
Uganda Protectorate, to wit, the hut tax and the gun tax." 99
This, according to Wilson, the Acting Sub-Commissioner, implied that the 
Administration had power to impose any taxation in these "two little 
Kingdoms", providing the same taxation was in force elsewhere in the 
P r o t e c t o r a t e . H e  contended that this provision was of general 
application, and that, a poll tax having been established in Buganda,
in accordance with the terms of the "Uganda Agreement", 1900, similar 
taxation could be instituted here, by proclamation, as was done in the 
non-agreement districts; there being no need for fresh tax agreements 
with the chiefs. Wilson1 s interpretation was, however, in sharp 
contrast to his legal advisers' . For them, Wilson's opinion was
contrary to the terms of the Agreements.
"By the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1905, a poll tax of 2 rupees was
imposed. In Buganda this was secured by Agreement. So far 
as Ankole was concerned it was considered that in view of 
Article 5 of the Ankole Agreement, 1901, a new Agreement was 
not necessary, and accordingly no Agreement was entered into.
I apprehend that it was considered that the words "there 
shall be imposed henceforth on the natives of Ankole district 
the same taxation as is in force by proclamation in the other 
• provinces or districts of the Protectorate" meant that the 
taxation in Ankole should be the same as from time to time 
should be in force in other districts; and thus, the poll tax 
having been established in Buganda, the leading province of 
the Protectorate, a poll tax could be imposed in Ankole 
without an amending Agreement. 101 For the reasons which
99. Vide, Article 5, Ankole Agreement, 1901, See also Toro Agreement 1900
100. C.O. 536/1/14537 Wilson to S/S Despatch No. 78 of 20.3.05
101. C.O. 536/28/40759 Russell's memo upon Poll Tax for Ankole and Toro 
Districts. The Poll Tax Ordinance, 1905, was imposed on the district 
of Toro by a notice dated 18/4/1905, the grounds for considering 
that no new Agreement was necessary being the same as in the case
of Ankole.
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I have given I venture to submit that the interpretation which 
has been placed upon the article of the Agreements in question 
is not correct. It appears to me that a new Agreement is 
necessary before a tax which is neither a hut tax or a gun tax 
can be imposed." 102
Wilson1s superiors were accordingly advised that amending Agreements were
necessary, before fresh taxation could be imposed in these districts.
This interpretation, in Bell's opinion, was unfortunate, "in view of the
possibility of its being considered advisable to impose a Poll Tax of 3
103
rupees in Toro in lieu of the" existing mixed Hut Tax and Poll Tax.
He, accordingly, sought the opinion of the Secretary of State, and 
received the following reply:
"I am advised that the Crown Advocate is correct in his opinion 
that a fresh agreement with the Kabaka and chiefs of Toro is 
necessary for the purpose of imposing new taxation on the 
natives of that district." 104
This despatch was translated into reality by the Toro Agreement (Poll 
Tax), 1910, under which a poll tax of 6 shillings was imposed on. "every 
adult male native of Toro over the age of 18 y e a r s " , i n  place of 
the existing Hut and Poll Taxes levied under the Hut Tax Regulations 
1900, and the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1905; and, incorporated (by 
reference) the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909. The Poll Tax Ordinance (No.2) 
1909, and the Poll Tax Ordinance (No. 3), 1909;^^ and was to be read 
in conjunction with the Toro Agreement, 1900.^°^ In particular, it was 
expressly provided that:-
"The following exemptions from the poll tax additional to those 
mentioned in the said Ordinances, shall be made, viz., all persons 
who by virtue of the note appended to the Toro Agreement, 1900, 
are entitled to exemptions from the hut tax in respect of any 
building or hut, shall instead thereof receive in each year one
102. Russell's memo of 3.6.09
103. C.O. 536/28/40759 Conf. Despatch of 15.11.09
104. C.O. 536/28/40759 Conf. Despatch of 7.1.10
105. The Toro Agreement (Poll Tax), 1910, Article 3
106. Article 5
107. Article 6
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poll tax ticket in respect of each exempted building or hut*
Such poll tax ticket may be given by the person receiving it 
to any person and shall exempt the person to whom it is given
from the payment of the poll tax for the year of issue of
such ticket." 108
In addition to these exemptions and privileges, Kasagama and his chiefs
were to receive 20% of the proceeds of the poll tax in accordance with
. . .  . 109
the proportions specified m  Article 7 of the 1900 Agreement. Thus,
for example, Kasagama was to receive 20% of the total value of all the 
taxes collected in his Kingdom; whilst each county chief was to receive
20% of the total value of taxes collected in his county. With the
exception of this concession, the objects of which are obvious, the 
proceeds of the new tax, like those of the Hut tax and the Gun tax, 
were to be remitted to the Protectorate Government for Imperial purposes.
Ho further direct taxation, however, could be imposed without Kasagama*s 
consent. It is true, this arrangement had no binding force; yet its 
significance, in terms of the Anglo-Toro relations and indeed Toro's 
status within the Protectorate can hardly be over emphasised. Henceforward, 
Kasagama, like his counterpart in Buganda, had to be consulted before any 
taxation other than the Hut tax and the Gun tax could be imposed on. his 
people. That, in the eyes of the rulers of Toro, was no empty gesture: 
it was a privilege of immense importance which in subsequent years was 
valued immensely by the chiefs and the nation as a whole. Of course, 
they had no veto power; and, indeed, had no say in the determination of 
tax rates; in any case, it was most unlikely that—a new form of taxation 
would be introduced in the near future. Income taxation, the only form 
of impost, the introduction of which would have necessitated a new 
Agreement - even this was doubtful - was still a long, long way off;
108. Article 5
109. Article 4
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some sixty years, in fact. Kasagama*s rights - the right to be 
consulted, the right to advise and the right to warn - were thus, 
for practical purposes, mainly honorific privileges.
281
7.3.1# THE HUT AND GUN TAXES IN THE NON-AGREEMENT AREAS
"Native taxation" in the Agreement areas was, as noted above, governed 
by the terms of the "Native Agreements" and the subordinate legislation 
issued under them.^^ This farcical example, however, was not followed 
in the non-agreement districts. Here, "native taxation" was governed 
by the Hut Tax ordinance and the Gun Tax ordinance, both of 1900;^^
111a
ostensibly because there were "no chiefs to consult on the subject".
In fact, Johnston had expressed, long before his arrival in the country,
that the British were free, except in Buganda, to deal with the country 
112
as they saw fit. He, thus, inter alia, claimed that:-
"Toru is practically ours because we have placed and maintain 
the present King on the throne. Unyoro is ours by aright of 
conquest; rights over land in Ankole shall be acquired in much 
the same way as in Torn. Elsewhere, I reserve to the British 
Government the arbitrary right to take at any time sites that 
might be needed for military purposes etc." 113
He, however, assured the Foreign Office, as regards "native taxation" 
that he would,
"besides using great discretion, caution and patience in the 
matter, only impose taxation with the consent of the native 
chiefs, so long as those native chiefs continue to govern 
their people in such manner as not to oblige the Imperial 
Government to intervene at its own cost to secure good 
government." 114
In the latter event taxation would be imposed by order without the 
consent of the chiefs in order to meet the costs of such administration. 
So, in
110. Vide, the Toro and Ankole Agreements of 1900 and 1901
111. The Hut and Gun Tax Regulations were subsequently called "Ordinances" 
111a.F.0.2/204 Johnston to Salisbury 13.10.1899
112. F.0.2/204 Johnston to Salisbury 13.10.1899
113. Ibid. ,
114. Ibid. .
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"those districts such as Ankole, Toru, Unyoro, and parts of
the Nile Valley where we have had to establish a military
occupation, or where we have had to intervene in order to 
restore order - that is to say where the sovereignty has
wholly passed to us - I propose . to establish native taxation
as I should institute any other order for the government and 
well being of the district since there are no chiefs to 
consult on the subject." 115
This, implicitly, gave him the right to make "Regulations", at his
discretion, under the African Order in Council, 1889.^^ As in Buganda,
however, "native taxation", in these areas, was to take the form of
a Hut Tax of 3 rupees per hut per annum, and a Gun Tax of 4 rupees
per a n n u m . A n d ,  likewise, the gun tax would mean that anyone who
used a gun or several guns would have to pay 4 rupees per annum,
without which licence he would neither be allowed to retain, in his
118
possession, or to use such weapons. And as in Buganda, "in default
of money" the revenue authorities, were, as a temporary measure to
accept either saleable produce or a month1s labour on Government works
in lieu of the Hut Tax or two month's labour in lieu of both Hut and 
119
Gun taxes. Even here, the keyword was voluntary compliance, and,
it was emphasised that taxation would only be imposed where the country
was under direct British control, or where it was under the control of
120
"friendly chiefs willing to co-operate" with the Administration:
121
in other words, "no government, no taxation." These were, in outline, 
the terms and conditions under which Johnston proposed to establish a
115* F.0.2/204 op. cit.
116. F.O.C.P.7375, see also London Gazette, 22.10.1889 part XI
117. F.0.2/204 loc. cit.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
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revenue system outside the Agreement areas. As, in the British colonies
I
i
j and Protectorates elsewhere, so in Uganda, he argued, the surest
prospect of obtaining local revenue sufficient to meet administrative
122
expenditure lay in "the moderate taxation of the natives". To this 
end, he enacted the Hut Tax Ordinance, and the Gun Tax Ordinance, both
of 1900, and applied them to the districts under effective British
_ . 123
control.
Section 2, of the Hut Tax Ordinance, established a Government tax of 
3 rupees, payable annually by every owner or occupier of any building 
used as a dwelling place, whether permanently or otherwise. The tax was 
due and payable on the first day of January, after which date it became 
a debt due to the Government and recoverable by process of law, like an 
ordinary debt. The Hut Tax Ordinance was thus similar to the Hut Tax 
provisions of the "Uganda Agreement", 1900, on which it was based, and 
so, too, was the Gun Tax Ordinance, 1900, save that the Ordinance 
imposed a fine of 150 rupees or 3 months' imprisonment for tax evation
or avoidance; and that, in these cases, the gun or hut in question was
. 124
liable to forfeiture, or confiscation. And so the strictures already
mentioned in respect of tax administration in Buganda, apply with equal
force here. None the less, Johnston believed that it was along these
lines that the surest advance would be made in the direction of a self- 
125
supporting state. And, though, he was "not so sanguine as to suppose 
that" his revenue measures would in the near future enable the country 
"to pay off its debts", he nevertheless believed that they would, in due 
course, "produce local revenue sufficient to relieve the British tax 
payer from any obligation to provide further funds for the protection
122. Cd. 256 (1900) Africa No. 6 p.7
123. No. 2 of 1900 S.8
124. Vide, S .8 and 9 of the respective Ordinances
125. Cd. 256 (1900)
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126
and development of Uganda.” He, accordingly, instructed all heads of
districts to institute "gentle and prudent measures" for the economic
. 127
and efficient collection of the Hut and Gun Taxes.
Both taxes were to be collected by the chiefs, who, where possible, were
to be "induced to pay in bulk for their people" in saleable articles
such as rice, wheat, coffee and ivory, to name but a few, even if this
meant accepting more varied kinds of produce than were on the officially 
128
approved list. Whether or not these instructions were adhered to is
not easy to determine. It would appear, however, that many chiefs and
collectors did not always observe the letter let alone the spirit of these
instructions with far reaching consequences for the revenue system.
Despite these difficulties, however, Johnston's revenue measures were
130
otherwise successful. The returns for the first two years were:
District Collected In Amount 1900-1901 Amount in
£ • ' £
Mau Cash 28 49
Kind 13
Nandi Cash 1129 1317
Kind 507
Labour 105
Baringo
Elgon Cash/Kind 1738 529
Busoga/Buke di Cash 187 1451
Buganda Cash 17615 16378
Shells 7692
Kind 1200
Labour 1519 11347
Ankole Cash 1516 328
Kind 36
Labour 39 483
Toro Cash/Kind/Lab our 485 292
126. F.0.2/204 op. cit.
127. Cir. No. 22 of 10.5.1900
128. Cir. No. 29 of 10.11.1900
129. Cir. No. Z«J U>le*.
130. UNA/A27/12 Statement showing amount of Hut Tax in the year 1901-02 
as compared with 1900-1901. The value of cowrie shells burnt was 
£7691-7-1 (in 1901). The amount for Gun Tax in 1900-1901 and 
1901-02 were £1082 and £733 respectively. (UNA/A27/12 (1902-1905) 
Special Files and Statement showing amount collected for Gun Tax 
in the year 1900-1901 as compared with the amount collected in 
1901-1902.
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Bunyoro Cash
Kind 
Labour
Bari/Shuli/
Dodinga Cash
GROSS TOTAL
In spite of these excellent results, however, there can be little doubt 
that Johnston*s tax arrangements were unsatisfactory. Enough has
131
already been said to show that they suffered from serious defects.
Yet it was not until 1914 that the Hut Tax Ordinance, 1900, was finally
repealed. It would seem that the drawbacks of the Hut Tax were, in view
of Government policy, regarded by Johnston and his successors, as a
necessary evil. Johnston had estimated that the British dealings with
Uganda had cost the British tax payer over six million pounds sterling,
viz. £1,394,000 for administration and £4,900,000 for the construction
132
of the Uganda Railway, and his mission was to relieve the British 
tax payer from any further financial burden connected with the 
administration of Uganda. He thus, somewhat peevishly, noted
"What justification is there for this outlay, and what hope 
of ever recovering the sums advanced, either by direct 
payments to Imperial Treasury or indirect profit to British 
commerce?" 133
The solution, in his view, lay "in the moderate taxation of natives"
134
and, in the creation of ideal conditions for British enterprise.
It is hardly surprising therefore, that the defects of the Hut Tax
f
were relegated to the lumber room. For one thing, Johnston took the 
view that the hut was the best taxable unit. He, erroneously, believed 
that it was the best measure of ability to pay; and, in consequence, 
other forms of taxation do not appear to have been seriously considered.
131. See, tax administration in Buganda, supra, pp.263-266
132. Cd. 671 (1900)
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
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Indeed, it appears, that the revenue authorities would never have 
entertained any tax reforms, but for the heavy losses of revenue 
occasioned by the widespread evasion of the Hut Tax. It is significant, 
too, that, both in Buganda and in the non-agreement areas, the need 
for reform was, as indicated below, spearheaded by the Native Authorities, 
the British authorities were merely interested in the tax receipts and 
hardly cared about the Hut Taxation1s social costs.
135
7.3.2.. THE POLL TAX ORDINANCE, 1905
In March, 1905, shortly after the introduction of Poll Tax in Buganda,
the Acting Commissioner,
"circulated among the responsible Administrative officials 
an invitation to ascertain if the same taxation would be 
acceptable in their Provinces and districts." 136
This enquiry was prompted by the Mukama and chiefs of Bunyoro who were 
anxious to substitute the Poll Tax for the Hut Tax. Their reasons 
appear sufficiently in the following extract from Wilson's despatch to 
the Secretary of State for the colonies and were as follows:-
"Instantly sub-commissioner Fowler reported that the Kabaka 
and chiefs of Bunyoro asked that the tax should be applied 
to their country. This I was prepared for as they have 
previously expressed to me their wish for such a tax, as 
the Hut Tax has ever been regarded as a burden undesirably 
distinctive in its bearing upon married persons; the Poll 
Tax fills the gap in its especial application to bachelors." 137
Fowler's report was shortly afterwards followed by Galt's conveying the
138
Ankole.chiefs' wishes to adopt the Poll Tax in place of the Hut Tax.
Reports from elsewhere, however, were less encouraging. Most officers
were against the imposition of the Poll Tax on the grounds that the
people were "not sufficiently acquainted with the principle of the Hut
*
135. No. 1 of 1905
136. C.O.536/1/14537 Wilson to Lansdowne, Despatch 78 of 20.3.05
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid..
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Tax," None the less, Wilson
"decided to enact the Poll Tax Ordinance, so as to meet the 
legal requirements, and to which it was necessary to enact 
promptly so as to benefit by the collections which were 
undertaken by the chiefs and which delay would have 
injuriously affected," 140
By the Ordinance, a poll tax of 2 rupees was imposed on "each adult
male native of the Protectorate" who was not liable to pay the hut
141
tax, under the Hut Tax Ordinance, 1900, The tax was payable m
the same manner as the hut tax, including payment in labour in lieu 
142
of cash. However, the Poll Tax Ordinance, unlike the Hut Tax 
Ordinance, did not make provision for revenue offences and their 
punishment. Otherwise the Ordinance was on all fours with the 
existing legislation; it was in its essential respects similar to the 
terms of the "Uganda Poll Tax Agreement", 1904, and was open to 
similar criticisms and abuses; and so, the Buganda precedent was, 
once again, adhered to. The reasons for this hardly need any emphasis. 
What is interesting, is that Wilson, the author of the Poll Tax Ordinance, 
1905, had as early as 1903 strongly recommended the abolition of the Hut 
Tax. He confided in the Commissioner thus:-
"Some of the means of evasion known to be employed invoke more 
serious results than simply direct loss of revenue to the 
state. There is that of overcrowding in huts: there is 
further that of refraining from marriage so as to avoid absolute 
need for a separate dwelling, and yet again, that of repudiation 
of the married state, by which phrase I refer to cases where 
heads of families send their wives to live temporarily with their 
friends while they themselves pose as bachelors or widowers, and 
live elsewhere until the period of tax collection is over, when 
the family reunites and lives again in the hut it had deserted.
I am told that in some parts of the country owing to these 
cases, on an average one hut is made to suffice for three 
families. The mischief is the more far reaching in a country 
so lax in its code of morality as this is, it can easily be 
imagined what opportunities for moral' irregularities arise from
140. C.O.536/1/14537 op. cit.
141. Poll Tax Ordinance, 1905, S.l
142. S.l. It follows that the Hut Tax Ordinance, 1900, was left intact 
despite its defects*.
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such conditions of overcrowding and depreciation of marriage, 
and I have felt bound to sympathise entirely with the 
missionaries when they have represented these circumstances 
as a set off against the great benefits accruing from the 
tax." 143
The excerpt is self-explanatory, it states the case against the hut
tax succinctly. Yet, as has already been stated, the Hut Tax Ordinance,
1900, was not repealed until 1914, Inthe "agreement Kingdoms", however,
the tax on huts was in 1909 superceded by a universal poll tax of 5
rupees payable by "each adult male native of the Protectorate in the
district in which the Ordinance is in force." For the purposes of
this Ordinance "adult male" meant any male, who in the opinion of the
145
District Commissioner, was above the age of 14 years; otherwise the 
new Ordinance was in similar terms to the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1905, 
which, incidentally, was left intact. Section 2 thus provided that:-
143. UNA/A27/13 Informal Minute for HM Commissioner by Wilson 2.12.03
144. No. 5 of 1909 S.3. The term "native of the Protectorate" was 
not defined. However, in 1910, the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1910, 
provided that the term included "every male native of East 
Africa who has been resident in the protectorate for one year, 
prior to April for which such tax is due." (S.2) The reasons 
for this were stated as follows: "I have purposely proposed 
that "East Africa should be inserted instead of 'Africa' so as 
to exclude Egyptians, Cape Boys and Arabs, as I think such 
persons should be classified apart from natives of East Africa. 
There are many natives of German as well as British East Africa 
who are permanently resident or employed for several years at a 
time in Uganda, and it appears to me that such persons should 
take their share in providing for the government of the country. 
Further it would be possible for natives of British and German 
East Africa to live a short distance within the Uganda boundary
and thus avoid paying taxes to either their own territory or that
of Uganda, while benefiting by the good government of both."
C.0.536/32/39947.
In 1914 the term "native of the Protectorate" was defined to 
mean a "native of Africa", not being of European or Asiatic
race or origin who has been resident in the Protectorate for
one year.
145. In March 1909, the age of majority was raised to 18 years by 
the Poll Tax Ordinance (No.3), 1909, S.2.
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"This Ordinance shall apply to such districts as the Governor 
may from time to time notify by Proclamation; and, the Hut 
Tax Regulation, 1900, and the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1905, shall 
not apply to any district to which this Ordinance applies." 146
Inter alia, this meant that the chiefs responsible for tax administration 
were still pbwerless (they had no statutory powers) to deal with 
recalcitrant tax payers. The Johnstonian approach still held sway. 
However, its weakness was soon realised, and this anomaly rectified by 
the enactment of the Poll Tax Ordinance, (No*2) of 1909, under which 
failure to pay the poll tax was punishable by a fine not exceeding 
15 rupees, or imprisonment not exceeding 3 m o n t h s . S e c t i o n  3 
provided that:-
"Any person who possess the means of paying the said Poll Tax 
and who upon demand shall neglect or refuse to pay the same 
shall be liable to a fine not exceeding three times the amount 
due from him or in lieu thereof to imprisonment with or without 
hard labour for a period not exceeding twice the period for 
which he might have been called upon to labour had he not 
possessed the means to pay the said Poll Tax." 148
This section applied to those tax payers with the means to pay; those 
with no means to pay were dealt with under section 4, by which
"Any person who has not satisfied the said Poll Tax before the 
expiration of the period within which the said Poll Tax is 
payable and who upon being required so to do neglects or 
refuses to work for the Government at such times and places 
and for the full prescribed period as may be directed by the 
District Commissioner or person authorised by him in his behalf 
shall be liable to imprisonment with or without-hard labour for 
a period not exceeding twice the period for which he ought to 
have worked for the Government as aforesaid." 149
These provisions were, however, from the point of view of the tax 
administrator, still far from satisfactory. In Rex v. Kakoyikoyi, 
for instance, the High Court held that no tax payer could be inprisoned
146. S.2 of No. 5 of 1909
147. S.2 of No. 2 of 1909
148. S.3
149. S.4
150. (1910) 1ULR 85
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for non-payment of poll tax, unless and until he had been required to
work and had neglected or refused to do so.^^ In this case the
defendants were convicted by the District Magistrate, and each sentenced
to two months1 rigorous imprisonment, although neither had ever been
required to work nor neglected or refused to work. It was held that
imprisonment could only be awarded under S.4, where it was proved
against the accused that they were required to work and neglected or
refused to do so. Accordingly, the decision of the District Commissioner
was set aside and the tax payers released forthwith. In the instant
case, the accused had almost served the whole of the period for which
they could have been called upon to work in lieu of the 1909-1910 Poll 
152
Tax; nevertheless, the effect of the Court’s decision on tax 
administration hardly needs emphasis, it virtually nullified section 4, 
and, no doubt, many a District Officers’ tax collecting efforts. 
Regrettably, however, the two hapless tax payers’ rights were not protected 
no compensation, for wrongful imprisonment was ever paid; for under the 
existing legislation and under the colonial regime they had no right to 
such compensation. That was colonial power. Any recognition of such a 
right was always viewed with suspicion - it was in some ranks of British 
officialdom a sign of weakness.
7.3.3. THE MOVE TOWARDS THE HARMONIZATION OF POLL TAX LAWS
It will have been observed that the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909, did not
abrogate nor amend the Hut Tax Ordinance, 1900, or the Poll Tax
Ordinance, 1905. Section 2 merely provided that the existing legislation
153
"shall not apply to any district to which this Ordinance applies."
151. per Ennis and Carter J.J. atj*86_
152. (1910) 1ULR 85 at p.86
153. No. 5 of 1909 S.2
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The Ordinance was originally intended for Buganda only. Shortly after
its enactment, however, it was noted that large numbers o-f tax payers
were leaving Buganda for Ankole, Bukedi, Bunyoro and Toro, in order
154
to escape the increased taxation in Buganda. Under these
circumstances, therefore, the revenue authorities had no alternative
but to try to prevent this wave of emigration. Accordingly, Tomkins,
the then Acting Governor, directed that the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909,
should be applied to the districts in question. However, when news of
this reached London, the Governor, who was then on leave in England,
advised against the extension of the new ordinance to the Western
Kingdoms. Instead, he suggested that the full rate of 5 rupees "should
155
be levied on all Baganda and Basoga settling in those countries."
This led to the enactment of the Poll Tax (Baganda and Basoga) Ordinance, 
1910, the main provision of which provided that:-
"A Poll Tax of Rupees 5 shall be payable by all adult male 
Baganda and Basoga in the Protectorate, whether resident in 
Buganda or Busoga or not and.the provisions of the Poll Tax 
Ordinance, 1909, the Poll Tax Ordinance (No.2), 1909, the Poll 
Tax Ordinance (No.3), 1909, shall so far as the same are 
applicable, apply to such Baganda and Basoga. Provided 
always that Baganda and Basoga who, before the 1st day of 
April 1909, had permanently left Buganda or. Busoga to live 
elsewhere, shall pay such tax as from time to time shall be 
payable in the part of the Protectorate where they shall 
reside: the burden of proof of such change of domicile as 
aforesaid shall be upon the Baganda or Basoga desiring to 
establish it." 156
In this way, the revenue authorities sought to stem the tide of 
emigration. However, it would seem that these arrangements did not prove 
particularly successful. For, shortly afterwards, the Poll Tax Ordinance* 
1909, as amended, was applied to the so called "tax haven" districts of
154. C.O.536/26/19220
155. Ibid. Bell's minute of 8.7.09
156. No. 4 of 1910, S.2
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Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro. In Toro this was effected by the Toro
*
Agreement (Poll Tax) 1910, under which, a poll tax of 3 rupees was
established in lieu of the Hut and Gun Taxes imposed by the Toro
Agreement, 1900."^^ In Ankole and Bunyoro districts, on the otherhand,
a poll tax of 5 rupees was imposed by proclamation as provided by the
158
Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909, S.4. It is evident that the Government’s
approach to taxation was still largely amateurish and pragmatic, it
would seem that the revenue authorities, despite the colonial office’s
injunctions to Johnston, had no clearly thought out policy on this
vital matterl Hitherto the hall-mark of the revenue system had been
the differential taxes and tax rates within the various administrative
districts; the origin of which was the distinction drawn by the early
British officers between the so called "highly developed tribes", on
159
the one hand, and the "primitive tribes", on the other. The result,
as the foregoing material indicates was the proliferation of piecemeal
tax legislation. Thus, by 1913 there were no fewer than 15 different
ordinances, in force, in different parts of the Protectorate. Clearly,
this state of affairs was very unsatisfactory: it was confusing and made
for complexity; and, indeed, it was increasingly becoming difficult to
defend the existence of differential taxes and tax rates in the same 
160
district. In the result the existing legislation was, in 1914, 
collated and embodied in the Poll Tax Ordinance of that year; and, so ended 
the dual tax legislation, though regretably, not the corollary two-tier 
tax structure. In future, a poll tax of 3 and in some districts, 5 
rupees was to be imposed "on every adult male native of the Protectorate."^^
157. Toro Agreement (Poll Tax), 1910
158. See also, No. 7 of 1911
159. For instance, see H.M. Special Commissioner’s First Report Cd.671(1901)
160. C.0.536/62/38509, Att. General’s Report on the Draft Poll Tax 
Ordinance 1913
161. No. 2 of 1914 Schedule 1
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Provision was, however, made for the exemption of several classes of
tax payers, including crown tenants, school pupils, ex-soldiers and
162
segregation camp attendants. Additionally, tax payers in Ankole
Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro "having by one wife five or more living
children over the age of one year" were to be exempted from taxation
altogether. The object of the latter exemption was "to encourage the
163
natives to breed and raise large families," thereby promoting the 
increase of population in those areas where the infant mortality rate 
was extremely high.
"At present the infant mortality is appalling and the population 
is dying out steadily. The death rate is 30% and the birth­
rate is only 17%. The women give hardly any care or attention 
to their children and seem to consider them an accumbrance.
I believe that exemption from Poll Tax could greatly encourage 
them to be good mothers." 164
These provisions apart, the Ordinance, as mentioned above, merely 
codified the existing legislation and as such may be indicted on 
several counts, the gravest of which, from the revenue point of view,
was the wholesale adoption, despite the "Kakoyikoyi case", of sections
165 166
4 and 5 of No. 6 of 1909, the effect of which, as Rex v. Malingumu,
shortly afterwards poignantly demonstrated, was to cripple the District
Commissioner's tax collection endeavours. The accused, in this case,
were convicted "of being unable to pay Poll Tax and neglecting to do so
when order to do so and sentenced to three weeks' rigorous imprisonment"
167
and, in addition, ordered to pay the tax due. Having thus stated 
the facts, the Chief Justice continued:-
162. Ibid. S.X(l) to (10), and (12)
163. Ibid. S.X(ll)
163. C.O. 536/1V2394 Fidde's minute (n.d.)
164. Ibid. .
165. Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909
166. (1915) 2ULR 125
167. Ibid.
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"Charges against two separate accused for two separate offences 
unconnected with each other cannot legally be tried together . 
Moreover, the sentences are illegal, as it appears the accused 
had no means to pay the tax, but no order to work appears to 
have been made under section 7 of the Ordinance, so the accused 
have not refused to work and rendered themselves liable to 
punishment under section 9. The Magistrate has not specified 
the particular section of the Ordinance under which a conviction 
has been had* It may not at first sight be clear from the 
Ordinance whether the Government in the case of a person who 
has not the means to pay may elect either to require a person 
to work under S.7 or to prosecute him under section 8, or 
whether the later section is intended to be used only where 
a person has the means to pay but neglects or refuses to do so.
I consider however that the latter construction is the correct 
one, and is moreover in accordance with the law on the subject 
prior to the present ordinance," 168
It was held that
"before a person can be imprisoned for failure to pay Poll Tax 
it must be shown that jhe had the means to pay, or that having 
no means to pay an order to work has been made under section 7 
of the Ordinance, which order had been disobeyed." 169
The Magistrate's decision was accordingly quashed and the order for payment 
of the tax cancelled. Similarly, in Rex v. Tabula^^ the District 
Magistrate's decision was set aside, simply because the revenue authorities 
had not shown that the accused had the means to meet his tax obligations 
and that he had, upon demand, refused or neglected to do so. In that 
case the accused had failed to pay his tax for three years, and was 
sentenced to two months' rigorous imprisonment for each of the three 
previous tax years. His simple and piteous plea was that he was a poor 
man with no fixed abode. The judgment after discussing the conduct of 
the case below including the failure of the Magistrate to express an 
opinion as to the truth or falsity of the plea, made the following 
pronouncement
168. (-1915) 2ULR 125
169. (1915) 2ULR 125
170. (1915) 2ULR 165 '
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"Sections 7 and 9 of the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1914, provide 
that a person who has not the means to pay cash may be 
required to work for the Government for one month and if 
he neglects or refuses to work as lawfully required shall 
be guilty of an offence. Section 8 further provides that 
a person who neglects or refuses to pay tax on demand shall 
be guilty of an offence. It is clear therefore that the 
last mentioned section of the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1914, 
must be read with Sections 7 and 9 and that it is only 
in the event of. the accused neglecting or refusing to pay 
the tax upon demand, if he has the means to pay it, that 
he has committed an offence; if he has not the means to 
pay when he is asked there are two courses open, either 
to give him time to pay or to require him to work for the 
Government. In other words, before a conviction can be 
had it must be shown that the tax was demanded and that at 
the time or subsequently the accused had the means to pay 
but neglected or refused to do so; it is not sufficient 
to show that the tax was demanded and that the accused had 
previously had the means to pay but had spent it or could 
have had the means to pay if he had chosen to work." 171
In the instant case there was neither proof of demand nor neglect or
refusal to pay or indeed, that the accused had the means to pay.
Accordingly the decision of the District Magistrate was quashed and
the accused set free. In cases where the tax payer had no taxable
income, the District Commissioner had, in Carter*s words "two courses
open (to him), either to give him time to pay or to require him to
172
work for the government." From the revenue point of view, such a
procedure was cumbersome, costly and inefficient. Indeed, this
prescription hardly differed from Johnston*s "pole pole" approach,
to taxation, in the early years of British rule which it sought to replace.
These'liberal11, and somewhat "unique" court decisions did not, however,
constitute a charter for tax delinquents. In the latter case, for
instance, the Magistrate*s decision was quashed "without prejudice to
the right of the District Commissioner to order the man to work, in lieu
173
of tax, for the prescribed period in respect of each year for which"
171. (1915) 2ULR 165'
172. Per Carter, C.J. in Rex v. Tabula (1915) 2ULR 165, at 166
173. Ibid.
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the accused had not paid his poll tax; which in this case amounted to
174
18 weeks instead of 12 weeks laid down by the relevant Ordinance*
This sentence was, however, less than that originally imposed by the 
District Commissioner.^^ That said, however, this state of affairs 
was both unfair and unsatisfactory. Yet this anomalous situation was 
not rectified until 1923.^^ In the meantime, the Poll Tax Ordinance, 
1914, itself had been, in the light of experience, drastically modified 
to meet some of the criticisms alluded to above. Of significance 
were the following amendments
174. This anomaly was due to the fact that taxation in Buganda was 
governed by the Poll Tax Ordinance, and the Native Law 
entitled "The Law for the people who do not pay their taxes 
before the end of the year for which it is due, 1910", under 
which six weeks* work could be ordered in lieu of payment of 
poll tax. The main provisions of this enactment were in 
similar terms to the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909, recast by the 
1914 legislation, but left intact in the case of Buganda.
Hence, the accused being a Muganda was dealt with in accordance 
with the "Native Law".
175. A prison sentence of 24 weeks had been imposed.
176. The terms under which the conflict was resolved were set out 
in the Uganda Agreement (Taxation of Natives), 1922, as 
follows: "The Governor agrees to introduce an ordinance to 
amend the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1920, so that natives of Buganda 
shall be allowed to pay their poll tax at any time before the 
thirty first day of December of the year in which such tax is 
due; and upon such ordinance being passed and approved by
His Highness the Kabaka and the Native Government, the Kabaka
agrees to repeal the native law entitled "the Law 1910".
Accordingly, S.9 of No. 27 of 1920 was amended in 1923, by 
No. 3 of 1923 in accordance with the above Agreement, thus 
bringing Buganda into line with the rest of the Protectorate,
t
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(a) the onus was placed on the tax payer to prove that he was
incapable of paying poll tax, thus overturning the rule
in Rex v. Kakoyikoyi. 177
(b) the penalties for non-payment of poll tax were greatly 
increased; the term of imprisonment, for instance, was 
trebled, from two to six months. 178
(c) Section 12 provided that a delinquent tax payer would not
be exempt from a civil action for the recovery of poll 
tax. The motivating factor behind this provision was the 
rule in Rex v. Malingumu and Petero. 179
(d) the police and the revenue authorities were empowered to 
arrest, without warrant, anyone contravening the provisions 
of the ordinance. 180
The cumulative effect of these changes was the reversal of the previous 
tax collection machinery, the main feature of which was the absence 
of the use of force and coercion. The "softly softly" approach 
advocated by Johnston and successfully implemented by his successors 
was no longer necessary; indeed by 1920 it was regarded by many as a 
liability. Hence these reforms. It would appear, however, that the 
pendulum swung from one extreme to the other. The Colonial Office, for 
instance, took special exception to section 7 and the use of the police 
and coercive methods in tax administration. Section 7 provided that:
177. (1910) 1ULR 85
178. S.10 provided that: "Any person as aforesaid who has neglected 
or refused to pay Poll Tax in any year prior to that in which 
the same shall become due shall be liable to a like punishment
in respect of every such neglect or xefusal for any number of past 
years not exceeding three. Provided always that the maximum term 
of punishment which may be inflicted in respect of non-payment 
of Poll Tax shall not exceed six months".
179. (1915) 2ULR 125
180. S.17 provided that: Any Police or Administrative Officer may 
arrest without warrant any person failing to observe the 
provisions of this Ordinance.
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"Any person liable to pay poll tax who proves to the satisfaction 
of the District Commissioner or the court that he has not the 
means to pay the same in cash may be required to work for the 
Government for a period not exceeding two months in lieu thereof 
by the District Commissioner and if directed by the court such 
work shall be done in custody." l8l
The following excerpt from a colonial office minute on the Poll Tax 
Ordinance, 1920, succinctly states their objections to S.7 in these 
terms
"I do not think the stigma of custody need be added. Ex 
hypothesis the person in question is only not paying because 
he has not the cash. I submit the same procedure should so 
far as possible be followed in all. the EA colonies in regard 
to native taxes. This is a departure from the Kenya 
provisions. It has been suggested to Kenya that the 
corresponding provision in the Kenya Ordinance should be 
cancelled." 182
Similarly, S.10 was attacked for departing from the policy of the
i Qq
Secretary of State for Colonies, on native taxation in East Africa.
Further, the powers of arrest under S. 7 were considered "unusual
in this connection", and in any event too excessive.
Despite these observations, however, the Poll Tax Ordinance,1920, was, without
modifications, approved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
However, the Governor was directed to furnish periodic reports on the
working of S.7; and his first report, in part, was as follows
"It is the practice fbr persons required to work under section 
7 of the Ordinance to be placed under the supervision of a 
member of the Native County Police during the performance of 
this work. In districts where there are no county police,
181. No. 27 of 1920 S.7
182. C.0.536/10^930
183. C.0.536/10U/2930, the matter is put thus: "S.10 is badly drawn and 
I think it impossible to give a meaning to it according to its 
grammatical construction. The intention seems to be to enable a 
person who has neglected to pay his poll tax 3 out of U consecutive 
years to be sent to goal for 6 months - a very severe penalty for 
not paying from 9 to 22s florins. This is a departure from the 
Kenya practice."
18U. C.0.536/10U/2930
299
a constable of the Protectorate Government Police force may­
be required to undertake the supervision. Such persons are 
not subject to further restraint unless it is evident that 
they deliberately intend to evade their obligation in which 
case it would be the duty of the Lukiko authorites to enforce 
the attendance until completion of the work,” 185
The second report was more comprehensive and informative, and for the 
first time spelt out the policy considerations behind the legislation. 
Among other things, it was reported that section 7 was applied to tribes 
who were in an early stage of development, and were accordingly not in 
a position to pay poll tax in cash. In lieu of such payment, the 
report continued,
"the young men of the tribe are called upon to work for short 
periods on constructional works, such as the bridging of 
swamps and the cleaning of roads or broad pathways, which are 
necessary for the opening up of the district to trade, as well 
as for efficient administration." 186
Here, the only way in which the tax paying public could obtain cash for 
the payment of'tax was by the sale or export of cattle, sheep and goats. 
However, this was fraught with difficulties; the Governor, for instance, 
was reluctant to offend local customs and prejudices against the sale 
of livestock.
"Nothing, however, would create more discontent and mental 
distress to a primitive tribe than the decrease of their 
livestock in this manner, and the tribe would infinitely 
prefer to work off their obligations by unpaid labour. I 
am therefore very much opposed to such a policy, apart from 
the consideration that in many areas necessary veterinary 
restrictions on the movement of livestock would render it 
an impossible one." 187
The report also examined the possibility of paying "the natives for
their labour on public works" and recovering in poll tax the money so paid,
185. C.O.536/113A6U00 Despatch No. 390 of 9-8.21
186. C.O.536/119/31883 op. cit.
187. Ibid.-
188. Ibid.
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However, this, too, was open to objection. Firstly, the wages were so
low that it would be necessary for a man to work for at least a complete
month before he could earn enough money to meet his tax obligations.
It was considered that this "would be burdensome and objectionable to
l89
individuals of a remote and undeveloped tribe." Secondly, the 
Governor was of the view that
" a system of inducing raw natives to work in return for a 
cash payment, which is immediately taken away again as Poll 
Tax, would seem to such natives to be incomprehensible and 
accentric conduct on the part of the Government," 190
It was felt, under these circumstances, that the relations between the
tax paying public in these areas and the revenue authorities were likely
to be far more friendly and generally satisfactory under the existing
arrangements than they would, if the alternative considered above were 
191
adopted. Accordingly, the Governor sought permission from the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the continuation of tax-labour, 
and received the following reply
"I am not in favour of the principle of tax labour if it can be 
avoided, but in view of the representations contained in your 
despatch, I do not wish to insist on the entire abolition of 
the system in Uganda. I consider, however, that its working 
should be closely watched and that as a general rule it should 
be confined to cases where the native has no other means open
to him of paying his tax." 192
The position of the Colonial Office in this matter was- far from clear.
It would seem, despite this rhetoric, that Winston Churchill, the 
Secretary of State, was indifferent to tax labour and the sale of cattle
189. C.0.536/119/31883 op. cit.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibiqj..
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193to obtain cash for the payment of poll tax. Indeed, though anxious
to harmonize "native taxation” in East Africa, he had no clearly
defined policy on the matter; his approach to "native taxation" was
largely pragmatic. In the result, tax administrative practice in
East Africa was not always uniform, it varied from area to area and
was usually determined by local conditions rather than by the mandarins
at the colonial office. ’ The following excerpt from a colonial office
minute on tax labour is illuminating:-
"I do not like tax labour, but seeing that we have just decided 
to allow it to be introduced into Tanganyika Territory in spite 
of the decision to abolish it in Kenya, I do not see very well 
how we can refuse to allow it to continue in Uganda." 19^
In line with this reasoning, tax labour was allowed to continue, and, 
despite the International Labour Convention, 1920, tax labour remained 
a central feature of tax administration throughout the interwar years. 
In sum, the Government’s tax policy, though successful in terms of 
tax receipts, was still in shambles. That Government policy on "native 
taxation" was in such a state, however, is hardly surprising; it was' 
on all fours with its ilk in other areas. True, it in no time, solved 
the thorny question of financing the Protectorate and so relieved
193. C.0.536/119/31883 thus part of his despatch to the Governor reads: 
"I realise the force of the gpecial considerations which arise 
with regard to the sale of livestock as indicated by you in 
para. 3 of your despatch. I would observe that this method of 
paying tax is normally employed in the case of the Masai in 
Kenya- without, so far as I am aware, any trouble arising.
While, however, I think this method should be encouraged, and 
consider that a less conservative attitude on the part of the 
pastoral tribes of Uganda would be for their ultimate benefit 
I do not wish to force the sale of stock as an alternative to tax 
labour in cases where it is strongly opposed."
1 9 k .  C.O.536/119/31883
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the Imperial Treasury and the British tax payer from shouldering the 
burden of "the Uganda expense", rather earlier than had been anticipated, 
but that was notits only, or indeed, the most important achievement*
Mention has already been made of the total disruption it brought in 
its train, and abominable, though, that was, it was by no means the 
worst effect of that policy. It vies, for pride of place, with the 
overcrowding, squalor, disease and the migration of people and the 
ensuing misery.
In retrospect, however, and from the point of state craft, the worst
effect and, indeed, the most lasting legacy of "native taxation for
Imperial purposes" was the stultification of local government and
local government finance, in particular, the two were utterly and
completely stunted* Yet, rather ironically, the transformation of "native
authorities" into autonomous local government bodies was, according to
the Canons of Trusteeship, the centre piece of British colonial policy*
Such a policy, however, was incompatible with "native taxation" - another
cardinal policy - the aim of which was "to amass revenue at any cost,
195and to cut expenses to breaking point"* The latter was anathema to 
the former, and the Government's dilemma was to try to harmonize the 
two irreconcilable policies. Needless to say. they did not succeed.
The list of colonial dilemmas was, evidently, indeterminate, and 
"native taxation" was one of the more intractable contraditions of colonial 
rule. Inter alia, this policy meant that the Colonial Government was 
the sole recipient and disburser of all the tax receipts; and that 
the "Native Authorities", which were, according to "official policy", 
being groomed and developed to take over, at some unspecified future 
date, the administration of their areas, were totally dependent on
195. Sir Frederick Jackson, (Governor of Uganda, 1911-1917) to Read,
Private and confidential of 19.7.1911
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central Government subventions, and had no say in, either the raising 
or spending of such funds. They had no single independent source of 
local•revenue - the hallmark of local autonomy - and ■were, in practice, 
no more than field agents of the Colonial Government of which, of 
course, they were employees; and it was not until 1955 that the folly 
of this policy was generally recognised and publically acknowledged 
and concerted efforts made to take the necessary corrective action.
And so it was, albeit belatedly, that the last five years of British 
colonial rule were, in this sphere, solely preoccupied wiih the 
unscrambling of the 50 year old central—local financial nexus, and 
the devolution of financial responsibility to the newly created 
District Administrations.’ This process, the details of which are 
discussed below, will pari passu, highlight the effects, if any,
’’native taxation” had on the development of local authority finance, 
and whether the District Commissioner’s half a century of good 
housekeeping was a boon or not.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8.1.1. THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY FINANCE
Whilst there is no universally accepted approach to local authority 
finance, it is, nevertheless, generally appreciated that the 
existence of financial resources which are independent of the state 
are a sine qua non of a proper system of local government and 
administration. For without them, local government authorities 
become mere appendages of the state machine, and the elective 
• principle a mere farce. - What is more, local government, may; in' such 
circumstances, be "reduced to the status of a mendicant begging for 
as much as can be spared from the national purse each year".1 It 
follows, therefore, that financial autonomy is the backbone of 
responsible local government. The degree of that autonomy, however, 
will invariably depend on the amount of revenue advanced by the state 
to local government authorities.
Unfortunately, however, the simplicity of this formula gives little 
indication of the intricacies of local government finance and 
taxation. First, it overlooks the fact that for the proper 
management of the nation1s economy the central government has to 
retain certain supervisory powers over the financial activities of 
local government authorities, second, it ignores the fact that, 
"however, good the division of taxable resources between the centre 
and local government authorities, there is inevitably a gap between 
the expenditure of Local Government and their income. This gap has
1. Report on Urban Local Government, L M Buchanan, Government 
Printer, Entebbe, 1954, p.27.
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£o be filled by grants".2 Thirdly, and more importantly, it 
presupposes the existence of semi-autonomous local government bodies 
at various levels beneath the Central Government. This, however, is 
not always the case. Thus, for instance, for over half a century, 
following the establishment of effective British rule in 1900, Native 
Governments and Administrations in Uganda, were no more than mere 
agents of the Protectorate Government, and were throughout this 
period, virtually dependent on Central Government grants and 
rebates. The entire power of taxation was, as a matter of Government 
policy, in the hands of the Protectorate Government. The "Native 
Governments and Administrations" were responsible for the assessment 
and payment of taxes, whilst the Protectorate Government was "the 
sole receiver and disburser of the revenue derived from direct native 
taxes".2 Of particular interest here are the subventions and Central 
Government grants in aid to the "Native Governments and 
Administrations" and the financial relations between the Protectorate 
Government and the "Native Authorities".
From 1900, when the first "Rebate" on Hut and Gun taxes collections 
was made to "Native Authorities" through to 1955, the grants in aid 
which the Protectorate Government increasingly provided were of the 
character of percentage grants. The amount received by each Native 
Authority depended, not upon its needs, but upon its expenditure, 
and, there was, evidently, "little method and much intricacy about 
the computation of this rebate".^ Thus, for example, the percentage 
grant system in vogue, in 1942 was:-
2. Report of the Relationship Commission, Earl of Munster,
Government Printer, Entebbe, 1961, p.313.
3. Memorandum on Native Taxation, Sir Charles Dundas, UGP, 1942,
p. 1 •
4. Ibid. p.2.
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"In Buganda, Madi, and West Nile 20% of the Poll Tax; 
in Ankole, Kigezi and Bunyoro 30%; in Lango 10% on 13/- 
of a 15/- tax plus 2/-; in Busoga 10% plus 6/- tribute; 
in Teso, Budama and the Central District 10% plus 3/-; 
in Karamoja 3/- (out of a 7/- tax); in Toro 2/- on 6/- 
taxes and 40% on 10/- taxes*"5
Besides Rebate on Poll Tax collections each "Native Authority" 
received other contributions from the Central Government, most of 
which partook of the nature of percentage grants; and these together 
with Rebate were, in 1942, equivalent in amount to 33 1/3% of the 
Poll Tax receipts*
"But here one comes upon most involved•transactions 
because the Native Authorities also make contributions 
to the Government* Thus in Buganda the Protectorate 
Government gives to the Native Government Rebate to the 
amount of £31,000 and receives from the Native 
Government £13,400 for road maintenance and receives 
from them £550 for audit fees, pays to the Native 
Government £212 on account of Poll Tax transport* The 
net result is that the Protectorate Government gives to 
the Native Government £42,462 or 27% of the Poll Tax of 
Buganda*
Much the same is the case everywhere else in Uganda*
The Native Authorities make tax collections for the 
Government, pay it to the Government, receive back 
rebate, make reimbursements to the Government, and are 
given grants by the Government: altogether a most
complicated proceeding entailing a great deal of 
accounting with waste of time, staff, and, be it noted, 
a preposterous paper consumption which could well be 
saved."®
The net result of all this was that the "Native Treasuries" were 
throughout the interwar years, "virtually operated by the District 
Commissioners simply because the Native Authorities [could not] 
understand the accounting system",? and the Protectorate
5* Memorandum on Native Taxation, op*cit* p*2* 
6* Ibid* p*2*
7. Ibid.
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Administration was evidently well satisfied with the way in which 
"Native Treasuries" were being run.
"It is only natural that finance as a new conception in 
African society should present the greatest problem, 
and because of its novelty it must lag behind other 
more familiar functions of the Native Administration. 
Pride may justly be taken in, the soundness and 
efficiency of the financial position and management of 
the Native Treasuries, but this fact is manifest proof 
that they have been the concern of the Native 
Administrations to only very slight extent. It is true 
that in many cases they are run by native staff paid 
from Native Treasury funds, and in some cases Katikiros 
or a Senior Native Administration Official presides 
thereof; but in other cases it is the District 
Commissioner who virtually controls the business as 
though it were a branch of his office. I naturally 
realise that in certain tribal areas it cannot be 
otherwise at the present time, and I am concerned only 
to see gradual progress made in the way of more direct 
and active participation and control by the Native 
Administrations themselves•"®
During the 1940s, however, there was growing dissatisfaction in some 
quarters with the existing central-local financial relations between 
the Protectorate Administration and the "Native Authorities”. This 
was a period when Native Governments and Administrations were being 
reorganised and given powers to manage their own internal affairs to 
the utmost of their abilities. However, that object could not be 
achieved nor the ultimate policy implemented, if the District 
Commissioners contiued to treat "Native Treasuries" as though they 
were local departments of the Protectorate Exchequer. The percentage 
grant system had clearly led to an undesirable degree of Central 
Government control over the activities of Native Treasuries, often to 
the disregard of broader issues of principle and Government policy. 
However, the Administration was beginning to realise, in view of the
8. Memorandum on Native Taxation, op.cit. p.2.
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changed circumstances, that "direct taxation should be presented to 
the native in its right perspective".8
"Formerly the Poll Tax went straight into the coffers 
of the Government and I speak from personal knowledge 
when I say that the native had his own views as to 
whether it went from that depository. It would, of 
course, be easy to prove by statistics that in Uganda 
all the Poll Tax and more is expended for the direct 
use and benefit of the native communities, but not that 
each tribe receives according to its contribution. I 
think this could be more effectively demonstrated in 
practice."18
Indeed, a growing number of taxpayers were beginning to ask some 
awkward questions and somewhat "rather suspiciously whether the 
contribution made by their Native Treasury to the Medical Department" 
was expended in their locality; and, an examination into this point 
disclosed that those contributions had in fact not always been 
expended locally; indeed, it was conceded that "the native might put
the same question respecting local expenditure of his Poll Tax".11
For, while it was true to say that all Poll Tax preceeds were 
"devoted to native services it is not correct to say that each tribe 
or area receives according to its tax contribution".^ Accordingly, 
the key to future policy was to be found in "the making of these
Native Treasuries more genuinely a function of Native
Administrations",12 so that it might be visibly demonstrated to the 
native that more than half his taxes go to his own Treasury for 
expenditure in his own tribal country".14 Towards this end, the 
existing taxes - the Protectorate Poll Tax and the Native
9. Memorandum on Native Taxation op.cit. p.4.
10. Ibid. p.4.
11. Ibid. p.4.
12. Ibid. p.4.
13. Ibid. p.4.
14. Ibid. p.4.
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Administration Tax - were to be consolidated into one, and the entire 
proceeds assigned to the Native Treasuries for their own use. This 
proposal, had as its "ultimate aim, the abandonment of direct 
taxation of Africans for Protectorate revenues", and the elimination 
of "payments to and from the Protectorate Government".1® Thus, at 
some future date, the entire proceeds of direct taxation "on natives 
would accrue to the Native Treasuries and so become in effect a local 
tax".1® The only question was whether, that aim could be realised 
"without detriment to Administration and Finance".1?
"A legitimate criticism of the scheme may be that a 
Native Administration emancipated from rigid control 
might not devote all these monies to the purposes for 
which they are intended."18
On the other hand, "the whole system of Poll Tax and all its 
implications" was, without question, "a blot on our fiscal 
practice",18 and Dundas, among others, felt that the time was "ripe,
if not overdue", for its overhaul. In any event the aims of
Government policy for the establishment of "Native councils" on a 
democratic basis could not be fully realised, "if their principles 
were to be subordinated to other considerations such as convenience 
and efficiency. Native Authorities were not instituted for sterner 
control of the people and Native Treasuries were not created merely
t
in order to give the District Commissioner a freer hand in local 
expenditure".28 Those institutions were "set,up solely in order to 
implement the policy of Indirect Rule and unless they function in
15. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to S/S. 7.1.1943. See also
C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to S/S. 3.9.1942.
16. Ibid.
17. Memorandum on Native Taxation, loc.cit.
18. Ibid.
19. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to Sir Arthur Dawe. 8.1.1943.
20. Native Administration in Uganda, op.cit.
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conformity of that policy there is no justificatioh for their 
existence".21 Few would quarrel with Dundas' planned reform. There 
were sceptics, however. But even here there was no opposition to the 
principle; the only point at issue was the timing and mode of their 
implementation in the various areas of the Protectorate. "The 
Regents of Buganda, for instance, have expressed their full agreement 
with the aims I have set, but would prefer to await the results of 
trials elsewhere of the new system envisioned."22 Dundas' problem, 
however, lay elsewhere. He thus confided in the Secretary of State 
that:-
"While some of my administrative staff have shown 
interest in the subject I have detected no enthusiasm 
but then I have been forced to realise that for the 
most part the provincial administration in Uganda is 
not very receptive to new ideas."22
Undeterred, however, Governor Dundas informed the Colonial Office of 
his intention to recast the percentage grant system and asked for 
permission to introduce "a single tax in the Eastern Province as from 
1st January 1943"; and in early December 1942 received the following 
reply:
"The desirability of aiming at the eventual conversion 
of the consolidated tax into a purely local tax at the 
sole disposal of the Native Treasuries appears to me to 
be open to question. Such a development would mean 
that the African had no direct financial interest in 
those services which must of necessity remain a charge 
on Central Government funds and the effect might be to 
make the Central Government dependent on the Native 
Administrations for a substantial part of its means of 
existence - a state of affairs which you will doubtless
21. Memorandum on Native Taxations, op.cit
22. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to S/S 3.9.1942.
23. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to Sir Arthur Dawe 8.1.1943.
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agree would be unsatisfactory in the extreme."24
Not unnaturally, Dundas was disappointed, but not at all surprised,
and his response, set out in a private letter to Sir Arthur Dawe is
illuminating.
"I dislike occupying your time with argument on a 
subject whereon there is no common basis for agreement 
and this is no time for academic discussion. But I do 
want to have it known that 1 regard the whole system of 
Poll Tax and all its implications as a blot on our 
fiscal practice. I can think of no other better method 
than indirect taxation. We have for instance at the 
present time special Wartime reveunue derived almost 
wholly from native production and consumption, pretty 
nearly equivalent to the sum of Native Poll Tax. I 
incline to think it could be substantially more and on 
the other hand I consider the Poll Tax to be in any 
case too high.
If the Native Administration Tax remains, and even if 
it be increased, it is not the same thing when a Native 
Government exacts cash from its people and when we do 
so. We must appear as an immensely rich and all 
powerful foreign autocrat squeezing hard earned money 
out of poor needy folk for our own purposes."2®
Dundas then restated his main proposals, outlined in his Memorandum 
on Native Taxation, and continued:
"I recognise that so long as such a policy is not 
agreed in principle the time is inopportune for raising 
the subject and in that case it may be as well not to 
tamper with any part of the existing system. But 
assuming the time is not yet ripe, I apprehend that 
when it is so I may not be concerned with such matters 
and I therefore take this opportunity to record my own 
views for what they may be worth someday in the 
future."26
24. C.O. 536/209/40256 Oliver Stanley to Dundas 3.12.1942. It is 
noteworthy that the levy of a single tax, as proposed by Dundas 
was by no means a new practice - it was in force in Nigeria, 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. Yet Dundas' 
request for its introduction in Uganda was turned down. The 
Colonial Office was anxious that Uganda should adopt the Kenyan 
system under which a "native tax" was imposed by the Central 
Government and local rates were imposed by the Local "Native 
Councils" for their own purposes.
25. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to Dawe 8.1.1943.
26. Ibid.
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Meanwhile, the existing financial arrangements between the 
Protectorate Government and the "Native Authorities" were to remain 
unaltered, save that steps were to be taken "to reduce the numbers of 
Africans imprisoned for tax default".27 it was hoped that this would 
obviate the appreciation of what Dundas regarded as "harsh measures 
in the enforcement of tax collections";28 indeed, if he had not been 
overruled by his superiors in London, he would have abolished Poll 
taxation and its attendant machinery.29 He strongly believed that "a 
system of taxation which occasions the annual imprisonment of large 
numbers of taxpayers must be fundamentaly wrong and a cause of 
estrangement between the people and the paramount power".28 Despite 
Dundas' spirited efforts, however, the imprisonment of tax defaulters 
was, until 1955, one of the main features of Poll Tax 
administration;31 and so, too, was the subordination of "Native 
Authorities", in financial terms, to the Central Government. In the 
eyes of the Colonial Secretary, "native taxation" for "Protectorate 
purposes" was the main bond between the Governor and the governed,
27. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to S/S. 3.9.1942. There were 9,000 
males, nearly 1% of the taxable population, in prison, many for a 
third of a year, at a cost not far short of or even exceeding the 
taxes from them, "and this at a time when the great need is 
manpower, merely because we retain a bad system of taxation". 
(Dundas to Dawe, 8.1.1942•)
28. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dundas to S/S. 7.1.1943.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. C.O. 536/209/40256 Dawe to Dundas 26.5.1942. In 1949, Sir John 
Hall, Dundas' successor, having, as has been seen, reorganised 
the "Native Authorities" on the lines of Creech Jones' Despatch 
of 1947, devolved certain powers on to the "Native Councils", 
fixed the Administration's share of the Poll Tax at six shillings 
per head per annum and increased the African Administration tax 
by an amount equivalent to the former rebate which he abolished. 
However, this experiment, as Dundas had predicted, was shortly 
afterwards brought to an abrupt end, and the financial 
responsibility for the devolved services, the "Native Treasuries" 
having failed the test, handed back to the Protectorate 
Administration. And subsequent attempts did not fare any 
better. Such was the legacy of the inter war period financial 
controls over the Native Governments and Administrations.
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and its premature severance was to be deprecated;32 and so it was
done. The projected financial reforms were put in cold storage, and
shortly afterwards, Dundas was replaced by Sir John Hall. There was,
of course, no direct connection between Dundas1 transfer and his
views on "native taxation"; it is however noteworthy that his
successor did not carry out his predecessor's root and branch tax
reforms. He, however, did respond, albeit, cautiously and, as it
happened, without success, to the post war, inside and outside, calls
for reform.33 Having taken little part in financial administration,
however, the "Native Treasuries" were ill-equipped to handling large
sums of public funds, and many were soon relieved of their recently
acquired financial responsibilities. The last 50 years had hardly
taught them anything, and Hall's modest financial reforms were the
first, in a series, to reap the benefits of their inexperience.
Thus, though, the British approach to "Native Taxation" realised its
first policy objective - the establishment of a self-financing
Protectorate - it did not achieve its equally important second
objective - the training of the "Native Treasuries" to administer
their financial affairs.. Again, the reason is not too far to seek:
as has been mentioned the two policy objectives were contradictory,
and it was not until 1955 when this somewhat primitive form of
taxation was superceded by the Personal Graduated Tax, the details of
which are set out below, that, once again, further efforts, were made
to devolve certain financial responsibilities on to the newly created
District Administrations. The damage had already been done, however;
and as the preceding account indicates, these efforts, too, were
foredoomed; many a District Council did not come under the new
#
32. C.O. 536/209/40256 Oliver Stanley to Dundas 3.12.1942, see the 
passage quoted at foot note 24 supra.
33. Vide, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945, Louis, R.W. OUP, 1977, 
passim.
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ordinance, and the few that chose to assume the new responsibilities, 
having failed, owing to lack of experience, to meet the Government's
<t
strigent requirements, were relieved of their financial duties, and 
the latter, once again, returned to the Central Government.
8.1.2. THE NEED FOR PERSONAL GRADUATED TAXATION
Before the passage of the District Administration (District Council) 
Ordinance of 1955,34 the financial arrangements between the 
Protectorate Administration and the Native Governments and 
Administrations were dominated, as has been seen by the Poll Tax 
rebates and the African Administration Tax, which despite the name 
was imposed by the Governor in Council under the African 
Administration Tax Ordinance, 1938.35 Thus both taxes were levied by 
the Protectorate Government though the proceeds of the latter went 
direct into the coffers of the "Native Treasuries". There was, as 
time went on, however, growing dissatisfaction within the ranks of 
British Officialdom with these fianncial arrangements between the 
Protectorate Administration and the various Native Authorities. 
Indeed, it was universally accepted that Poll Tax was not a 
satisfactory form of 'Native Taxation', but the Government, though
34. No. 1 of 1955. S. 51(1) provided that:- any rate or tax including 
the district administration tax may be based upon any one or more 
of the following systems:- (a) a uniform rate per head; (b) a 
graduated rate per head; (c) a rate based on the value of any 
movable or immovable property belonging to, leased, lent or 
occupied by any person liable to pay the rate or tax; or (d) any 
other system approved by the Governor in Council.
35. Cap. 188. Section 3(1) stipulated that:- "there shall be 
charged, levied, and collected - an annual tax to be known as the 
African Administration Tax. (2) The tax payable shall be at the 
rates specified in the schedule to this ordinance in respect of 
the areas and the class of persons therein mentioned. (4) The 
proceeds of the tax shall be payable to such African 
Administrations as the Governor may direct"•
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not oblivious to this it could not dispense with its proceeds, nor 
indeed, find a good substitute therefor. And it was not until the 
1940s, that serious attempts were made to find alternative sources of 
revenue. As a flat rate levy, it was argued, Poll Tax was 
regressive, inequitable and an unsatisfactory form of taxation. It 
did not recognise the concept of "ability to pay", one of the most 
important canons of taxation.
"Turning first to direct taxation of Africans, its form 
is that of a poll tax or house and poll tax at a flat 
rate which does not vary with the resources of the 
individual, though it is higher in districts where 
conditions are favourable e.g. availability of paid 
employment. The tax is, of course, regressive in 
character, the burden being heaviest for the poorest 
man.36 jt is also the case that the necessity for 
earning money to pay tax sometimes forces the 
African male into wage earning employment, away from 
his tribe with consequent disruption of his normal way 
of life. The tax has been criticized on the grounds . 
that it implies recognition of the "plurality of 
Society in East Africa ...."37
In Dundas' eyes, however, these criticisms, though valid, were
36. It was pointed out that "in the case of the lowest income groups 
it might represent a considerable burden amounting, in some 
cases, to nearly the whole of the cash income". Woods Report p. 
112. See also Report on Revenue and Taxation, A.E. Forrester, 
(the Treasurer of Uganda) Government Printer, Entebbe, 1936 p.4: 
"In Uganda the bulk of the taxation is paid by large numbers in 
small sums. Generally speaking, the amount paid by each 
individual represents a very large proportion of his money 
income, in many cases this proportion approaches 100 percent."
And as early as 1914 the Committee appointed to inquire into and 
offer suggestions for revising additional revenue to meet the 
increased expenditure of the Protectorate had this to say:
"The injustice of the Poll Tax when it is the only 
direct tax is that the sacrifice demanded from the 
Native is not in proportion to his means, the wealthy 
chief who owns from 10 sq miles up to 100 sq miles (as 
in the case of the Katikiro of Buganda) and has a large 
herd of cattle pays the same in direct tax as the 
ordinary working peasant." (C.O. 536/68/18929. Inc.
No. 1 in Despatch No. 178 of 24.4 1914.)
37. Report on A Fiscal Survey of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika,
Sir Wilfrid Woods, Government Printer, Nairobi, 1946 p.12.
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misdirected; the problem, in his view, outlined below, lay elsewhere 
the tax itself.
"While I consider that in Uganda native taxes are 
unduly high, it is less the incidence and burden than 
the existing form and nature of taxation which I would 
see changed. The Poll Tax System has not been a very 
happy feature of Administration in Africa and we would 
do well to soften its appearance for the future. The 
time for doing so is ripe, if not overdue. For over 
and above all other objections I feel strongly that 
this system of taxation is now out of date and has 
become a misfit in the general framework of our policy 
of African Administration. It survives from a time 
when rough and ready means of furnishing revenue was 
unavoidable and when also a visible sign of submission 
was of practical consequence. Since then the whole 
relationship between our Government and Native 
Communities has been tranformed, and so also has the 
fiscal system undergone radical changes, in as much as 
there is now not only a Protectorate Administration and 
a Protectorate Treasury but there are also Tribal 
Administrations and Tribal Treasuries."38
Dundas maintained that had these conditions existed at the beginning 
of this century, the Poll Tax system in question would never have 
been devised. He thus believed that the time had come, if not 
overdue to "review the system in its relation to modern conceptions 
of Administrative practice and policy".39 He, accordingly, drew up 
his Memorandum on Native Taxation, the upshot of which was his 
abortive fiscal reforms considered earlier. These efforts, however, 
were not entirely wasted. Dundas' fiscal policies, having been 
condemned by the then Colonial Secretary, were subsequently embraced 
by his successors at the colonial office and incorporated into the 
post war financial reforms, of which the high watermark was the 
Graduated Personal Tax, the main features of which are considered 
below.
38. Memorandum on Native Taxation op.cit.
39. Ibid.
8.1.3
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THE GRADUATED PERSONAL TAX LEGISLATION, 1955
Until 1953, the revenue sources of local administrations were 
basically the Poll Tax rebates, and the African Administration Tax 
collected by the "Native Authorities" but imposed by the Governor in 
council under the relevant legislation; at a flat rate which varied 
from area to area according to the varying economic conditions; 
provision being made for the partial or total exemption of those 
incapable of paying the full rate. In 1952 the Central Government at 
the behest of Andrew Cohen, the new Governor, wishing to adjust the 
Central-Local relations, including the financial relations, invited a 
local government expert, Claude Wallis, to inquire into and report, 
inter alia, on the devolution of financial responsibilities onto the 
various local government bodies. In this connection, Wallis found 
that progress towards graduation of taxation had been hampered by:-
"(i) lack of insistence by the Central Government;
(ii) the maintenance of a flat rate poll tax by the
Government itself;
(iii) local vested interests;
(iv) inability to think except in terms of a scheme uniform
throughout a district;
(v) fear of getting out of line with neighbouring districts;
(vi) confusion with income tax;
(vii) thinking only in terms of varied rates of poll tax."40
Wallis thus found that the existing financial arrangements between 
the Protectorate Government and the "Native Authorities” had largely 
been influenced by political rather than by sound fiscal 
considerations. The imposition of the Protectorate Poll Tax, and its 
retention, despite its defects, is a case in point.
40. Report of an Inquiry into African Local Government in the Uganda 
Protectorate, C.A.G. Wallis, Government Printer, Entebbe, 1953,
p. 26 .
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"In 1943 the Governor asked whether he could combine the Poll 
Tax and the Native Administration Tax. This was considered 
undesirable as it was felt that the natives should make a 
contribution to the Central Government and should be aware of 
their duty to do so."41
"Indeed, the only argument I have heard in support of retaining the 
Poll Tax is that it is a loyalty tax."42 Evidently, this view was 
shared by a large number of witnesses, including one or two 'Native 
Administrations'I Yet, Wallis "found no evidence that the people's 
loyalty to the crown" was in doubt: "it seems to be deep and general 
and to be undisturbed even by the equally deep general suspicion 
about the Government's land policy."43 Nevertheless, the argument 
persisted. But in keeping with his other proposals, Wallis dismissed 
this argument, and duly recommended that the Central Government 
should force the pace by:-
"(a) abolishing Poll Tax;
(b) reducing the subventions for education by a like amount;
(c) pegging the African Local Government Tax at a fixed level;
(d) insisting that any further revenue shall be raised by
graduated assessments."44
"The adoption of a rational and just taxation policy, [Wallis 
insisted], is essential if local governments are to assume 
complete financial responsibility for their present functions, 
let alone extend them. The flat rate is the most primitive 
form of taxation and became out of date as soon as variations 
in individual wealth appeared. In all districts now there is 
some variation of wealth: in some districts the variation is 
considerable. Graduation of taxation should now become the 
criterion of a local authority's understanding of what 
financial responsibility means. It should be kept permanently 
on the agenda until a satisfactory plan has been worked out."45
41. C.O. 536/213/40256 Minute by Footman - 18.5.1944.
42. The Wallis Report op cit p.26. Wallis felt that this was a 
political, not a financial argument. He records "that Bukedisupp 
orted it"•
43* The Wallis Report loc cit. p.26.
44. Ibid. p.26.
45. Ibid. p.27.
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Wallis' recommendations were, with minor exceptions accepted and 
embodied in the District Administration (District Councils)
Ordinance, 1955, and in the rules and regulations made under it.
Under this legislation, District Councils were authorised to levy an 
annual tax - the District Administration Tax - for their own use.
It was provided that the rate or tax should be based on one or more 
of the following:-
"(i) a uniform rate per head;
(ii) a graduated rate per head;
(iii) a rate based on the value of any property owned by the
person liable to pay the rate or tax;
(iv) any other system approved by the Governor in Council."46
Thus, regrettably, the Personal Graduated Tax was not mandatory; the 
Ordinance was permissive, and not surprisingly, only 10 District 
Councils adopted it: the rest remained under the African Local 
Governments Ordinance, 1949•
In broad terms, the graduated personal tax is an income tax based on 
ability to pay, "but one which is suitably adapted to African 
conditions."47 in fact, the tax introduced in most areas between 
1954 and 1956, was in its essential respects a poll tax dressed in 
modern garb: it was based on the value of the taxpayer's visible 
possessions and income earning assets both movable and immovable. 
Assessments were made at sub-county level, partly on the information 
furnished by the chiefs and partly on the personal knowledge of the 
members of the Assessment Committee. The tax rate was fixed locally,
46. No. 1 of 1955, Section 51 (1)
47. Report of the Uganda Fiscal Commission, Ursula Hicks,
Tress, R.C., and Sims, F.H., Government Printer, Entebbe, 1962,
p. 18.
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subject to the Provincial Commissioner's approval, and initially 
ranged from 20 through to 100 shillings. As anticipated, each tax 
authority published its tax schedules and rates that varied according 
to the varying local economic conditions, and while this had been the 
theoretical justification for the imposition of the graduation of 
taxation, in practice it soon proved unworkable. To the extent that 
different district councils fixed varying tax scales the system 
opened itself to endless abuses. It was common place for ordinary 
individuals to pay taxes in those tax districts where the rates were 
lower than in their own districts, thus avoiding the payment of 
relatively higher taxes. Besides, some taxpayers were constantly 
moving their goods and chatties across district boundaries in search 
of liberal tax assessments. Moreover, salary and wage earners, whose 
earnings were readily verifiable tended to pay relatively higher 
taxes than farmers and others whose wealth and assets were difficult 
to assess. Indeed, early attempts to make assessments mere equitable 
by taking into account the individual's income earning assets such as 
livestock, coffee trees and cotton were strongly resisted by the 
farmers and their supporters on the District Councils.
Clearly, such differences were arbitrary, unsound and indefensible, 
and as might be expected, tax assessment regulations were 
subsequently formalised and standardized throughout the 
Protectorate. In 1958, the Protectorate Authorities intervened and 
imposed an upper limit of 400 shillings, and this was subsequently 
raised to 600 shillings. Despite these changes, however, the methods 
of tax assessment remained crude and susceptible to such abuses as 
deliberate under, or overvaluation, ha;:rassment, bribery and 
corruption.
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Yet another assessment related problem was the non-uniformity of tax 
administration - i.e. assessment, collection and enforcement - within 
any tax area. Tax assessment and collection varied from county to 
county and sometimes within the county and the amount collected 
depended largely on the chief's efficiency, ability and industry, and 
this in turn led to the introduction of the so called tax quota 
system of which the modus operandi in Bukedi will serve as an 
example•
"In 1956 a detailed study was made of the tax payments in each 
county and the average rate of tax paid by each tax payer was 
obtained. This revealed a remarkable difference between 
payments in the six counties. In Budama County, where 
assessment had been efficiently carried out, the people were 
paying at an average rate of shs. 34/25, whereas in the worst 
county, Sarnia Bugwe, people were paying shs. 26/10. This 
situation clearly had to be rectified as it showed that some 
counties were in effect 'sponging' on the others, and were not 
playing an equal part in the development of the district.
To counter this a quota system was evolved in 1957 whereby each 
county was given a tax quota, based on the number of taxpayers 
multiplied by a standard average rate of tax. This was 
designed to ensure that every county contributed equally to 
district revenues, and it enables the people to feel that they 
are being equally taxed with their neighbours in adjoining 
counties. The quota is then broken down within the county to 
the Kitongole level and assessment committees have to ensure 
that while still assessing people on an individual basis, the 
quota for each Kitongole is reached. This arrangement has 
proved popular and has resulted in a considerable increase in 
revenue."48
48. African Local Government Taxation in Bukedi, Government Printer,
Entebbe, 1958.
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In fact the quota system was far from popular and was the subject of 
much criticism and is said to have been one of the causes of the 
disturbances which occurred in the Eastern Province in I960.49
"The evidence that an alleged high level of taxation and an 
imperfect method of assessing and collecting it were the 
unifying forces in the disturbances has been overwhelming, and 
we are compelled to give the subject detailed examination."50
And so, they did, and the Commission's report sheds some light on tax 
assessment and the quota system in the district. The Commission 
found that the quota system had, "in an area where intertribal 
jealousies abound", ensured that each area contributed its fair share 
of taxation, and that it had efficiently served the purpose for which 
it was designed.81 However, it was also found that the quota system 
was fraught with difficulties. In particular, the Commission noted 
that:-
"The difficulties of assessment have been inextricably 
complicated by the application by the district council of a 
system of 'quotas' upon each saza, which in turn are broken 
down into quotas for Gombolola and lesser units. In fact the 
individual assessments have been affected by the quota 
allotted, and the general complaints regarding the system of 
taxation as distinct from the specific complaints by 
individuals, have nearly all been directed at the quota rather 
than at the method of assessment in the narrower sense. We 
have concluded that these complaints are not without
foundation."52
49. Report of the Commissioner of Inquiry into Disturbances in the 
Eastern Province, 1960, Bennett, K.G., Government Printer, 
Entebbe, 1960, p.39.
In this connection the Report has this to say:-
"Indeed, the quota system has been under attack in Bukedi 
itself and, complaints having come to the District 
Commissioner's notice, the Finance Committee of the District 
Council appointed a subcommittee to consider the matter in July 
1959, and its report dated two months later, shows the 
inextricable connection between assessment and quotas."
50. Bennett's Report Ibid. p.39.
51. Ibid p.38-39.
52. Ibid p.39. See also Mr. J. Wasukulu's letter to R.F. Roper, the
D.C., Bukedi, dated 13.1.1960 - Bennett's Report Ibid.
Appendix 3.
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Even the District Commissioner was "satisfied that in some cases the 
African Local Government graduated tax has been wrongly or 
arbitrarily assessed."88 Indeed in 1959, complaints having come to 
the District Commissioner's notice, the Finance Committee was forced 
to appoint a subcommittee to look into and report on the quota 
system. The subcommittee's Report, of which the following is an 
excerpt, was equally critical.
"The general opinion expressed in the district is strongly 
opposed to a form of quota system given to counties each year. 
Objecting to a quota system for all counties, it was stated 
that when quotas are given to counties this enforces chiefs to 
assess high taxes to people in order to get the required quota 
from the County and to get excess if possible, even if some 
people supposed to pay the quota have immigrated."84
Despite this general opposition, however, the subcommittee 
recommended, and the Finance Committee accepted that the "quota 
system should continue to guide the superior power to know how much 
is to be the revenue in the district and enable the committee 
concerned with the estimates to run its work properly."55 As the 
Commission laconically states: "The quota system had become 
prostituted."88 Finally, there was the issue of reassessments to 
which the quota system gave rise. It will not have escaped notice 
that the quota was a break down of the desired and possible total tax 
revenue from the district or its sub-divisions, and the purpose of
53. Message from the D.C., Bukedi, to the people of Bukedi, Bennett's 
Report, op cit. p.87, Appendix 7.
54. The Bennett Commission, Ibid., p.39.
55. Ibid., p.40.
56. Ibid., p.42. "There was good evidence that there had been some 
reassessment in the previous years." Thus one witness "admitted 
that of 2419 taxpayers, 600 - mainly factory workers - had been 
assessed. And it was not always that, on reassessment, a mere 
single step in the tax progression - shs. 10/- - was added to the 
original sum. We have inspected tickets showing tax increases of 
shs. 40 and shs'. 5 0 ......"
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the quota was to ensure that that target was achieved. The tricky 
dilemma, with which the tax collector had to contend, was what to do 
where there was a shortfall? According to the Bennett Commission, 
reassessment was the only answer. Indeed, the Commission found, in 
almost all the cases where there was a shortfall, that the Saza chief 
"gave instructions to the chiefs to raise taxes to those people who 
were wealthier and also to reassess those who had been out",57 and 
were quite satisfied that reassessment was a common feature of tax 
administration in the district, and in view of their findings, had no 
hesitation in recommending its abolition.88
"Not withstanding the perfectly proper reasons for its 
introduction and its usefulness, we consider that the quota 
system must be abandoned, and with it will go the device of 
reassessment, which we are convinced played so large a part in 
causing dissatisfaction with the tax system. It can be held 
against it that it influences an assessment which by law should 
be made in relation to the payer's capacity and not be 
influenced by other considerations. In addition, it is the 
mass hysteria which the word now evokes which persuades us to 
recommend as we do. No amount of reasoning, even given the 
requisite understanding, would remove the stigma which attaches 
to the system.*59
Finally, the Commission, as part of a process to transfer the burden 
of tax administration, particularly assessment from the chiefs to the 
Council, recommended that a subcommittee of the district council 
should be set up to supervise the work of the assessment committees;
57. The Bennett Commission, op cit., p.42.
58. Ibid., p.42. It is reported that: Reassessment was prevalent, 
and it was fatal. But the pressure took other forms. We are 
quite satisfied that people previously exempt were assessed to 
quite considerable taxes. We are also satisfied that, in the 
search for "starters", youths below the age of 18 years were 
assessed. Old men entitled to reduction, if not exemption, were 
taxed. There, had been frequent annual increases in personal 
assessments of as much as shs. 20 and if these were not 
capricious they were certainly so regarded."
59. The Bennett Commission, loc cit., p.44-45.
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and that such a subcommittee, consisting of elected members, and 
including a high ranking officer such as the Treasurer or the 
Assistant Treasurer, should bear responsibility for the making of 
assessments, it being understood that the Council itself was 
ultimately responsible for the work of its subcommittee. It seems 
the taxpaying public and indeed certain Government officials, 
including the District Commissioner, were of the view, albeit 
erroneously, that tax assessment was the responsibility of the 
chiefs. In fact the responsibility for tax assessment was vested in 
the District Council.80 In practice, however, the chiefs were the 
dominant force, and this led some of them, with a view to meeting 
their quotas, into following improper practices and procedures which, 
as the foregoing material shows, ultimately brought the whole tax 
system into disrepute. Rather surprisingly, there was no statutory 
authority for the appointment of assessment committees; such 
committees as existed were appointed by the District Councils, at 
their discretion; and this, it was alleged, was the cause of the 
confusion, first referred to above, and, of course, largely dictated
the proposals of the Bennett Commission.
The Commission's proposals were accepted by the Government and were 
subsequently incorporated into the Local Administrations ordinance,
1962,81.which fixed the maximum tax rate at shs. 600 p.a., and
60. L.N. 329 of 1958. This Legal Notice varied the provision which
originally provided for a flat rate tax of 22/- 00 that "any
person whose means are in the opinion of the Council, sufficient 
to pay a greater tax, such person shall pay an additional amount 
of tax, as the Council may, having regard to his means, 
determine•"
61. No. 23 of 1962. The main provisions of this Ordinance lie
outside the scope of this study, but are outlined here for the
sake of completion.
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provision made for the establishment of Assessment Committees, proper 
assessment procedures, and the abolition of all the previous 
"bewildering complex of taxes", noted earlier, including those "which 
ha<j racial overtones."82 An attempt was thus made to inject a fair 
amount of justice and fairness into an inherently inequitable tax 
regime; mainly because the assessment of a person's ability to pay 
more than the standard rate was liable to infinite variation. In 
consequence, the poor, despite the graduation of taxation, continued 
to pay a large proportion of his meagre income to the state in the 
form of the Personal Graduated Tax.
However, the new measures were a major improvement on the existing 
machinery of tax assessment and collection. In particular the 
establishment of Assessment and Appeal Committees was of the greatest 
importance and a timely provision. It brought the tax structure into 
line with modern conceptions of taxation and fiscal administration. 
Under these arrangements, assessment committees were set up at every 
Gombolola, throughout the Protectorate. Each Committee consisted of 
the Gombolola chief, the ex officio chairman, two parish chiefs and 
two elected members of the Sub-county Council. The purpose of having 
such committees was to ensure that the knowledge of the local 
"notables", both official and unofficial councillors, should be 
utilised to determine the correct and appropriate income brackets in 
which individual taxpayers belonged. Each Assessment Committee was 
responsible for determining the individual's tax liability and the 
assessment of the taxpayer's means for meeting his tax obligations.
The determination of taxable income was carried out in three stages
0
as follows:-
62. Report of the World Bank of the Economic Development of Uganda, 
1961, p.64.
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"The first process is to determine the standard rate of return 
on particular assets, proper to the season and the district: so 
much per coffee tree, so much per head of cattle, and so on. 
Secondly, a popular committee (consisting of the sub-county 
chief as chairman, one parish chief, the parish chief of the 
area being assessed, and two other persons, from the sub-county 
elected by the Council) visits the taxpayers.88 The business 
of this body is purely fact finding: counting coffee trees, 
checking salaries, noting as well as they can the turnover or 
stock in trade of a shopkeeper. All sources of income for each 
taxpayer are then entered on a form which is signed or 
otherwise identified by the taxpayer. The final stage, which 
is usually performed in full village meeting, consists merely 
of the necessary arithmetic to calculate the taxpayer's total 
income. From this any allowances are deducted to give his 
taxable income. This method of assessment has several merits. 
It is simple and cheap. The taxpayer knows his assessors and 
they are familiar with his circumstances. When the processes 
are carried out conscientiously it is ideal for peasant farm 
and mixed incomes, but it can easily go wrong. Not all village 
chiefs are energetic or competent to carry out their work 
properly. It has been put to us, too, that political 
affiliations have been allowed to influence tax assessments.
It must also be acknowledged that the machinery of popular 
assessment works much less efficiently at the higher than at 
the lower levels: it is too easy for the local rich man to find 
ways of securing a favourable assessment."84
Nevertheless, the general opinion among the various local 
administrations was that the existing machinery of assessment, though 
not perfect, was worth preserving. In particular, they pointed out 
that the presence of non-officials "gives psychological satisfaction 
to the taxpayers, who get a feeling of assurance of a fair deal in 
the assessments made, than would be the case with the civil servants 
who may be revenue minded."88 what was needed, therefore, was a much
t
greater use of training courses for chiefs, members of assessment 
committees, and others connected with tax assessment and collection; 
and obviously, there was a need for model codes for the guidance of 
local administrations in the preparation of their own assessment
63. S.65 (2) of No. 23 of 1962.
64. Report of the Uganda Fiscal Commission, Government Printer, 1962, 
p. 22—23.
65. Tax Inquiry Report, 1964/65, Government Printer, 1965, op.cit.
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regulations. Such guidance, coupled with a greater use of Central 
Government Inspectors, would secure a better standard of assessment, 
strengthen the hands of the local treasurers, and "remove some of the 
politics which at present leads local councils to blocking 
improvements."88 Furthermore, it was essential that the Revenue 
Authorities, in cases of suspected malpractices, should avail 
themselves of the appeal procedures set out in S.67 under which any 
aggrieved person, whether a taxpayer or a tax official, could within 
30 days challenge the assessment committee's decision. Thus a county 
chief had a right of appeal, if in his opinion the local assessment 
committee had made an assessment which was not commensurate with the 
income of the taxpayer. Further, there was a right of appeal in 
cases where an individual who ought to be assessed was not assessed 
or where an individual was unreasonably granted partial or complete 
exemption from taxation.8?
Likewise, the taxpayer could, within 30 days, appeal and otherwise 
challenge the merits of the assessment committee's decision, provided 
he was a person:-
(a) assessed to pay a tax for which he was not liable under the law;
(b) assessed to pay a rate tax than the standard rate of tax;
(c) who was refused exemption from the payment of tax; or
(d) whose exemption or partial exemption from the payment of tax had 
been varied or revoked.88
66. Report of the Uganda Fiscal Commission, loc cit.
67. S.67 (3) (a), (b) and (c). The composition of the Appeal
Committee was as follows:- (a) a judicial officer in the service
of the Administration, as chairman, (b) two officers in the 
service of the Administration, (c) an elected member of the 
County Council; and (d) an unofficial member of the Finance 
Committee of the Administration elected by the Council's Finance 
Committee.
68. S.67 (2), S.58 (2).
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The Appeal Committee, on receipt of an application, had the power to 
confirm or vary the assessment committee's assessment, and except in 
the "treaty states", its decision was final and conclusive - there 
was no further appeal. The atmosphere at the hearing was informal 
and the taxpayer was allowed to present his case; as he saw fit and 
without much interference from the bench. The tax authority's case 
was invariably put by the Muruka chief of the area from which the 
appeal arose, and in most cases he (the 'prosecuting' Muluka chief) 
was always a member of the assessment committee whose determination 
was in question. Indeed, the Appeal Committee itself was an integral 
part of the local authority's tax administration machinery, and in 
this restricted sense, was open to the charge of partiality, and 
despite the interposition of elected councillors, the Appeal 
Committee could not be said to be truly impartial. Indeed, these 
quasi-judicial assessment arrangements were contrary to the rules of 
natural justice, particularly the nemo judex rule, in that the tax 
assessors were, in reality, judges in their causes.
These arrangements were, however, from the point of view of the 
revenue authorities, indispensable - summary justice was dispensed 
inexpensively and expeditiously - a capital objective in any scheme 
of things tax administration; and indeed were a major advance on 
previous practices-and procedures. The same could not be said of the 
tax itself, however. Despite graduation and the reforms noted 
earlier, the majority of the common people continued to pay a higher 
percentage of their incomes in taxes, partly because the tax was 
inherently regressive, and partly because of high tax rates.
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"The present system of the personal graduated tax cannot be 
said to achieve a fair and equitable distribution of the burden 
of taxation on the different classes of people. Unlike the 
case with progressive income tax, the burden of personal 
graduated tax is heavier in the lower income group, whilst the 
percentage of the imposition is higher on those in higher 
grades of income. Personal graduated tax is hence regressive, 
not only between the different grades of income, but also 
within each bracket of the graduated scale of tax, as the levy 
is not on the slab system as obtaining in income tax, which is 
progressive with the increase in income."89
In practical terms, this meant that the bulk of the tax revenue was 
paid by large numbers in small sums, the amount paid by each 
individual taxpayer representing a very large proportion of his money 
income and in many cases the whole of the annual income.
"The personal graduated tax is regressive in the sense that 
looking at the scales as a whole, people with low incomes pay a 
higher proportion of their incomes in personal graduated tax. 
There are two root causes of this phenomenon. First, unlike 
the systems operating with the income tax, there is practically 
no tax free allowance. For example, an able bodied who manages 
to get just enough cash income to pay the standard rate of tax 
pays 100% of his income in tax, while a rich man in receipt of 
60,000/- p.a. pays only 600/- in tax, that is 1% of his income.
The second cause of the regressive character of this tax is 
that ....it has a ceiling of shs. 600/- stipulated by law and 
this is payable in most districts by people in receipt of shs 
1000/- and above. Since a person's income increases beyond shs 
1000/- he does not pay more graduated tax the percentage of his 
income absorbed by the tax tends to fall."?0
In fact, it was the Government's policy towards income taxation that 
was the main cause of these anomalies. The nascent Administration, 
like its colonial predecessor, was thus of the view that every 
person, including the "unemployed, the very poor and the lowly paid, 
should contribute his mite to the exchequer",?1 and that "no
69. Tax Inquiry Report, 1964/65, op cit.
70. Ibid., p.153.
71. Ibid., p.153.
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able-bodied adult male should be a drag on society".?2 it was his 
duty, the Government maintained, "to secure work or find means to pay 
the tax to which he is liable".?8 Despite the foregoing, however, . 
the graduated personal tax was a major source of local revenue; it 
provided more than 50% of the local authorities' revenues, and this 
may well explain the Government's reluctance, not withstanding its 
inherent defects, to do away with their only beneficial inheritance. 
And they, too, were not slow to extol its virtues, not least of which 
was the cultivation of the taxpayer's sense of responsibility for 
government services annd participation in the nation's economic 
development by selling his livestock, produce or his personal skills, 
both innate and acquired. Indeed, no better colonial bequest could 
have been devised and, not surprisingly, it has weathered the storm 
rather well. It is, as a matter of fact, the only unadulterated 
colonial institution still in force, and that is no mean achievement.
72. Tax Inquiry Report, op.cit., p.153.
73. Ibid., p.153.
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE MODERNISATION OF NATIVE TRIBUNALS
9.1.1 THE PLACE OF NATIVE COURTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
•
"With our limited European staff, at the most two, often only 
one officer in a district, we must work through the chiefs and 
admitting this it follows that the authority of the chiefs 
must, in reason be upheld and that they must have certain 
political powers with which in these countries it is impossible 
to disassociate a certain civil and criminal jurisdiction."!
Before the advent of colonial rule, each tribe in Uganda had its own 
arrangements for the settlement of disputes, and some of these 
traditional judicial systems were highly developed and fairly 
sophisticated. There existed in Bunyoro, for example, a well ordered 
system of indigenous tribunals which administered justice in 
accordance with well established and recognised local rites and 
customs. These tribunals, over which the local chief presided, were 
an integral part of the tribe's political organisation and collective 
security. Consequently, each chief in the administrative hierarchy 
had jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over his people; and his 
magisterial work was, in fact, the most important of his chiefly 
duties: the Banyoro were, indeed, a litigious people1 There were no 
clearly defined forms of procedure or rules of evidence, and subject 
to the right of appeal to a higher court and ultimately to the King's 
Court, the chief's jurisdiction was unlimited. Thus each territorial 
chief had power to hear all cases, such as murder, cattle lifting, 
theft, and all manner of matrimonial causes, arising in his area of 
jurisdiction. The machinery of justice in Bunyoro was thus clearly 
well rooted and refined. Many early British officers were indeed
1. F.O. 2/858 Col. Hayes - Sadler to Lansdowne, 4.8.1904.
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struck by its high degree of development, formalisation and 
efficiency: it was accessible and not infrequently used. Here as 
elsewhere, particularly in Ankole, Buganda and Toro, the 
administration of the lex loci was, to the outside observer, equally 
startling, and what is more, exceptionally good.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that the colonial power should, on 
the establishment of colonial rule, have left the administration of 
justice in the hands of the King and his Chiefs. The various 
indigenous legal systems found in vogue were, as a matter of course, 
recognised and simply incorporated in the new Native Agreements.
Thus Portal's Provisional Agreement of 1893 implicitly recognised the 
existence and jurisdiction of the Kabaka, the Lukiko and the 
divisional chiefs; and, so too, did the Uganda Agreement, 1900. The 
latter simply stated that the Kabaka should exercise direct rule over 
his subjects, to whom he was to administer justice through the Lukiko 
and through others of his officials in the manner approved by the 
H.M. Commissioner.3 similar recognition was given to the Toro and 
Ankole judicial systems in 1900 and 1901, respectively.^ The "Unyoro 
Native Courts Ordinance, 1905" gave similar statutory recognition to 
Bunyoro's chiefly courts, and the Native Courts Ordinance of the same 
year made provision for the establishment of Native Courts in the 
Central and Nile Provinces.
Similar arrangements were extended to the other parts of the 
Protectorate as and when these came under British control and by 1919
2. Vide, John Roscoe, The Northern Bantu, OUP 1915.
3. The Uganda Agreement, 1900, Article 6.
4. The Toro Agreement, 1900, Article 6', and the Ankole Agreement, 
Article 6 were in similar terms.
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the administration of justice, outside the treaty states, was 
governed by a single ordinance - the Native Courts Ordinance, 1919, 
and the hitherto unlimited jurisdiction of the traditional chief 
defined and circumscribed. As in the pre-European days, however, the 
"tribal court" and the "supreme tribal Council" were inextricably 
integrated: the organisation of native justice was "an integral part 
- often the most effective of the administrative machine which the 
native authorities operated".5 Instances of gross injustice were 
less frequent and indeed very rare among the more advanced chiefs, 
and many District officers, who exercised advisory and supervisory 
powers over them were generally satisfied with their work, and any 
attempts to divorce judicial administration from native 
administration was always discouraged, and indeed frowned upon by the 
Protectorate Authorities. For them the functions of the chiefs were 
"administrative, judicial and fiscal".5 Indeed, there was at this 
time, considerable agitation, in administrative circles, that Native 
Courts should be placed under the exclusive supervision of the 
Executive branch rather than the Judiciary. Under the prevailing 
system of Indirect Administration, it was felt that any material 
interference with the traditional judicial processes would "deal a 
serious blow at the power and prestige" of the Chiefs, thus weakening 
the Native Administrations generally.? In any case, it was generally 
averred that the doctrine of "the separation of powers" was unknown 
to "primitive tribes", that the powers of the Chief were indivisible 
and that there was, in the eyes of the native, no distinction between 
a ruler and a judge. That, in a nutshell, was Sadler's judicial
5. Dr. H.F. Morris, "Native Courts: a corner-stone of Indirect Rule" 
in Morris, H.F. and Read, J.S. Indirect Rule and the Search for 
Justice, OUP 1972, pp.131-166.
6. Sir Charles Dundas, Native Administration in Uganda, 1941.
7. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to S/S, 4.8.1904.
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policy, which, as it happened, was approved by the colonial office, 
and was subsequently adopted by his successors* It was felt that the 
development of Native Courts should be left in the hands of the 
District Officers rather than the Judiciary* Sadler's reasons for 
this were partly dictated by convenience and partly by the 
constraints of official policy on Native Administration*
"I consider that the direct subordination to the High Court of 
the limited jurisdiction exercised by the Chiefs a measure to 
be much deprecated* They exercise their powers according to 
Native Law and Custom, and this part of the country is in too 
primitive a state to adapt to our laws and procedure; so long 
as the European officer can at any rate interfer, as he can at 
the weekly Baraza or on complaints received, and that 
substantial justice is done, this, I consider is all that we 
should at present require* Let us rather in the words of 
Sir Harry Johnston, "encourage the King or Chief to govern his 
people directly on humane principles, with only that amount of 
interference from the nearest European official as may protect 
the natives from injustice and cruelty*"®
Native Courts, under the "sympathetic control" of District Officers, 
were thus regarded as having an administrative role and as such as 
agents of "administration and modernisation"*® It follows, 
therefore, that any study of local government institutions in the 
colonial state, without an examination of the development of Native 
Courts would be misleading and, indeed, incomplete; hence this 
study* Its aim is to examine the salient features of the Native 
Courts legislation, the policy considerations underlying its 
introduction and implementation, the relationship between Native 
Courts, and the High Court and, in particular, the subsequent 
subordination of the former to the latter*
8* F.O* 2/858 Sadler to S/S op.cit*
9* F.O* 2/858/Wilson to S/S Inc* in Dispatch No. 218 of 4*8*1904*
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To this end, the "Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance, 1905" is examined 
first - and in some detail - partly because it determined, once and 
for all, the main lines of Government policy on Native Courts, and 
partly because it was the first to give definite recognition to 
tribal judicial systems and thus set the pattern for future 
legislative developments; highlights the significance and place of 
Native Courts in the early days of British rule, the importance the 
British attached to them and their crucial and supportive role in the 
chief's exercise of his executive authority* Indeed, Native Courts 
were the core of the local institutions with which this thesis is 
concerned.
9.1.2 THE (B )UNYORO NATIVE COURTS ORDINANCE 1905
For* reasons that are not readily apparent, the Kingdom of 
Bunyoro-Kitara was always regarded, by many administrative officers, 
as "a conquered country"1® and in consequence, though the oldest 
kingdom in the Protectorate, no agreement was entered into with her 
rulers until 1933* Yet, it was always administered in the same way 
as Ankole and Toro as a matter of administrative convenience*
"There is no reason why Unyoro should not be administered in 
the same way as Ankole and Toro - all three little kingdoms 
have their Kabaka, Lukiko and Saza chiefs - it is indeed being 
administered on the lines obtaining in those districts, but 
without sufficient warrant*
10* F.O* 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne, 4*8*1904* "Unyoro was acquired 
by us by conquest, we have therefore a free hand in the'matter*" 
It is interesting to note that though both Kabarega and Mwanga 
were captured at the same time, Buganda, over which the latter 
ruled, was never considered a conquered country.
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Unyoro differs from Ankole and Toro in that it was acquired by 
force of arms, it is not therefore necessary to enter into any 
Agreement with the Kabaka, and the Chiefs of the district, and 
any settlement made would more conveniently take the form of a 
concession or an order• "11
It was in the furtherance of this policy that in 1901 the Special 
Commissioner "decided to introduce a systematic civil administration 
into the country".12 in late 1901, the Lukiko and the recognised 
Saza chiefs were allowed, by the Acting Commissioner, to exercise 
"certain powers, civil and criminal", but like Col. Sadler, "I have 
been unable to find any record of what was actually done".1® It 
would appear, however, that the Acting Commissioner simply authorised 
the Saza chiefs to continue to exercise their traditional judicial 
powers, albeit under the general supervision of the local European 
officer in charge of the district. These powers were subsequently 
incorporated into a provisional agreement and the chiefs "told to 
follow its provisions for a couple of years, by which time they would 
be able to show if they were worthy of becoming parties to such an 
Agreement"•14 This arrangement was confirmed by the Acting 
Commissioner and for a time was sympathetically followed by 
successive officers, "but with several changes in officials and an 
unfortunate tendency to overlook records, the fact that the chiefs 
were in a progress of education [was] lost sight of, and a perfection 
of integrity - required of them as could more reasonably be expected 
in so long administered a country as Uganda".15
11. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne, 4.8.1904.
12. F.O. 2/858 Wilson to Sadler, 10.3.1904.
13. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne, 4.8.1904.
14. F.O. 2/858 Wilson to Sadler, 10.3.1904.
15. Ibid.
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This, Wilson felt, was the cause of the difficulties - "The disputes 
and tension between the chiefs and the peasantry" on the one hand, 
and "the chiefs and Prendergast", the collector, on the other - which 
he enquired into in early March 1904.16 Wilson's report, besides 
dealing fully with the matters in hand, gives an interesting summary 
of the country's political and social conditions and bears indirectly 
on the subject of civil and criminal jurisdiction under 
consideration. Of immediate interest are his proposals for reform of 
which the most important were:-'
"1. That, in addition to existing native Lukikos, open
official Barazas be established at Hoima and Masindi, 
where due publicity can be given to administrative 
measures and where opportunity can be given for an open 
hearing of such appeals from the natives as should be 
received.
2. That the Kabaka proceed to Masindi every quarter to review 
the action of the chiefs of that station [and] to hear 
such appeals from the County Chiefs as has been difficult 
to deal with at Hoima.
3. That each native Lukiko should keep a book of registration 
of cases tried by it and this book should always be 
available for official review.
4. That natives be publically informed that appeals can be 
made from the native Lukiko to the official Baraza."1?
Wilson's proposals were accepted by the Commissioner and incorporated 
into the (B)Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance 1905, the primary purpose 
of which was to enable the Commissioner "to formally authorise that 
justice in purely native cases in Bunyoro [should] continue to be 
administered by the Saza chiefs", ("some doing very well, others
16. F.O. 2/858 Wilson to Sadler, 10.3.1904.
17. Ibid.
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being untrained")1 &•, under the supervision of the High Court and in 
accordance with the Uganda Order in Council 1902. The latter 
provided that the Commissioner could, in addition to the High Court, 
constitute "courts subordinate to the High Court and Courts of 
special j u r i s d i c t i o n " T h e  Order in Council thus envisaged the 
establishment of two types of inferior tribunals - "subordinate 
courts" and "special courts". Whilst the former were to be 
subordinate to the High Court, the latter's legal status was a moot 
point.
This question first came to a head in 1904 when the Commissioner 
proposed to regularise the Native Courts in Bunyoro and sought to 
place them under the control of the Executive rather than the 
Judiciary. It was his view that Native Courts were "courts of 
special jurisdiction", and as such, outside, the purview of the High 
Court.20 The Judiciary, on the other hand, held the view that Native 
Courts were "courts subordinate" to the High Court and not "Courts of 
Special" jurisdiction as contended by the Commissioner. It was 
pointed out that any other arrangement would contravene the terms of 
the Uganda Order in Council of 1902 by which full jurisdiction, civil 
and criminal, over all persons and matters throughout Uganda was
18. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne, 4.8.1904. Indeed Wilson's 
recommendations were implemented immediately by an administrative 
order; the Ordinance was a mere formality: "I have already, 
[Sadler informed the Foreign Office] instructed the Deputy 
Commissioner that in carrying out the reforms he suggested and of 
which I approved, care should be observed not to take any action 
which would imply the exercise by the Chiefs or the Lukiko of any 
jurisdiction beyond that we have hitherto more or less tacitly 
allowed."
19. Uganda Order in Council, 1902, Article 18(1).
20. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne, op cit.
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vested in the High Court.21 This point was emphatically made by 
Judge George Ennis, in his memorandum to the Acting Commissioner in 
the following terms
"I submit, with the utmost deference, that [Native Courts] in 
so far as they exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction would 
be subordinate to the High Court. Article 15(i) of the Uganda 
Order in Council vests full civil and criminal jurisdiction in 
the High Court over all persons and all matters in Uganda. 
Article 18 gives power to constitute by Ordinance courts 
subordinate to the High Court; and, courts of special 
jurisdiction, while Article 22 provides that the High Court 
may, with the approval of the Commissioner make rules, subject 
to the provisions of any Ordinance, for regulating the practice 
and procedure of the High Court and all other courts which may 
be established in Uganda.
Courts of special jurisdiction contemplated by Article 18 must 
necessarily be courts whose jurisdiction is neither civil nor 
criminal such as courts for the hearing and disposal of 
matrimonial causes, divorce causes, probate and administration 
and bankruptcy, the jurisdiction in all of which is essentially
special."22
That, briefly, was the Judiciary's prima facie case, and so, when 
Ennis was asked to prepare a draft ordinance for the regularisation 
of Bunyoro's Native Courts, he ignored the Commissioner's wishes and 
left their supervision to Sadler's chagrin, in the hands of the High 
Court and the Judiciary. Sadler was livid. He was, in the words of - 
a Foreign Office minute, "strongly averse to this and would rather 
have the Order in Council of 1902 altered".23
Sadler's objections were largely "based on the fear lest the High 
Court overturn the coach by overloading it with technicalities
21. F.O. 2/984 Ennis to Wilson, 3.1.1905.
22. F.O. 2/9841 Ennis to Wilson, 3.1.1905.
23. F.O. 2/9841 Bottomley to Risley, 12.4.1905
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unsuitable in native p r o c e d u r e " .24 ne thus told the Colonial 
Secretary that:-
"I consider that the direct subordination to the High Court of 
the limited jurisdiction exercised by the chiefs is a measure 
to be deprecated. They exercise their powers according to 
Native Law and custom, and this part of the country is in too 
primitive a state to adapt itself to our laws and procedure, so 
long as the European officer can at any rate interfere as he 
can at the weekly Baraza or on complaints received, and that 
substantial justice is done; this, I consider, is all that we 
should at present require."25
Besides, it was contended that the proposed subordination to the High 
Court of the limited jurisdiction exercised by the tribal authorities 
was contrary to the policy of Indirect Rule.26 Thus Wilson reminded 
the Colonial Office that:-
"I am fully alive to the fact that the authorised system of 
rule is that through the native chiefs, but I cannot help 
feeling that it is not fully conceived how very rapidly the 
main principle of that policy is being endangered by the 
tendency prevalent among officials unconsciously absorbed in 
magisterial routine to directly control domestic native 
affairs, oblivious to the fact that their administrative 
influence must in such matters be confined to the area round 
their stations and that to the detriment of government of their 
district on large lines."27
24. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to Lansdowne, op cit. Wilson was equally 
determined that the control of the Native Courts should be in the 
hands of the Administration. He thus, in the absence of the 
Commissioner on leave, told the Foreign Office that: "To begin 
with, my strong opinion, based upon actual experience is that the 
institution of High Court supervision over Native Courts in 
countries of crude conventions must inevitably lead to increased 
obtrusion of European interference into native methods of 
jurisdiction. In most new countries there has been a tendency to 
outrun the local native conditions in the application of legal 
technicalities in the early stages of judicial procedure. I 
therefore venture to again submit that the power to make rules of 
practice and procedure be placed in the hands of the 
Commissioner, confident that there will be thus secured a 
sympathetic bond between administrative officers and natives 
which is indispensable in promoting content among the people." 
(F.O. 2/9841/Wilson to Lansdowne, 20.3.1905).
25. F.O. 858/Sadler's Dispatch No. 218 of 4.8.1904.
26. Ibid, Wilson to Secretary of State, 20.3.1905.
27. F.O. 2/984 Wilson to Secretary of State, 20.3.1905.
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The thinking behind Sadler's argument was that the people were 
"insufficiently advanced for a regular system of jurisdiction", that 
the chiefs' judicial powers were inseparable from their executive 
duties, and that the judiciary's interposition in "native affairs" 
would inevitably lead to confusion and friction in the general 
administration of the country,28 and that Sadler was not prepared to 
accept, and he, accordingly, sought to reverse Ennis' decision "so as 
to allow of purely native cases ••••remaining under the control of 
the Commissioner",29 and duly enlisted the Secretary of State's 
support, and, as it happened, so placed the Foreign Office in a 
quandary. Here, as in Uganda, there was a division of opinion and, 
interestingly enough, along departmental lines viz, the 
Administrative versus the Legal officers. The former's arguments 
were essentially similar to Sadler's and were summarised by Read as 
follows:-
"Col. Sadler spoke strongly to me on this subject and I concur 
in his views. The simpler the judicial machinery in these 
under-developed countries the better. If Mr. Innis' [sic] view 
is correct as to the interpretation of the 0. in C., then the 
difficulty is at worst a technical one and can be got over by 
amending the Order in Council."20
To this end, Read sought counsel's opinion and received the following 
reply
"I agree with Mr. Risley. I think it is essential that the 
Supreme Court should have powers of revision and control over 
native courts, otherwise, as in the Gold Coast, extortion and 
officerism will be liable to spring up in the native courts.
The Commissioner's fears as to legal technicalities are natural 
but unfounded. Nothing could be less technical than the 
regulations proposed. Certain rules of law, e.g. that hearsay
28. F.O. 2/984/Wilson to S/S. Dispatch No. 48 of 10.2.1905.
29. Ibid.
30. F.O. 2/984/Read's minute of 1.5.1905.
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evidence is not evidence or that no man cannot be tried and 
condemned on a criminal charge in his absence are 
technicalities, but they are essential to ensure that justice 
is done. There are technicalities and technicalities and the 
Commissioner's watchful or suspicious eye upon them I do not 
think that judges or magistrates need be feared. Native Courts 
unrestricted and unrestrained are much more likely to be 
mischievous•"21
Sadler's desired change was, however, shortly afterwards greatly 
enhanced and, almost met in full, by Risley's liberal interpretation 
of Article 22(i) of the Uganda Order in Council, 1902, the terms of 
which were as follows:-
Subject to the provisions of any Ordinance, the High Court may, 
with the approval of the Commissioner, make rules for 
regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court and of 
all other courts which may be established in Uganda.22
This, Risley felt, did not mean, as Ennis had insisted, that the 
power to make rules was exclusively vested in the High Court.
Indeed, Risley did not "see any legal necessity for the High Court 
to make rules for all the courts subordinate to it".23 »jjy 
conclusion", [he went on] "is that the mere fact of these courts 
being subordinate to the High Court does not preclude provision being 
made by this Ordinance, as is contemplated by clause 22(i) of the 0. 
in C., that rules of court shall be made by the Commissioner instead 
of the High Court."34 Sadler was accordingly advised and told to 
redraft clause 14 "as he wishes without necessitating any amendment
31. F.O. 2/984 (Minute of 10.5.1905).
32. Uganda Order in Council, 1902, London Gazette, 15.8.1902.
33. F.O. 2/984 loc cit.
34. Ibid.
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of the Order in Council".25 The impasse was thus resolved and the 
way paved for the enactment of the "Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance, 
1 9 0 5 ",26 provision made for the constitution of the "Native 
Appeals Court, the Lukiko, the Saza Courts and the Sub-chiefs'
Courts. At the apex of the new legal system was to be the Court of 
Appeal, consisting of the Collector, the precursor of the District 
Commissioner, as President, "the Kabaka and the C h i e f s " . 27 The court 
had power to hear and determine "all Banyoro cases" presented to it 
through the usual channels, or brought to it in open Baraza. This 
meant that the Court, not withstanding its designation, had original, 
revisionary and appellate jurisdiction. It was also provided that 
any person aggrieved by a decision or sentence of the court of the 
Lukiko, the County Court, or the Sub-chief's court, had a right to 
."present his case to the Native Appeals Court for consideration and 
further decision".28
Thus, for instance, a litigant aggrieved by a decision of the 
Sub-chief's court, the lowest court in the land, could directly bring 
his complaint to the Appeals Court, without having exhausted his 
local remedies in the lower courts. It may also be noted here that, 
under section 11, the Commissioner had power to transfer any case or 
class of cases from any of the new courts to any other court in the 
Protectorate as he saw fit.29 Moreover, besides the supervisory
35. Risley's Minute of 17.5.1905. S.14 as amended, provided that the 
courts established by this Ordinance shall follow the rules of 
practice and procedure from time to time laid down by H.M. 
Commissioner for such courts, and shall decide all cases 
according to substantial justice without undue regard to 
technicalities of procedure and without undue delay. ,
36. "Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance, 1905".
37. Ibid.,
38. Ibid. s.5.
39. F.O. 2/858/Sadler to S/S Dispatch No. 186 of 4.7.1905.
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jurisdiction of the High Court, there was, in certain specified 
cases, a right of appeal from the Chief’s decisions to "His Majesty's 
High Court of Uganda", at Entebbe,4°
Below the Native Appeals Court was the Court of the Lukiko, which
was, for all intents and purposes, the Court of last resort in the
district. The Court consisted of the "Lukiko of Unyoro", that is to 
say, the Omukama, who when present presided over the court, the 
county chiefs and the sub-county chiefs. The court had full 
jurisdiction, civil and criminal over all matters and over all 
persons in the district. In particular the court had power to hear
and decide the following cases:-
(a) All serious criminal cases including murder and manslaughter.
(b) All cases where the punishment awardable by the lower courts was 
inadequate for the offence,
(c) All cases where the amount or value of the subject matter in 
dispute exceeded 50 rupees.
(d) All appeals from the Saza Courts and the Sub-chiefs' courts.
Appeal lay from the decisions of the court of the Lukiko to the 
High Court of Uganda, in criminal matters where a sentence of 
death or imprisonment in excess of 5 years or a fine of more than 
1,500 rupees was imposed; and in civil matters in cases where the 
amount or value of the subject matter of the suit exceeded 1,500 
rupees; whilst appeals in minor cases lay to the Native Appeals 
Court, at Malsindi,
40. F.O, 2/858 Sadler's dispatch op.cit,
41. Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance, 1905, No. 5 of 1905 s.6,
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Next, provision was made for the modernisation of the Saza Courts 
throughout the district. These courts as the name suggests were 
based on the old traditional administrative unit, the county, 
otherwise known as the Saza. A Saza Court consisted of the Saza 
Chief, the sole judge. He had a limited, civil and criminal 
jurisdiction, which was coterminous with the Saza over which he 
presided. The court had exclusive original civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over all matters and over all persons, aliens excepted, 
and could not impose "a greater punishment than 6 months rigorous 
imprisonment, or a fine of 30 rupees, or whipping of 12 lashes".42 
Nor could the court entertain any civil action in which the property 
in dispute or value of the subject matter was 30 rupees or less; and 
it had no appellate, supervisory or revisionary jurisdiction over the 
Sub-chiefs' courts within the limits of the county.43 This was a • 
departure from the indigenous arrangements under which appeals lay 
from the decisions of the minor chiefs to the courts presided over by 
their immediate superiors in the chiefly hierarchy; but was in accord 
with the new court structure. For the Saza chiefs were members of 
the court of the Lukiko to which appeals lay from the Sub-chiefs' 
courts. This, it would appear, was the rationale for not placing the 
jurisdiction of the Sub-chiefs' courts under the immediate 
supervision of the Saza Chiefs' courts. The experiment, however, was 
a failure and was subsequently abandoned, and the status quo ante
restored.44
Finally, section 10 confirmed and reconstituted the Sub-chiefs' 
courts along the lines recommended by the'Sub-commissioner.
42. Clause 9.
43. Clause 5.
44. See the Native Courts Ordinance, 1905.
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The Sub-chiefs' courts were, under the Unyoro Native Courts 
Ordinance, 1905, the lowest courts in the land, and like the Saza 
Courts, they too, were held by the recognised chiefs; and their 
jurisdiction was likewise limited to causes arising in the 
administrative areas in which they were situate and over which the 
Sub-chiefs were in charge* Each court was empowered to hear and 
decide:
(i) All cases in which a native of Unyoro is accused of an offence, 
provided always that a greater punishment than 1 month rigorous
i
■ imprisonment or fine of 5 rupees, or whipping of 6 lashes shall
not be imposed*
i (ii) All cases in which the amount, or value of the subject matter
in dispute does not exceed 15 rupees *46
Appeal lay from the decisions of the Sub-chiefs' courts to the Court 
of the Lukiko, with a further appeal to the Native Appeals Court, at
I ■
Masindi•
9*1*3 RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The procedure for the hearing of cases was, as had been mentioned 
above, governed by the Unyoro Native Courts Rules, 1905, made under 
s*14 of the Unyoro Native Courts Ordinance, by the Commissioner in 
accordance with article 22(1) of the Uganda Order in Council, 1902* 
This Code, though "of the simplest kind"46 was, in view of the state 
of development of the country, in fact, revolutionary* True, the
45. S.10*
46* Ennis' minute quoted above.
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rules were based on the principles of natural justice, particularly 
audi alteram partem,47 nevertheless, were a major advance on 
Bunyoro's "crude conventions"4® of justice, which incidentally were 
the raison d'etre for the reorganisation of the indigenous tribunals 
and the promulgation of the rules of practice and procedure in 
question.
Whether or not these rules were, in fact, strictly observed by the 
Courts has not been, owing to a dearth of documentary evidence, easy 
to verify. It would appear, however, that many a chief paid scant 
attention, if at all, to the Code. Indeed, it seems, that many 
hardly knew of its existence. In any event, it is not clear what 
effect, if any, non-compliance with the Code of Practice would have 
had on the decisions of the Court. There were neither sanctions, nor 
remedies for failure to observe the Code. Indeed; these rules 
notwithstanding, the Courts were obliged to determine "all cases 
according to substantial justice without undue regard to
47. The "Unyoro Native Court Rules, 1905" gazetted on 15.1.1905 were
as follows:
1• The following rules of practice and procedure shall be 
followed by the Native Courts.
2. The evidence in criminal cases must be heard in the presence 
of the accused.
3. The accused must be given an opportunity of making a 
statement, of putting questions and of calling witnesses, 
should he so desire.
4. Where imprisonment has been imposed a warrant must be issued 
by the Court distinctly stating the name of the court, the 
term of imprisonment, the date of the sentence, and the 
offence for which it was imposed.
5. Civil cases may be heard in the absence of the. defendant when 
due notice of the time and place of hearing has been given to 
the defendant.
6. The parties in a civil case must be given an opportunity of 
making statements, putting questions and calling witnesses.
7. These Rules may be cited as the Unyoro Native Courts Rules, 
1905.
48. F.O. 2/984 Wilson to S/S. Despatch No. 48 of 10.2.1905.
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technicalities of procedure and without undue delay1*.49 Furthermore, 
it is remarkable that, when Native Courts on the Bunyoro model were 
established elsewhere in the Protectorate, none were required to 
follow similar rules in the exercise of their jurisdiction. Instead, 
provision was made that each of the Native Courts should exercise its 
civil and criminal jurisdiction "according to the procedure and 
practice heretofore followed by the tribal authorities in the 
district in which" the Court was situate.6®
9.2.1 THE MACHINERY OF NATIVE JUSTICE IN BUGANDA
Having recognised the Kabaka "as the native ruler" of Buganda and 
determined the powers of his Government vis-a-vis the Commissioner, 
the Uganda Agreement, 1900 proceeded to define the judicial powers of 
the Lukiko or native Council, the Kabaka, and his chiefs.61 It was 
provided that the Kabaka was to exercise jurisdiction, civil and 
criminal over his people "through the Lukiko and through others of 
his officers in the manner approved by Her Majesty's Government".6^ 
The Kabaka's jurisdiction over his people - he had no jurisdiction 
over non-Baganda - was, subject to the limitations noted below, 
almost unlimited.66 In criminal cases, for instance, the Kabaka's 
courts were "entitled to try natives for capital crimes" such as 
murder and manslaughter,64 save that no death sentence could be
49. S.14.
50. S.7 of No. 15 of 1909.
51• Article 6.
52. Ibid.
53. Art. 8'provided that: All cases, civil or criminal, of a mixed 
nature where natives of the Uganda Province and non-natives of 
that province are concerned, shall be subject to (the 
jurisdiction) of British Courts only".
54. Art. 6.
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carried out by the Kabaka or his courts without Her Majesty's 
representative's approval.66 Indeed, there was, in serious cases, a 
right of appeal to the High Court and from there to the 
'Commissioner.66
Besides, any punishment or sentences imposed by any of the Kabaka's 
courts, which, in the eyes of the Administration, were 
"disproportioned or inconsistent with humane principles", the 
Commissioner could directly interpose:-
"Her Majesty's Government in Uganda shall have the right of 
remonstrance with the Kabaka, who shall, at the request of the 
said representative, subject such sentence to 
reconsideration."67
This, it was thought, would enable the Commissioner, in the interests 
of justice, to interfere and exercise jurisdiction in cases where it 
was deemed just, expedient and desirable so to do. Such at least was 
the theory. It soon transpired, however, that Johnston's judicial 
arrangements were, contrary to anticipations expressed at the time of 
the Agreement, far from satisfactory. In particular-the Agreement's 
provisions relating to appeals from the decisions of the Court of the 
Lukiko to the High Court; and those governing the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the Commissioner presented a number of thorny 
problems of interpretation and implementation.
First, there was the vexed question of whether or not there was, 
under the Agreement, a right of appeal from the Kabaka's courts to 
the High Court in both civil and criminal causes. Article 6, inter
55. Art.6
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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alia, provided that "there will be a right of appeal from the native 
courts to the principal court of justice in Uganda as regards all 
sentences which inflict a term of more than five years' imprisonment 
or a fine of over £100".50 The use of the terms "sentences" and 
"fines", it was argued, implied that there was, in civil cases, no 
right of appeal from the Lukiko to the High Court. Yet, as noted 
earlier, in the case of appeals from the Lukiko to the Kabaka, the 
Agreement, in particular Article 11, did not differentiate between 
civil and criminal matters, thus giving the Kabaka appellate 
jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.59
Secondly, there was the matter of the Commissioner's supervisory 
powers in relation to the appellate jurisdiction of the Kabaka. Here 
the question was, what powers, if any, did the Commissioner have over 
the jurisdiction of the Lukiko and the Kabaka? Did the Commissioner, 
for instance, have the power to review the Kabaka's decision? If so, 
could the Kabaka be compelled to follow the Commissioner's advice?
If not, could the Kabaka's judgement be carried out without the 
approval of the Commissioner? Thirdly, and more importantly, the 
Agreement, though largely based on the indigenous system of courts, 
did not recognise let alone regularise the judicial powers and 
jurisdiction of the inferior courts other than "the courts of First 
Instances held by the Chiefs of the counties".60 Yet these inferior 
courts, over which the sub-county chiefs presided, were, in many
58. Article 6.
59. Article 11, inter alia, provided that: In all cases involving 
property or claims exceeding £100 in value or a sentence o f . 
imprisonment exceeding five years, or sentences of death, the 
Lukiko shall refer the matter to the consideration of the Kabaka, 
whose decision when countersigned by Her Majesty's chief 
representative in Uganda shall be final.
60. Article 11.
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respects, the most important courts in the land; they heard the bulk 
of all the local cases and were, of course, very close to the people, 
and it was to remedy these defects that Sadler framed the Uganda 
Agreement (Judicial) 1905, under which the Kabaka, with the consent 
of the Commissioner, was empowered to establish courts for the trial 
of minor cases in which all the parties were Baganda.61 These 
courts, like the court of the Lukiko and the Courts of Abamasaza 
established by the parent Agreement, were to exercise their 
jurisdiction under the supervision and control of the 
Administration. And, following the Bunyoro example, the Commissioner 
was given wide powers to transfer any case or class of cases, as he 
saw fit, from the Kabaka's courts to any established by or under the 
Uganda Order in Council, 1902.62 Additionally, the principal 
Agreement was amended and provision made for a right ■of appeal from 
the Lukiko to the High Court, in both civil and criminal matters.
"There shall be an appeal to His Majesty's High Court of Uganda 
(1) in criminal matters, from the courts established by or 
under this or the principal Agreement from the sentences of 
such courts where a sentence of death or imprisonment exceeding 
five years or of fine exceeding £100 or of whipping of over 24 
lashes has been imposed, and (2) in civil matters, in cases 
where the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit 
exceeds £100; and nothing contained in the principal Agreement 
shall prejudice or affect such right of appeal as afore 
said."66
However, it was not until 1909 when the Buganda Native Courts 
Proclamation was issued that these changes were formally 
implemented.64 The Proclamation began with a preamble stating that:
61. Revised Laws of Uganda, 1951, p.28: The Uganda (Judicial) 
Agreemment, 1905.
62. Ibid, Article 3.
63. Ibid, Article 4.
64. Proclamation: Native Courts in Buganda, 1909.
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"Whereas it is expedient and has been agreed by the Kabaka, 
chiefs and people of Buganda (1 ) that the Native Courts in 
Buganda should be organised and recognised, and their powers 
and jurisdiction defined; (2) that the supervision of the 
Native Courts by His Majesty's Government should be defined; 
now therefore I, Sir Henry Hesketh Bell, Governor of Uganda, by 
virtue of the said Agreement and in the exercise of the powers 
conferred upon me in that behalf hereby declare and proclaim 
that the following Native Courts have been established in 
Buganda with powers and jurisdiction following, that is to
say:"65
Having constituted the courts of the Lukiko, the Courts of Abamasaza, 
and the Courts of the Sub-chiefs, and defined their powers and 
jurisdiction, the Proclamation placed them under the control and 
supervision of the Administration, particularly the District 
| Commissioner. In him were vested wide powers, to call for records,
I to stay all illegal or improper proceedings, to direct the rehearing
i
| of any case as he saw fit, to terminate the proceedings of cases
| where the Court of the Lukiko, Saza or Sub-chief had no jursidiction
and to refer such cases to a court having jurisdiction;65 to hear and 
decide all offences committed in urban areas; civil and criminal 
cases in which the parties were in Government service as sailors, 
soldiers, police, post-runners, interpreters, clerks, process servers 
and office messengers; and all offences created by special 
legislation, such as Arms, Game, Forest, Fiscal and Mining 
Ordinances.67 It was specifically stated, however, that in the .
f
exercise of his supervisory and revisionary powers over the Kabaka's 
Courts, the District Commissioner, should "not unduly interfere with 
their proceedings".6® Indeed, he too, was to exercise his powers 
under the watchful eye of the High Court Judges. There can be little 
doubt, however, that the District Commissioner was in charge of
65. Proclamation: Native Courts in Buganda, 1909.
66. Article 2(6).
67. Article 6(a)(i), (ii) and (iii).
68. Ibid. 2(a)(iv).
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whatever he surveyed. His powers were, in fact, in 1917, greatly 
extended and brought into line with those of his counterparts 
elsewhere in the Protectorate; and Buganda*s judicial autonomy 
virtually brought to an end. The Lukiko, for example, lost its power 
to hear capital cases which, henceforth, were to be heard by the 
District Commissioner.
At the same time, however, the Kabaka's courts were, for the first 
time, empowered to hear and determine cases, civil and criminal, in 
which non-Baganda were parties, presumably in return for their loss 
of jurisdiction over capital offences. Unlike their jurisdiction 
over Baganda, however, the Kabaka's court's jurisdiction over 
"aliens" was fairly circumscribed and subject to stringent and 
detailed supervision and control, and was, in practice, 
infinitesimal. Even so, the Lukiko's new jurisdiction was a source 
of pride and gratification.
Indeed, its grant was considered a major concession and was the sop 
that induced the Kabaka to give his unqualified approval to the 1917 
Proclamation and the concomitant surreptitious alteration of the 
"sacred Uganda Agreement, 1900".69 No one, at any rate, on the 
Buganda side, seems to have fully appreciated the Proclamation's 
profound impact on their judicial powers; and yet, it was in some 
respects inconsistent with the terms of the Judicial Agreement of
69. The Agreement was "looked upon with almost superstitious
reverence" per Sir Phillip Mitchell, at C.O. 536/195/40199 of 
16.10.1937.
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1905; and, indeed, was hardly in keeping with the maintenance of 
exclusive jurisdiction in the Native Courts: it conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction upon British Courts, but, paradoxically, it did not do 
so in the case of Native Courts*
Worse, the Proclamation, said to have been made with the agreement of 
the Kabaka, chiefs and people of Buganda, "would appear to override 
the Agreement of 1900 when the two are not consistent with each 
other".70 Considering that the Kabaka and his people regarded the 
Agreement as their magna carta, that they were "very jealous indeed 
of any attempt to whittle down their rights under the Agreement", 
that "supplementary agreements were viewed with some suspicion", and 
that "any attempt at a comprehensive revision of the original Uganda 
Agreement would be a failure",71 the 1917 Proclamation was, 
undoubtedly, a great coup. The problem with this interpretation^ 
however, is that the Proclamation's legal status is far from clear. 
There are two contrasting views: the first, and the better view, is 
that the Proclamation had no legislative effect.72 The second, and 
one which, in view of its great possibilities, would have appealed to 
the Kabaka and his people, is that the Proclamation had statutory 
force,76 ostensibly because it was issued under the Courts Ordinance
70. Article 4(a)(b), for example, is not in conformity with Article 
3 of the Uganda (Judicial) Agreement, 1905.
71. C.O. 536/195/40199 Draft dispatch to Mitchell, 16.10.1939.
72. C.O. 536/195/40199 "I am somewhat uncertain as to the effect of
the Proclamation of 1917. What validity it has, and whence 
that validity is derived, I do not know, but I gather it has no
legislative effect." (Roberts-Wray to Duncan 23.9.1937).
73. C.O. 536/195/49199 "If it should transpire that the 
Proclamation has legislative effect, then Article 7 gives the 
effect of statute to the Agreement of 1900, and Article 5 of 
that Agreement assumes considerable importance. It seems to 
require all laws to be read subject to the terms of the 
Agreement." (Roberts-Wray to Duncan 23.9.1937). This would 
have heartened many a Muganda.
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of 1911 and, in that case, some believed, it had "statutory effect 
and ....equal validity with any other ordinances in existence”.74 
This, clearly, would have put the cat among the pigeons and, as the 
issue at stake was "important and very political",75 Bushe was forced 
to unreservedly retract his original opinion on this matter,55 and 
was asked to write a private letter to the Attorney-General, "setting 
out the whole of the problems" of this "involved" question.75 And so 
he did and, rather eloquently, too.
"We have been in some difficulty in formulating a reply to the 
Governor's despatch Mo. 238 of the 12th of July, and I think it 
may clear the air a little if I tell you my own view on the 
question. In the first place, when you see the reply, you may 
feel that it is not really an answer to the question put, but 
the explanation of this is that the reference appears to be 
misconceived.
We did not want to say all this as we realised the difficulty 
in which the court found itself having regard to the Secretary 
of State's decision of 1907. In these circumstances, the 
question which the High Court had to decide is not really a 
matter for us at this end, but the following reflections may be 
of use to you."77
74. C.O. 536/195/40199 Bushe to Flood, 1.10.1937.
75. C.O. 536/195/40199 Flood to Bushe, 9.9.1937.
76. C.O. 536/195/40199 "Sir G. Bushe's suggested reply is at No. 2 on
the file and on reading it I was frankly puzzled as to what the 
people at the other end would think. I, therefore, addressed my 
further minute to him and I gather that he is of the opinion that 
the courts should be able to thrash the matter for themselves." 
(Flood to Sir C. Parkinson, 5.10.1937). See Bushe's letter to 
H.R. Horne, the Ugandan Attorney-General, of 1.11.1937. The 
question was whether or not the Kabaka had exclusive jurisdiction 
over his people, and arose out of the Rex v Besweri Kiwanuka
case, Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1937, of which the facts were 
these: The appellant, a Muganda, was convicted in the District 
Court of Kampala of the first class of stealing the sum of shs. 
390, the property of the Native Government of Buganda, and was 
sentensed to 14 months' imprisonment with hard labour. He filed 
an appeal on the facts, but the High Court, a preliminary point 
of jurisdiction having been raised, declined to hear the case, 
and sought the opinion of the Secretary of State, under S.4 of 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890.
77. C.O. 536/195/40199 Bushe to Horne, 1.11.1937.
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The gist of these reflections was that Sir John Risley's view, which 
was overruled by the Secretary of State in 1907, was correct, and 
that the High Court had concurrent jurisdiction in Native Cases; and 
dealt at some length with the proposition that the Proclamation of 
1917 gave legislative effect to the Uganda Agreement of 1900, in so 
far as it conferred jurisdiction on Native Courts. However, as this 
interpretation would have been "particularly awkward",75 it was toned 
down and a shadow of doubt cast over it.75 Mitchell was accordingly 
advised, and urged, under separate cover, to leave the matter well 
alone; but, since the colonial office could "not guarantee that his 
Judges would have the same view as that of their legal adviser",55 he 
was duly forewarned
"You will no doubt agree that, when the judges have considered 
the reply, the political implications, if any, will have to be 
most carefully reviewed in case any amendment of the law should 
be necessary to make the position, clear.”51
It was admitted, however, that this approach was "not very 
satisfactory", but there were, clearly, no easy solutions; indeed, as 
Flood put it, "the whole thing is considerably involved”;55 and as 
was usual in such situation, it was put in cold storage, sine die, 
and luckily, from the British point of view, the point was never 
raised, let alone noticed, by the other side. It was, as it 
happened, brutum fulmen - a harmless thunderbolt.
78. C.O. 536/195/40199 Flood to Parkinson, 5.10.1937.
79. C.O. 536/195/40199 Bushe to Mitchell, 2.11.1937.
80. C.O. 536/195/40199 Flood to Mitchell, 16.10.1937.
81• Ibid.
82. C.O. 536/195/40199 Flood to Parkinson, 5.10.1937.
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9.2.2 THE ANKOLE AND TORO JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
The administration of justice in these "two little kingdoms" was 
governed by the terms of the respective Toro and Ankole Agreements of 
1900 and 1901.55 These Agreements, which were in similar terms, 
provided that "justice as between native and native" should be 
administered by the "Lukiko, the divisional native courts and the 
principal European officer in civil charge" of the district; and that 
all cases involving "natives and foreigners" should be heard by 
British magistrates and removed altogether from native 
jurisdiction".84 Thus, the hearing of "purely native cases" was 
virtually left in the hands of the respective hereditary rulers and 
their territorial chiefs. Again the Administration's main concern 
was, in those days, to ensure that "substantial justice" was done:55 
the policy was "to encourage the King or Chief to govern his people 
directly on humane principles with only that amount of interference 
from the nearest European official as may protect the natives from
83. F.O. 2/858/Despatch No. 218 of 4.8.1904.
84. The Toro and Ankole Agreements of 1900 and 1901, the main
features of which were modelled on the Uganda Agreement, 1900, 
were in similar terms and article 6 of the Ankole Agreement, set 
out below, will serve as an example:-
Justice as between native and native shall be administered direct 
by the recognised chiefs of the ten subdivisions. In all cases 
where a sentence of over three months' imprisonment, or a fine 
exceeding £5 in value, or where property of over £5 in value is 
concerned, an appeal shall lie from the divisional native courts 
to the Lukiko of the Kabaka of Ankole. In cases where the 
imprisonment exceeds a term of one year, or property involved 
exceeds the value of £100, an appeal shall lie from the decision 
of the Kabaka or his Lukiko to the principal European officer in 
civil charge of the district of Ankole. All cases between 
natives of the district of Ankole and natives of the other
districts of the Uganda Protectorate, or between natives and
foreigners, shall be tried by the British magistrates in the 
district of Ankole, and shall be removed altogether from native 
jurisdiction.
85. F.O. 2/858 Sadler to S/S, 4.8.1904.
- 359 -
injustice and cruelty".86 This, with very little resources, as 
Sadler put it, "is all we should at present require".87 - That, at any 
rate, was the theory. Its practical implementation, however, soon 
ran into some local difficulties. Some of these first arose in 
Buganda as early as 1904, and as noted above, directly led to the 
promulgation of the "Uganda (Judicial) Agreement, 1905.88 Despite 
its name, however, this Agreement was solely concerned with Buganda, 
and did not affect judicial administration elsewhere. Here, as the 
following material shows, the necessary changes were haphazard, 
piecemeal, confused and contradictory, and were brought in, 
particularly in Ankole and Toro, rather late in the day, partly 
because of apathy on the part of the District Officers, and partly 
because, the changes in Buganda notwithstanding, of the High Court 
Judges' attitude towards the Ankole and Toro Agreements: they 
believed, mistakenly as it happened, that "British Courts" had no 
jurisdiction in the Agreement areas, that their jurisdiction in these 
districts was subject to the "Native Agreements" and, indeed, limited 
to the hearing of "mixed cases", that is to say, cases involving 
"natives and non-natives".88 The argument, briefly stated, was that 
the Ankole and Toro Agreements pre-dated the Uganda Order in Council, 
1902, that the latter could not, subsequently and unilaterally, vary 
or modify the terms of the former, and that, despite the terms of 
that Order to the contrary, the rights of the "Native Rulers" to 
administer "justice between native and native"80 could not be taken 
away without their consent.81
86. F.O. 2/200 Johnston to S/S, 12.3.1900.
87. F.O. 2/858/ Sadler to S/S, 4.8.1904.
88. Vide pp. supra pp. 349-352.
89. C.O. 536/2/33072 Ennis to Sadler, 11.8.1905.
90. 71 See section 6 of the Ankole Agreement, 1901.
91. C.O. 536/2/33072 Ennis to Sadler, 11.8.1905.
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This point first came to the fore in 1905, when the Judiciary was 
asked by the Administration to prepare a draft ordinance for the 
establishment of "British Native Courts", for the trial of "native 
cases" which, in their view, and considering "the primitive state of 
the people", could not safely be left to "native jurisdiction"•85 
Sadler's objective was to set up these courts throughout the 
Protectorate, but his efforts were frustrated by Ennis' insistence 
that such courts could not be established in the Agreement areas. He 
thus advised Sadler that:-
"I recommend the establishment of such courts in every district 
of the Protectorate, except the Kingdom of Buganda, Ankole and 
Toro, in which districts the right to administer justice to
natives by British courts has, for most purposes been done away
with by the Agreements."85
Ennis' advice was accepted and "British Native Courts" duly set up in 
each and every district except Ankole, Buganda and Toro, and the 
matter would, presumably, have ended there.84 But that was not to 
be, for shortly afterwards, the question of the "High Court's 
jurisdiction over the natives in the Agreement areas" was pointedly 
brought into focus by the locus classicus case of Katosi v Kahizi, of 
which the facts were, briefly, these:-85
The appellant was a Munyankole (and, so too, was the respondent), 
who, for undisclosed reasons, wished to impugn, in the High Court, 
the Omugabe's Court's decision. Despite its earlier decision to the 
contrary, however, the High Court declined to entertain Katosi's 
application and, in spite of his previous ruling on the matter, 
sought the Secretary of State's opinion, under section 4 of the
92. C.O. 536/2/33072 Sadler to S/S, 16.8.1905.
93. C.O. 536/2/33072 Ennis to Sadler. Op.cit.
94. Vide The Native Courts Ordinance, 1905.
95. Katosi v Kahizi, 1907. IULR 22.
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Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. It was submitted by the Judges that 
the High Court had jurisdiction under the Agreements in mixed cases 
only, and that in purely native cases the appeal was not to the 
British judiciary but to the executive administration, for it was 
considered that an Order in Council could not vary existing 
agreements, and that, consequently, the jurisdiction of the High 
Court under the Order in Council was subject to the terms of the 
agreements.86 The Secretary of State agreed, albeit after some soul 
searching, and advised the Governor accordingly:-
"I have had under consideration Mr. Hesketh Bell's despatch 
No. 447 of the 8th April last relative to an enquiry on the 
part of His Majesty's Judges in the Uganda Protectorate 
regarding the existence and extent of the jurisdiction of the 
High Court in Ankole and Toro. In ceding jurisdiction to His 
Majesty under the terms of the Toro Agreement, 1900 and the 
Ankole Agreement, 1901, it would appear that the respective 
chiefs of these districts reserved their right to try native 
cases. The validity of the Uganda Order in Council, 1902, in 
so far as it nullifies this reservation, is consequently open 
to question.
In these circumstances, I am advised that the Uganda Order in 
Council, 1902 should be construed in such manner as not to 
impair the right thus reserved, and I accordingly concur in the 
view put forward by His Majesty's Judges in Uganda, that the 
jurisdiction of the High Court under the Order in question must 
be subject to the terms of the Agreements above mentioned."87
And so, though unenforceable, the Ankole and Toro Agreements were, 
rather ironically, given, at least in this matter, some semblance of 
inviolability. Their quasi legal status was, however, short lived, 
for, despite the Secretary of State's ruling, the Ankole and Toro 
Agreements judicial arrangements were, respectively reorganised, in 
1911 and 1912, and brought under the Native Courts Ordinance, 1911, 
thus "confirming" the High Court's jurisdiction over "native cases",
96. See Katosi v Kahizi [1907]. IULR 22.
97. C.O. 536/13/17445 Lord Elgin to Bell, 31,7.1907.
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and, ipso facto , invalidating the Secretary of State's decision. It 
was not until 1937, however, that this decision was irrevocably, 
reversed by the Colonial Office, and Risley's 1905 legal opinion 
adopted and the Agreements' position vis-a-vis the Uganda Order in 
Council, 1902 definitely settled.88 In the meantime, the 
Government's attitude towards these Agreements remained ambivalent.
The reorganisation of Ankole's Native Courts and the corrolary 
overturning of the Secretary of State's decision was triggered by 
Carter's findings, while on circuit at Mbarara, in 1908. His report 
makes interesting reading and, in some respects, is a telling 
commentary on "Administrative justice" and those responsible for its 
control and supervision; and reads as follows:-
98. C.O. 536/195/40199 Bushe to Flood, 28.9.1937. The actual words 
used were: "I attach the reply which I think should be sent. It 
is regrettable that it should reverse the Secretary of State's 
decision of 1907, but that decision was, I think, clearly wrong. 
Sir John Risley's view, which everybody ignored, contained the 
true doctrine and has been confirmed by the Privy Council". (The 
Privy Council's decision referred to is that of Sobhuza II v 
Miller, 1926, AC 516).
Sir John Risley's minute to Antrobus was as follows:- 
"I do hot think that H.M's jurisdiction under the Uganda Order in 
Council is limited, legally, by such Agreements as the Ankole and 
Toro Agreements. H.M's High Court has full jurisdiction, civil 
and criminal, over all persons and all matters in all the 
territories comprised in Uganda. When H.M. has entered into an 
Agreement with native chiefs providing for the administration of 
justice as between native and native, etc., by the chiefs, the 
High Court has in my opinion full Concurrent jurisdiction in 
native cases which, however, it should exercise at its discretion 
only in cases of gravity, leaving ordinary cases to be dealt with 
as provided by the Agreement." (Risley to Antrobus, 18.5.1907). 
This exercise provides yet another colonial paradox: the Order in 
Council was "an act of state", and was, therefore, 
unenforceable. So too, were the "Native Agreements". But, 
rather surprisingly, both sides were inclined to construe them as 
if they were legally binding and subject to verbal 
interpretation.
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"While at Mbarara I took the opportunity of seeing the Kabaka 
of Ankole and, without myself expressing any views on the 
matter, of asking him what courts existed in Ankole and what 
were their powers. I gathered from him that there were only 
the Lukiko over which he presided, and the Saza courts, but he 
hoped that certain inferior courts of Batongole would soon be 
created. These would have a very limited jurisdiction and the 
powers of the Saza courts seemed also quite small. He further 
informed me that the Lukiko had never given a sentence of one 
year, but that that was the limit which he contemplated for 
that Court's and that all cases involving more serious 
punishment would be brought to the Baraza. The Acting 
Collector expressed to me a very decided opinion that the 
Bahima Chiefs in Ankole had little conception of the duties and 
responsibility of a judge and were not to be trusted to give 
impartial decisions, refusing to decide cases without large 
presents of cattle being given to them. These are in the 
nature of fees. In one case, Mr. Watson was informed and 
believed that 20 heads of cattle were taken and received by the 
chiefs trying the case and divided among them."88
Clearly, this was a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and Carter's 
instinctive,response was, predictably, to make proposals for 
immediate reform.100 Before these could be implemented, however, an 
internal inquiry was ordered and conducted by the resident Acting 
Collector, Ankole, and Carter's worst fears confirmed.101 He, too, 
was inclined to view past practices with disfavour, and was not 
uncritical of his charges and was in favour of reform, albeit on a 
modest scale. His report, the relevant portion of which appears 
below, sheds some light on the machinery of justice in Ankole, its 
dismal record, state of development and the prospects for its 
reform. It is refreshingly frank and reads as follows:
99. C.O. 536/20/30072. Judicial Department Report for 1907 
attached to Bell's dispatch No. 162 of 13.7.1908.
100. Carter's main proposals were the recasting of the Ankole 
Agreement, 1901, the establishment of "British Native Courts", 
and the reconstitution of the Lukiko and its subordination to 
the High Court.
101. C.O. 536/20/30072 Memorandum by the Acting Collector for Ankole, 
10/6/1908.
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"It is correct that there are at present only 5 native courts,
namely (i) the Ankole Lukiko, (2) the Courts of four saza
chiefs - Mbaguta, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Effendi and Namwera. The
remaining Saza chiefs have as yet no properly constituted
Courts and any cases arising in their districts are at once 
brought before the Ankole Lukiko. The Saza courts at present 
constituted are limited as to their powers in criminal cases to 
sentences of four months - sentences beyond must go before the 
Ankole Lukiko. In civil cases they give their decisions 
regardless of the amount of the subject matter, only referring 
to the Ankole Lukiko in cases they cannot arrive at a decision 
or if the subject matter be cattle.
I agree that it would be advisable that the existing courts 
should be put on a proper footing and I am endeavouring to 
arrive at this end and purpose following the Baganda system. I 
do not consider the time is ripe for the institution of 
inferior (Batongole) courts as the Batongole system has only 
lately been introduced and is not yet complete and more 
especially as 6 counties are yet without properly constituted 
Saza courts. I do not think that it is necessary for a British 
Officer to sit in the Native Lukiko while cases are being heard 
unless some political importance is attached to the case under 
hearing•
I am in complete accord with the opening remarks quoting 
statements by my predecessor. The Bahima Chiefs, including the 
Kabaka have no sense of justice and are of a most grasping 
disposition and if left to themselves are not to be trusted to 
give impartial decisions. There is however, a large Baganda 
element which counteracts these shortcomings of the Bahima 
Chiefs and has certainly given me the impression that they, the 
Baganda members of the Ankole Lukiko, are anxious and willing 
to sift matters and to arrive at equitable decisions. Were it 
not for this Baganda element I should say that the chances of 
getting justice from the Ankole Lukiko without some sort of 
supervision would be very small.1,102
What is more, there was, as these extracts indicate, no provision for 
the hearing of minor Civil and serious Criminal cases, or the 
reviewing of "excessive", "inhumane" or long term prison sentences. 
There was, however, a right of appeal from the decision of the Lukiko 
to the District Collector, but he, admittedly, does not appear to 
have regularly, if at all, exercised his appellate j u r i s d i c t i o n . 103
102. C.O. 536/20/30072. Edward Teffrey 10.6.1908. Apparently, 
"Although the Ankole Agreement 1901, was suspended in 1905, 
section 6 which dealt with the matter of justice between native 
and native was in practice followed as a guide, and was allowed 
to stand, subject to any orders from time.to time made by the 
Commissioner•"
103. ibid.
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There were, in most areas, no properly constituted Saza Courts and 
their unlimited Civil and Criminal work was apparently carried out, 
contrary to the Agreement by the Lukiko;104 Under the Agreement the 
Lukiko was an appellate court and had no original jurisdiction. In 
short the Agreement's judicial provisions had never been implemented.
Consequently, in March 1911, the Omugabe's courts were reconstituted, 
their powers defined and, without an Anglo-Ankole Judicial Agreement 
placed under the newly enacted Native Courts Ordinance, 1911*106
The reorganisation of Ankole's. Native Courts was, a year later 
followed by the Toro Agreement (Judicial), 1912 by which Toro's 
"indigenous' legal system was recast and "put on a regular 
footing."106 Subject to the Governor's Consent, the Omukama was 
empowered to Constitute Native Courts, define and limit their 
jurisdiction and with a like consent and subject to the terms of the 
Agreement, from time to time, add to or abolish such Courts and, or 
revoke, amend or vary their jurisdiction.107 But, it was also 
provided that:
"Native Courts so established may also be established and 
constituted by the Governor as Native Courts under the Courts 
Ordinance, 1911, for the purpose of appeal to and supervision 
and revision by British Courts and to give them jurisdiction,
104. Teffrey's memorandum, op.cit.
105. Cd. 6007 (1913) Colonial Report, No. 748.
106. Cd. 7050 (1914) Colonial Report No. 787: Report for 1912-13.
The Toro Agreement (Judicial) 1912, is said to have been framed 
on the lines of the Uganda Agreement (Judicial) 1905, with some 
modifications to allow the reorganisation in Toro to approximate 
to that of the Ankole Native Courts." (C.O. 536/52/37005
Inc. No. 2. Memo by wm. Morris Carter, C.J.).
107. The Toro Agreement (Judicial) 1912, article 1(a), (b), & (c).
should the Governor so direct, over natives of the 
Protectoratewho have been resident in the district of Toro for 
a period of at least five years, and in cases in which natives 
of the district are concerned. The Governor may with the 
consent of the Omukama transfer any case or class of cases from 
Native Courts established by the Omukama under this Agreement 
to British Courts established by or under the Uganda Order in 
Council, 1902, which British Courts shall exercise jurisdiction 
there in in accordance with the law for the time being in force 
in the Protectorate."10®
The High Court's jurisdiction in Toro was thus formally recognised 
and the power or right of the Lukiko to hear and determine certain 
cases abrogated.10®
"At present the power of the Mukama of Toro extends only to the 
trial of natives of Toro, but in order that the Native Courts 
in Toro may have jurisdiction, similar to the Ankole Native 
Courts, over certain cases in which non-natives of the district 
are concerned, the draft Agreement provides for the 
establishment by the Governor, of the Toro Native Courts as 
Courts under the Native Courts Ordinance. In addition to their 
establishment by the Kabaka under the Agreement. In this 
respect the Toro Native Courts would have powers which were not 
enjoyed by the Native Courts in Buganda, on the other hand, 
under the draft Agreement, the Lukiko would not have as it has 
in Buganda, the power for trying case's punishable with death 
or transportation.110
108. see Article 3.
109. The cases reserved for trial by British courts were:
1• Cases in which a person was charged with murder or in which
the punishment available was death or transportation for 
life.
2. Offences committed in urban areas.
3. Civil and Criminal cases in which the accused, the
complainant or any of the parties were regularly employed in 
Government Service.
4. Breaches which were punishable as offences of Special law: 
e.g. Arms, Game, Forest, Fiscal or mining legislation.
5. Cases in connection with marriage other than a marriage 
contracted under or in accordance with any native law.
6. Cases relating to witchcraft.
110. C.O. 536/52/37005 Memo by wm. Morris Carter, C.J. 14.10.1912.
This provision was similar to that with respect to Ankole,
Busoga, Bunyoro and Mbale.
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|
i Apart from this, however, the powers and jurisdiction of the Lukiko
| *
i  remained wide and unlimited. On the other hand, however, the powers
of the new Saza and subcounty Courts were precisely defined and
respectively limited to the hearing of cases in which the maximum 
punishment available was a term of 9 months rigorous imprisonment, a 
fine of shs 80/-, or a whipping of 24 lashes; and, in civil cases 
where the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute did not 
exceed shs 400/-, ten cows, 100 sheep or 100 goats. The jurisdiction 
of the Courts of the Subchiefs was limited to the trial of criminal 
cases in which the maximum sentence which could be imposed was a term 
of one month rigorous imprisonment, a fine of shs 10/-, or a whipping 
of 6 strokes? whilst in civil cases their jurisdiction was limited 
to the hearing of cases in which the maximum amount or value of the
property in dispute was shs 150/-; 5 cows, 50 sheep or 50 goats.111
In the exercise of their jurisdiction, the Lukiko, Saza and subcounty 
Courts were to follow the "Toro Native Courts Rules", or the 
procedure and practice hitherto followed by their predecessors, and 
were to administer and enforce Toro's Native Law and Custom, 
provided, of course, that the latter was not contrary to statute and 
that it did not offend the susceptibilities of the District 
Commissioner.
111. Revised Laws, Vol. VII (1951) p. 76.
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9.3,1 THE EVOLUTION OF NATIVE COURTS IN THE NON TREATY DISTRICTS
Until 1909 the administration of justice outside the Agreement areas 
was largely in the hands of the chiefs and elders, and though carried 
out under the supervision of District Officers had never been 
statutorily defined. In the intervening years, however, the 
Administration had vigorously pursued a policy of installing 
"intelligent and reliable Baganda"!12 chiefs, with powers to 
administer civil and criminal justice on the Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro 
pattern. Indeed, in some cases, particularly, in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, the "Agents" were specifically recruited for the 
hearing of "native cases" and the "teaching of the indigenous chiefs 
to hold Courts and to settle disputes."!13
These arrangements were made by individual District Officers as they 
saw fit. And, though, the Agents' jurisdiction was exercised under 
the supervision of the "British Native Courts", presided over by 
District Officers, and, ultimately the High Court it, nevertheless, 
had no statutory basis; and the same was true of the tribunals over 
which they presided, they were nd^*statutorily constituted or legally 
recognised, and by 1909 were in serious need of reform. For, despite 
the British Native Courts' wide supervisory jurisdiction, the Agents 
powers were unlimited and undefined, and in consequence, some Agents 
werein the habit of "taking undue advantage of their position among
the savage tribes" under them.!!4 The most frequent abuses were:
"bribery, extortion, excessive and inhumane punishments"; the Agency 
system was thus, albeit unwittingly, bringing British rule in these 
areas into considerable disrepute.!!®
112. C.O. 536/21/37925 Bell to S/S Despatch No. 200 of 11.9.08.
113. Ibid.
114. C.O. 536/21/47489 Despatch No. 254 of 20.11.08.
115. C.O. 536/21/37925 Bell to S/S op.cit.
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Naturally, the Administration was well aware of these shortcomings 
but "owing to the absence of influencial indigenous chiefs to act as 
media between the Administration and the general mass of the 
population. The employment of "alien chiefs" was in their view "a 
necessary evil•"116
Indeed, the Administration would appear to have been well satisfied 
with their Agents.
"We have been fortunate, [Wrote Bell] in securing a number of 
really excellent men. In some cases, of course, we have fallen 
on unfortunate material but in most cases we have found in our 
Baganda Agents, helpers of amazing utility."117
Increasingly, however, the use of these Agents as magistrates in the 
non-Agreement areas became indefensible and was in due course 
abandoned. In the meantime, a number of palliative measures were 
instituted, the most important of which was the enactment of the 
Native Courts Ordinance, 1909, the main object of which was to enable 
the Governor to give definite recognition to the Agents' jurisdiction 
which, though tacitly allowed had never been defined. The Ordinance 
made provision for the establishment of Native Courts over which 
British Native Courts, held by District Officers, had appellate, 
supervisory and revisionary jurisdiction.1 These Courts, which 
were based on the Buganda model, were to administer justice between 
"native and native" and were to conform to the rules made by the High 
Court, or subject to the District Officer's approval, the procedure
116. C.O. 536/21/37925 op.cit.
117. Ibid.
118. See the Native Courts Ordinance, 1909, sec. 10.
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and practice, hitherto followed by the local traditional courts11^. 
That was the theory. The actual setting up of these courts in the 
Eastern and Northern Provinces was still largely determined by the 
initiative of each individual District Officer, and was, as it 
happened, very slow and, indeed, piecemeal. Thus, though, the Bukedi 
and the Nile Districts, for example, were placed under British 
overrule as early as 1906, it was not until 1913, that their judicial 
machinery was brought under the current native courts legislation.
It would appear, however, that the protectorate authorities were 
quite happy with the existing informal judicial arrangements, and 
many were strongly averse to any changess-
"The inhabitants of this district are mostly savages. Under 
our administration the district has been divided into 
subdivisions and a number of chiefs and elders whose authority 
supported by us extends over certain sections of the population 
now hold courts of various grades as follows:- the court of 
village elders; the court of the sub-chief; the court of the 
tribal chief; and the court of the tribal chiefs of a 
subdivision sitting together.
These courts which are based on those in vogue in the more 
advanced parts of the Protectorate, have been instituted here 
very gradually and are in different stages of development, 
those sitting nearest government stations being as a rule the 
more advanced. The jurisdiction of these courts extends to all 
civil cases between natives of the district and to many 
offences triable under the Indian Penal Code which are for the 
present, I consider more advantageously dealt with by these 
courts. Instances of grave injustice are less frequent, and 
indeed very rare among the more advanced chiefs. In a few 
year's time regulations governing the native courts of the more 
advanced parts of the Protectorate might be introduced; mean 
while, I should be exceedingly sorry to hear of such an 
introduction or of any serious tampering with the present 
system"120.
119. Section 14(i) provided that, "In this ordinance and the Native 
Courts Ordinance, 1905, the term "native of the district" shall 
include ... any native of the Protectorate or any native of any 
tribe on the confines of the Protectorate who has been resident 
in the district for a period of 5 years".
120. UNA/JMP79325. DCs Report on the machinery of Justice in 
Bukedi, 1909.
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The Administration was thus generally content with the unreformed 
system of Native courts.
The principal reason for this, as the preceding extract illustrates, 
was the belief held by District Officers that the indigenous judicial 
bodies were well adopted to the needs of the people over whom they 
had jurisdiction. This optimisum, however, was not shared by the 
judiciary. They believed that the powers of District Officers, over 
Native Courts, though wide in scope, could not be effectively 
exercised mainly because, the judiciary maintained, the Executive 
Officers, apparently, had no inclination nor the requisite expertise 
to exercise their statutory powers. Some District Officers, it was 
alleged, had
"a tendency to take cases in an informal way without records; 
that is by way of "shauris": (informal arrangements) in which
verbal orders were given, orders which unless made in 
accordance with the established law, had no legal 
authority.1,121
The Executive, on the other hand, still believed that any material 
interference with the powers and jurisdiction of the indigenous 
courts would deal a lethal blow to the status and prestige of the 
chiefs, to the detriment of British administration. Accordingly 
during the early years of British rule, the Executive resented any 
suggestion by the judiciary for the regular section of the tribal 
tribunals. In subsequent years, however, the Executive, too, albeit 
grudgingly became disenchanted with the unreformed arrangements for 
the hearing of cases, and by 1920, justice throughout the 
Protectorate was being administered within the general framework of 
the Uganda order in Council, 1902. District Courts held by District
121. Ennis' memo, op.cit.
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Officers had been in existence for several years, whilst "Additional 
District Courts", held by Stipendiary Magistrates, existed in a 
number of Townships, such as Entebbe, Jinja and Kampala# For the 
majority of people, however, the local chiefly courts were still the 
most important courts, for it was in such courts that the bulk of 
"native cases" were heard and all manner of disputes settled. The 
role of the Supervisory Courts was to ensure that the "Native Courts 
R u l e s "122 were strictly adhered to
122 The London Gazette, 15.8.1902. The Uganda Order in Council,
1902, Art 22(1). Whilst these rules varied from district to
district, the Kabale Native Courts Rules, issued on 9th June
1922, will serve as an example.
The Kabale Native Courts Rules
1• These rules may be cited as the Kabale Native Courts Rules.
2. The County and Sub-Divisional Courts shall sit weekly for the 
trial of cases.
The Lukiko Court shall sit quarterly or oftener as may be 
directed by'the District Magistrate.
3. All cases shall be instituted in the County or Sub-Divisional 
Court of the Chief of the accused or defendant if an native 
of the district, or in the Court of the County or 
Sub-division in which he usually resides or where the course 
of action arose if he is not a native of the district.
4. The Lukiko Court shall submit a return of all cases tried to 
the District Magistrate as soon as possible after the 
conclusion of each sitting.
All other courts shall render returns monthly, provided that 
the files of all cases in which a sentence of imprisonment or 
whipping is imposed shall be submitted to the District 
Magistrate as soon as possible.
5. The fees specified in the schedule hereto shall be leviable 
in the Kabale Native Courts.
6. The fee leviable on execution shall be payable not by the 
plaintiff but by the defendant. All other fees shall be paid 
in the first instance by the Complaint or plaiantiff, but may 
be remitted when the court thinks fit, and may be ordered to 
be repaid by the defendant if judgment is given against him.
7. All fines and fees collected in any Court shall be paid into 
the Lukiko Fines Fund.
8. No person shall be imprisoned in any Gombolola lock-up.
9. Any person sentenced to not more than seven days imprisonment 
may be imprisoned in the Saza lock-up for such period. All 
persons sentenced to more than seven days imprisonment shall 
be sent without delay to the prison at Kabale.
10. Warrants of imprisonment shall accompany each prisoner and 
shall be signed by the Chief who presided at the Court which 
sentenced the prisoners.
11• Notice of appeal from any decision shall be given to the
Appeal Court within one mouth unless the Court for any reason 
considers that such time ought to be extended.
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and that "substantial justice was administered without undue regard
to technicalities and without undue delay".123 Many of these courts,
however, had power, by virtue of the Proclamations creating them, to
try cases arising from certain specified ordinances. Otherwise,
Native courts were solely concerned with the administration of
"native law" per simpliciter. There were, even here, however, very
important qualifications: all courts were required, in the exercise
of their powers, to comply with Article 20 of the Uganda Order in
Council, 1902, the terms of which, in part, stated that:-
"In all cases, civil and criminal, to which natives are 
parties, every court (a) shall be guided by native law so far 
as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and 
morality or inconsistent with any Order in Council or 
Ordinance, or any regulation or rule made under any Order in 
Council, ••••"124
It would appear, however, that these statutory provisions were, in 
practice, largely redundant: witness the wholesale infringement, or 
rather, the non-observance, by the Native Courts, of section 306(i) 
of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, 1919. The Native Courts and, 
evidently, the Executive were unaware that the limited
123. Uganda Order in Council, 1902, Art. 20. Needless to say that 
the expression "without undue regard to technicalities of 
procedure" did not mean that all forms of procedure were to be 
ignored. On the contrary, in the absence of any directions 
Native Courts were required to exercise their jurisdiction
  according to the procedure heretofore followed by the
indigenous tribunals in which the court was situated. And the 
Supervisory Court had power to give directions as to practice 
and procedure to be followed by the courts under its 
supervision and control: Courts Ordinance (1919) s.39; and The 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance (1919) s.25.
124. Uganda Order in Council, 1902, Art. 20. The legislative powers 
of Native Councils were set out in the Native law Ordinance, 
1919, whilst the powers of chiefs to make orders and 
regulations were contained in s.7 of the Native Authority 
Ordinance, 1919. in Buganda the powers of the Buganda 
Government to make laws governing the Baganda were recognised 
by and exercised according to the terms of the Buganda 
Agreement (Native Laws) 1910.
- 374 -
criminal jurisdiction exercised by the chiefs had to conform to the 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance, 1919, and the Uganda Order in Council, 
1902. Thus, in 1926, Sir William Gowers, for example, unashmedly
confided in the Secretary of State that:
"At the time of the chief justice's original report I had been 
less than three months in Uganda and the fact that women were 
beaten by Native Courts had not previously come to my knowledge. 
The Chief Secretary wishes me to add that he was wholly unaware,
throughout his service in Uganda that the practice existed ....
I was not aware, until the point was made clear by the Chief 
Justice and the Attorney General that the practice was directly 
forbidden to Native Courts by Protectorate legislation. Native 
Courts administer native law and custom and it has never, so far 
as I am aware, been made clear to administrative officres that 
the procedure and punishment permitted to Native Courts are 
governed entirely by this O r d i n a n c e " 125.
In any case, this was, in Gower's view, a very minor issue; for him, 
the real problem facing judicial administration in rural areas was 
the subordination of Native Courts to the jurisdiction of the High 
Court. He firmly believed that the existing arrangements were 
illogical and unsatisfactory, and efforts were accordingly made to
125 C.O. 536/139/3288 Gowers to S/S 8.3.1926.
On the 25th September 1925, following a meeting at which the 
Chief Justice, the Chief Secretary and the Attorney General 
were present and the legal position fully discussed a 
telegram was sent to all Provicial Commissioners informing 
them that the practice of flogging of women was illegal and 
inconsistent with the law of the Protectorate, and advised 
that the practice "must cease forthwith", and their attention 
drawn to the relevant terms of the Ordinance in question: 
C.0.S36/139/3288 E.B. Jarvis to Sir Charles Griffin, C.J. 
7.11.1925. Enclosure No. 12. Conf. Memo, to P.C.S. Re: 
Flogging of Women. "From my knowledge [observed Gowers] of 
the social evolution of similar primitive communities I 
should, however, have been surprised to find that this form 
of punishment was unknown in Uganda. It is quite consistent 
with native public opinion, and I need not point out that 
European views regarding the treatment of women are quite 
foreign to primitive African tribes, among whom it often 
happens that the female is physically the equal of the male".
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place the trial of "purely native cases" under the exclusive control 
and supervision of District Officers; and he, uncompromisingly so, 
told the Secretary of State. He wrote:-
"Since I assumed the administration* of this Protectorate, the 
System under which Native Courts are supervised and controlled, 
has caused me considerable misgivings and anxiety. All Native 
Courts in the Eastern, Northern and western Provinces are set up 
under the Courts Ordinance Part V and are Subordinate to and 
under the supervision of the High Court.
In Buganda, Native Courts are recognised as having been created 
by the Principal Agreement or by the Kabaka under the Buganda 
Agreement (Judicial) 1905, but for purposes of supervision they 
are treated as courts established under the Courts Ordinance and 
accordingly as subordinate to the High Court.
The defects of this system were first brought to my notice in 
1926 •••• The state of affairs revealed clearly indicated that a 
system of dual control and divided responsibility was likely to 
be ineffective and unsatisfactory. A report on the working of 
the Lukiko Court by a magistrate of the Judicial Department early 
in 1928 indicated clearly that the results of this dual system of 
control have been as unsatisfactory in Buganda as elsewhere. In 
my opinion responsibility for the control and supervision of 
Native Courts throughout the Protectorate should be vested in a 
single authority -that authority should be the Provincial 
Commissioner in his province, directly responsible to myself.
For the supervision and training of the Native Courts in Uganda 
at their present stage only a moderate standard of knowledge of 
exotic law and legal procedure is required. A profound knowledge 
of the customs and an intimate familiarity with the habits of 
thought and the mental outlook of the particular tribe 
in which the courts are set up are, however, essential. Senior 
Officers of the Provincial Administration are expected to possess 
all the above qualifications, but it would be unreasonable to 
look for them in judges of the High Court. Further the training 
of Courts forms so important a part of the education in 
self-government of the various tribes of the Protectorate which 
is a primary duty of the officers of the provincial 
Administration that it is impossible to contemplate the 
elimination of the Provincial Commissioner and his assistants 
from these duties.
No tribe in this Protectorate has yet reached the stage in which 
it is possible for them to appreciate the desirability of a 
separation between the judicial and executive functions of 
government and a premature attempt to enforce this distinction 
must militate against the successful social and political 
education of these tribes. At the present stage, and for a 
number of years to come, it is essential that the authority .which 
exercises executive control over chiefs and Native Councils 
should control and instruct them in all functions of Government 
without differentiation.
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I have had under consideration for some months a draft ordinance 
which would transfer control of those courts from the High Court 
to the Provincial Administration but action in this matter has 
now been anticipated by the recent enactment of a Native Courts 
Ordinance in Tanganyika Territory. This Ordinance follows 
precisely the lines which I had in contemplation for a Uganda 
Ordinance, the "objects and reasons" for the legislation which 
were published with the Tanganyika Bill are not less applicable 
to Uganda than Tanganyika and I desire very strongly to support 
Sir Donald Cameron's views which are embodied in the third and 
fourth paragraphs of this document. I accordingly ask for your 
authority to-bring before my legislative council a Native Courts 
Ordinance on the lines of the Tanganyika Ordinance with such 
modifications as may be necessary to meet local conditions.
I am aware that the enactment of the Ordinance in Tanganyika has 
evoked some criticism from members of the public who ignore or 
are ignorant of the fact that the system which they would condemn 
has operated admirably for many years in other dependencies such 
as Nigeria and Sudan. These criticisms appear to me to be based 
entirely on fallacious assumptions and a disregard of essential 
facts which render the system greatly preferable to any 
alternative which can be s u g g e s t e d . 26
Despite its well known defects, the Nigerian judicial system, on 
which the Tanganyika Ordinance' was modelled was yet again to be 
Gower's model for reform."*27 fact that it was in vogue, or
rather "operated admirably for many years in other dependencies" was, 
in his view, sufficient warrant for its adoption elsewhere. Gowers' 
Legal Advisers, however, did not exactly share their master's view; 
and attached to his despatch, to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, were two short crisp "minutes", one by the chief justice, 
Sir Charles Griffin, and the other, by Judge Guthrie-Smith, that were 
vehemently opposed to the proposed legislation. Guthrie-Smith's 
minute will serve as an example. It reads
126. C.O. 536/157/20405 Gowers to S/S. 21.6.1929.
127. C.O. 536/196/3548. Clearly Gowers' Nigerian experience had 
left an indelible mark on him. "The Government is endeavouring 
to introduce the Nigerian System of Native Courts supervised by 
Administrative Officers and not by the Judiciary. Sir Donald 
Cameron introduced the system in Tanganyika where he got it 
from Nigeria, and Sir William Gowers, as an old Nigerian 
Province official in Nigeria, naturally, was inclined to follow 
that model" (per Flood): Minute of 30.3.1933.
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"I have read the reasons in support of the Tanganyika Ordinance 
and cannot see that they have any application to Uganda. They 
lead to the inference that the Territory must be very many 
years behind Uganda in civilisation. The present system has 
worked for 25 years and in my opinion it would be a step 
backward to abolish it."128
The judiciary was thus "entirely opposed to the purpose sought to be 
achieved" by new Native Courts Ordinance. They strongly believed 
that the proposed changes, particularly, the abolition of the High 
Court's revisional jurisdiction, were inconsistent with the rule of 
law. They "did not feel confident (in those circumstance], that the 
rule of law [would] p r e v a i l ".129
Besides, the judiciary, quite rightly, pointed out that the proposed 
legislation was contrary to the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
a retrograde step, and as such a measure to be deprecated.120 
Despite these scathing criticisms, however, Gowers' dispatch was 
favourably received, at the Colonial office, by Parkinson, the 
Assistant Secretary, and rather surprisingly, by the Secretary of 
State's Principal Legal Adviser, Sir John Risley. They too, like 
Gowers, erroneously argued that a system which had worked in Nigeria 
with success and which had recently been adopted in Tanganyika could 
hardly be said to be unsuitable for Uganda.131 They suggested, 
however, that "proper provision should be made with regard to 
criminal proceedings for offences by or against non-natives to be 
strictly safeguarded" by providing that such cases should be heard by
128. C.O. 536/157/20405. Inclosure No.3, Cuthrie-Smith to Gowers
9.5.1929.
129.' C.O. 536/157/20405. Inclosure No.1, Griffin to Gowers
15.4.1929.
130. C.O. 536/157/20405. Griffin to Gowers, ibid.
131. C.O. 536/157/20405.' Risley's minute of 12.8.1929. Parkinson's
minute of 8.8.1929 simply stated that: "I anticipated 
criticisms from Griffin, C.J. whose opinion of P.C.S. is low 
and whose opinion of the majesty of the law is high."
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a District Court or the High Court. 1^2 Thusr though the proposed 
legislation was obviously inapposite for "non-natives", it was 
perfectly suitable for the "natives", and Gowers was advised 
accordingly;1^  an(j three months later a draft Bill on the lines of 
the Tanganyika Native Courts Ordinance was submitted to the Colonial 
Office for approval.1-*4
However, despite the Secretary of State's previous decision, in 
favour of the new legislation, Gowers' final Draft Bill was 
unfavourably received by Grattan Bushe, the Assistant Legal Adviser, 
at the Colonial office, who, like the local judges, but unlike 
Risley, his immediate superior, took the view that the proposed 
Native Courts Ordinance, was inimical to good judicial practice and 
administration, and so caustically minuted, at some length, as 
• follows;-
"My task is simply to examine the terms of this Bill paying due 
regard to decisions taken on the question of principle. Since, 
in my view what was done in Tanganyika and is now being copied 
with avidity in Uganda is the only retrograde step in colonial 
administration which I have seen and the task is not an easy 
one. The executive gives the law and administers it.
Political officers adjudicate upon their own orders and, if 
needs be, upon their own conduct. No court can control them, 
no lawyer is even allowed to watch them. A native may appeal 
from Caesar to Caesar, but is otherwise without redress. The 
result to my mind will be complete subordination of law to 
policy. We have built a sound proof wall round the 
administration of native justice and, since no echo can reach 
the outside world, the system of course "works satisfactorily".
132. C.O. 536/157/20405 Risley's minute, op.cit.
133. C.O. 536/157/20405 Lord Passfield to Gowers 13.3.1930.
134. C.O. 536/160/2053 Gowers to S/S 11.6.1930: Initially, Gowers' 
Draft Bill was whole heartedly welcomed, Ingrams noting, for 
example, that "the new system ... is really one that should 
have been adopted years ago, but it has been difficult to get 
rid of the idea that English law was the best for people in any 
stage of development, and that it should be enforced willy 
nilly on the territories under British control, however, 
backward the inhabitants were".
'l
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Even now I think that the worst features of the system might be 
alleviated by conferring upon the Supreme Court power in the 
last resort to hear an appeal by special leave, that is to say, 
there would be no right of appeal, but if a prima facie case of 
injustice would be shown the court would have to allow an 
appeal. In other words, clause 34(4) might provide instead of 
the ultimate appeal being to the Governor that it should be to 
the Supreme Court by special leave of the court. This would at 
least provide a vent, however, small."135
Additionally, he made proposals for some much needed amendments to be 
effected, including the recommendation for the making of periodic 
reviews and renewal of the entire ordinance. Bushes' proposals were 
unreservedly accepted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
S t a t e ,136 Gowers ordered to prepare a fresh Bill along the lines 
indicated above.1^^ Such a Bill was published in February 1931, and 
was about to be presented to the Legislative Council when the Uganda 
Law Society objected to it and presented a strongly worded petition 
against its enactment to the Secretary of State for the colonies.138 
The Law Society's petition against the Bill was, shortly afterwards, 
followed by an equally strongly worded petition from the Buganda 
Government deprecating, the introduction of a measure which precluded 
the right of appeal to a Court of Justice.139
135. C.O. 536/160/20531 Bushe's Minute of 28.8.1930.
136. C.O. 536/160/20531 Dr. Drummond Sheils' Minute reads as
follows: "I think [he minuted] I have made it clear all along 
that I think this series of ordinances is retrograde and not 
progressive. I agree entirely with Mr. Bushe's criticism of 
this recent new departure in our judicial system in the African 
colonies. It has as Sir Cecil points out led to disaster in 
Southern Nigeria. As Mr. Bushe rightly says policy and not 
justice will determine the line of judgement, and this spirit 
will persist right back to the final authority - the Governor. 
The principle is entirely wrong, and if the Supreme Courts are 
bad or imperfect, the remedy is not this arrangement but a
revision of the personnel of the Supreme Courts".
137. 536/160/20531 S/S to Gowers 16.9.30 is in similar terms to the 
two minutes quoted above, i.e. Bushe's and Sheils' 
respectively.
138. C.O. 536/173/22188 Enclosure to Weatherhead's dispatch of 
7.10.1932.
139. Buganda's Petition was signed by the Kabaka and his three 
ministers•
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"We note further [the petitioners went on] that finality under 
the Bill is reached when the matter has been dealt with by the 
Provincial Commissioner. The official, however, sits not as a 
Court but as a revising officer, and therefore the proceedings 
of a Court are not open to the Public and cannot therefore 
receive the publicity which is the first principle of British 
Justice."140
It was also argued that the draft Bill was racial and discriminatory 
- witness the submission, on behalf of the Uganda Chamber of 
Commerce, that "every native should have the right of appeal in 
matters both civil and criminal to the High Court and thence to all 
further Courts of Appeal in the same way as other subjects", namely,
. Asians and Europeans.^1
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly it was pointed out that 
the proposed legislation was both unconstitutional and ultra vires 
the Uganda Order in Council, 1902.142 ge that as it may, the
Governor was not impressed. Indeed, according to the Ugandan
(
authorities the Petition of the Buganda Government was "the result of 
representations made to the Kabaka by the Kampala Advocates who are 
naturally interested financially in the continuance of the existing 
practice under which certain cases originating in Native Courts may 
ultimately appeal to the High Court and be represented by CounselN, 143 
whilst the Resolution of the Uganda Chamber of Commerce was "inspired 
by the legal members of the chamber, with the object of making more
140. Buganda's Petition was signed by the Kabaka, Katikiro,
Omulamuzi and omuwanika.
141. C.O. 536/160/20531 Enclosure to dispatch of 11.6.1930.
142. C.O. 536/171/22083 Enclosure to dispatch of 20.7.1932.
143. C.O. 536/173/22188 Weatherhead to S/S 7.10.1932. Buganda's
petition op6ns thus: "We note with gratitude that this 
Ordinance does not expressly apply to Buganda, we still fear 
that it may in future be extended to this country and we would 
therefore earnestly request that this may not be considered 
necessary"•
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legal work for t h e m s e l v e s *144 Nevertheless, these representations 
afforded the opponents of the proposed legislation, particularly the 
Judicial Department, the opportunity to reconsider the policy to 
which they had reluctantly given their consent and in April 1933 the 
Secretary of State addressed a further dispatch to the new Governor, 
Sir Bernard Boudillon, "in which he receded entirely from his 
original approval of the Tanganyika p r i n c i p l e "  .145
The rationale for this reversal of policy had several strands. 
Firstly, "the model, though it worked in the past, it was [by 1933] 
beginning to cause considerable anxiety" in Whitehall.146
"If every remnant of the independent Judiciary [minuted Bushe] 
is excluded from the Province and the Provincial Commissioner 
exercises both executive and Judicial functions, and does that 
moreover under a condition where there is no publicity 
whateverf you get an autocracy which is as absolute as anything
that can be i m a g i n e d ."147
Secondly, the point was made that the system under consideration
placed "political officers in an impossible position" in that they
had "to combine in themselves inconsistent functions", viz,executive,
legislative and j u d i c i a l .148 Thirdly, the Colonial office was
apparently not satisfied with "the adequacy of the control exercised
[over native courts] by the Administrative Officers".149 " m
particular [noted Flood] it is often alleged that the review of the
proceedings of a Native Court is perfunctory and tends to become more
and more so with the increase in the work of the Native Courts and
144. C.O. 536/160/20531 Gowers to S/S 11.6.1930.
•145. C.O. 536/183/23644 Bourdillon, Memorandum on Native Courts. 
April 1934.
146. C.O. 536/176/3548 Flood's Minute of 30.3.1933.
147. Ibid. Bushe quoted By Flood in the minute cited above.
148. Ibid.
149. Flood's minute of 30.3.1933.
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with increased administrative work thrown on the District 
O f f i c e r s ".15° Fourthly, and perhaps more importantly, the principle 
underlying the proposed legislation was, in Bushe's words, "entirely 
wrong"; it was "retrograde and not progressive*". The idea of 
"administrative justice" was increasingly becoming indefensible and 
outmoded; and as far as Uganda was concerned, "Any endeavour to 
exclude (the jurisdiction of) the High Court over all persons and 
matters in Uganda (would according to Abraham C.J.), "sooner or 
later, end in trouble".151 por the jurisdiction of the High Court 
laid down in Article 15 of the Order in Council of 1902 was part of 
the Constitution of the Protectorate, and as Flood noted, since the 
High Court (had) exercised this jurisdiction in the past over the 
Native Courts, it would be a very difficult step to remove that 
jurisdiction and substitute administrative arrangements with the 
Governor as the final Court of A p p e a l . I52 "what (he went on) I 
should like to see would be an appeal from the Native Courts to the
* See Bushe's minute, op.cit.
150. C.O. 536/176/3548. Cf Abrahams (C.J.) observations on His 
Excellency the Governor's Memorandum oh Native Courts, the 
relevant portion of which reads: "In compliance with the 
request of His Excellency I herewith submit such observations 
on his memorandum on Native Courts as I feel enabled to do so. 
Hitherto the High Court has had practically nothing to do with 
Native Courts outside Buganda although from time to time 
certain elementary Rules of Court have been made by it.
Speaking for myself, I know practically nothing of the way in 
which these native courts perform their duties or of their
potentialities for improvement". (Enclosure II to the Conf.
despatch of 28.9.1934.) Indeed, this was the raison d'etre for 
the proposed legislation. One of the main arguments adduced in 
support of an appeal to the Governor was that the High Court 
had no interest, or time to exercise its supervisory powers 
effectively. "It is obvious [wrote Bourdillon] that the High 
Court cannot possibly exercise proper control over Native 
Courts which try something like 100,000 cases in a year unless 
the intermediate supervision by the Subordinate British Courts 
is adequate, and the real object to be aimed at is the adequacy 
of this supervision". (Boundillon: Memorandum on Native Courts, 
1934).
151. C.O. 536/183/23644 Enclosure II to Dispatch of 28.9.1934.
152. C.O. 536/176/3548 Flood's Minute of 30.3.1933.
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District Commissioner sitting as a Magistrate, or to the Provincial 
Commissioner sitting as. a Magistrate also in more important cases, 
and from there to the High Court which would be final"*153
Bourdillon was accordingly informed and in September 1934 the Acting 
Governor sought authority, from the Secretary of State, for the 
preparation of a revised Native Courts Bill, and in January 1938, Sir 
Philip Mitchell, the then Governor, received the following reply:
"It is possible that you may wish to give this matter fresh 
consideration but on the material before me, I think I may 
express my concurrence in Sir Bernard Bourdillon's conclusion 
as to the effect of Article 20 of the Uganda Order in Council.
With regard to the question of the rule-making power I do not 
feel that the requirement of approval by the Governor of the 
exercise of rule-making powers by the Chief-Justice, could be 
reasonably be held to involve an extension of the executive's 
control over the judiciary while on the other hand, I am 
advised that there is no objection in law to the power to make 
rules being conferred upon the Governor. Accordingly, a choice 
between the alternative procedures may well be made purely in 
the light of expediency, although I incline to the view that it 
would be preferable to follow the usual practice of conferring 
the power on the Chief Justice to be exercised with the
153. C.O. 536/176/3548 op.cit. This was accepted by the Secretary 
of State, and in April 1933, Bourdillon informed that: "You 
will understand that in the present circumstances I feel great 
difficulty in approving proposals which would have the effect 
of abolishing in Uganda, where it has been long established, 
the system which it is proposed to introduce and extend 
elsewhere". (C.O. 536/176/3548 S/S to Bourdillon 8.4.1933).
0
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approval of the Governor."154
In April 1939, a fresh Native Courts Bill was prepared and having 
received the secretary of State's approval was enacted and became law 
in April 1940.155 a s enacted, however, the Native Courts Ordinance, 
1940, involved no major change of principle: it merely confirmed, "in 
legal form the procedure of the Native Courts as it had been
154. C.O. 536/183/23644 S/S to Governor 8.1.1938. It was hoped 
that the Chief Justice "would invoke the assistance of the 
Administration in formulating the necessary rules". Indeed 
judging from past experience, there could be no other course: 
"At the present moment, (wrote Bourdillon) the High Court has 
power to make, prescribe rules for the Native Courts in both 
civil and criminal cases. I think I am correct in saying that 
no rules have been issued which prescribe the procedure to be 
followed or lay down what form the record of the case should 
take". Hence the Governor's proposal. In response to this, 
Abrahams C.J. had this to sfay. "There has been, as His 
Excellency say, no exercise of the powers conferred on the High 
Court to make rules prescribing the forms and procedure to be 
used and observed by Native Courts. This is riot surprising in 
view of what I have already said, that the High court knows 
practically nothing about these courts. If I had to make such 
rules I should not know where to begin. It may be that I have 
misunderstood paragraph 8 of His. Excellency's Memorandum, but I 
am unable to agree that if any procedure is prescribed we 
should make no attempt to bring Native Courts to conform with 
our own standard. After all procedure is only an attempt to 
formulate a method designed to produce the best results".
(C.O. 536/183/23644 Enclosure to dispatch No. Conf. of 
28.9.1934.)
155. No.3 of 1940. The objects and reasons for the Bill were set 
out by Mitchell in his dispatch to the Secretary of State in 
the following terms:
"I* am advised that the legislation from which they (Native 
Courts) derive their powers is in a most confused state and 
that the jurisdiction of the Courts is ill defined and in
certain directions, unduly limited. The draft Bill is based
on similar legislation in force in the Tanganyika Territory 
and Nigeria, with modifications to suit local circumstances, 
and, I believe, some improvement. The High Court is the 
final forum for aggrieved parties, and the power to make 
rules is given to the Provincial Commissioners subject to the
approval of the Chief Justice. The proposals have his
support and I feel confident that with his collaboration 
valuable progress will be achieved in developing the Native 
Courts as an essential and integral part of the judicial 
system of the Protectorate. Complementary to the British 
Courts•"
(C.0.0 536/205/40249 Mitchell to MacDonald 19.4.39).
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developed in practice since the enactment of the Courts Ordinance of
%
1 9 1 1 ".156 The only radical change in procedure was the limitation 
set to the chain of a p p e a l s . 157 a circular memorandum issued in June 
1941, explains the practical implications of this provision rather 
well and is reproduced below for ease of reference.
"The warrants for the Native Courts of each district have been drawn 
up so as to interfere as little as possible with existing practice.
It has been laid down that in no case tried under the Ordinance shall 
there be more than two appeals. No appeal therefore lies from the 
appellate decision of a Central Native Court dealing with a case 
originally tried in a Gombolola Court which has also been the subject 
of an appeal via County Court. On the other hand, where a case has 
originated.in a County Court, an appeal can lie to the District Court 
from the appellate decision of a Central Native Court, as this will 
involve no more than two appeals. As this procedure in appeal might 
prevent cases in which important interpretation of native custom are 
involved, from reaching the District Court, a proviso has been added 
to the Warrants of Gombolola Courts that in cases involving a 
substantial question of native law or custom, appeals shall lie 
direct to the Central Native Court, provided permission for such an 
appeal is first obtained from that Court.
As this proviso is an innovation in native court procedure its 
application may first lead to difficulties. District Commissioners 
should therefore ensure with as little delay as possible, that 
Central Native Courts understand their new judicial function of
4
156. Hailey, Lord, Native Administration in the British African 
Territories HSMO 1951, Part 1 p.41.
157. See Section 25(2) of No.3 of 1940.
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granting leave to appeal and that the new procedure in appeal is also 
understood throughout each district.
At present it is not proposed to issue written instructions from this 
office prescribing the manner in which cases should be tried but 
District Commissioners must ensure that all members of Native Courts 
fully understand and adhere to existing procedure, together with the 
powers conferred on them by their Court Warrants. In explaining the 
purpose of the new Ordinance and various changes involved, care 
should be taken not to give the impression that it is anything new 
or revolutionary. Any major change in procedure which it may be 
desired to introduced should first be referred to this office. If it 
appears desirable, written instructions under s.4(1) of the Native 
Courts Ordinance will be i s s u e d . 1 58 The new ordinance supplies a 
foundation upon which it should be possible gradually to build up a 
sound African judicial system. This however can only come about when 
Native Courts have developed a stronger sense of responsibility than 
is always apparant at present. Such development should be the 
constant care of every Administrative Officer who must not only 
supervise the Native Courts within his charge but also guide their 
progress". ^ 9
158. KDA No.104 Provincial Commissioner, Western Province to
District Commissioner, Western Province, 19.6.1941 S.4(1) 
provided that: A Provincial Commissioner may prescribe by the
warrant confirming the establishment of a Native Court or by 
directions given by him in writing, the Constitution of such 
Court, the order of precedence of the members thereof, the 
method of arriving at a decision if the members of the Court 
are in disagreement, the number of the members of the Court 
which shall constitute a quorum, the power of the court to sit 
with or withour assessors, the manner of trial with assessors 
and whether any penalty to be imposed is to be fixed by the 
Court as a whole or by any specified member or members of it.
If any of the said matters are not prescribed by the Provincial 
Commissioner as aforesaid, they shall be regulated by any 
native law and custom applicable to such court.
159. KDA No.104 ibid
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In him were vested the power of supervision, revision and appeal. He 
had access to the native courts in the area of his jurisdiction and 
could "send for and examine the record of any proceedings before a 
court for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, 
legality or propriety of any judgment, sentence or order, recorded or 
passed, or as to the regularity of any proceedings, (and if 
necessary), revise, quash or order the case to be reheard de novo 
either before the same court or some other native or subordinate 
competent court of competent jurisdiction or report the matter to the 
High Court", as he saw fit.160 In such cases the High Court could 
order the case to be reheard de novo by itself or any native or 
subordinate court of competent jurisdiction and in appropriate cases 
especially where there was a miscarriage of justice or where there 
was an error material to the merits of the case, the High Court 
could, revise any original or appellate proceedings of a native court 
as if it were a magistrate's court.15! Such jurisdiction, however, 
was rarely exercised; local control, including appeals and revision, 
as indicated earlier, was in the hands of the District Commissioner, 
whilst ultimate control was vested in the Provincial Commissioner.
He held very wide and extensive powers of revision, appointment, 
suspension and d i s m i s s a l 1 52 and, subject to the concurrence of the 
Chief Justice, the power to make rules of practice and procedure to 
be followed by the Courts and for the carrying out of the Ordinances
160. No.3 of 1940, ss.23 and 24.
161. Ibid. s.26. However, the High Court could refuse to exercise 
its jurisdiction where the applicant had not exhausted his 
rights to appeal under s.25.
162. SS.3 and 5 of No.3 of 1940.
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g e n e r a l l y . 163 He was empowered to prescribe by the warrant 
confirming the establishment of native courts, their constitution, 
practice and procedure, the order and precedence of the Court 
holders, the method of reaching decisions, the extent and manner of 
trial with or without assessors including the determination of fines, 
sentences and p u n i s h m e n t s .164 it was his duty to ensure that the 
chiefs fully understood the nature and the extent of their judicial 
powers, the practice and procedures and the applicable statute and 
local laws. The Executive, the Provincial administations in 
particular, were determined to take "away from the High Court all 
control over the Native Courts",“165
163, In particular, s.28(1) empowered the Provincial Commissioner to 
make rules in respect of the following matters:
(a) The practice and procedure of native courts in their 
original jurisdiction,
(b) The causes or class of cases to be treated as of a 
criminal or civil nature,
(c) The procedure relating to the swearing of witnesses,
(d) The practice relating to the institution of criminal
complaints,
(e) The practice relating to the arrest of accused persons.
(f) The provisions relating to bail,
(g) The practice relating to execution and attachment in
criminal and civil cases,
(h) The provisions relating to the reward of accused persons.
(i) The practice governing the imposition & administration of
corporal punishment,
(j ) The procedure relating to the hearing of appeals in native 
courts.
(k) The costs relating to the institution of cases both civil 
and criminal,
(1) The Records to be kept by native courts,
(m) The fees to be paid in native courts.
(n) The disposal and application of fines and fees received by 
native courts,
(o) The forms to be used.
164, SS. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15 and 28.
165, C.O, 536/183/23644 Memorandum on Native Courts, 1934,
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and the Native Courts ordinance, 1940 was the first step towards that 
end.
As it happened, however, this legislation soon ran into difficulties 
and was subsequently repealed and replaced by the African Courts 
Ordinance, 1957; and provision made for the incorporation of the 
"African Courts" into the main judicial system thus enabling "their 
move to follow the practice and procedure of the Protectorate 
C o u r t s " , 166 the ultimate objective being the establishment of "one 
body of general law and one judicial system applicable equally to all 
p e r s o n s " ; 167 and, as is shown below, the next five years - as it 
happened the last years of colonial rule saw a definite movement 
towards this goal. However, it was not until 1964 that complete 
integration was finally achieved.
9.3.2 THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS INTERGRATION
The colonial machinery of justice was, as noted earlier, organised a 
long racial lines. There were, on the one hand the "Protectorate 
Courts" the High Court and the subordinate courts; and the "Native" 
or Tribal tribunals on the other. The former were, despite the name, 
solely concerned with "non native" matters whilst the latter, as the
f
name suggests, were concerned with purely "native cases" and were, 
contrary to the Uganda Order in Council 1902, under the control and 
supervision of the Executive. Thus though the High Court had "full 
jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all persons and overall 
matters in Uganda", the bulk of "native cases" were outside its 
purview.168
166. Annual Report, 1957.
167. Record of the Judicial Advisers' Conference 1953, p.5 para. 3.
168. Vide, Uganda Order in Council, 1902, Article 18(1).
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In 1933, for example, out of 100,000 cases heard in native courts, 
the High Court, at the instance of individual litigants, made four 
revisional orders, one civil and three criminal; there was no 
original or appellate jurisdication. Indeed, despite its wide powers 
the High Court had never "ever exercised its revisional powers over 
native courts otherwise than the result of an application by 
an aggrieved p e r s o n " , 169 For, as Bourdillon, some what curtly put 
it:-
"They have not the machinery for doing so. They do not receive 
returns of all cases tried by Native Courts and if they did it 
would obviously be impossible for them fully to scrutinise 
them",1
Worse, it was alleged, without demur, that the judiciary had no 
interest, nor the inclination to exercise its wide powers over Native 
Courts; and, as the following passage shows their attitude towards 
Native Courts was decidedly negative.
"Hitherto (minuted the Chief Justice) the High Court has had 
practically nothing to do with Native Courts outside Buganda 
although from time to time certain elementary Rules of court 
have been made by it. Speaking for myself I know practically 
nothing of the way in which these Native Courts perform their 
duties or of their potentialities for improvement".171
It is not surprising, therefore, in view of this apathy, that the 
Executive, to put it mildly was inclined to leave "native justice" 
under their control and supervision. But as indicated earlier, the 
subordination of Native Courts to the executive was never complete, 
and despite official rhetoric to the contrary, the administration of
169. Bourdillon, Memo, on Native Courts, op.cit.
170. Ibid.
171. C.O. 536/183/23644 Abrahams, C.J. to the Acting Governor; 
Inc. II to confidential Dispatch of 28.9.34.
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justice in these courts was perfunctorily supervised# The main 
problem for the indigenous litigant, however, was the existence of a 
dual legal order, consisting of "British" and "Native" courts 
administering "Protectorate" and "customary" law to "non-natives" and 
"natives" respectively. He was subject to both, but his access 
to the former, though quaranteed by the Order in Council, was fraught 
with insuperable difficulties; and, this state of affairs was, in the 
early 1940s, increasingly becoming intolerable, the question of the 
day was to find a link between the two legal systems by which a 
growing number of indigenous litigants could gain easy access to the 
"British judicial System" over which the British judiciary presided.
Initially, the link was found in the portfolio of the Judicial 
Adviser, the main functions of which were advisory and revisionary. 
The idea was to place, a legally qualified, person between the two 
judicial systems, thus doing away with "the foregoing curious mixture 
of appellate and revisionary jurisdiction by the High Court and the 
revisionary jurisdiction of the lay Administration".172
The Judicial Adviser or Judicial Commissioner would, it was hoped, in 
the case of Buganda for example, do all the revisions of the Lukiko 
cases in the name of the Kabaka whom he would advise that such and 
such an order ought to be made imrespect of such and such a case. 
Again, as was usual, this principle, or rather device, was borrowed, 
root, stock and barrel, from the metropolitan legal system.
"To compare very small things with great, (Mitchell Confided in 
Ormsby-Gore), the effect of the "advice" would be as in the 
case of the Judicial Committeee of the Privy Council, and would 
be operative as soon as it was given. In addition, the 
Judicial Adviser, with an Assistant or two, would be 
responsible for the inspection and general control and
172. C.O. 536/188/40080/1 Mitchell to Ormsby-Gore 28/8/1936.
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supervision of Saza and Gombolola Courts throughout Buganda 
vis-a-vis the High Court and would function as it were, as a 
Registrar for all Native Court cases on their way to the High 
Court."173
This, Mitchell opined, would strengthen the hand of the Judicial 
Adviser: it would, for example, "place him in a good position to 
establish contact rather than friction between" the British and the 
Native judicial systems; it would afford him ample opportunity to 
develop the Native judicial systems; and, of course, would enable him 
to bring the latter into close harmony with the former.17^
He thus told Bottomley that:-
"I have invented a plan which I tried on Hailey and found that 
he thought well of it and I have therefore tried it since on 
Hall and Cox and they both incline to like it and if therefore 
it is acceptable at your end, with such modifications as you 
consider desirable, I should go ahead with it, putting it up of 
course in official form. I assume that a native judicial 
system with such extensive powers as that of Buganda, and the 
British judiciary cannot continue to function indefinitely side 
by side, under two divergent procedures and involving a number 
of things in which the weaker (native) is incompatible with, or 
unacceptable to the stronger. On the other, hand, the Buganda 
Agreement, whatever it may be called is in fact a treaty and 
since it is quite certain that the Baganda will never consent 
to any whittling down of what their courts enjoy under it, the 
stage is set for an increasing measure of friction between the 
two, unless a bridge can be formed between them, it seems to 
me that that bridge may be a Judicial Adviser in place of the 
not legally trained Administrative officer in the Provincial 
Commissioner's office who now deals with Lukiko cases and 
petitions•"17^
Mitchell's proposals were subsequently modified and embodied in the 
Buganda Courts Ordinance, 1940, and the office of Judicial Adviser, 
which in fact, had already been established, formally constituted.^7^
173. C.O. 536/188/40080/1 Mitchell to Ormsby-Gore, 28.8.1936.
174. C.O. 536/188/40080/1 Mitchell to Ormsby-Gore, 28.8.1936.
175. C.O. 536/188/40080/1 Mitchell to Bottomley 3.4.1936.
176. Supplement in the Uganda Gazette Extraordinary of 8.4.1940.
S . 24 .
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Mitchell's idea was adopted by the colonial secretary, and , in 1946, 
formed the core of the latter's circular despatch, on Native Courts, 
of which the pertinent part was as follows:-
"I. believe that judicial Advisers will be required in all the *
main Africian territories and, broadly speaking, I consider
that their functions should be as follows
(a) to advise generally on all questions connected with the
operations and procedure of native courts;
(b) to keep under review the tendencies of the native law and
to guide its growth, where necessary, in close relation to
the developing social and economic needs of African 
society;
(c) to study the relationship of African and European law and
to keep under review the future development of this 
relationship ;•
(d) to keep under review, and where necessary suggest
modifications in the composition and organisation of 
native courts, bearing in mind the developing needs of the 
community and the necessity for the progressive 
development of the law;
(e) to organise and direct research on problems relating to 
African law and native cours and their exisiting 
operations and procedure."177
The Secretary of State's despatch concluded by urging the colonial 
governments without Judicial Advisers to endeavour to make such 
appointments and to take an increasing interest in the problems of 
African law and its relationship with European law.17® The Secretary 
of state was, at long last, not unwilling to abolish the existing 
racist laws and their administration. He was thus anxious to promote 
integration "in close relation to the developing social and economic 
needs of African Society".179 Many of his subordinates, however, 
were not ready for some of these changes and a significant minority 
of District Officers were, for the following reasons, averse to 
complete integration:
♦ 177. Despatch from the S/S to the Governors of the Africian
Territories 10.4.46.
178. Ibid.
179. Ibid.
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(i) That the final appeal from native courts would, in most cases, 
"be to judges without adequate knowledge of native law and 
customs and local conditions".
(ii) That integration would almost certainly lead to the 
introduction of "too many legal technicalities and too much 
English law into the body of native law and native courts 
procedure"•
(iii) That fusion would inevitably give rise to intractable problems 
"regarding the admission before appellate courts of legal 
practitioners"•180
These arguments though understandable were as the following extract 
shows by no means incontravertible.
"The weight to be given to these three objections is a matter 
of opinion. None of them can be lightly brushed aside, but 
they can be met as progress is made in the process of 
integration. The last one does not seem to have much 
substance. In territories where an appeal lies to the Supreme 
Court, advocates may be allowed to appear in that court and 
little if any criticism has been heard. It does not follow 
that they should also be permitted in lower courts, though they 
may in fact be heard, in some territories, on appeal to a 
magistrates court presided over by an administrative 
officer."181
Thus, though understandable, these objections were virtually without 
substance, and were largely based on antiquated "native" policy 
considerations. In any event the case for integration was, 
arguably, unanswerable; indeed, the duality of judicial 
administration was, sooner or later, destined to disappear. It was 
inevitable; the die was cast. It was not until 1953, seven years 
after the initial decision was made, however, that irrevocable steps 
towards complete integration were finally taken. In that year, the
180. Record of the Judicial Advisers' Conference, 1953, p.4.
181. Ibid.
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merits of the existing two-tier court structure and its concommitant 
racial laws, were carefully examined by a group of eminent officers, 
including seven substantive Judicial Advisers and conclusively 
rejected. This gathering, over which the Secretary of State's Legal 
Adviser, presided, having examined the constitution, jurisdiction and 
personnel of native courts; the functions of Judicial Advisers; and 
the "vitally important question of i n t e g r a t i o n " 1 8 2  resolved that:
(i) In principle, any country should have one body of general law 
and one judicial system applicable equally to all persons;
(ii) Just as, with insignificant exceptions, that state of affairs 
(which represents complete integration) was achieved by Western 
countries centuries ago, so also it must be the ultimate 
objective in African territories;
(iii) No doubt in more backward areas this process will take a long 
time, but steps, however small towards that objective should be 
taken as soon as conditions permit;
(iv) The development of the necessary conditions should be 
encouraged and the situation should be continually under 
review,183
These objectives were, having been accepted by the Protectorate 
Government, given formal expression in the "African Courts Ordinance, 
1 9 5 7 ",^84 By this Ordinance, the African courts, as Native Courts, 
were now called, were reorganised, placed directly under the 
jurisdiction of the High Court; empowered "more closely to follow the 
practice and Procedure of the Protectorate Courts";1®® enjoined to 
administer native law, bye-laws, orders or directives of the
182.
183.
184.
185.
Record of Judicial Advisers Conference, 1953, p.5.
Record of Judicial Advisers Conference, 1953, p.5.
No.1 of 1957: "An Ordinance To Make Better Provision For The 
Constitution Of African Courts And For The Administration Of 
Justice By Such Courts"•
SS. 26(1) and 27(1 ).
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Legislative, District and Local Councils? and in the hearing of 
criminal cases, to follow the Criminal and Penal Codes, the practice 
and procedure of the sub-ordinate courts, and in certain cases, the 
Evidence Act, 1909.186
Rather strangely, however, failure to comply with these provisions 
had no legal effect; it could not invalidate the court's ruling, 
decision, or order.187 The provisions were declaratory rather than 
mandatory. Justice, "as between native and native" was still crude 
and elementary, and so too was the machinery of justice. Hence, 
legal representation in the African courts was for example, expressly 
p r o h i b i t e d . 1 88 The reasons for this blanket ban were many and 
various and almost all stemed from previous illiberal judicial and 
educational policies. Most courts were mainly concerned with petty 
cases and were presided over, by semi-literate chiefs. There were no 
indigenous lawyers and the few foreign lawyers in private practice 
were unfamiliar with native law and, of course, none could speak the 
vernacular tongue. The courts' practices and procedures were too 
informal, their jurisdiction over enacted law extremely limited, and 
had no jurisdiction over "non-natives". Consequently, the admission 
of counsel was, under these circumstances, generally discouraged, 
considered inadvisable and, indeed, a ticklish issue. Such a move 
was thus frdught with many difficulties and would have necessitated 
several fundamental changes, many of which were unacceptable to many 
District Officers*
186. SS. 9,10,11,12,13 and 14.
187. S. 15 stated that: "The fact that an African Court has not been
guided or properly guided by the provisions of any Ordinance 
referred to secitons 12, 13 and 14 of this Ordinance shall not 
of itself entitle any person to be acquitted or any order of 
the court to be set aside".
188. S. 23 provided, inter alia, that: "No advocate or legal 
practitioner may appear for any party before an African 
court;...."
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The advent of foreign lawyers they maintained, would for example, 
have necessitated strict adherence to the Criminal Code, the Penal 
Code, and the Evidence Act, 1909, the interpretation of which was in 
their view beyond the ken of many a chief. Besides the appearance of 
lawyers would, they felt, deal a lethal blow to some of the courts' 
virtues, such as accessibility, informality and cheapness, and would 
most certainly require translation facilities with their attendant 
problems. Having said that however, the appearance of legal 
representation had its virtues. It would, doubtlessly, in most 
cases, have served the ends of justice better than the existing 
arrangements, it would have encouraged law reform and the training of 
indigenous lawyers; and most importantly, justice required it, 
particularly where imprisonment or excessive fine, or where the 
citizens' liberty or fundamental rights were in question. It is 
elementary in such dire circumstances, that the accused be given 
ample opportunities to present his case in the best possible way, and 
arguably, he can only do so by hiring the services of a skilled 
lawyer. As noted earlier, the advent of legal representation would 
have had a salutary effect on the courts' practices and procedures, 
and there is no doubt that that in itself would have been a major 
step towards judicial integration; it would have led to the early 
development of the local bench; local magistrates and judges; the 
establishment of the local bar, and the growth of the legal 
profession. Unfortunately, however, these advantages were given 
short shrift treatment; they were sacrificed at the alter of 
administrative convenience and practical expediency, and it was some 
time before these vital and necessary reforms were implemented. In 
the meantime, however, the training of local magistrates was stepped 
up and elementary short and long courses in law mounted at the 
Nsamizi Training Centre. Judicial Advisers were appointed to each
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region with a Senior Courts Adviser formulating judicial policy and
*
overseeing its implementation.18®
In 1961 the Nsamizi Training Centre was designated a Law School 
and provision made for the legal education of the 2nd and 3rd class 
magistrates and their supporting staff. At the same time the right 
of appointments, promotions and dismissals which, hitherto had been 
in the hands of the Local Appointments Boards, was placed in the 
hands of the newly appointed Judicial Service Commission. In 1962, 
the African Courts Ordinance, 1957, and the Sub-ordinate Courts 
Ordinance, 1902, were amended and the "African Courts" structure 
streamlined: the "saza divisional courts" were abolished and the 
three tier court structure reduced to two tiers, to wit, the 
sub-county courts and the District Courts;1®® and provision made for 
the Chief Justice to appoint any "African Court" or any particular 
person presiding over such a court, a subordinate court, or 
magistrate of the 2nd or 3rd class. Inter alia, this meant that 
certain "African Courts" in addition to sitting as such, were also 
acting as "Central Government Courts" that is to say, as "Subordinate 
Courts" under .the "Subordinate Courts Ordinance, 1902". That 
however, was not integration: the "African Courts" as the name 
suggests were still essentially "African Courts" pure and simple; 
integration had yet to come, but the tempo was rapidly quickening. 
Indeed, later that year the Government announced that the integration 
process was to be accelerated, and that the "African Courts" staff 
were to be integrated with the Central Government Courts. It agreed 
to improve their terms of service and pay structure; to meet all the 
costs and
189. These appointments were formally mentioned in No.1 of 1957 SS.
26(1) and 27(2).
190. Vide the Subordinate Courts Amendment Ordinance, 1962, and the
African Courts Amendment Ordinance, 1962.
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expenses of integration; and was, in return, to receive all the 
courts' receipts and revenues. With these arrangements the scene was 
thus set for the complete unification of the "African" and the 
Central Government court systems. However, the "Native Courts" in 
Buganda were still governed by the Buganda Courts Ordinance, 1940,191 
and were clearly in need of urgent reform. However, no legislation 
could be enacted without the consent of the Kabaka and as this was 
not forthcoming, the Government's planned changes were put aside and 
the existing Ordinance allowed to stand intact. It was hoped 
however, that the Buganda Courts would, in the near future, with the 
Kabaka's consent, of course, be reorganised along the lines obtaining 
elsewhere in the country.1^2 Here, as elsewhere, the necessary 
reforms involved the abolition of the existing dual legal system and 
its panoply, to wit, the dual courts, the dual laws and the dual 
supervision. Emphasis was to be placed on the development of "local 
courts", the extension of their jurisdiction, both civil and 
criminal, over all persons and over all matters within their 
respective areas; the appointment of professional magistrates; the 
extension of legal representation to all the local courts; the 
codificaiton of customary civil law was eschewed on account of its 
enormity and complexity; the separation of the judicial and executive 
functions in the local courts; the ending of unofficial arbitral 
tribunals, including the settlement of minor disputes out of court. 
Bie ultimate objective was for the "new local courts", their future^
191. S. 1(2) of No.1 of 1957 provided that: "ttiis ordinance shall 
not apply to Buganda". -
192. Schedule 7 to the constitution of Uganda part II paragraph 7 
provided that the Uganda Parliament had exclusive power to make 
laws relating to "Courts, other than courts dealing with 
Buganda clan cases, including -
(a) the jurisdiction, powers, practice, procedure and 
organisation of such courts;
(b) persons entitled to practice before the courts".
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nomenclature was under active consideration, to become an integral 
part of an independent judiciary exercising jurisdiction over all 
persons and over all statutory laws on a non-racial basis. Some of 
these changes were hurriedly effected shortly before independence,19 3 
but many more, and in many ways the most important were stalled and 
left in limbo and, to this day, they are still awaiting retrieval and 
implementation.
Arguably, there are several explanations for this, but none is more 
apt and convincing than the colonial heritage itself. The mish mash 
of colonial policies, the main features of which sufficiently appear 
in the preceding pages, could hardly be expected to elicit anything 
other than this sort of response; in this case, not even the 
"Lancaster House Juju"19^ could perform miracles. The damage was 
almost irreparable. The further under-development of the pre­
independence constitutional changes is thus a vindication of the 
former policies of the decamping colonial power, and their subsequent 
neglect and demolition is the most fitting epitaph to British 
Colonial rule.
193. The Uganda (Independence) Order in Council, 1962, and the 
Uganda Constitution provided that no man, two years after
independence, was to be convicted of a criminal offence that
was not statutorily defined. The former provided that "subject 
to the provisions of this order, the constitution of Uganda
... shall come into effect ... at the commencement of this 
order: Provided that S 24(8) of the constitution shall come 
into effect on 9th October 1964 •••"• Article .24(8) of the 
constitution provided that "No person shall be convicted of a 
criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty
therefore is prescribed in a written law ...". (Vide Statutory
Instruments 1962 No. 2175.)
194. Vide, Lancaster House Juju, The Economist, London, December 3rd 
1960, pp. 999-1000.
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CHAPTER TEN
10.1.1. THE OUTLOOK FOR REFORM: THE PRELUDE
The basic assumptions underlying the main principles of local 
administration, with which this study is concerned, were, throughout 
the colonial period, fairly elementary and pragmatic in nature. 
Basically because the colonial authorities had limited objectives and 
limited resources, and let it be said, both were self-imposed 
limitations. Thus, the colonial power, with such a narrow programme, 
was "forced" to recognise the local chiefly hierarchies, and, where 
non-existed, to set them up, and then proceeded to endow them, both 
the new and the old, with unlimited and undefined powers to make and 
unmake laws, to hear and decide cases and to assess and collect taxes 
for imperial purposes. It was felt iivo'fficialdom circles that the 
traditional chiefs, including the new recruits, were natural rulers 
with immense authority and following and that it would be folly, 
therefore, so the argument went, to fail to exploit such resourceful 
assets. However, this commonsense approach to "native 
administration" was by no means flawless. The fallacy of this 
reasoning "lay in its naive view of the.nature of the authority 
possessed by rulers, who were credited with a claim to total 
obedience equivalent to that of a modern dictator but not requiring 
the machinery of a modern police state to enforce it".1
This, not withstanding, however, the colonial authorities were overly 
committed to the establishment of a self-supporting administration 
and, even if they wanted to, they could not have devised a more
1. Mair, L.P., Representative Local Government as a Problem in
Social Change. Journal of Africa Administration, January 1958, 
p.13.
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expeditions, efficacious and cheaper apparatus than the chiefly - the 
so called indirect rule - system they so avidly and indiscriminately 
installed everywhere throughout the Protectorate. Theirs was 
therefore, not to quibble with some nabulous academic arguments.
Sir Gerald Portal, the first Briton to advocate this approach to 
colonial rule in Buganda had no difficulty in rationalising his pet 
strategem to his paymasters in London. For, in Buganda, the 
indigenous political institutions were at their zenith: there was a 
king, a Lukiko, a chiefly hierarchy and a homogenous intelligent 
people. There was, already in existence, therefore, a tailor-made 
indigenous bureaucracy to meet Portal's immediate requirements, 
administrative and otherwise. And, under these circumstances, it 
would, he argued, have been not only bad policy but sheer waste, not 
to recognise the Kabaka and his chiefs.2 And so it was done. 
Unfortunately, however, the rest of the Protectorate, the eastern, 
the northern and some western districts, in particular, had no highly 
developed political systems and when Portal's successors came to 
establish British rule in these areas and proceeded to administer the 
doctors prescription, they soon found that some of the elixir's most 
important ingredients were missing. The indigenous political systems 
were, in these areas, still in their infancy and the colonial nabobs
f
had to be content with the "loudest-mouthed ruffians", who put 
themselves forward as their peoples' leaders and rulers.3 And, where 
non-offered themselves, they were soon found, installed and adorned 
with all the traditional trappings of power and authority, including 
chiefly titles, rights and privileges, on the Buganda pattern. And,
2. Portal, Sir Gerald, Mission to Uganda, op.cit. passim.
3. Cameron, Sir Donald, quoted by N.U. Akpan in "Have Traditional 
Authorities A Place in Modern Local Government Systems"? Journal 
of African Administration Vol. VII No. 1, 1955 p.110.
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indeed, many of the new recruits were Baganda themselves; "for who 
better, the British reasoned than the Baganda to teach the 
intricacies of the Buganda System"•4 And so began the 
Bugandanisation of "native administration and all that it brought in 
its train, not least of which was the distortion and corruption of 
Portal's principle of "indirect rule".5 a s , Fred Burke mused, 
"indirect rule" in its original sense was replaced by an indirect 
style of indirect rule".6 This, notwithstanding, however, the 
district officers' proteges were, in 1919, statutorily confirmed and 
their executive legislative and judicial powers definitively 
defined.7 This consolidating legislation was, subject to the "Native 
Agreements", applicable to the three treaty states and was largely 
modelled on that in force elsewhere in Africa and other British 
Colonial dependencies, with scant regard, being had to local 
conditions and circumstances. And not surprisingly, therefore, most 
of this legislation and the numerous bye-laws issued there under, 
made very little impression on many a citizen, his welfare and 
material progress. Indeed, most of the provisions remained dormant 
and disused; nevertheless, they were an integral part of a formidable 
array of executive authority and an important part of the main legal 
framework within which British rule was, throughout the interwar 
years, exercised through the Chiefs, both ancient and modern. This
4. Burke, F.B. Local Government and Politics in Uganda, Syracuse 
University Press, New York, 1964, p.34.
5. Thus, Burke writes: "Although some of the expatriate Baganda 
agents were honourable, others regarded themselves as conquerors 
and superior to their backward subjects. They arrogantly 
confiscated for themselves choice lands, women and food; needless 
to say Baganda chiefs were not overly popular". Burke, ibid., 
p.35. See also M. Twaddle, Politics in Bukedi 1900-1939 (PhD 
thesis, London, 1967 pp.255-276; G.W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional 
Law and Government in Uganda, EALB, Kampala 1975, pp. 301-302; 
and pp. 147-153 supra.
6. Burke, loc.cit. p.34.
7. See Native Authority Ordinance, 1919; Native Law Ordinance, 1919; 
and Native Courts Ordinance, 1919.
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set up, however, was far from ideal. Inter alia, it set bad 
precedents, the most notorious of which were "petty tyrannies", 
corrupt practices and despotic rule which, in Buganda, led to the 
1945 and 1949 riots. These outbursts of political protest, though 
directed at the Buganda Government were, in fact, aimed at the 
Colonial authorities for their failure to democratize the former 
regime. The lack of participation, by the educated elite, in the 
internal management of their local affairs, the Central Governments 
total reliance on the traditional chiefs and their illiberal policies 
were the primary causes of these upheavals. Yet, regretably, though 
not surprisingly, the official inquiries which looked into these 
disturbances paid little attention to these political demands; 
instead emphasis was placed on the Government's repressive measures 
used to suppress the riots; the need for more effective security 
measures; and, though they recognised the need for reforming the 
procedures relating to the selection of chiefs, they nevertheless 
summarily dismissed the much needed political reforms, and thus so 
missed many of the fundamental issues raised by the movement's 
leaders. And, though the riots were swiftly and ruthlessly smashed 
without any concessions whatsoever, the rioters did not suffer in 
vain, for within a few years a number of the important changes 
demanded by the "agitators" were conceded.
Thus the composition of the Lukiko was made more representative and 
democratised; the procedures for the selection of chiefs were 
streamlined and the position of the chiefs redefined; major economic 
reforms, including the reorganization of the cotton and coffee 
industries were instituted; and the provision of technical, further 
and higher education considerably extended, with some salutory 
results, in and outside Buganda. In the latter areas, however, the
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impetus for change was largely prompted by the now famous dispatch 
from the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, dated 25 February, 
1947* The main theme of this confidential dispatch was the 
development, in each British African dependency, of "an efficient and 
democratic system of local government",8 which, the Colonial 
Secretary believed, was the "Key to the Success" of the many 
political, social and economic programmes that were in the pipeline. 
And, though he insisted that "these had been the aims of our policy 
over many years", there is little doubt that Creech-Jones1 dispatch 
was unprecedented and, indeed, a departure from the existing British 
Colonial policy and practice. At least, the verbiage was 
refreshingly new. His understanding and formulation of the key 
words, "local", "efficient" and "democratic", for example, was not 
only novel, but it seemed to herald the beginning of the end of 
indirect rule, including the genus of the chief and the corollary 
autocratic rule.
That, at any rate, was the theory, its implementation, however, 
remained for the future, and, to be sure, the necessary preconditions 
for success were ominously lacking. Nor did the terms of the 
dispatch offer an easy passage. It was, obviously, the work of many 
individuals including Africanists, purists and the diehard 
imperialists and, not surprisingly, was littered with sophistry, 
highfalutin and many irreconcilable inconsistencies: its terms were 
too vague, too general and gingerly stitched together.9 Thus it 
advocated local democracy, but eschwed the participation of the most 
important elements in society; its strong accent on local government 
- that it "must not only find a place for the growing class of
/
8. For details see p. 177-186 supra.
9. Robinson, Cohen and the Transfer of Power, 1940-51. op.cit. 
pp. 50-72.
- 406 -
educated men, but at the same time command the respect and support of 
the mass of the people",1® is illuminating.
Clearly, these verbal subtleties, apart from revealing their authors' 
indifference to women's political rights, were not easy to reconcile, 
let alone, translate into action: they resemble declarations of 
intent for later, rather than, immediate implementation, indeed, 
that much can be deduced from the language of the dispatch itself.11 
But given the Government's previous policy of deconcentrated 
devolution could these aims be simultenously achieved? Moreover, 
though, the emphasis on "efficiency" is understandable, it is well to 
remember that the insistence on that illusive ideal by the 
Protectorate Authorities had already caused a lot of havoc; witness 
the strict supervision and control exercised by District Officers 
over the various local administrations, the lack of meaningful 
functional decentralisation, and the resultant underdevelopment of 
the existing Native Authorities. Thus, the call for both 
"efficiency" and "democracy" was, in these circumstances, unrealistic 
and, indeed, disingenuous, because the political framework which the 
dispatch presupposed, simply, did not exist. Furthermore, the 
dispatch overlooked the fact that "efficiency" and "democracy" do not 
always much hand in hand, indeed, experience elsewhere, suggests that 
democratic institutions are not always efficient and that efficient 
organisations are not always democratic;in other words, there is no 
correlation between the two concepts. It is, of course, good policy
10. Creech-Jones' dispatch op.cit. p.1.
11. Thus paragraph two states, inter alia, that "the general policy 
must be applied differently in different areas; the broad aims of 
securing an efficient and democratic of local government will, 
however, be the same everywhere". And paragraph four adds:
"where conditions are still primitive they cannot be- transformed 
except through a laborious process of evolution".
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to always strive for the best, but given the colonial governments 
previous track record, the Colonial Secretary's dispatch, in spite of 
its good intentions, was incapable of immediate implementation in its 
entirety: it was a manifesto, a declaration of intent and, as it 
happened, this is the spirit in which it was received by the 
Protectorate Authorities•
"And needless to say, the Secretary's dispatch did not 
immediately effect a political revolution. Local, democratic 
and efficient local government still do not exist in Uganda, 
although the trend is clearly in that d i r e c t i o n . " 1 2
That was written ten odd years after the Colonial Secretary's 
dispatch was issued, and the same is true to-day - some twenty years 
later - save that in the present circumstances, Fred Burke's 
optimistic remarks have a hollow ring about them. The opportunities 
for reform unleashed by the dispatch were, as is now well known 
completely missed; and the resulting legislation, the Local 
Governments Ordinance, 1949, despite its name, was, as has been 
mentioned, an anticlimax. It merely regularised the existing "Native 
Authorities" as organs of local government,13 and that was a far cry 
from the aims and aspirations vividly set out in 1947 by the 
Secretary of state for the colonies.
Worse of all, it established the district as the basic local 
government unit, and as the administrative districts, including the 
treaty states were corterminous with the major tribes, "the 1949 
Ordinance in effect provided a legal basis for the institution-
12. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda, op.cit. p.38.
13. Section 3 of the African Local Government, 1949 states: In each 
district there shall be an African Local Government which shall 
consist of chiefs, a District Council and such other councils as 
may be established under Sections 5 and 7 of this Ordinance.
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alization of parochial tribally oriented local government",14 with 
some dire consequences; it sharpened the latent tribal differences - 
it was a classic example of divide et impera - and its ghost has yet 
to be exorcised. Needless to say, the Ordinance led to 
disenchantment and was, in 1955, superseded, but not repealed, by the 
District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance, 1955, which, 
despite the nomenclature was, rather ironically, more in keeping with 
the 1947 dispatch than the inaptly named Local Government Ordinance, 
19491 And, though, not flawless, the 1955 Ordinance was on paper, at 
least, a gigantic leap forward towards the establishment of a genuine 
system of local and democratic local government throughout the 
Protectorate•
Its main drawback, however, was that it was permissive rather than 
mandatory; it was an enabling and adoptive legislation and sadly many 
District Administrations did not adopt it, and, of course, it did not 
apply to Buganda; thus further exacerbating the cleavages between the 
"Native Government" and the District Administrations. And more 
importantly, it retained most of the paternalistic and petti-jogging 
controls that were a common feature of previous illiberal enactments. 
Thus, though the ordinance provided for the devolution of authority 
to District Councils, it at the same time, subjected them to new and 
more sinister strigent central government controls. Lurking behind 
this apparent contradiction was, of course, the hackneyed notion of 
training so frequently espoused but infrequently carried out by many 
a British proconsul. Indeed, the main factor underlying these 
provisions was the realisation, rather late in the day* that no 
training programme had, hitherto, been instituted by the colonial
14. Burke, op.cit. p.39
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authorities* Nevertheless, the contradiction remained and it was not 
long before its full implications came home to roost. The new 
District Councils were placed in a false position and subsequent 
events in Teso and Bukedi Districts merely served to highlight their 
predicament. In both cases, albeit for different but somewhat 
genetically similar reasons the councils had failed to reconcile 
their conflicting powers - the Central Government had to directly 
intervene in the management of the Councils' internal affairs, thus 
virtually nullifying the ordinance and, in effect, undercutting the 
councillors' authority. Indeed, shortly afterwards the ordinance and 
the constituent Constitutional Regulations were altered and some of 
the most important devolved powers withdrawn and the status quo ante 
reimposed. In other words, the student, after 57 years of colonial 
tutelage and control had yet to muster the art of local self- 
government, implying that there had been inadequate or no tuition, at 
all, let alone proper parental guidance. And subsequent events 
exposed a gaping lacuna in the "preparation" programme. And as the 
Teso fiasco graphically illustrated, the Protectorate Authorities, 
owing to their previous policies and the belief in "the plenty of 
time ahead" were not ready to slacken their tight grip on their 
charges: Query, how was the apprentice to acquire the necessary
knowledge and administrative skills?
The Government's unwillingness to allow the pupil to make mistakes 
cut both ways; it implicitly acknowledged the failure of the existing 
control mechanisms and yet sought their continuation thus prolonging 
the pupil's naivete and the concomitant under achievement. The moral 
of this cruel dilemma was that the District Administrations, their 
staff and councillors could never stand on their own feet. However, 
the colonial authorities never grasped the import of this elementary
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maxim and their inability to come to terms with it, is one of the 
reasons why their belated efforts to transform "Native Authorities 
into efficient and democratic local government institutions ended in 
failure.
The Governments approach to local government in the townships was 
even more revealing. Here, the main concern was the creation of 
salubrions conditions for European habitation. The problems of the 
largely uncontrolled peri-urban areas, mostly inhabited by alien 
migrant labourers were left in the hands of the Buganda G o v e r n m e n t ; 1 5 
and, so, racial segregation in townships was born. The inner circle 
of the township - the Boma - which catered almost exclusively for 
Asian and European interests was, as might be expected, administered 
by central government officials and was wholly financed out of 
Protectorate funds. And, though the local people were always in the 
majority, numerically, their interests were not catered for nor, 
indeed, represented on the various townships' governing bodies.
Racial considerations appear to have been the main policy determining 
factors and the results were not wholly unexpected. The most serious 
upshot was, of course, the underdevelopment of local government 
institutions in urban areas. The Government could not introduce 
local democracy, ostensibly, fearing that such a move might set a bad 
precedent outside the townships; whilst the transient European and 
Asian Communities were not keen to press for it, partly because they 
were well satisfied with the free existing local amenities, and 
partly because they did not want to saddle themselves with township 
rates. The old adage "no government no taxation" aptly captures both 
the prevailing mood and the practical realities of the situation.
15. Southall, A.W. and Gutkind, P.C.W. Townsmen in the Making:
Kampala and its suburbs. EASR, Kampala, 1956.
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This cosy relationship between the Centre and the urban communities 
was, however, detrimental to the development of proper local 
government institutions; based, as it was, on racialism, it led to 
the differentiation between town and country and to the continuation 
of urban administration as a central government service, with, as has 
been mentioned,tsome disastrous results*
Finally, mention must be made of the origins and causes of the dual 
legal system. Again, there is little doubt that the invisable hand 
of racism was largely responsible for this duality of laws and 
courts. In this case, however, there were other forces at work, 
particularly the Government's policy of indirect rule. The colonial 
power, having decided that the chiefs' executive and judicial powers 
were inseparable, had no choice but to maintain this little farce,' 
and then, rather characteristically, proceeded to make virtue of 
necessity. The arguments for the preservation of native courts as an 
integral part of the administrative apparatus which the chiefs 
operated were many and various; they ranged from the artificial to 
the absurd, and a typical assortment of those most commonly rehearsed 
ran as follows:-
"District officers of the inter-war period conscious of the 
importance of the native court system as part of the native 
administration organisation and not unjustifiably proud of the 
success they had achieved in its development, were loud in 
extolling its virtues. The native courts were, they 
maintained, part of the indigenous society, and were accepted 
as such by the bulk of the population, while the law they 
administered was known to, and accepted by, the people. The 
procedure in these courts was simple and understandable by all, 
and was not complicated by the intrusion of advocates. Native 
courts were, by reason of their situation and number, easily 
accessible to the public, and the justice they dispensed was 
cheap and, certainly when compared with that provided by the 
High Court, rapid. The chief who presided over the court was 
well known to the litigants and was, it was presumed trusted by 
them: if he abused his authority then this would be remedied,
and if necessary the chief replaced, by the district officers, 
who, it was likewise presumed, would also be well known and
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trusted by the local population. It was accepted that the 
union of executive and judicial functions in the same person 
was contrary to British theory and practice, but, it would be 
maintained, this had always been a feature of African life and 
the African public saw nothing wrong in it: moreover, the 
district officer would argue, it would not have been 
practicable or advisable, in the interests of good government, 
to have attempted to separate the two."16
Needless to say, this is a formidable list, and few would question 
it, save to note the self-righteous paternalism it exudes. This does 
not mean, however, that these arguments are necessarily conclusive, 
or that there are no alternative arguments, nor, indeed, that the 
virtues of native courts could not, otherwise, be achieved, as the 
apologists of these arguments imply. On the contrary, the case for 
the chiefly native courts is flawed and can be criticised on several 
grounds: most of the arguments are unprincipled, oblique and are
solely based on convenience and expediency rather than conviction. 
That the native court system was cheap, few would deny; but that is 
not the issue, the question is, who were the main beneficiaries - the 
local population or the colonial authorities? Moreover, was this 
gain bought at too high a price and at whose expense? The whole 
argument is riddled with ambiguities and tainted by suprious 
considerations. Take the penultimate argument, for example, the 
first limb of that argument ignores or rather neatly exposes the 
colonial moral pretentions plainly embodied in the theology of the 
dual mandate and begs the inevitable question: How many sacred 
African customs, rites and rituals were swept away, in the name of 
European civilization, by the colonial authorities? Was this - the 
chiefly•court - the holy of the holies? And the second part of the 
argument under consideration, likewise, calls for a rhetoric
16. Morris, H.F., Native Courts: A cornerstone of Indirect Rule in 
Morris, H.F. and Read, J.S., Indirect Rule and the Search for 
Justice, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, pp.131-1.
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question: Did they have any choice? And, as a rider, it is pertinent 
to remember that the "relics of slavery or barbaric punishments",1? 
for example, were swiftly excised from the customary law in the 
native courts; that the law and procedure incorporated the rules of 
"natural justice" - and nothing could be more technical than that - 
and that, in all cases, all the courts administering native law had 
to ensure that it was not repugnant to justice and morality" - 
presumably European - or "inconsistent with any order in council or 
ordinance", or rule made under any order in council or ordinance".18 
It is inconceivable that it was beyond the ingenuity of colonial 
administrators to set up a separate cadre of local worthies to 
administer justice to their fellow country folk, thus leaving the 
chiefs, who, were, incidentally drawn from the same pool, free to 
concentrate on their administrative duties. The new cadre of 
magistrates would have met all the requirements of District officers, 
whilst the new style of native courts would have retained all the 
virtues of local knowledge, cheapness, informality accessibility and 
acceptability, without the disadvantages associated with the old 
chiefly native courts. However, there were, evidently, "strong 
grounds of expediency" for the preservation of that quaint, though by 
no means unique African institution - the chief's inseparable
17. Morris, op.cit. p.131.
18. The Uganda Order in council, 1902, article 20, The London 
Gazette, August 15, 1902, p.5307 at 5210.
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executive and judicial authority.19 And that, rather than the 
standard litany of rationalisation, was the real reason for 
concentrating all the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in 
the same hands;20 native courts were cheap to run and, more 
importantly, they were the chassis of Native Administration.
In sum, many of the administrative difficulties identified in this 
section and, indeed, throughout this study were the natural and 
direct result of Government policy and were perpetuated by the 
colonial authorities for their selfish ends. And, it is against this 
dismal colonial record that the following proposals for reform must 
be considered. But, first, it is pertinent to state the need for 
change and the case for reform respectively.
19. Some of these may be gleaned from the following extract: "The 
task of guiding and directing the development of the native 
courts lay, in practice, almost exclusively in the hands of 
district officers men who, although they had practical experience 
of magisterial court procedure, were unlikely to possess formal 
legal qualification. The district officer carried out his duties 
of supervision and control of the native courts largely in the 
course of his periodic tours of inspection of rural areas.
During these inspections the whole native administration machine 
was brought under his watchful eye, but it was to the standard 
and nature of the chief1s court, so essential apart of the 
apparatus of indirect administration that he usually devoted most 
attention. Here the chief's ability and effectiveness could well 
be judged.1* Morris, op.cit, p. 131.
20. It is noteworthy that similar powers were possessed and enjoyed 
by the Administration, from the Governor through to the District 
Commissioners•
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THE OUTLOOK FOR REFORM; THE CASE FOR AUTONOMOUS LOCAL AUTHORITIES
10.1.1. THE NEED FOR CHANGE? THE PROBLEM STATED
The setting up of British rule was from the outset beset with some
awkward and cruel dilemmas. There was, for example, the dire dearth
of resources, financial and human; the former, thanks to the chief's 
tax gathering efforts, was easily and rather surprisingly quickly 
solved, while the latter was largely overcome by the device of 
'Indirect Rule', under which, subject to British supervision, the 
mundane chores of local government were left in the hands of "black 
civil servant" chiefs. This pragmatic approach, however, though 
understandable and, indeed, inevitable, did not bode well for the 
future. The Government's over dependence on the chiefs, for example, 
meant, among other things, that meaningful devolutionary policies 
could not be instituted, for the chiefly hierarchies were 
undemocratic and unrepresentative. And when the time for reform 
eventually arrived, the chief and his attendant paraphernalia 
decidely became a stumbling block; their anomalous position could not 
be easily fitted into the new structure and the result was the 
mishmash of policies and legislation documented above. Worse, the 
growing number of budding nationalists, who were virtually debarred 
from active participation in local affairs, were alienated and in 
consequence begem to view the evolving local institutions with some 
suspicion. Their attitude towards local government was thus rendered 
negative and, regretably, many leaders have never recovered from that 
posture. In their view, the Government's obsession with the chiefly 
hierarchies and "native administration" was a deliebrate ploy or 
gimmick designed to forestall the necessary political changes at the 
centre, thus postponing the end of British colonial rule. And as 
might be expected the nascent nationalists were, on the assumption of
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political power, already set against the further development of the 
newly established local government institutions; and many did not 
lose much time in dismantling them, and, not surprisingly, they had 
plenty of supporters and ample missiles to hurl at them. Of these 
arguments, the most important, and certainly, the most frequently 
cited were:-
(i) that local government was devisive, anti-nation building and 
wasteful of meagre national resources - that "with so many 
varied interests and ideas pertaining to local administrations, 
resources and manpower which should be directed at one common 
purpose of Government policies are likely to be diversified to 
the detriment of development".1
Of course this is true, if local government is viewed as a unit 
.and in total isolation from the central government; otherwise 
the argument cannot be taken too seriously. For a nation 
consists of several constituent parts and their individual 
betterment, socially, politically and economically, means the 
development of the whole and whether this is through national 
or local endeavours is, therefore, neither here or there. 
Admittedly, this is a widely held view and those with long 
memories will remember that the colonial authorities used 
ethnicity and local differences to divide and rule, but that is 
some twenty to. thirty years ago. And though the argument is a 
pragmatic one, it raises more questions than it solves, and it 
completely ignores the accumulated experience of the last 
twenty years: centralisation has been tried and found wanting 
and its dismal record does not augur well for the future; there
1. Kanyeihamba, G.W., Constitutional Law and Government in Uganda,
EAPH, Kampala, 1975, p.300.
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is a strong case for an alternative approach, viz, 
meaningful decentralisation. The periphery and the centre are 
one and the same organisation.
(ii) that local government does "not always attract the right kind 
of officers"; that "in many cases councils are dominated by 
small cliques of local persons often with selfish motives in 
mind"; that "this often results in lack of active participation 
by the local inhabitants"; and that "with the exception of some 
important issue of local policy on which the elections, where 
these are permitted, are characterised by low polls".2
Again this argument glosses over some fundamental and complex 
issues. It, for example, concentrates on the symptoms rather 
than the causes and thus avoids the real issue, namely apathy. 
And the question which suggests itself is what are the causes 
of this malaise? The culprit, to be sure, is not the 
institution of local government, but rather the legislator; in 
other words, the causes of apathy are to be found in 
constitutional instruments designed by autocratic rulers and 
their legal advisers; to wit the trivialising of local 
government (by refusing to devolve ample financial, executive 
and legislative powers). The problem of apathy, the bete noir 
of local government is thus man made; it is not institutional, 
it is solely due to the fallibility of man, and is, therefore, 
not beyond his wit to remedy.
(iii) that "there is more incompetence in local administrations than 
there is in the Central Government", and that "consequently,
2. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional Law and Government, op.cit. p.300.
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there is little planning and much wastage on petty projects".3 
Clearly, this argument is directly related to the last two, 
and is, likewise, untenable. It might have been plausible 
immediately before independence, but, thanks to the untold 
incompetence of the post independence bureaucracies, it is no 
longer credible. Besides, what is, in this context, a "petty 
project"? What is the essence of local government?Admittedly, 
it is about local issues and per force "petty projects"I 
Indeed, it is tantalisingly tempting to quote the "small is 
beautiful" slogan to highlight the corpus of local interests 
with which local government is concerned.
(iv) that local government officers "are easily corrupted"; that 
"since many of them are local men the temptation to benefit 
their friends and those from whom they expect some sort of 
return benefit, by way of gratitude, is greater than at the 
national level"; and that the perks which "legitimately accrue 
to local officials are so small compared to those that accrue 
to national officers, that they", the argument goes, "are often 
supplemented by illegitimate means. It is interesting to note 
that the exponents of this view do not deny the existence of 
corruption at the national level. Admittedly, corruption is 
a national rather than a local disease, and, regretably, may 
very well be away of life. If so, why pick on local 
government? True, two wrongs do not make a right. But the 
fact that corruption permeates public life does undermine the 
thrust of the argument; unless, of course, it is to be argued 
that all corrupt institutions, local or national, should be
3. Kanyeihamba, op.cit. p.300.
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abolished! In that case, few, if any, would extol the virtues 
of a corrupt local government system. But as things stand at 
the moment it may well be more profitable to try and understand 
the causes of corruption - and if need be to tolerate it - than 
to use it as an excuse for the abolition of local government 
institutions.
(v) that local government is susceptible to ceaseless pressures
\
from the centre, that there is too "much active participation 
in local administration by national political leaders", and 
that "they have used ruthless persuasion, political blackmail 
and nepotism to gain favour with the local people, that local 
issues have been abandoned in favour of political propaganda 
and advantage"•*
The premise of thi3 argument can be countered on several 
grounds.* Firstly, it presupposes that local government is an 
island and that it can be cacooned from the hurley-burley of 
national party politics. But, in the real world, that is not 
possible. Secondly, and this follows from the foregoing, this 
argument, the former pet of British District officers, 
erroneously assumes that party politics have no part to play in 
local government. Nothing could be farther from the truth 
however. The idea of local government is to facilitate the 
provision of local services, the allocation of resources, and 
the meeting of local needs and interests. In turn this 
involves the making of choices and the reconciliation of 
competing and sometimes conflicting local interests, and 
nothing could be more political than that.
4. Kanyeihamba, op.cit. p.300.
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Thirdly, the argument seems to assume that there are "local 
issues", and a priori, "national issues" which are the 
respective preserve of the lower and upper tiers of government. 
Such a demarcation, however, is, with a few exceptions, far 
from easy. For instance, is primary education a local or a 
national issue? What about the police and the maintenance of 
law and order? And the list can be extended ad nauseam. The 
division of functions between the centre and the periphery 
raises, as noted below, practical rather than theoretical 
considerations many of which are largely dictated by 
opportunism and, of course, convenience and expediency.
However, there are several factors which, in addition to these 
negative criticisms have, since independence militated against the 
building of more meaningful local government institutions. There is, 
for example, the need for stimulating economic and social development 
the unification of the various disparate and, not infrequently 
mutually suspicious, local communities, the efficient utilization of 
the nation's meagre resources and the maximisation of the economies 
of scale. This does not mean, however, that local government has no 
•role to play in the furtherance of these noble objectives.5 on the 
contrary, local government can play a decisive role in the fulfilment 
of these laudable aims and indeed there are several meritorious 
advantages to be had through the proper use of local government 
bodies to justify their further development and reform. Some of 
these virtues stem from the pre-colonial social political and
5. That many of these aims have not been realised may very well be 
due to the non-involvement of local government, or rather the 
Central Governments reluctance to develop and use local 
authorities to their full potential. Indeed, it will be argued, 
later on, that the Government's failure to mobilize local bodies, 
is one of the causes of the present chaos.
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societal differences. Most of the present day local government units 
- the provinces, districts, counties and sub counties, for example, 
existed in some form or other long before the advent of British 
Colonial rule.
"The disparity in local conditions, local needs, local 
resources and local aspirations and hence local priorities 
points up the importance of establishing an effective means of 
transforming central policies into local programmes in a 
responsive and a responsible manner. The handicaps inherent in 
running the array of services of a variety of local communities 
directly from the ministries headquartered in a distant state 
capital are almost insuperable. Moreover, many of the 
officials in the state bureaucracy have as little understanding 
of the diversity of local conditions as most local residents 
have empathy with the state capital."**
Furthermore, the close councillor - citizen relationship which local 
government fosters provides ample opportunities for the promotion of 
better and "specific understanding of local needs, greater 
flexibility in mustering resources and allocating priorities and 
increased possibilities of involving" the local citizenry.7 in turn, 
this means that meaningful decentralisation "is likely to be more 
efficient in responding" to local issues, particularly in large and 
sparcely populated districts with very poor transportation 
facilities.8 It is also most likely to "make better use of local
6. Humes, S., and Martin, E., The Structure of Local Government, A 
Comparative Survey of 81 countries, International Union of Local 
Authorities, The Hague, 1969, p.32. A somewhat similar point has 
recently been made by Nelson Kasfir. He writes: "Nevertheless, a 
powerful case for decentralisation can be mounted. Physical and 
social conditions in Africa favour it as a pragmatic response to 
problems of government. The inability of central government to 
reach its citizens effectively suggests that something else is 
necessary. The continuing strength of the democratic norm in the 
city and countryside demonstrates the persistent desire of people 
to participate in the management of their own affairs". See 
"Designs and Dilemmas: an overview". Nelson Kasfir, in Mawhood, 
P. (ed) .Local Government in the Third World, John Wiley and Sons, 
Chichester, 1976.
7. Humes and Martin, The Structure of Local Government, loc.cit. 
p.32.
8. Ibid., p.32.
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knowledge", and more importantly, it is bound to "draw forth [local] 
leadership which might otherwise have remained unutilized".9 Indeed, 
local government is the best training ground for budding national 
leaders•
"Decentralized administration provides less scope for the 
central government bureaucracy to make mistakes and spreads the 
risk of learning how to administer. Local units with some 
measure of homogeneity in population simplify the task of 
satisfying the populace. Smaller units provide a greater 
opportunity to co-ordinate the various services of government 
and allow local people to control their own bureaucracy. 
Moreover, the use of local government provides more opportunity 
for local residents to have contact with, to take an interest 
in and have understanding of, to complain about, to exert 
influence upon and to participate in public affairs than does 
the use of central government. It provides a means for 
involving local residents who otherwise might be apathetic to, 
alienated from or even antagonistic to the total government 
system."10
Thus the advocates of local self-government see it as a school of 
"political capacity and general intelligence".11 Political education 
is, indeed, the sine quanon of local representative bodies. It is 
here that the individual imbibes the cannons of democracy, the 
rudiments of government, the use of power and authority and the art 
of tolerance and responsibility. It is interesting to note, for 
example, that many past and present national and international 
political personalities in the Western Democracies, the United 
Kingdom excepted, began their political careers, either in Local or 
Regional governments. Notable examples include Konrad Adenauer,
Willy Brandt, Kurt Georg Kiessinger, Wilson Ronald Reagan, James Earl 
Carter Jr., M.M. Debre, Chaban-Delmas, Mauroy and Mitterand. Even in 
Uganda, "local government" has had some famous alumni, including Sir 
Edward Mutesa and Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, the first President and
9. Humes and Martin, op.cit., p.32.
10. Ibid *, p.3 3.
11. Mill, J.S. On Representative Government, 1861, Ch.XV.
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Vice-President respectively. Both were, on assuming national 
responsibilities, Heads of their respective tribal governments. The 
real value of local government is thus political, it is to be gauged 
in terms of its contribution to the Country's political life and not 
solely in terms of its administrative skills and achievements. 
Moreover, the need for a semi-autonomous system of local government 
can hardly be overstressed. "It is obvious", wrote Mill "that all 
business purely local - all which concerns a single locality - should 
devolve upon local authorities"•12 True, the division of functions 
between central and local governments along these lines, in a modern 
state with up to date communications and management techniques, is 
not an easy one, but it is not impossible either. Thus, for example, 
there is the question of what constitutes "local" and "national" 
services. There are, arguably, functions and services, especially 
the so called "personal" or "social" services, that are basically the 
concern of the local communities into which the state is divided.
The state's interest in these services is no more or less than that 
it has in the welfare of the individual citizen. Yet, there are 
services, such as the police, the administration of justice and the 
provision of education which, though normally left in the hands of 
local authorities, "cannot be said to be matters of local as 
distinguished from national importance"•13 follows, therefore,
that the devolution of power is largely a matter of political 
expediency and tradition. The value of local government is, thus 
largely political, and it is upon this basis that the central 
government is obliged to delegate some of its powers and authority to 
an institution, the importance of which depends upon other 
considerations, rather than on the "local" - "national" service
12. Mill, op.cit.
13. Ibid.
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dichotomy, or on its administrative capacity per simpliciter. 
Moreover, there is the dilemma of reconciling the need for optimum 
uniformity in local service throughout the land, and the desire for 
the maintenance of local autonomy, without which true local 
government cannot exist. Thus, areas endowed with natural resources 
cannot be allowed, for example, to possess excellent educational and 
medical facilities, while similar services in the less fortunate 
districts are inadequate. This means that ways and means must be 
sought for establishing an efficient and benevolent system of central 
control that does not sacrifice local autonomy at the altdr of 
efficiency and economy.
These arguments are of universal application and have been 
instrumental in fashioning local government institutions in both 
developed and developing countries. It is now generally accepted, 
however, that the case for autonomous local authorities in the latter 
countries can, with equal force, be made on other grounds, the most 
important of which are developmental - economic and political.
"There are many development schemes where success, in whole or 
in part, depends on the active co-operation of the people, and 
that co-operation can best be secured through the leadership of 
local authorities. Local government has an equally important 
part to play in the sphere of political development. An 
efficient and democratic system of local government is in fact 
essential to the healthy political development of the African 
Territories; it is the foundation on which their political 
progress must be built. In [Uganda] the term local government 
must not be interpreted narrowly; it covers political questions 
•••• financial questions •••• and economic questions, 
[including] land usage and the evolution of systems of land 
tenure."14
14. Creech-Jones, Despatch to the Governors of the African
' Territories, 1947. It is a matter of regret that these noble 
ideals were never relentlessly persued. It is not always easy to 
tell as to whether these utterances were genuine or mere 
propaganda to placate the critics or just plain self-righteous 
tosh.
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The question, to put it bluntly, is what contribution can a reformed 
system of local government make in the sphere of economic, social and 
political development. These, it is generally accepted, are the main 
problems facing most African Governments today. The post-independence 
centralists thought that the quickest possible way of forging a 
nation was to be found in a highly centralised system of government. 
It was felt that this would enable the centre, not only to force the 
pace of economic and social development, but that it would also 
enhance the ends of national unity. The slogan was: "One President, 
one nation and one People"• It was vigorously argued that "we cannot 
afford the luxury of local government or its expense; that local 
government was divisive and wasteful of financial resources and 
manpower; that local authorities were susceptible to corruption and 
manipulation and that they were potential centres for harbouring 
dissidents and malcontents. In short, they argued, that local 
government was inimical to national unity, interesting arguments 
were made and, in particular, insufficient public funds and trained 
administrators were duly cited to support and substantiate their 
claims. Consequently, the pre-independence arrangements imposed 
upon them were, in the name of national unity, economic and political 
development, usually placed under strict controls and generally 
treated as mere extensions of the Central Government. As it happened, 
however, none of these goals have, after twenty years, been achieved, 
and there are positive signs that the era of centralisation is soon 
coming to an end.
It is now generally accepted that the case for centralisation was 
overstated, and efforts are being made to revive the idea of "an 
efficient and democratic system of local government"; for the absence 
of strong local government institutions, it is now fully appreciated,
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has been the rock on which many political leaders, their Governments, 
policies and aspirations have foundered.
Once again, the development of "an efficient and democratic" system 
of local government is being vigorously advocated as the best means 
of political, social and economic advancement. It is felt that
"a system of decentralised administration in which the greatest 
possible freedom of choice is allowed to local communities will 
arouse and nourish a wider and more lasting interest and 
support for the aims of national unity and economic 
development".15
Inter alia, the Indian experience, vividly shows that local 
government can play a very significant and decisive part in the 
processes of national and economic development» So, too, does the 
Yugoslav experience. In both countries, local government bodies - at 
all levels - form an integral part of the state development apparatus 
and actively participate in both the planning and implementation of 
all development p r o g r a m m e s M o r e o v e r ,  and, perhaps more 
importantly, recent local government reforms in Ghana, Nigeria and 
Sudan, for example, strongly suggest that there is widespread 
disilllusionment with the results of centralisation which 
characterised the 1960s, and, indeed, indicate the realisation that 
"better than anything else an intelligent policy of decentralisation 
will serve the purpose which Africa's political leaders generally 
regard as most essential, namely political unity and economic 
development"•^
15. Vide, Report on Local Government in Basutoland, - "Restricted" - 
by N. Kaul, a U.N. Expert in Community Development. 13.6.66.
16. Ibid.
17. ECA Paper E/CN 14/UAP/37; Robert K.A. Gardiner, Executive 
Secretary of ECA.
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It is now clear that the failure to associate and involve local 
government bodies in these vital processes was a serious omission. 
Perhaps the best formulation of the case for the utilisation of local 
representative institutions for developmental purposes was made by 
the 1961 Cambridge Summer School Conference, the relevant part of 
which reads as follows:
"(1) Local Government is the strongest link between the few and 
the many in planning economic development. In the 
execution of plans it is the best means of providing 
supporting facilities. Every one agrees that popular 
participation in economic development is essential to 
success. If community development is the most likely 
method of arousing popular interest local government offers 
the best means of holding it.
(2) Local Government is the best means of promoting unity. At 
every point it is opposed to separatism and to 
exclusiveness of any kind whether of racial, tribal, 
religious or other origin. By stressing the unity of the 
state it counteracts any pull to turn.local authorities 
into tribal governments."18.
This does not, of course, mean that local government authorities are 
to be left to their own devices. Quite the contrary. The hub of any 
scheme of local autonomy is a healthy relationship between the two 
tiers of government.
The onus is on the centre to ensure that the periphery follows the 
guidelines laid down by the legislature, and that it has ample 
resources to carry out its tasks within the national framework. And 
the success of the enterprise will largely depend on how the centre 
exercises its advisory and supervisory powers. The aphorism "as the 
school master is, so will be the school" is as pertinent here as it 
is in the world of public education. 'ftius, "A government which 
attempts to do everything (in the name of efficiency) is aptly
18. Report of the Summer School Conference, 1961.
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compared by M. Charles de Remusat to a schoolmaster who does all the 
pupils' tasks for them; he may be popular with the pupils, but he 
will teach them little".18
It was partly a recognition of this that led the then Governor, Sir 
Charles Dundas, among others, to seriously consider the reform of 
local government, with special reference to democratic and 
representative institutions. These changes were, however, 
shortlived, and their reversal is the raison d'etre for the current 
debate about local government and its role in the field of economic 
and political development. The Uganda Peoples Congress manifesto, 
for example, freely acknowledges the importance of local government 
in handling the problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction, and 
indicates that District Councils will be the means by which the 
peoples "hopes and aspirations for National Unity, National 
Independence, Stability and Prosperity" will be translated into 
reality.20
19. Vide, Mill, op.cit.
20. The Uganda Peoples Congress, Manifesto, 1980. The manifesto 
devotes a page to Urban Authorities and Local Councils and, the 
relevant part is couched in the following terms:
"While recognising the need for a strong Central Government as 
essential in spearheading planned, orderly and rapid progress, 
UPC strongly believes that the people themselves must be 
directly involved in political and socio-economic activities at 
grass-root levels.
UPC recognises that district councils are the key units of 
Local Administrations.
We shall review the existing local councils establishments and 
structures with a view to making them more democratic and more 
effective."
This, as it happened, turned out to be no more than 
electioneering propaganda; very little, if any, was done to 
implement this part of the Party's manifesto and there is no 
doubt that the Government's unpopularity and its eventual 
downfall can be traced to its failure to secure - through local 
government - the co-operation of the masses.
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Whether this is mere political propaganda or whether it is, following 
several false starts in the 1950s and 1960s, a genuine fresh start 
towards local government reform is a very nice question. The sceptic 
may well say that this is a piece of electioneering rhetoric, while
the diehard enthusiast will, no doubt, see the declaration of intent,
in the Party's manifesto, as a possible watershed. It hardly needs 
to be said, however, that the Government's successful implementation 
of its rehabilitation programmes and, the extent to which it succeeds 
in securing the co-operation of the masses will largely depend on how 
the vexed question of participatory democracy at the periphery is 
handled by the Centre.
The first step, to that end, is to recognise the need for local self- 
government and all its attendant machinery; the second is to accept 
local government's need for an adequate system of local taxation: for 
a certain amount of financial independence is the mainstay of local 
autonomy; the third is to tolerate local government as a self- 
governing institution, and, to appreciate that "no lesson can be 
learnt at all unless people are allowed to make mistakes" (and that) 
there is no substitute for this process of trial and error in the 
acquisition of political wisdom";21 the fourth is to understand the 
issues involved; the fifth is to develop ideas and evolve techniques 
and procedures for handling them. It is to be borne in mind,
however, that the road ahead is a maze and not a motorway: it is
potholed, slippery and, to be sure, the going is anything but plain 
sailing. So it should be. For the importance of local government, 
in any scheme of nation building, can hardly be overemphasised; the
4
plethora of ordinances examined here is indicative of -the importance
21. Hinden, op.cit. p.8.
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attached to local government institutions by successive Protectorate 
Administrations? and any Government, particularly, one which is 
desirous of promoting "National Unity, National Independence, 
Stability and Prosperity", and neglects the development of strong and 
quasi-autonomous local government bodies, does so at its peril. For 
the realisation of these aims will largely depend on the active 
co-operation of the local people, and local government is the most 
effective instrument for mobilising the masses in carrying out such 
programmes of political, social and economic a d v a n c e m e n t .22 i t  
follows, therefore, that the key to success lies in democratic 
decentralisation, and if the conditions outlined above, were 
satisfied the public would understand the value of local government 
not only as a provider of services but also as an essential part of 
the fabric of a democratic and responsible government, and that in 
itself would be a great advance towards the ultimate goal.
10.1.2. THE NEED FOR CHANGE: SOME ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM
a
"The primary function of a local government body is to provide 
civic services and though it must have legislative powers, 
these should be regarded in the main as incidental to the 
"provision of these services. Local government bodies should 
never be set up for their own sake as an administrative 
exercise, or to be important agents of central government, but 
should always be built around the administration of at least
22. "I do not believe there is any better training ground for the art 
of self-government than participation in local administration.
Our own history shows that our constitutional government, 
developed at Westminster, has owed a very great deal to our 
experiences in local administration. I regard the extension of 
local government as one of the quickest and certainly the surest 
methods of making certain of the extension of central 
government." Per Colonel Stanley, House of Commons, 13.7.1943.
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one service in autonomous fashion". 23
The conciliar system and its attendant machinery, the main features 
of which this study is concerned, were largely fashioned on the 
indigenous models found in vogue immediately prior to the advent of 
British Colonial rule and, for this purpose, were generally regarded, 
and, indeed, treated as local government along the lines of their 
Metropolitan model. But nothing could be farther from the truth.
In the colonial context, however, the term local government had no 
fixed meaning, it was, throughout the colonial period, 
indiscriminately used, inter alia, to denote: Native Authorities, 
Native Governments, Regional Administration, District Administration; 
and, not infrequently, the epithet Indirect Rule was used to mean 
local government. Thus local government meant different things to 
different people, but this confusion did not end here, it is to be 
found in the frequent changes of policy on local government detailed 
above. It is also remarkable that some of these ill-chosen terms 
were, depending on the occasion and circumstances, insultingly or 
rhetorically used. In all cases, however, each term was used as a 
euphesmism for a system of "local administration" otherwise known as 
deconcentration, under which the District Commissioner, a Central
23. Proceedings of the Cambridge Summer School Conference, 1951.
Thus, as has been mentioned above, the main defects of the 
African Local Governments Ordinance, 1949, were that the "African 
Local Governments created by that Ordinance had no functions or 
responsibilities other than those arising from the Native 
Administrations (Incorporation) Ordinance, 1938; that the 
Councils had no responsibilities, for their bye-law making powers 
were subject to central government approval, and so, too, were 
their annual budget resolutions. Similarly, the county, 
sub-county and village councils had no positive functions other 
than their triennial duty of electing members of the higher 
councils. And, as the preceeding chapters show these criticisms 
can, with equal force, be levelled at any subsequent local 
government legislation considered in this thesis.
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Government official, was in charge of all he surveyed.
"In discussing the organisation of local government in colonial 
territories, we must learn to distinguish between the substance 
and the shadow in this way. Administrative bodies, "boards", 
"committees", call them what you will are not local government 
authorities within the proper meaning of the term if they are 
set up by a central government, composed of a number of local 
inhabitants nominated for this purpose, and given a sum of 
money to spend on the poor, the roads, or slum clearance.
Local government may originate in this way, and this may well 
be an excellent first step in the evolution of a system of 
local government, but it does not give us the finished product 
until a long process of evolution has been gone through.
Neither on the other hand, do we get a system of local 
government if a machinery of election is established, a number 
of councillors elected who, when meeting together, formulate a 
series of "demands" or "complaints" concerning the activities 
of the central government, in the manner described in 
Mr. Edward Thompson's classic study of colonial society; "A 
Farewell to India".24 Local government, if it is to be 
anything at all, must be responsible government. Those who 
represent the people in the town and district must accept a 
measure of responsibility for the formulation of policy and its 
execution in relation to a given service, and it is the duty of 
electors and the citizens at large to see that they discharge 
their responsibilities properly. As a corollary, they must 
possess a sufficient degree of authority to plan their services 
as they will (within reason), and a sufficiency of money to 
maintain them at a satisfactory level of efficiency. In other 
words, the local government body must possess enough freedom 
and power to give it an independent life of its own."28
Thus, it follows, that the so-called "Native Governments and District 
Administrations" were, even at their zenith, no more than Central 
Government Agents, and very poor agents at that; for they did not, 
especially in the interwar years, have any of the attributes of local 
government bodies referred to in the above extract. Indeed, they did 
not enjoy any executive powers of their own. Their main duties were 
still the maintenance of law and order, the hearing of "purely native 
cases, the assessment and collection of central government taxes and
24. Cf. The Bennett's Commission Report on the Disturbances which 
broke out in certain areas of the Bukedi and Bugishu Districts of 
the Eastern Province of Uganda during the month of January, 1960.
25. Hinden, R., (Ed) Local Government and the Colonies; Report to the
Fabian Bureau, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1948, p.7.
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the interpretation and implementation of Government policies as laid 
down by the Legislative Council.
It was consistently argued that the "Native Authorities" were 
incapable of carrying out any duties or responsibilities without 
detailed Central Government intervention. The arguments advanced 
were many and various. In particular, there was the fear of loss of 
administrative efficiency and the occurrence of malpractices. Many 
officers felt that many a chief still needed constant stimulation and 
controlling; that the "Native Authorities" were insufficiently 
advanced, and that the time was not ripe for the development of "an 
efficient and democratic system of local government". These 
arguments, together with many other short-term considerations, were 
repeatedly and effectively used against any proposals for building up 
local government bodies; and, as might be expected, there were few 
critics of these arguments; and, in consequence, the development of 
true local government institutions was held in check for several 
decades. Indeed, as has been mentioned, it was not until 1955 that 
concerted efforts were made towards functional and meaningful 
devolution of power. Unfortunately, however, the 1955 legislation 
was doomed to failure. It was far ahead of its times, the Central 
Government was not ready to hand over power and the local
t
authorities, having been underprepared, were not ready to receive it; 
and worse, the ordinance was too closely modelled on the English 
pattern of local government, albeit without the prerequisite 
infrastructure. It was like sowing some exotic seeds in the Sahara 
desert in mid-summerI
That this approach might not, under the prevailing circumstances be 
the most suitable, was summarily brushed aside, and its virtues
- 434 -
e x t o l l e d . 26 <rhe reasoning behind this was mainly that "the 
legislation in force is basically English legislation"; that, "it is 
the system we understand"; and that, “You cannot expect us to teach
!
the French system"; even though i t  might be the ideal s o l u t i o n . 2 7  jt 
I has since been conceded, however, that Wallis's assumptions were
erroneous and subsequent events gave support to this belief.28
"In our former overseas possessions the story has been quite 
different. Our patterns were adopted because neither we as 
colonisers nor the colonised themselves had any experience of 
any other form of local government. Indeed, the people on the 
spot, colonial administrators like myself, had precious little 
knowledge even of British local government. We had, after all, 
spent most of our adult life outside England. So it will come 
as no surprise to learn that the record of attempts at local 
government in our former colonies have not always been 
successful."29
There were, of course, no critics and Wallis's proposals were 
accepted by the Government and, incorporated into the District 
Administrations (District Councils) Ordinance, 1955. But, as is now 
well known, this ordinance, though a model instrument, was in actual 
practice, a flop, its antecedents were ominous.30 For example,
26. There's no space here (wrote Wallis), to argue the merits of the 
British, French, American, Irish or other kinds of local 
government. I must content myself with the practical arguments 
that no principles other than British can be imported into Uganda 
by an administration composed of British officials. Wallis's 
Report p.15.
27. Comments by District Commissioners on the Wallis Report, November 
1952.
28. In this connection, the following observations by a District 
Commissioner are illuminating. He wrote:
"I think the basic assumptions of the Report sound: namely that 
local government in Uganda must progress in the English rather 
than the continental pattern, although Wallis's reasoning which 
leads him to this decision is not itself conclusive. I, for 
one, must admit that until I had spoken to him, I was not at 
all sure what constituted the essential difference between the 
two systems." (Comments by D.C.s on the Wallis Report,
November, 1952)•
29. Jacobs, B.L., A short talk on "Local Government in Other Places", 
delivered on 23.11.73, at the Village Hall, Beckley, Sussex.
30. For details see page 207-213 supra.
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having had no previous administrative and political experience, the 
District Councils which adopted it were, for reasons given below, 
soon forced to give up their newly acquired powers and 
responsibilities. As a Secretariat paper poignantly observed, the 
problem was "how to relate the system of Native Administration, which 
had been built up under a hierarchy of Chiefs, to executive local 
councils, and how to relate the purely African local government 
bodies in rural areas to the local authorities in Municipalities and
Townships.31
There were, however, other contributing factors, not least of which 
was the manner and the speed, after several years of neglect and 
deconcenration, with which decentralisation was introduced and 
implemented. It has been suggested, for example, that having done 
"too little or nothing" the Colonial State "went too far too fast" in 
promoting an English type system of local government, regardless of 
the local conditions or the state of political and administrative 
development and experience•22
Moreover, the main factors determining the central-local financial 
relationship, which, it will be recalled, had a built in presumption 
that District Administrations were incapable of running their own 
internal affairs remained the same. The inflexibility of the grant 
system and the lack of adequate and independent sources of local 
revenue, for instance, were largely responsible for the arbitrary 
distribution of services between the centre and the periphery and 
worse still, to an indefensible distinction between "mandatory" and
31. Vide, the Wallis Report p. 11.
32. E/CN. 14/UAP/39. Unesco, Local Authorities and Training for 
National Development - by Prof. B.L. Jacobs, 14.4.1965.
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"permissive" devolved powers. The result was a most unsatisfactory 
state of affairs which, in many cases, gave rise to misunderstanding 
or maladministration which, in turn, in certain districts such as 
Bukedi and Bugishu, culminated in wide spread civil disturbances 
which broke out in early January, 1960.33
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, owing to past Government 
policies, was the Councillors' lack of administrative skills and 
political experience. They had had no training in operating 
democratic institutions, and, not surprisingly, many councils had no 
appreciation of their new responsibilities. Thus the Bennett 
Commission, which enquired into the disturbances in the Eastern 
Province in early January, 1960, reported that:
"Numerous witnesses, many of whom are district councillors, 
have complained to us particularly about the level of taxation 
which their own council has imposed, and, being at a loss to 
explain how the necessary majority was ever obtained to impose 
it....
We are far from saying that there can be no criticism of the 
Council's Conclusions and we do not expect that a member who 
has opposed a measure within the Council Chamber should support 
it outside. But we do criticise most strongly the attitude of 
witnesses and council members who seemingly deny the 
possibility of the Council as a body doing anything which later 
proves unpopular and who at the same time castigate their 
Chiefs and the District Commissioner for implementing or even 
supporting the decisions. The overwhelming impression we have 
gained from this evidence is that Bukedi is not ready for 
representative local government, but we are not saying that the 
attempts to prepare them should be lessened or that the 
existing position should be c h a n g e d " . 3 4
Elsewhere, the Commission categorically states."that neither the 
enfranchised nor the elected have yet any proper appreciation that 
"democracy" does not solve anything by its own inherent q u a l i t i e s " . 3 5
33. See the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in 
the Eastern Province, 1960 - otherwise known as the Bennett 
Commission.
34. The Bennett Commission, para. 109.
35. Ibid. para. 235.
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It is pertinent to recall, however, that until 1958, it was, 
Government policy to keep politics out of "Native Administrations". 
Hitherto, the chiefs, who were the virtual "local authority", were 
mere Civil Servants - they were appointed, paid and dismissed by the 
District Commissioner and were under his control and supervision. 
"Local Government" was no more than a central Government Service and 
was under the closest supervision of "Administrative Officers 
bureaucratically concerned with efficiency and material progress"36 
as opposed to political advancement of the people and, under these 
circumstances, there was no room for local politics. It is against 
this background that the catalogue of failures identified and 
detailed in the Bennett's Commission Report must be considered and 
evaluated. Thus viewed, the findings of the Commission are quite 
intelligible? and the inescapable conclusion is that virtually all 
the mistakes were the direct result of past policies and practices, 
and the authorities' unwillingness to allow the people to learn by 
their mistakes. It was naive, therefore, to expect that raw 
Councillors would grasp the whole gamut of local democracy at one 
swoop. Experience elsewhere suggests that the lesson has to be 
learned the hard way - by trial and error; and obviously over a long 
period of time. Equally, the mistakes committed by others can easily 
be avoided, whilst their successful innovations can be profitably 
emulated•
The moral is, however, that there is no simple magic wand? the art of 
government, be it at the local or national level, can only be 
acquired through practical experience? and the overwhelming evidence 
elsewhere suggest that there•is no better kindergarten than the 
village council.
36. The Bennett Commission, op.cit. para. 235.
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The lack of personnel and financial resources have often been held up 
as bugbears. Some aspects of the latter problem have been noted 
already and, it is widely acknowledged that local government finance 
is, even in the Western democracies, a thorny i s s u e . 37
Local Government will always depend on central government grants; but 
the maxim: he who pays calls the tune need not be blindly followed. 
The central authorities have to "recognise that a reasonable measure 
of financial independence is an essential element in local democracy 
- and that each central control weakens the sense of local 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ”.38 The essential point, therefore, is for the state, 
first to delimit the boundaries of local government and then equip it 
with a buoyant system of local taxation.
As regards the former, viz, the lack of personnel, the prospects are 
somewhat blighter. Indeed, in view of the growing number of 
unemployed college leavers, including some university graduates, the 
"lack of personnel" is no longer a major obstacle to functional and 
democratic decentralisation. The question, therefore, is merely one 
of manpower planning and effective utilisation. In particular, there 
is a strong case for setting .up a single "civil service" embracing 
central and local government departments. This would enable local 
authorities to secure their full complement of professional staff; 
would greatly increase interest in matters of local government; would 
standardise working conditions and remuneration; and would free 
individual officers from "undue local, political pressures and 
oppressive decisions" handed down by their local masters.
37. Vide, The Royal Commission on Local Government in England, 
1966-1969, Vol.1 Ch.XIII; and the Royal Commission on Local 
Government Finance, 1974.
38. Cmnd.4040 (1969) The Redcliffe-Maud Report on Local Government in 
England, para. 532.
- 439 -
Indeed, this arrangement would open up opportunities for the transfer 
of staff between different districts and, in appropriate cases, 
between central and local government departments. It is contended 
that such a move would enable local authorities to recruit and retain 
highly trained and highly experienced officers to serve their local 
communities. The local government structure, too, is in many ways, 
far from satisfactory. The existing local government units are 
either too large or too small. There is, while acknowledging the 
advisability of disturbing as little as possible the existing 
tribally based local government units, a very strong case for the 
rationalisation of the present arrangements. The idea would be to 
create optimum local government units for personal and environmental 
public services. Some sacred cows would, inevitably, have to be 
slaughtered, but local susceptibilities wOuld, as far as possible, be 
honoured. There are, of course, in delimiting these local government 
units, no universally accepted guidelines. There is no doubt, 
however, that different local services require, for their optimum 
effective operation, different local government areas. Ideally, 
personal services, and arguably, representative local government 
demand small and intimate operating units, while environmental 
functions, and the concomitant revenue considerations, require larger 
local authority units. And the problem, in the real world, is to 
reconcile these competing and conflicting aims and objectives. The 
definitive and prerequisite factors - the size of the country, 
population, including its density and sparsity; financial resources, 
tribal and linguistic affinities, and communication facilities - are 
clear enough, however. Thus particular local authority areas would 
be created to suit particular functions, and the size of each would, 
inter alia, be dictated by the number of its inhabitants and 
financial resources? and in turn this would mean a two-tier local
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| government structure, on the British model, consisting of county and
district councils. And to complete this pattern, each local 
authority - the upper and the lower tier - would have its separate 
legal personality, name, budgetary autonomy functions and policy 
making powers. This, it is argued, would most effectively meet the 
aims, needs and aspirations of both local and national leaders thus 
facilitating the development of an efficient unitary and democratic 
state. Indeed, the fact that the country is a cogeries of ethnic 
communities unthinkingly put together by the colonial authorities in 
itself provides much incentive and strong arguments in favour of 
decentralisation: this rich diversity must be positively and 
constructively, rather than negatively utilized, as is often the 
case, for the benefit of all concerned? in other words it must be 
harnessed to promote the goal of political, social and economic 
development. The idea is to turn the country's so called negative 
attributes - the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious
differences and, indeed, the nascience of the masses, to good use.
The current deficient infrastructure, potholed roads, inadequate 
transportation facilities, likewise, support the case for semi- 
autonomous local government bodies. For, "as a general rule, the 
worse the communications in a given area the greater the need for 
decentralisation through devolution"•3$ Thus the country's penury 
far from being inimical to decentralisation is, in fact, concordant 
and conducive to such a policy. It is imperative that these
negatives should be turned into plusses? they are the bricks and
mortar for nation building. Moreover, their existence, recognition 
and proposed utilisation is not a matter of theory or doctrine, but
39. Wraith, R., Local Administration in West Africa, Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1972.
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reality; and any scheme of government which eschews them is, as the 
experience of the last twenty-three years vividly and graphically 
illustrates, doomed to failure. The abject lessons of 
post-independence centralisation need not be rehearsed here, they are 
too evident. Suffice it to say that the case for parternalistic 
deconcentration can no longer be taken for granted, partly because it 
has miserably failed to deliver the promised millennium, and partly 
because, the case for devolution is, of course, overwhelming.
b
Firstly, decentralisation is more likely to enhance consent for 
political decisions, to alleviate discontent with central government, 
and more importantly, to promote rather than threaten national 
unity, secondly, meaningful devolution would give rise to a more 
responsive, representative and efficient system of government, both 
at the centre and the periphery. Thirdly, the importance of local 
government - the kind advocated here - is that it can prevent the 
powerful central bureaucratic machine from running amok, and in so 
doing stall the egocentric and sectarian interests of those in 
positions of authority and influence at the centre. In sum, 
devolution of power is the locomotive of good government and 
administration: it provides the necessary "checks and balances". It
is an instrument of change, the nursery of participatory democracy 
and the cornerstone of nation building.
kk2
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